WINNIE MANDELA’S BANNING ORDER, 
THE TERRITORIALITY OF POWER AND 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE

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ABSTRACT
‘Political violence’ is a weak concept with a weak empirical basis. Counting acts of violence as ‘political’ are ultimately done on a subjective basis. By leaving out 80-90% of all violence in society (counted by murders) it is not able to capture the real power relations in society. A less subjective and more comprehensive concept of violence would be preferable. In this paper I outline such a concept in three steps. First I consider the difference between violence and power; and secondly I explore Winnie Mandela’s banning order for clues to the territoriality of power. It reveals four territorial units: state, ethnic group, town and house. I argue that across the borders of exactly these four territorial units are all power relations of any nation-state articulated. Finally I return from power to violence in order to sketch a comprehensive way of coding of data on violence based on the four territorial units.

1. PROBLEMS WITH ‘POLITICAL VIOLENCE’
The political violence in South Africa during the last twenty years has attracted wide attention for obvious and tragic reasons. More than 15,000 persons lost their lives in this ‘unofficial war’ (Kentridge 1990), and for many years South Africa figured in the SIPRI year-books as a civil war-location among the world’s wars. I am currently engaged in a research-project at Centre for Cultural Research, Århus University, Denmark, trying to outline a theory of civil war as such, and taking as my case South Africa in the period 1976-1996. In this paper however, I will limit myself to a exploration of some basic problems arising from the concept of ‘political violence’ and its use. The general discussion of civil war may be taken up at some later stage.

The practical reality underlying all academic work on political violence is that the classification of violence as ‘political’ is done at the discretion of the individual police officer reporting an ‘unrest-related’ crime (or of the journalist-monitor) and
then any errors or uncertainties are multiplied by researchers further down-stream. An example of the magnitude of empirical uncertainty is a bit of information I got from Ellen Potter, chief librarian of the South African Institute of Race Relations, and the person that for more than ten years has been responsible for producing the information on political violence in the Annual Surveys, by common consent regarded as the most reliable source. She told me, as she also states in the Surveys, that her figures are an average of the minimum and maximum number of deaths that can be attributed to political violence. Minimum figures would include only killings with declared political intent, or done by persons of well-known political allegiance etc.; while she would include in the maximum figure killings connected with warlords, taxi-wars, cattle-rustlings etc. This is all perfectly sensible, but I am afraid that the average started to lose meaning when she told me that the difference between minimum and maximum in the fresh figures for Jan. 1996 is min. 2 and max. 75, and for Feb. 1996 min. 14 and max. 80. She added that during the years she had been involved in this work it had become increasingly difficult to distinguish political violence from other kinds of violence. The police no longer uses the category ‘unrest-related’, presumably because in the new South Africa there is no such thing, except, of course, in KZN - where the lists of ‘unrest-related incidents’ still is drawn up at the discretion of the individual police officer. There was and is no written guidelines in the SAPS as how to do this. It is done by ‘feeling’, according to Chris de Koch, SAPS Director of Crime Information Management Centre, Pretoria. This is clearly unsatisfactory because it makes all figures potentially ambiguous (and wide open to politically motivated ‘adjustments’). But can it be otherwise?

The very notion of ‘political violence’ implies the possibility to accord a kind of logic to some violent acts and not to others. By common-sense there are acts of violence with a clear political purpose and others that are private. But evidently a lot of violence falls into a grey area, fx. warlordism and gangsterism. The struggle for political power on a national scale is structured according to a particular logic. It does not by any means exclude violence, but makes the use of violence ‘rational’. But the life-world of individual humans may be structured differently and thus change the rationale of violence. If politics is a struggle over resources in the broad sense, then it is becoming difficult to draw a line between politics and

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1 Personal communication 3-27-1996.
2 David Chidester (1991) uses the expression ‘worldview’ about this clash of rationales: “an open set of discursive, practical, and social strategies for negotiation person and place in a world” p 4 in his deeply fascinating book.
gangsterism, taxi-violence, cattle-rustling, warlordism etc. Even when we know the individual perpetrator’s personal motive for an act, and he himself (it is almost always a he) may declare it ‘political’, a host of other motives may be mixed up and make it a meaningless classification (this will be a difficult problem facing the Truth Commission\(^3\)).

Two approaches to the problem of studying political violence stand out. A number of recent treatments of political violence \(^4\) stress there are forms of extreme violence out there, like neck lacing, difficult to comprehend within the standard notion of politics as a vehicle of modernity (du Toit’s master narrative of democratic inclusion) but nevertheless ‘political’ in the sense they impinge on the collective historical practice. They agree there are important discursive reasons for extending the notion of ‘political violence’ to include an unknown quantum of violence. But this does not bring us closer to a better empirical basis for explaining the scale of violence. Johann Graaff sums it up precisely, “The problem is to explain how discourse theory might talk about a quantum leap in the consequences of the discourse, i.e. the body count?”(Graaff, 1995:5) The other approach has been to improve the gathering of data\(^5\), which is absolutely important, by narrowing the notion of political violence to violence somehow conforming with the coding rules. The data will remain on shaky ground, and ultimately with the right coding they can be made to support any historical interpretation. So again: what can the body count tell us? What historical processes are we actually explaining with these figures?

In this paper I shall argue that a possible way out of this deadlock is to reconsider the difference between violence and power and to explore the territoriality of power. I will then return to violence in order to consider some ideas on how to produce a new data-base.

2. FOUCAULT

\(^3\) As far as I am aware the TRC has not produced a full explanation of what constitute political violence. They subscribe to the fundamental legal definition formulated in the “Norgaard principles”, see Boraine (1995) pp156; the law itself only says “offences associated with political objectives committed in the course of the conflicts of the past,” Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995, my emphasis.


\(^5\) Both in the all-important gathering of broad historical evidence (fx. Lodge, 1991), and the improved targeting of monitoring, coding, computation etc.; see Bekker (1992) pp 72 for a good discussion of the methodological problems with the data-gathering, but which do not go beyond the official categories of ‘unrest-related incidents’
“The carceral city, with its imaginary ‘geo-politics’, is governed by quite different principles [than the country of tortures and the city of punishments]... some of the more important ones [are]: that at the centre of this city, and as if to hold it in place, there is, not the “centre of power”, but a multiple network of diverse elements - walls, space, institution, rules, discourse; that the model of the carceral city is not, therefore, the body of the king, with the powers that emanate from it, nor the contractual meeting of wills from which a body that was both individual and collective was born, but a strategic distribution of elements of different natures and levels.... That in the central position that it [the prison] occupies, it is not alone, but linked to a whole series of “carceral” mechanisms which seem distinct enough - since they are intended to alleviate pain, to cure, to comfort - but which all tend, like the prison, to exercise a power of normalization...And that ultimately what presides over all these mechanisms is not the unitary functioning of an apparatus or an institution, but the necessity of combat and the rules of strategy. That, consequently, the notions of institutions of repression, rejection, exclusion, marginalization, are not adequate to describe, at the very centre of the carceral city, the formation of insidious leniencies, unavowable petty cruelties, small acts of cunning, calculated methods, techniques, ‘sciences’ that permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual. In this central and centralized humanity, the effect and instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple mechanisms of ‘incarceration’, objects for discourses that are in themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of battle.”

Thus he ends “Discipline and Punish” (1977:307-8). Many observers of South Africa have noticed how the extreme spatiality of apartheid social engineering lend itself to a Foucauldian reading. (Among others Robinson 1990 and 1992; Thornton 1994; Coetzee 1995). Indeed apartheid is the carceral city writ large. But we must try and unpack Foucault’s ‘normalising power’. What agencies of power can manifest themselves as spatial borders? Below I will sketch a simple model for studying the power relations of a nation-state (in casu South Africa) in their territorial dimension. But in order fully to understand the spatial dimension of power and the limits to this approach, especially when we want to understand political violence, I think another voice in the discussion of violence and power demands to be heard, that of Hannah Arendt’s.

3. HANNAH ARENDT DISAGREEING WITH FOUCALUT?

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6 Thornton (1994) is evocative, but far to unsystematized to focus on the specific relation between spatial boundaries and power.
“Behind the apparent confusion [of the precise meaning of power and violence] is a firm conviction in whose light all distinctions would be, at best, of minor importance: the conviction that the most crucial political issue is, and has always been, the question of Who rules Whom? Power, strength, force, authority, violence - these are but words to indicate the means by which man rules over man; they are held to be synonyms because they have the same function. It is only after one ceases to reduce public affairs to the business of dominion that the original data in the realm of human affairs will appear, or, rather, reappear, in their authentic diversity” (Arendt 1970:43) and she continues, ”To sum up: politically speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and violence is not the same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance... By this, I do not mean to equate violence with evil; I only want to stress that violence cannot be derived from its opposite, which is power...“(p56). With Hannah Arendt’s important distinction between power and violence, we can see that political violence cannot be a continuation of power in Foucault’s sense, but rather it’s opposite. Hannah Arendt would not agree that power is “a multiform production of relations of domination”(Foucault 1980:143), stressing that power springs from “the human ability to act in concert”(Arendt 1970:44). Violence including political violence is a sign of loss of power. Throughout her book she stresses that people can act in concert and constitute a republic, and thus has a responsibility to do so.

She evokes the Athenian polis and the Roman civitas and the eighteenth century revolutionaries that “had in mind a concept of power and law whose essence did not rely on the command-obedience relationship ..[but].. constituted a form of government, a republic, where the rule of law, resting on the power of the people, would put an end to the rule of man over man, which they thought was ‘a government fit for slaves.’”(Arendt 1970:40). Foucault’s understanding of the genesis and reproduction of the group as a group acting in concert is very different from Arendt’s, and he writes, “One might thus contrast two major systems of approach to the analysis of power: in the first place, there is the old system found in the philosophes of the eighteenth century. The concept of power as an original right that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty, and the contract, as the matrix of political power, provide its point of articulation... In contrast, the other system of approach no longer tries to analyse political power according to the schema of contract-oppression, but in accordance with that of war-repression... On this view, repression is none other than the realisation, within
the continual warfare of this pseudo-peace, of a perpetual relationship of force... the pertinent opposition is not between the legitimate and illegitimate, as in the first schema, but between struggle and submission.” (Foucault 1980:91,92). But is this an instrumental view of power, is it is domination to achieve an end? There is no will behind this power. I think it is very much “the essence of all government” as Arendt says.

At the end of the day, the real difference between Arendt and Foucault lie in the trust they put in human agency to deal with power, in the inherent sovereignty of man. Arendt speaks of an acting humanity, it “constitute a government; support the laws; give their consent; have an opinion; assume responsibility” (Arendt 1970:40,49) About as far as Foucault goes in considering agency is the following remark, “There are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised.” (Foucault 1980:143), and unfortunately he does not elaborate on this. The roar of battle is heard only in the very last sentence of “Surveiller et punir”. It seems to be very hard indeed to break out of the carceral city.

4. POWER AND SPACE
Any effort at explaining political violence must address the level of human individuals and cope with the problem of structure and agency: whether people are ‘forced’ to kill their neighbours or ‘choose’ to do so. It is necessary to combine Foucault’s important insight into the territoriality of power with Arendt’s categorical separation of power and violence. In an academic tradition neighbouring political science we find examples of treatment of power that are both structurally aware and sensitive to human agency. In her wonderful book ‘Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance’, Jean Comaroff singles out the “problem of power in the motivation of historical practice itself - power material and symbolic, both concentrated and dispersed in the various domains of social action” (Comaroff 1985:13). Through her careful exposition of the Tshidi and their resistance to the South African state, she is able to overcome the barren dichotomy of structure and agency. When Foucault claims that “endeavouring to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power”(Foucault 1980:69), Comaroff takes this a step further: “Bourdieu has argued that the symbolically ordered environment, particularly “inhabited space” such as the house, objectifies the classifications and organizing principles underpinning the wider sociocultural system....It is in these
terms that the material and spatiotemperal forms of the Tswana house must be viewed; not merely as things themselves, but as elemental signs with hidden meanings, mediating between the sociocultural system and the experiencing subjects that live within it’ (Comaroff 1985:54).

Now, the modern South African reality cannot be understood as a single cosmos, as a single symbolic space. It is structured as several superimposed grids that all have their distinct spatial realities. I will argue that we can discern a four-layered grid of power relations in any nation-state. The units in each of the four grids are: (i) states with a nation; (ii) nations without a state; (iii) towns; (iv) household space. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the spaces we are talking about all are practical and symbolic realities ordering and bordering human bodies - just like the Tswana house did. Each grid is defined by a specific relation between territory and the essential markers of the human body. The relation between nation-state space and human body is pragmatic: practically everybody living on the state-territory are part of the nation; it is an inclusive relation, nation follows state. The nations without states can range from small groups to religious and ethnic communities. The relation between ‘ethnic’ space (I use this as a catch-all term) and human body is essential: whatever references are used to index bodies - race, creed, language, descent, purpose - only the pure, the clean bodies has the inherent right to live on the soil; it is an exclusive relation, state follows nation. The relation between urban-capitalist space and human body is virtual: there is no state and no nation, but only the infinite exchangeable relations of producers and consumers of commodities. The relation finally between household space and human body is organic: revealed by birth and defined by society as sex, age, and race. The grids are superimposed on each other and interact both on the level of historical events and long wave structure. The point is that they have different historical roots and trajectories and cannot be reduced to one overriding logic like ‘modernity’; quite distinct historical forces are at work, with different origins, different modes of interpellating the individual and very different promises for the future.

5. COERCIVE AND COMMUNICATIVE POWER

Foucault does not talk of power alone, but always in conjunction with knowledge. There is military-coercive power, but also communicative-ideological power (and economic-reproductive power). Comaroff’s uses the word ‘symbolic space’ to stress that they must coexist in the tangible world. When Slavoj Zizek, the brilliant Slovene film-buff and Lacan and Hegel theorist, writes, “Implicitly at least, symbolic violence is conceived of as a kind of “extension of real violence by
other means”. This famous Clausewitz’s proposition to which we have just alluded (war - physical violence - as the extension of politics - an eminently symbolic activity if there was one - by other means)... paradoxically as it may sound, the order of the terms has to be inverted, i.e. one has to conceive “real” violence as secondary, as a species of symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is no substitute or prolonging of the real one: it is rather real violence itself which erupts when a certain impasse arise in the midst of the symbolic order - the place of real violence is always-already marked out in the symbolic order... the problem is that the subject is never “empty”, confronted with “pure” external violence, but always -already situated within a fantasmatic space which frames his space of meaning and which is disturbed by the outbreak of violence,” (Zizek 1995:13,14) it is true, but only, and this is very important, from the point of view of the individual. From the point of view of the interpellated human body only, not from the point if view of the interpellating state. So when Hannah Arendt says “Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may follow.” (Arendt 1970:52), we can see that her notion of an ‘initial getting together’ is very problematic. I think a very simple model can illustrate this.

Coercive power flows from the state and manifests itself in territorial boundaries. Communicative power rests on legitimate boundaries and produces justification of state violence, it is a circle, a never-ending historical process turning over and over. For the individual the circle starts in the second movement, from the position of interpellated object in the always-already marked out symbolic space. But for the state it is opposite. For the state the circle starts with the first movement, from the position of interpelling subject positioned as it is, in the ever on-going war with other states, that is the never-ever marked out space of real violence. This was Clausewitz’s perspective, and therefore he was perfectly right to put symbolic violence after real violence.

Arendt is thinking only of the second movement, of an initial ‘big-bang revolution’, but I doubt there ever was a primordial revolution. All revolutions, all new spaces of meaning have limits, borders, rubbing against other older spaces of meaning. And remember, the house and the state are not just symbolic spaces, but always space both in the symbolic and the territorial sense. Both 1776 and 1789, the two great eighteenth century revolutions, took place within boundaries created by previous colonial or absolutist violence (and the revolutionaries themselves used violence to extend the boundaries). The Russian revolution may
have intended to become a world revolution, but it too succumbed to borders set down by previous violence. The first movement in the circle is silent, coercive power bounding the community, the second is talking, communicative power imagining the community. It may be easier to record talk than silence, and that may explain why so much more has been written on the second movement than on the first (on discursive communities, on nationalism etc.). In this paper I will be exploring the silent, coercive movement and not touch upon the talking, communicative movement due to constraints of space. Although this, of course, by the nature of things, is a skewed presentation.

6. BANNING
On Dec. 23, 1976 Winnie Mandela was banned to Orlando for five years. She would ignore as best she could the stipulations in the banning order and later be banned to Brandfort in the Orange Free State. All this is well known and not my concern here. Rather I want to explore the text of the banning order for clues to the territoriality of power, how the text represents the four borders mentioned above. Winnie Mandela’s banning order is a short text of some three pages signed by James Thomas Kruger then Minister of Justice in Cape Town. Within these few pages he is laying out the whole workings of apartheid, in the peculiar legalistic style where the utter arbitrariness of apartheid practice is cloaked as law. The banning order sets out to restrict Winnie Mandela in a territorial field as well as in a communicative space. In the creaking voice speaking the words of the law, J.T. Kruger first of all states that he is ‘satisfied’ that Winnie Mandela will endanger the maintenance of public order, and he therefore must ban her.

The idea of legal banning (and not violent abductions or house arrest) necessitates that the whole country is cut up into territorial-legal bits coloured by essentialist notions, which completely contradicts the legal equality of nation-state territory. A fairly standard nation-state like Denmark does indeed have functional-territorial distinctions, fx. military areas, or administrative divisions, but not any essentialist ones, like saying fx. that some areas should be reserved/prohibited for our own colonialised population, the *inuits*, because of their “race” (although some laws come pretty close, fx. the “place-of-birth-criteria” used to pay expat Danes in Greenland substantially higher wages than the local *inuit* population for the same work). I would claim that the spatial grids of South Africa can give us a key to understand the relations of power and thence political violence. The state made use of all its military and coercive power to enforce its spatial divisions. These borders were very real contested fronts, and at the same time symbolic representations of the apartheid cosmology.
7. THE STATE BORDER
“To: Nomzamo Winnie Mandela, (IN 3981073) 8115 Orlando, Johannesburg.
Notice in terms of Section (9)1 of the Internal Security Act, 1950 (Act 44 of 1950).” thus starts the banning order and it goes on, “Whereas I, James Thomas Kruger, Minister of Justice, am satisfied that you engage in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the maintenance of public order, I hereby, in terms of section 9(I) of the Internal Security Act, 1950 [that says 'whenever in the opinion of the Minister there is reason to believe that the achievement of any of the objects of communism would be furthered'], prohibit you for a period commencing on the date on which this notice is delivered or tendered to you and expiring on 31 December 1981, from attending within the Republic of South Africa or the territory of South-West Africa - .” The first territorial definition Mr. Kruger uses is thus “the Republic of South Africa and the territory of South-West Africa”. It is easy to find the boundary on a map, and it is not difficult to understand this line as the spatial representation of power relations between states\(^7\). Our daily newspaper experience seems to corroborate that the paradigmatic Weberian nation-state is wielding supreme power on the national territory only, and among states, as Clausewitz said, a perpetual state of war, either potential or explosive, exists. The first and fundamental spatial front therefore is the state boundary, separating internal sovereignty from external anarchy\(^8\). The borders are at any given time a hard reality defining the lives of people, but across time they have been extraordinarily fluid. South Africa has had a fascinating procession of international borders\(^9\). This vast historical store of South African international borders cast their shadows on today’s politics because any border and its discourse can be retrieved and put to use in new historical and political environments. The borders did not just change location over time, they also changed structurally in the way power was articulated across them. The nation-state border articulates power in absolute terms: either full or no sovereignty. In world history the nation-state is the exception and different kinds of gradual sovereignty across a wide frontier has been the norm. A state comprising territories with different status is contravening the basic notion of a nation-state: a territory with full and un-divided sovereignty.

\(^7\) Johann A. Dannhauser (1997); has very nice maps and extremely detailed explanations of every kilometre of South Africa’s international border.


\(^9\) Kalley (1987), for an introduction to all the treaties defining the South African borders since the British came.
In his very naming of South Africa Kruger betrays the ambiguous status of South Africa. When the words “territory of South-West Africa” is annexed to the name “South Africa”, it is, of course, mirroring annexation on the ground. The realities of international power relations made it impossible to incorporate Namibia, but the territory was adding strategic depth to South African defence on the western border. The DMZ on the eastern border during the 80’s was a rather shallow frontier and symbolic strength was added with an electrical fence. A further element in the frontier set-up was the Rand-area covering Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia which gave South Africa some extra leverage outside the national border. Finally the frontier was burned deep into the front-line states by overt and covert military means with a terrible toll of lives. In fact, it can be argued when counting the victims of apartheid violence in South Africa 1976-94, one would do injustice if not counting the much, much higher casualties in Angola and Mozambique.

In her article “The military and the making of modern South Africa” Annette Seegers points to the inside half of the frontier, “[with] the Bantu Promotion of Self-Government Act of 1959... Racial Utopia created a process of state fragmentation; creating more and more entities out of one.”(Seegers 1994:12). When the apartheid politicians ranked the ethnic-racial border over the state-national border they contradicted the logic of a nation-state. They stretched the frontier-zone of ambiguous power on both sides of the international border and made carrying the war across the border seem logical. But this priority got the apartheid-state more and more out of step with the world of nation-states and ultimately into an impossible confrontation with the international community, promising only increasing exclusion and poverty. Neither ‘frontier South Africa’ nor ‘inner South Africa’ functioned as a proper nation-state. What kind of state then was South Africa before 1994, an empire, a nation-state or something third? Annette Seegers terms South Africa an empire, but in a rather off-hand way, “If neighbours fought among themselves, the Empire (Roman, American, British, Rhodesian or South African) would be safe.”(Seegers 1994:23) In order to explain why South Africa embarked on external war and how this war had direct links with the internal stasis, I think the categorical difference between empire and nation-state may help. But whatever kind of state South Africa as a whole was, on the republican territory it had sovereign power and could interpellate the rest of society, i.e. dictate the multiple sub-state borders - except, of course, in areas and times of civil war.
8. THE ETHNIC BORDER
The banning order continues: “(I) any gathering contemplated in paragraph (a) of the said section 9(I); or any gathering contemplated in paragraph (b) of the said section 9(I), of the nature, class or kind set out below; (A) Any social gathering, that is to say, any gathering at which the persons present also have social intercourse with one another; (2) being within - (a) any Bantu area, that is to say, (i) any Scheduled Bantu Area as defined in the Bantu Land Act, 1913 (Act 27 of 1913); (ii) any land of which the South African Bantu Trust referred to in section 4 of the Bantu Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act 18 of 1936), is the registered owner or any land held in trust for a Bantu Tribal Community in terms of the said Bantu Trust and Land Act 1936;“ The second territorial unit to appear in the order is “Bantu area”. With some trouble we can find the borders on a very detailed map. In practice the territorial definition meant an inventory of spaces, written up as a ‘schedule of native land’ and I quote at random from the ‘Native Land Act’ of 1913, (p448) : “East London District: Newlands Location; St. Luke’s Mission; Portions of farms 12S. and11S. falling in this district and forming part of the Moiplaats Location; Kwelea Location, comprising Farms 2W, ... ...”. Every locality added sectors to the long, meandering front of power relations between ‘Europeans’ and ‘Natives’, which the law defined thus: “‘Native’ shall mean any person, male or female, who is a member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa” (p446). With this classification of a postulated essential racial and tribal difference between the ‘Native’ and the ‘European’ human body, the state begun forcing territorial realities to conform with the racial vision. Ruthlessly the legislators set out to join an essential definition of the human body with territorial space.

The Whites created the ethnic border to clean ‘their’ land, or put differently, the ethnic border symbolised the relation of power between coloniser and colonised, and therefore the law (knowledge) divides people after their ‘essence’. To the African societies it was a wholly foreign idea that they constituted the ‘aboriginal race and tribe of Africa’ but they would learn quickly as it happens in all cases of ethnic othering. Ironically at the time of the law (1913) the ‘European race’ used the expression ‘the race-question’ about their own antagonism (but presumably not when the Africans were listening). Later, in the 1960’s, in the endless

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10 As an example, consult Christopher (1994:78) for a map showing a 30 km long strip of Mfengu Reserves, Tsitsikamma, with intricate spatial re-arrangements to comply with race.
11 “Far more feared than a Native Uprising was an Republican Uprising, a third Anglo-Boer War.” (Seegers 1994:3).
mirroring of images of the other across the ethnic border, the Whites would stand united against the Blacks.

Anything can provide ‘essence’: race, clan, gang and elaborate constructions like religion. Paradoxically ‘big’ popular nationalism that makes a people go to war as opposed to ‘small’ elitist nationalism, follows the state and not the essentialist nation. South Africa’s involvement in two World Wars demonstrated that ‘European race’ did not translate easily into state-national loyalty. Accordingly there can be several ethnic borders in one state articulating the particular power relations of different ‘nations without a state’ all postulating their own pure relation of land and ethnicity. I would argue that purity of the land is impossible in principle, it is never to be achieved because the people regarded as alien and impure is always there already, even inside the individuals. In reality, the notion of purity and essence is an expression of struggle, it is a powerful, evocative name given to contesting a border, to power. The state border can be made subservient to ethnic essence by a dominant political group, but they will face the problems apartheid South Africa or other ethno-states like Israel or Armenia have experienced, precisely that an ethno-state is facing a liability in its struggle with nation-states, and that its internal quest for purity is illusive and self-destructive.

I will even argue that no ethnic group has ever produced durable new borders. Israel might seem to be the only example of durable if highly contested ethnic borders, but they rely on outside support; the original 1947 borders were colonial borders, drawn up and guaranteed by outside imperial forces, and the current peace process can be seen as an effort to substitute essentialist ethnic borders with pragmatic state borders Israel itself can sustain. All other ethnically motivated border-contests, to my knowledge, settle along older, state-created provincial, departmental, etc. borders. Ethnic warriors establish borders by gutting every trace of impure culture and ‘purifying’ their land in cataclysmic self-destruction, as we see in Bosnia or Rwanda. The state can create ethnic sub-borders, a careful pragmatic sham because ethnic essence is always too mixed, like in KwaZulu Natal or the Soviet Union. Look at the maps for the Caucasus or Central Asia with their tortured borders full of territorial pockets belonging to neighbouring states, like Nagorny Karabakh and Azeri Nakhitevan inside Armenia. RSA’s ‘international’ treaties with the ‘independent’ homelands on borders, movements of persons and bridges were not concluded with the ministry of foreign affairs in Pretoria, but with the ministry of home affairs; the ethnic border was not a state border.
The duplication of an racial (‘aboriginal race’) and an ethnic (‘tribe of Africa’) definition of ‘Natives’ in the 1913 Act, and kept in all subsequent South African racial legislation, reflects a fundamental ambiguity in the official view of the relationship between Black and White. The racial distinction between ‘Europeans’ and ‘Non-Europeans’ (or “Natives” or “Bantu” or “Black”) made the Black population wholly auxiliary to the White society, whereas the ethnic apartheid idea proposed separate national development. “Regardless of its imperfections, paternalism and White Supremacy had been a social contract. Racial Utopia was nothing of the sort; it effectively denationalized black people...This was fighting talk.”(Seegers 1994:12). If one can doubt the validity of the social contract (did not Mandela say to the Eminent Persons Group, that only free men can enter into contract?), the point Seegers raises on the difference between racism and ethnicity is very important, because in simple terms racial othering creates rejected individuals whereas ethnic othering creates an opposed ethnic society. Ethnic othering thus creates a potential dangerous opponent while the rejected racial other is alone with his or her rejection. But that is also why Black Consciousness is, I think, so fundamentally important to a future common non-racial society. Racism rest with the individual, and it is in the power of the individual to challenge it as Fanon said at the dawn of African independence.

9. THE TOWN BORDER
Let us once again return to the banning order. It continues: “ - any location, Bantu hostel or Bantu village defined and set apart under the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945 (Act 25 of 1945); (iv) any area approved for the residence of Bantu in terms of section 9(2)(h) of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945 (Act 25 of 1945); (v) any Bantu Township established under the Regulations for the Administration and Control of Townships in Bantu Areas, promulgated in Proclamation R293 of 16 November 1962. - except Orlando; (B) any Bantu compound; (C) any area set apart under any law for the occupation of Coloured and Asiatic persons; (D) the premises of any factory as defined in the Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act, 1941(Act 22 of 1941);” So Winnie Mandela was to be banned to Orlando within the third spatial unit referred to: the Urban area. We would now need an extremely detailed map to see the border; fx. the map showing a bit of downtown Port Elizabeth in Christopher (1994:117). Under the urban heading the banning order mentions location, hostel, village, Bantu, Coloured, Asiatic urban area, township, compound, and factory. Still all these localities do not define the urban area as such opposed to rural areas, but follow the ethnic divisions of the national
area. The point is however, that there is such a thing as an urban area prefiguring the ethnic division. There is a historical dynamic at work producing spatial divisions completely different from both the ethnic and state-borders. What the quote tells us, is that apartheid had to accommodate the urban dynamic, and the way in which apartheid tried to come to grips with this distinct dynamic. But still we have not really captured the urban-rural border. This border is not based on citizenship or ethnic or racial grouping, it is not due either to age, gender or religion, but on a dynamic where the spatiality of towns and capitalism intersect.

Fernand Braudel points out that “the town-country confrontation is the first and longest class struggle the world has known” (1973:373). In his magisterial exploration of the global history, including the history of towns, Braudel traces the fighting relationship of town and state. “The state usually won and the town then remained subject under a heavy yoke. The miracle of the first great urban centuries in Europe was that the town won entirely, at least in Italy, Flandres and Germany... This was a colossal event. Its genesis cannot be pinpointed with certainty, but its enormous consequences are visible.” (1973:398) Braudel points out that here for the very first time in world civilisation “a new state of mind was established, broadly that of an early, still faltering Western capitalism - a collection of rules, possibilities, calculations, the art of both getting rich and of living... Capitalism and towns were basically the same thing in the West.” (1973:400). The state would subsequently conquer the closed medieval town, but at the same time the state was heir to its institutions and way of thinking, and completely unable to without them. Braudel defines three forms of towns in world history up to year 1800: open towns, the towns of ancient Greece and Rome; the town closed in on themselves, the medieval cities, and finally the subject towns in the early modern period.

But, in my opinion, Braudel’s equation of the European town with capitalism is not the whole story. Basically capitalism is a stream, a flow, a circulation between production and consumption ordered by capital accumulation in a highly distinct fashion - as Braudel certainly portrays it on his vast and fascinating canvas\textsuperscript{12}. To cut a very long story short two different geographies developed. Money led to the development of national territorial \textit{spaces} in Europe with the first royal and urban mints in the 13th century leading up to the formation of nation-states in the

\textsuperscript{12} See also vols. 2 and 3 of Capitalism and Material Life.
17th century. But capital is very different from money\textsuperscript{13}, it developed transnational branches of production defined materially by their products, like cars, music or plastics. The birth of capitalism was the transnational Dutch and English shipping industry in the 17th. century\textsuperscript{14}. Capitalism is a web linking towns globally. All the flows of people, commodities, and information are parts of capitalism. The global urban network fuelled by capital accumulation is the true realm of ‘modular man’ (Gellner,1995) as neither proletarians nor yuppies have a fatherland, and maybe not the nations Gellner thinks. The town is the interface between these two geographies; one can say that towns are the high density areas of capitalism. That is why class struggle has been such a prominent feature of urban life. Class difference like ethnic divisions subdivides the town - and the countryside - but they do not cause the urban-rural divide. Towns predate capitalism by several thousand years.

The Tshidi-towns Comaroff describes (1985:23-24) with up to 30,000 inhabitants, and thus much larger than most ancient and medieval European towns, would fall in the classical open-town category, and be without a link to the modern towns - and indeed the towns of Western Transvaal have settler origins; the modern urban-rural spatial division in South Africa is a local implant of the global development of capitalism. The actual urban border then is a composite of two divisions: the urban-rural and the one between those engaged in global capitalism and those marginalized. Historically since the birth of capitalism in the West the rural areas slowly disappeared and became outlying towns with industrialised agriculture. Today marginalisation is becoming more important than the urban-rural divide globally, and many rural areas outside the West are becoming overpopulated wastelands, with no input whatsoever to capitalism. The absolute end of rural Africa is the enormous, sprawling refugee camps, sustained by powerful NGO’s\textsuperscript{15}. In South Africa both processes are on-going, there are still truly rural areas, but the critical sector of the border is now the squatter camps, the informal settlements, the ‘frontier’ of the town\textsuperscript{16}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}[noitemsep]
\item\textsuperscript{13} Karl Marx uses the whole of ‘Das Kapital’ to reconstruct the difference between money and capital, by explaining surplus value. See in particular chapters 1-4 in Vol. 1 and 1-10 in Vol. 3.
\item\textsuperscript{14} I have argued extensively for this in my “History of the State” (Tin 1976-7-9).
\item\textsuperscript{15} I give an account of such a bleak refugee camp at the Ethiopian-Kenyan border in my travel novel “Fra Cape til Cairo” (Tin, 1994:146-162). For the long overdue discussion of the role of NGO’s in African emergencies see Macrea (1994).
\item\textsuperscript{16} A wide searching, very well informed and ultimately optimistic book on the informal economy of the third world mega-cities is Latouche (1993).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The town-frontier cannot be defined here, but it is loosely any non-rural township. A study from Urban Problems Research Unit at UCT among the Black population in Cape Town undertaken in 1995, found that the households were highly diverse, and did not fit with the town-planners and other policy makers presumptions of stable, standard households. Household-size ranged from 1 to 11 persons and only 39% were nuclear. People were highly mobile between town and rural smallholdings. People had low and unpredictable incomes, 36% did not earn enough always to buy food; they were spatially divided from areas of economic activity. Another survey from Durban of 1800 shackland households found that 66% sent money home regularly to the up-keep of rural homesteads. Apartheid took on the dynamic of towns and lost. In the process they destroyed millions and millions of Black people’s lives. The apartheid people wanted to make white cities (and a white republic). But it was impossible. What we see in the banning order is a ruthless and desperate effort to approximate the goal; to have the cake and eat it too: have a white town and still exploit Black people. The rural-urban border became one of the most contested borders with millions of Blacks charged by the police of offending the urban laws.

10. THE HOUSE BORDER
I skip the next bit of the banning order, where Winnie Mandela is restricted in the communicative space of South Africa, and turn to the concluding part of the order: “(5) receiving at the said residential premises any visitor other than - (a) a medical practitioner for medical attendance of you or members of your household, if the name of such medical practitioner does not appear on any list in the custody of the officer referred to in section 8 of the Internal Security Act, 1950 and no prohibition under the Internal Security Act, 1950, or the Riotous Assemblies Act, 1956, is in force in respect of such medical practitioner; (b) your children Zenani and Zindziswa. Given under my hand at Cape Town this 23rd day of December, 1976, J.T. Kruger, Minister of Justice.” Finally the fourth territorial unit introduced is the residential premise, the household space. We are able to find this border on any property-surveyor’s map. Christopher supplies the layout of a 1960’s middle-class house from a Port Elizabeth suburb (Christopher 1994:142). On this plan we see how the power relations of paternalistic apartheid were symbolised in the functional positioning of human bodies.

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17 Information from Peter Wilkinson and Vanessa Watson at the ‘Housing Needs and Cultural Diversity’, seminar at UCT, Feb. 27 1996.
The detached servants quarter behind the garage is 10m² and the main house is some 115 m² placed with the public side facing the road and a private, back side, facing a garden. Echoing incidentally quite accurately the spatial ratio between republic and homelands, the house reproduces the historical power-relation between white and black. The kitchen is the interface between the two racial worlds, and the only room in the whole house with a double entrance, one facing a transformative space, a passage, and the other opening leading to the back side, next to the dirty space of WC and bathroom. To be sure the servants had their own extra-dirty WC hidden in the back of their quarter. The entrance to the black private space is also on the invisible back side, out of sight from the road, while the white entrance of course, faces the white public space, the road. The kitchen is also the only room in the house with a window to the back, the garden. In the house other power relations were signified, between male and female, and children and adults. The female sphere, the kitchen is in the back, while the garage with the car, the public sign of the status of the (presumably) male breadwinner, opens towards the public space; and although it is not written on the plan one can assume that the children’s space were significantly smaller than the adult’s. All traffic from the private and dirty sections in the back of the house to the clean, outwardly representative living room next the entrance, had to go through the passage.

This plan of a private house is telling us that racial laws were contradicting ethnic utopias, as they were nation-wide, in towns and in factories. While the Immorality Act forbid sexual relations across the race-line it did not forbid a master-servant relation; and the slave-owning legacy made it too tempting not to keep black servants. Black nannies was the racial at its most ethnic subversive because it legitimised a very intimate bodily relation between white (child) and black (female) based on a deeply patriarchal family structure extending from the father to the beasts, mechanical or living, with the household border clearly paramount to the ethnic border in the sense that ethnic exclusivity came second to household integrity.

In political philosophy there is a traditional opposition between public space and private space. For the nation-state, and probably all states, to function, it must polarise power between itself and the private, and as far as possible empty any

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19 The patriarchal family was also black. It is movingly portrayed by Bloke Modisane in his autobiography (Modisane 1963?).
intermediate fields of power. Obviously the antipodal territorial unit to the public realm of the state is the private house. But during the history of the nation-state the actual territorial unit defined by the household has changed significantly. A good example of this is provided by the evolution of the vote in England. Originally the vote was given to the patriarch as head of the household, qualifying in terms of sex, age, property and respectability. The household was in most cases respected as an extra-territorial entity by the state. For his woman, children, and servants the patriarch was the law unto himself. But with the extension of the vote to women right after World War 1 largely as an effect of the state employing them in the armaments-industries, the patriarchal house started to crumble, and with the universal declaration of human rights as an outcome of the next World War the state had effectively ruined the patriarchal house. In the SAPS crime code list offences no. 02201-02219 is ‘attempted rape or rape of wife by husband’. This tells us very clearly that the house no longer is an autonomous symbolic space defining one sector of the male-female front. This now all-powerful state was the welfare-state, or the state-of-unlimited-social-engineering. Of course, this development was seen as a liberation and a promise of equality for everybody still in the grips of colonialism and patriarchy, and it was. But the state also intervened in the house in a unambiguously destructive manner. Norman Duncan and Brian Rock describe how apartheid ruined the black family by destroying the role and authority of the adults and how it destroyed and politized the lives of children (Duncan, 1994:pp45). The state’s interventions in the power relations of households then, both in Black and White societies, left the territorial unit of individuality very ambiguous. These contested fronts, the power relations of sex and age did not go away, of course, but extend right through society, across the spaces of towns, ethnicity and state and in some ways they became even more pronounced, precisely because of the deep uncertainty of which house now would frame them.

If it had once been plausible that the household signified the minimum space for power relations indexed by birth as age, sex and race, closer inspection over the last twenty years or so has revealed that the minimum space may in fact be the human body. Since Foucault saw the body as the ultimate battlefield and wrote, “if power takes hold on the body, this isn’t through its having first to be interiorised in people’s consciousnesses... For the State to function in the way it does, there must be, between male and female or adult and child, quite specific

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20 Jacklyn Cock (1991) has a good discussion of war as a gendered activity and how individual’s experience of war is shaped by gender.
relations of domination which have their own configuration and relative autonomy.” (Foucault 1980:186,188) this has become the dominant discourse on ‘body-politics’. In a discussion of Van der Leeuw’s theories of sacred space, David Chidester says very much the same, if in another register, as Foucault, “all sacred places, the home, temple, city, and pilgrimage site, coalesced in the heart, because ‘the real sanctuary is man’ [but] even the heart...was a situational, relational, and contested sacred place. Like every other sacred space, the heart provided no purely poetic, mystical refuge from the politics of the sacred.” So today we are confronted with a feeling of ‘post-modern homelessness’, “A spatial ‘disalienation,’ particularly in the midst of the endlessly signifying but essential meaningless ‘hyperreality’ of a postmodern world, as the critic Frederic Jameson has observed, requires more than merely developing new techniques for ‘cognitive mapping.’ A recovery of place, in Jameson’s terms, requires a cultural politics dedicated to a ‘practical reconquest of a sense of place’. It is not the home, but the battlefield, that provide the governing metaphor for such a poetics and politics of space.”(Chidester, 1994:226,229).

11. FROM POWER BACK TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE
To sum up: What I have done so far is to extract the territorial units in the banning order, and they were: state, ethnic group, town and house. I will argue that across the borders of exactly these four territorial units are all power relations of any nation-state articulated. These are the four points of articulation of identity in a nation-state. The two other points often mentioned in discussions of divided societies, religion and class, I would claim, are in fact articulated within the parameters of the four borders - religion at the ethnic border and class at the town border.

Before I return to political violence, it is necessary briefly to consider how the four borders interact. Inherent in any state’s drive to assert itself on the national territory is a tendency to polarise power between itself and the atomised mass of individuals constituting the sovereign people. Obviously this is the ideal situation, in real life power is also present at the ethnic border and at the border of towns. The State will interpellate society and rank the borders: state on top, house in bottom with ethnic and town borders in between. In the short historical perspective (10-25 years) the main threat is coming from the ethnic border. Michael Mann uses the terms ‘centralizing’ and ‘territorializing’ of society to explain two important characteristics of the nation-state: centralizing equals
monopoly of violence and territorializing equals creation of the territorial state with definite borders. A strong ethnic border threatens the nation-state on both counts; it can ‘de-centralize’ the means of violence, and it can ‘de-territorialize’ the territory. Both developments can lead to civil war, the first to a ‘revolutionary civil war’ when groups fight for control of the state, and the second to an ‘ethnic civil war’ when groups try to secede and split the state.

The point is that no state, whether a state-nation or an ethno-state can afford to have power localised at a sub-state border. States can try to cope with the ethnic border pragmatically, allowing the ethnic border to be lifted into the state border by cultural accommodation or essentialistically by dragging the state border down to the ethnic border by a policy of violent cultural exclusiveness. The pragmatic route is relatively durable because by giving everybody access to the state it does not create an ethnic out-group, it can successfully polarise power between itself and the mass of atomised citizens that as such cannot form a coherent sub-state border. The essentialist route is in most cases self-defeating because it will create an ethnic outgroup, a new minority, by necessity reflecting the essentialist criteria constituting the dominant group and thus developing a new dangerous sub-state border. When the state cannot cope with the ethnic border it will get high rates of political violence - and in the end civil war.

To move analytically from territory to violence we must understand violence as the inversion of power. When we experience violence we do not experience power, but the lack of power; Zizek puts it this way, ‘“real violence” emerges when the symbolic fiction that guarantees the life of a community is in danger,” (Zizek 1995:20). The murder becomes the negative, inverted signifier of communal power, and therefore the positive, direct signifier of a break-down in communal power. Now, this is still incomplete, because there is no ‘break down’ of a static situation; the basic condition for any community is an ever on-going reaffirmation of its borders. What violence in fact is telling us, is that a border is moving. Violence is not the key to the ‘symbolic fiction’ of a community but is the re-negotiation of its territorial borders. And finally one important hypothesis needs to be made; within each borders there is one hegemonic symbolic fiction, and violence is ultimately about that particular border.

12 THE BODY COUNT

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21 See his contribution to Hall (1986) a programmatic and useful version of his magnum opus, Mann (1993).
Violence in its most raw form may arguably be murder. The incidence of murder is a solid pointer to the degree of violence in any society. Murder is a clear cut event; the corpse is there... and murder is according to the police the crime most fully recorded. Even though the current SAPS crime code list distinguishes ‘murder’ from ‘culpable homicide’, ‘assault with the purpose to inflict grievous harm’, and ‘attempted murder’, and the actual classification of single incidents may be difficult, ‘murder’ remains probably the most consistent category on the list, and the one safest to compare across time (and with other countries). I would therefore argue that murder is the best index to violence, and anyway the easiest statistical unit to work with.

The crucial question then is: Is it possible to allocate the number of murders to the four borders? I cannot give an affirmative answer at this still speculative point of my investigation. But let me indicate briefly how the figures would be compared with the standard counting. If we categorise violence in a nation-state based on the territorial distinctions elaborated above we arrive at a list like this:

**State border**,

violence from the state border and outwards, indexed by all murders (casualties) perpetrated:

(1) along the international border and outside of the state.

**Ethnic border**, 

violence from inside of the state-border to the town-border, indexed by all murders perpetrated nation-wide:

(2) in rural areas, (except amongst family-members inside residential premises);
(3) half of all murders perpetrated in town-frontiers.

**Town border**

violence from inside the town-border to outside of the house, indexed by all murders perpetrated nation-wide:

(4) in industrial, financial etc. premises and their rolling annexes (commercial cars, trucks, taxis etc.);
(5) in public town spaces excluding town-frontiers;
(6) half of all murders perpetrated in the town-frontier.

**House border**

violence from the house border and inside, indexed by all murders perpetrated nation-wide:
(7) in connection with housebreakings in residential premises and their rolling annexes (private cars) in towns;
(8) amongst family-members perpetrated inside the house.

State. In peace-time (1) will be insignificant, but with the growing numbers of illegal immigration into South Africa it could grow. In war-time (1) was low if only counting the South African casualties, and extremely high if counting also the front-line state casualties.

Ethnic. Rural area can be defined as country-side, villages and small towns up to a certain number of inhabitants (fx. 5000); (2) will include much of the KZN violence, witch-killing and rural ‘crime’, but excluding murders amongst family-members perpetrated inside the house, as they articulate the power relations of the household. (2) will be low, except in KZN, where there is a severely contested ethnic front. (3)+(6) comprise the town-frontier. In the town-frontier two violent dynamics are active and overlapping: inclusion-exclusion of the town space, and inclusion-exclusion of the ethnic space. (3)+(6) will include all kinds of township violence. To distinguish ‘ethnic’ from ‘town’ violence is the challenge of any student of political violence. To divide the violence 50/50 is, of course, not satisfactory, but a start. (2)+(3) will cover most of the ‘political violence’ but in addition include probably the majority of ‘criminal’ murders.

Town. The urban area can be defined as towns with more than fx. 5000 inhabitants.(4) will include most murders connected with labour dispute and taxi-violence. (5) will include ‘criminal’ murders in the ‘inner’ town, not connected with private houses. (6) is mentioned above. Gang-violence will be included if it takes place in the town-frontier. If it takes place in the ‘inner’ town it will fall under (5).

House. (7) will include all murders at the border between public and private space and include the rolling private space, the car. (8) will cover all murders nationwide perpetrated inside private houses, between family-members. If it is not between family-members it will fall under (7).

With this coding ‘political violence’ disappears. Instead of the simple choice of political violence or crime, we will have 8 categories representing the four main power relations. If we collect our data on the basis of location rather than by imputed motive we will possibly get a better foundation for an empirical understanding violence and power. In this way too, our data will be comprehensive, covering all violence (initially indexed by murders), and not pre-
excluding the majority of violence in society. I think it is politically dangerous to ignore ‘crime’ and only see ‘political violence’. Today in South Africa, it is probably safe to say that people are more worried about crime than ‘political violence’.

What material is available? The following notes do not claim any comprehensiveness, and I will be grateful for any additions.

South African Police
The annual reports of the commissioner of the police; very un-detailed and due to frequent changes in the way of coding of offences they are difficult to compare. The material on which the reports were based up to 1989 are still scattered among local archives in 1400 police stations and much may be missing altogether, especially in the former homelands; only random bits are kept in the central archives in Pretoria. Since 1989 the SAP6 crime-code-list has been in effect on the old territory of South Africa. The homelands are only now with great problems being incorporated in the central system, they have very poor statistics, not centrally collected, poor administration and under-reporting. From 1993 onwards the Crime Administration System, a computerised crime list, was put into practice in some provinces (first in Gauteng). It is hoped to have national coverage by 1997.

The coding for murder and related offences is somewhat strange. It divides murders along the age of victim (<12, 12-17, 18-49, >50 years, but unfortunately not of murderer), race of murderer and victim, and finally according to weapon used (small arm, commercial rifle or shotgun, military firearm and unknown firearm, i.e. home-made). For an analysis based on locality the starting point will the spatial distribution of figures from the individual police stations. It would be helpful if the ‘micro-locations’ residential, business, financial, and vehicle used in the SAP6 for robbery (crime-codes 05401-05490) would be introduced for murders (maybe instead of the unimportant and very complex racial classifications).

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22 The total number of murders in South Africa less the homelands.
  • 1975/76:6000
  • 1976/77:7569
  • 1984/85:8959
  • 1985/86:9665
  • 1986:9913
  • 1987:9800
  • 1988:10631
  • 1989:11750
  • 1990:15109 [3699]
  • 1991:14693 [2582]
  • 1992:16067 [3499]
  • 1993: 17467 [4398]
  • 1994:18312
  • 1995:18457

Political violence figures in square brackets (source: SAP Annual Reports and Minnaar after Duncan (1994)).
Chris de Kock considered not more than 5 - 10% of murders in KZN to be unreported. He estimated 7-8% of all murders in KZN to be political violence from a police point of view, 15-20% from the point of national security. The incidence of political violence was possibly overestimated before 1994, now underestimated for political reasons. However KZN has the highest proportions of all kinds of crime in South Africa 1994-5. The specific defining of ‘unrest related violence’ is still done at the discretion of the individual police officer in KwaZulu-Natal. National census figures are very problematic and thus all proportional assessments. As an example de Kock cited the different estimates of illegal immigrants in South Africa. The ministry of home affairs says 2 mill, the police 5 mill, the HSRC says 8,2 mill. and Van Slabbert 10 mill. Nobody knows for sure.

The National Safety Services
The national safety services operated the IRIS-system with data on ‘unrest related incidents’ since 1982-3. The figures given to the media during the 80’s came from this source. It is supposed by Chris de Kock that the IRIS-figures could be 100% higher than the police figures due institutional pressure. i.e. the rationale of the Security Services was a high incident of ‘unrest’, while the police should deal with ‘crime’.

Parliament
does not keep any special records on violence. The Hansard have scattered figures used in reply to questions in parliament, and they would be supplied by the police. But the search can be worthwhile, from this source I have got crime figures from each individual police station.

Independent sources
South African Institute of Race Relations has collected figures for political violence since 1984, based on newspaper reports, independent monitors, police and security figures etc. They have tackled the definition problem by collecting two figures, a minimum figure covering well-established political violence, and a maximum figure including grey-zone violence like cattle-rustling, taxi-wars and faction-feuds. The published figure is an average. An other good source is the Human Rights Committee. At the Human Science Research Council Johann Olivier and Anthony Minnaar has coded data on political violence dating back to 1970 (Olivier 1995), while a range of independent monitors have done it from the

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23 Personal communication with Chris de Kock, Director, Crime Research, National Crime Information Management Centre, SAPS Pretoria 5-3-96.
1980’s. Simon Bekker and the Indicator SA-team has done a similar extensive
survey in Natal from the middle 1980’s onwards and he is currently working
along similar lines in the Western Cape, all based on Johan Oliviers coding
manual. A potentially very import source will be the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission depending on the way they will process their incoming material.

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