

RISK AID

Humanitarian aid in a new
century

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Preface.

What I present here, is a draft version of a book on risk aid, humanitarian aid in a new century. It is the outcome of a two-year research project on 'The Peace-Inducing Impact of Danish Humanitarian Aid to Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova, 1992-1999' commissioned by the Danish Research Council for Development Research. I have had the benefit of institutional affiliation with the Danish Institute of International Affairs, DUPI, and the Centre for European Cultural Studies, CEK, University of Aarhus. My thanks go to Director Niels-Jørgen Nehring DUPI, and Director Uffe Østergård CEK for their support throughout this project. I would like to appreciate all the practical assistance provided by agencies in the field, often in difficult circumstances: Danish Refugee Council, ICRC, Dacaar, Diakonia-Bread for the World-Germany, Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, World Food Programme-Kosova, OSCE-Kosova, and the Danish Army in Kosova. I had the great advantage of not being on any kind of official mission, and were free to travel as I pleased with my good companions, my friend Rage Mohamad Haji Rage in Somaliland, and my wife Nina Rasmussen and my friend photographer Per Folkver in Afghanistan and Kosova. My warmest thanks go to them.

In the period November 1988-January 1999 I visited Hargeisa and Mogadishu, but not Kismayo for security reasons as heavy fighting broke out in Juba in early December 1998 at the time of my visit. I did one field-trip to nomads living to the south of Hargeisa and two field-trips out of Mogadishu, one to small villages in the Qorioley district in Lower Shebelle and one to small villages in the Jowhar district in Middle Shebelle; still my direct contact with the intended beneficiaries was limited. In south Somalia I was at all times escorted by armed guards.

August and October 1999 I visited Pakistan and Indian Kashmir; September 1999 I travelled in Afghanistan with Nina Rasmussen and Per Folkver, first flying to Herat and driving down to Farah visiting several villages and later villages east of Herat, where some project areas were off-limits for security reasons. Then we flew with Ariana Airlines to Kabul and later drove up to villages in the mountains of Laghman province with armed Taliban escort. From Jalalabad we finally flew to Faizabad in non-Taliban Badakshan, also visiting a number of villages. Nina was able to visit women, reducing somewhat the male bias of reports from Afghanistan.

April 2000, I went to Albania with Nina Rasmussen and Per Folkver, drove from Tirana to Kukes and on to Prishtine in Kosova. We saw most of Kosova before driving to Montenegro and returning to Albania. In Kosova we had no security problems. Security is a double-edged sword. Every-one, I guess, would like to come home sound and well, but on

the other hand it is so easy for local powers, including agencies, to restrict the access of curious people to sensitive information by invoking security.

The purpose of circulating this draft is, of course, to get responses that might benefit and improve the final version. I will be more than happy to receive comments, corrections, and suggestions.

Knowledge is a collective pursuit and without the generous help by a lot of people this book had not been written. I was impressed time and again by the readiness of people to share with me their knowledge, visions, and feelings accumulated by receiving and working with humanitarian aid. Needless to say, the facts, interpretations, and opinions expressed in this book are mine and my responsibility. I hope this book can return some of their generosity, and contribute to a shared commitment to better aid.

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Mørke, 15 August, 2000

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Acronyms

| | |
|--------|--|
| ARCS | Afghanistan Red Crescent Society |
| DAC | Danish Afghanistan Committee |
| DACAAR | Danish Aid Committee for Assistance to Afghan Refugees |
| DBG | Diakonia-Bread for the world-Germany |
| DCA | Dan Church Aid (= FKN - Folkekirkens Nødhjælp) |
| DHA | Department of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations) |
| DRK | Dansk Røde Kors = Danish Red Cross |
| DRC | Danish Refugee Council (= DF - Dansk Flygtningehjælp) |
| ECHO | European Community Humanitarian Office |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IFRC | International Federation of the Red Cross |
| MFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NAC | Norwegian Afghanistan Committee |
| SACB | Somalia Aid Co-ordinating Body |
| SCA | Swedish Committee for Afghanistan |
| SCF | Save the Children Fund |
| SEOC | Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium |
| SRCS | Somalia Red Crescent Society |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nation's Children Fund |
| UNMIK | United Nations Mission in Kosovo |
| UNOSOM | United Nation's Operation in Somalia |
| UNRISD | United Nations Research Institute for Social Development |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organisation |

I ntroduction

People ask - this humanitarian aid, does it help people? Or is it just making conditions worse?

The shortest possible answer is, yes, aid do help people; and yes, it do make conditions worse.

This book is a longer answer. Humanitarian aid travelled a very long distance during the 1990s. From compassionate charity aroused by the Somalia hunger crisis, humanitarian aid ended in a position directly opposite that of charity in Kosova, namely defending *our own* safety against risks closing in from a fragmenting and threatening world. Humanitarian aid became *risk aid*. But I am getting ahead of my story...

1. A story of Somali and Denmark

My story of aid begins four o'clock in the morning in an old battered Ilushin 18 plane from Damal Airlines taking off from Sharjah airport, destination Somaliland. Next to me in the tattered seats dosed my friend Rage Mohammad Haji Rage, a Somali refugee visiting his country for the first time since his escape from civil war five years back. Rage had found shelter in Denmark and he was not the only one; in a couple of a years 12.000 Somalis had got asylum in Denmark, by far the largest group of Africans in that wealthy part of Northern Europe. Before they arrived Somalia had been a story of a famine and a civil war in a country nobody knew much about and had cared even less for.

With a chock Danes realised that black women in colourful all-covering dresses mattered to their own country. Somalis became the very embodiment of refugees 'swamping' Denmark. A tough stance on the 'Somali-issue' grew into a cure-all to the 'threat' to Christian culture, homogeneous society, and hard-earned welfare. Kim Benchke, MP for the right-wing Progress-Party, gained notoriety by saying on Danish Television that Denmark should get rid of the Somalis by dropping them with parachutes over Somalia. Escalating pressure in 1997 from right-wing parties and Social Democratic mayors in towns with large immigrant communities, made it a priority for the Social Democratic government to strike a deal with any Somali authority able to secure the return of rejected asylum-seekers. For the Somaliland

government, entering its sixth year of totally unrecognised independence, linking returnees with recognition was one of the very few ways to put any kind of pressure on the outside world. High-ranking officials from Denmark went to Somaliland, and after a short negotiation they signed two deals with local ministers (6-7-1997). Somaliland accepted the return of rejectees and Denmark promised development aid, while recognition was studiously left hanging in the air. Somaliland optimistically saw the official agreement on refugees and aid as the beginning of a process that would lead to recognition.

But back in Denmark the deal came under heavy fire from the right-wing parties, themselves ready to drop Somalis in parachutes on the Horn of Africa, for being an unsavoury trade in humans, and in end the deal was defeated in Parliament (11-9-1997). Yet, the Minister of Development, Poul Nielson, later to become EU commissioner for development, had no intention to let this incoherent rubble of right-wing xenophobia stop him and asked his staff to modify the deal so it could be funded by the 'MIKA'-budget, otherwise intended for environmental fall-out of the East-European transition from communism. Three months later the first millions were appropriated to aid projects in Somalia in a low-key way without a parliamentary battle. Now the Social Democratic government of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen believed they had a deal with Somaliland, and the first four rejected Somali asylum-seekers were sent back accompanied by Danish police officers and duly admitted by the Hargeisa government to the dust and poverty of Somaliland.

NGOs should implement the aid part of the deal. Arne Piel Christensen, whom we will meet again in Prishtine, then secretary-general of Danish Refugee Council, defended the deal against accusations in the press of helping the government with a dirty job, arguing that the very credibility of Europe's asylum-policy would be undermined if rejectees could not be sent back, but stayed on in Europe on terms like those granted asylum. The effect would be, he said, ever higher walls around Europe keeping everyone out. And to be able to send back rejectees, the conditions in their country of origin had to be safe, thus aid was a precondition for the return of rejectees, and in long term permitting even voluntary repatriation of those staying legally in Denmark. Official statements declared that a major reason for assisting in emergencies was to avoid refugees. Precisely this linkage of asylum-policy and aid was made possible with the new MIKA-budget-line. This was the birth of 'risk aid' in Denmark.

Among Somalis in Denmark the deal became embroiled in the complex antagonisms of their home country. Chairman of one of the many competing Somali organisations in Denmark Mr. Mohamed Gelle said, "Somali refugees in Denmark are concerned that Denmark has begun to take part in the Somali civil war, because Denmark have struck a deal with

Somaliland at the expense of other parts of our country. Each time someone from the outside interferes in Somalia the civil war has escalated. When one clan-leader gets support another will feel at a disadvantage, and then he will have to make trouble. I am coming from the south, and I am afraid of this deal.” (Information, 2-4-98)

For several weeks two Somali women and a girl, rejected asylum in Denmark, had been waiting in a police cell. Their only ‘crime’ was that Somaliland did not want to give the green light for bringing them back. Then one day, without alerting the Somaliland authorities, they were deported to Hargeisa accompanied by five Danish police officers. When they suddenly arrived in Hargeisa it caused a major row and the subsequent nullification of the deal by the Hargeisa government in April 1998. Back in Denmark the Somali issue once again blew up in the face of the Minister of the Interior, Thorkild Simonsen. In a bizarre move to salvage the deal and fend off accusations of incompetence he ordered the Head of the Danish Police Ivar Boye to go to Somaliland to beg pardon in person.

The door of the fuselage was cranked open and I could smell the hot, dry air of Somalia. The burnt-out hull of an old Russian tank and two worn Toyota pick-ups were parked on the apron. Rage welcomed me to Hargeisa, exited at being back, depressed by the destruction, and nervously taking in the new political situation. Some days later, in a low barrack housing the ministry of foreign affairs in Hargeisa I stumbled upon two Danish policemen and an official from the Home Ministry trying for the umpteenth time to salvage The Deal by a visit to the authorities of Somaliland. The Somaliland Minister of Foreign Affairs said to me, that rejectees would be accepted but warned the Danish Immigration Service “not to dump refugees on us. Our reception capacity is nil.” Sixteen months after signing the deal only seven Somali rejectees had been returned to Somaliland; Somaliland had been promised aid for sixty million dkk, but not recognition.

Refugees had tied Denmark to the Somalia complex emergency, and an improvised move had sucked Denmark into the cut-throat politic of top-down state building. From confidential communication, I have found in the Danish Foreign Ministry archives, it transpires how sensitive the whole affair was. A dispatch from the Danish UN mission in Geneva on the reaction to the formal Danish agreement with the Somaliland authorities pointed out that “several of the consulted countries considered the topic highly sensitive...” and it was stressed that no public reference could be made to the answers of the consulted governments. In a meeting with Danish officials, the EU special representative for Somalia, Mr. Sigurd Illing said that, “The recognition by a European country of the independence of Somaliland would have detrimental implications for the general development in Somalia.” It was

reported to the Danish Ministry that the OAU was strongly opposed to Danish recognition of Somaliland, and UN in New York advised that Denmark should not enter any bilateral agreements with Somaliland.

In sum, Danish recognition of Somaliland's independence could have made a real and dramatic difference. If other countries followed suit it would seriously have weakened the claim for a united Somalia, and possibly by implication the claim for the unity of several other African countries. Poul Nyrup Rasmussen's government had no wish to do that, and with only an incidental Danish interest in Somalia and no long-term policy for the region it was natural to follow the advice of UN, OAU and EU. On the other hand, it demonstrated where Denmark (and other states) could and did effectively influence peace in Somalia: in the international community. Let us not forget that humanitarian aid is one of the outer ramparts dividing the rich and poor continents of the world. Abukar Sheikh Ali, my Mogadishu host, business-man and DBG project co-ordinator expressed it like this:

“Somalia and Denmark have same number of people. Well, if you gave us the richest half of your population we would give you the poorest half of our population; then I think we could solve our problems!”

In this little story of Somalia and Denmark I have presented the stakeholders in humanitarian aid and provided the lay-out of the book: the human being hit by an emergency (Chapter One), the local state in conflict (Chapter Two), the donor government (Chapter Three), and the humanitarian agencies (Chapter Four) implementing projects for beneficiaries (Chapter Five and the Appendix), and finally the international community setting the context (Chapter Six).

2. Designing the research

Apart from a single Danida evaluation, nothing, as far as I am aware, has been published on the subject of Danish humanitarian assistance. There is a small body of literature on Danish development aid and a burgeoning international field of humanitarian aid studies, while studies of military intervention and complex emergencies are already too numerous to fully follow. Armed conflicts have triggered an outpouring of political science literature on Somalia, on Kosova (with a lot in press, and relatively less on Afghanistan, discussing the lessons of the clash with the Powers. This literature tends to build on a few canonical anthropological-historiographical texts explaining the ‘deep’ conflicts: e.g. I.M. Lewis on Somalia, Olivier Roy on Afghanistan, and Noel Malcom on Kosova. This is also, it must be admitted, to some

extent the case of the present writer, and clearly an unsatisfactory, but real limitation for comparative research.

It is becoming ever more banal to state that no country moves in isolation. Yet, to what degree this reflects a deeper similarity of state structure is a matter of controversy. Basil Davidson (1992) asked if not Africa and East Europe had something in common in dealing with the Janus-faced nationalism. Jean-Francois Bayart (1993) argued that the state in Africa has to be analysed as the state in Europe. In his book on Afghanistan, Barnett Rubin (1995) drew the logical and unsettling conclusion of the similarity, asserting that the fragmenting states showed the western states their common future. War in Kosova was a European war, perhaps admitting Kosova into that grand experiment with a post-nation state, the European Union, as a Kosovar philosopher and politician hoped (Maliqi 1998). In a recent volume Nederveen Pieterse concluded on the global change heralded by humanitarian interventions, "The key issue is the form of states and of sovereignty." (Nederveen Pieterse 1999:259) Humanitarian aid is, as I shall try to show, central to this experiment with new forms of states and sovereignty in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova. At the turn of the millennium, the peoples of these three countries were paying a terrible price for breaking down the nation state. Their experiment with the post-nation state holds a scary message about our common future. Risk aid in Kosova was a strong answer, but not perfectly edifying.

Designing my research, I had three objectives. All the stakeholders of humanitarian aid listed above should be included, in particular reducing as far as possible the bias of air-condition, tremendously strong in most reporting on aid, namely the almost total silence of the first stakeholder. Time, security, comfort and all kinds of practicalities down to questions of where to sleep, produce a seducing, but often ignored, bias towards the world of air-condition far removed from that remote, time-consuming, hot, dusty, infected, smelly, and hard to understand planet inhabited by the 'beneficiaries'. The reader will find some local voices presented in the interviews (some translated from native tongues into English), yet my direct contact with the beneficiaries was limited. As I shall argue in this book, in the world of humanitarian aid the very persons that should be centre-stage are in fact little more than a necessary trouble on the road to fulfilling the interests of the other, much more powerful stakeholders of aid. Humanitarian aid is built upon tremendous inequalities in power and agency. The local state in conflict is largely silent or reluctant to say anything that might turn off aid. It is the donors and agencies that wield power and agency, they communicate, not least in a language, both verbally and conceptually, immediately intelligible for the researcher, him- or herself more or less part of the donor-agency 'block'.

Secondly, the research should be comparative. Apart from the practical problems of getting to know the textures of several local societies, histories, and conditions, the real challenge was to devise a methodology that allowed for a controlled comparison. How to translate social phenomena into numbers is a permanent problem of social science. The methodology I present here contains very few 'hard' measured data; for instance, there is hardly any reference to money. Indicators of vulnerability, protection, and conflict have been developed and employed, hopefully allowing for a meaningful comparison of aid to Somalia, Afghanistan and Kosova.

Thirdly, it should have some historical depth. During the 1990s, the decade of complex emergencies, humanitarian aid has expanded, changed, and diversified dramatically. These changes should be reflected in the design of the research.

Selection of years.

Risk aid is a phenomenon originating in the 1990s. Somalia experienced arguably the first risk aid operation with the US/UN operation Restore Hope in 1992. At the time of writing Kosova 1999 is the most recent risk aid operation. 1992 and 1999 was thus selected as cut-off dates for the general discussion of risk aid. I decided only to include projects in the sample that I have visited myself in the period 1998-2000.

Selection of countries.

Somalia and Kosova were thus obvious countries to include in a discussion of humanitarian and risk aid in the 1990s. A third candidate, limiting the total number of countries to three for practical reasons, should preferably be Asian to ensure maximum geographical spread. Afghanistan was the only Asian country receiving major Danish humanitarian aid both in 1992 and 1999.

Selection of donor.

The focus on Danish humanitarian aid in a general discussion of humanitarian may be questioned on two opposite counts: the evidence will be too specific Danish to reveal general problems, and in the field Danish aid anyway cannot be singled out in multilateral operations. My impression is that problems found in Danish aid are common problems, while invisibility in the field is a real challenge for donors eager for maximum national visibility. Thus a discussion of Danish aid may well be of general relevance.

Selection of agencies.

Criteria for the selection of agencies were simple: The Red Cross Movement had to be included as one of the largest agencies in humanitarian aid both internationally and in Denmark; UN agencies had to be included for the same reasons. Danish humanitarian NGOs should be included. Testing the limits of risk aid are three non-typical 'aid agencies': the OSCE and the Danish Army in Kosova, and a private family in Albania hosting refugees.

Selection of projects.

The final selection of projects from each agency was guided by my priority of first-hand experience of ongoing projects, suggestions from the agencies, and travel conditions. I believe the sample of the thirty-five projects ended up reflecting some of enormous variation found in 'humanitarian' projects. I have used some space to discuss each project on their own terms in the Appendix; that is a presentation of my 'raw-material' in its local, human dimensions.

2. Design of the book

Chapter One, Emergency events and life-impact

An emergency is first and last a human story. From the perspective of the individual sufferer, the victim, the beneficiary, the human being caught by a disaster, I first consider the usefulness of the three most common indicators to identify an emergency, namely diseases, hunger, and violence. Although suffering on a grand scale always is a disaster, these indicators are found to be insufficient as they do not capture the synergy of the victim, conflict state, donor state, donor public, and the multitude of agencies together creating, what I propose to call, *the emergency event*. I argue that the number of international NGOs active in the disaster zone is a better indicator of a disaster becoming an emergency event, than the number of sick, starving, displaced and dead persons. To assess the impact of humanitarian aid on people caught by a disaster I propose three parameters of '*life-impact*': health, livelihood, and protection. Protection against violent death, exposure and displacement is paramount, while health and livelihood are dependent.

Chapter Two, Complex emergencies and state-impact

In this chapter the perspective shifts to the state affected by the emergency event. Complex emergencies are deep social conflicts propelled by civil war, producing losers and winners, groups benefiting from the emergency; and complex emergencies have no clear ends. I very briefly mention the cycles of violence in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova during the 1990s. Complex emergencies have challenged both notions of 'pure' emergencies and linear 'development'. How to translate these insights into practical assessments of the impact of

humanitarian aid on conflicts is still a matter of experimentation. The methodology developed for the present book groups social conflicts, actors, and spaces into four ‘bundles’, tagged house, town, ethnic, and state. The impact of projects is assessed for each of these ‘bundles’ producing an estimated aggregate ‘state-impact’. It does not refer to measured quantities, but systematises qualitative impressions. The chapter ends with the list of specific criteria used for assessing positive or negative impact.

Chapter Three, Danida the donor, from humanitarian aid to risk aid

In this chapter, and the next, we change perspective to the parties to the emergency event that are not suffering. Like all major donors in the 1990s, Danida has responded to emergency events with three very different mutations of humanitarian aid: with an ever more professional and industrialised emergency aid; with a type of projects blending with development aid; and by integrating humanitarian mandates into national security interests, creating a new type of aid I propose to call *risk aid*. I tell the story of how, and how differently, Danida has assisted Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova from 1992 to 1999, with Kosova receiving sixty times more Danish aid per inhabitant than Afghanistan.

Chapter Four, The good industry, the humanitarian agencies

Protection is the common theme of this chapter: how did Dan Church Aid, Dacaar, Danish Refugee Council, ICRC, and UNHCR met the challenge to protect their beneficiaries in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova during the 1990s? The track record spans from the irresponsibility of a logistics-only approach to a constructive low-scale engagement with armed business-men in Somalia. From controversial protection negotiated with the Taliban to a successful but bitterly disputed direct co-operation with military intervention forces in Kosova.

Chapter Five, Field impact of thirty-five projects: protecting people?

In this chapter the perspective moves on again from the individual person caught by a disaster (Chapter I), the state fragmenting in a complex emergency (Chapter II), the donor state (Chapter III) and the humanitarian agencies (Chapter IV) to the impact of individual aid projects. First-hand, on-the-spot impressions of thirty-five humanitarian projects provide core evidence. Short descriptions and discussions of each project can be found in the Appendix. It should be emphasised that the assessments are not evaluations, but a comparative discussion of how a certain sample of projects have impacted on the lives of the beneficiaries and the states they live in. The reader will find no cost-benefit assessments of efficiency, no discussions of effectiveness, nor of problems of co-ordination and institutional structure. I have attempted to assess the impact of each aid project on the context of conflict.

First, the impact on health, livelihood, protection, and aggregate life-impact is estimated for each project. Secondly, the impact on the four ‘bundles’ of conflicts, actors, and spaces, and aggregate state-impact is estimated, also for each project. Finally, by tracing correlations of life-impact and state-impact, some of the dilemmas of protecting individuals in conflicts are identified.

Chapter Six, Protecting states in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova?

The final chapter outlines how the international community have tried to protect, create or recreate sovereign territories, national governments, and state institutions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova during the 1990s. They have all, with varying emphasis, experienced four fundamentally different types of support and interventions: (i) ‘top-down’ (re)creation of the borders of a sovereign territory, a national government, and state institutions, often focusing on an army; (ii) imposing of ‘protectorates’ suspending national sovereignty; (iii) ‘bottom-up’ state building based on revival and implanting of local self-government; and (iv) ‘experimental’ intervention, blending trans-national business, international state-like provision of ‘welfare’ and localised, fragmented control of violence. Aid has been a crucial vehicle for outside powers in all four modes of intervention. At the same time, the national interests of outside powers have compromised humanitarian aid. All three countries today violate the nation state coherence of sovereign territory, national government, and state institutions. Their experiment could produce fragments of the post-nation state.

The longer answer

We need a longer answer than, yes: humanitarian aid does help people, and yes: it does make conditions worse, because humanitarian aid is a matter of life and death. We run a risk of doing harm when we help. The aid worker is confronted with the dilemma, that saving lives today may put other lives, and possibly more lives, at stake tomorrow. That doing good may end up causing harm. This is an terrible dilemma because each life has absolute value, while the link between what you do today and what the outcome will be tomorrow can never be more than imagined. To act upon such imagined consequences, and not save a live today that could have been saved, is impossible for aid moved by the humanitarian imperative. Yet the dilemma will not go away.

We cannot stop all aid. Confronted with the suffering of fellow humans we must risk aid. Not to do harm, more knowledge is needed about how acts today produce outcomes

tomorrow. It is the hope of the author that the present book may contribute to such knowledge.

Interview with Aisha Maulana, IFRC, Somalia delegation, Nairobi, 7 Jan. 1999

“I keep saying [to the Somalis]: don’t ask for money - you must pull up your socks. I am a Muslim woman from Africa [from Lamu, Kenya] - I can tell them. I ask them: how do you see your future? You should not always be the receiving. We have developed too much dependency. They are so used to ask for money.”

“But in fact, the biggest problem is the NGOs losing their own jobs if they really pulled out. International humanitarian aid is a work-creation game. The system has to be maintained. The expatriates will feel obliged to keep funds running to themselves.”

“The warlords get rich by all the aid we pump in; we ought to close all aid. If we cut off all help then there is chance peace will come. On the other hand you cannot sit back and watch people suffer. It is a dilemma. ”

1 ● EMERGENCY EVENTS AND LIFE-IMPACT

1. The emergency event

Brutal images of human suffering reached the world from Iraq and Kurdistan in 1991, Somalia in '92, Bosnia in '93, Rwanda in '94, and Kosova in '99. But the terrible list of emergencies in the 1990s also includes 'silent' emergencies such as Angola, Sudan, and Afghanistan with less spectacular peaks of suffering, fewer gory pictures, and no dramatic humanitarian role for the military. In this chapter I discuss emergencies from the point of view of the individual human being caught by an emergency; the different, complementary, view of an emergency as a conflictual, political, and complex emergency will be considered in the following chapter. From the view-point then, of the individual victim, I first consider the usefulness of different indicators to identify the event of an emergency: (i) diseases, (ii) hunger, and (iii) violence. Secondly I discuss how to assess the impact of humanitarian aid projects; three parameters of impact on the life of individuals will be suggested: (i) health, (ii) livelihood, and (iii) protection.

The icon of the Somalia emergency is a starving skeleton baby, eyes full of flies, suckling a withered breast, the icon of the Kosova emergency is an endless column of people walking to reach a border post; the icon of the Afghanistan emergency is of a different kind, a woman hidden in a blue *burqa* scuttling down a street of ruined houses. An emergency is always first and last a human story, and lead role in any emergency has the sufferer. But that is a strange role, almost silent, overwhelmed by the clamour of a host of supporting characters of donor governments, aid agencies, and charitable publics. Yet suffering, even on a grand scale, unnoticed by the world is a disaster, but not yet an emergency. The pain and anguish of individual human beings struck by a disaster should be distinguished from the international socio-political emergency event. (The 'complexity' of emergencies refers to a different set of problems, discussed in the next chapter) With no audible voice the sufferer has to be discovered by the world to set the stage for an emergency event, whereupon all the other actors can perform their parts. Emergency events turn human qualities into national quantities, and this dual dimension drives a wedge of ambivalence into all public stories of emergencies.

In May 2000 a fireworks factory exploded in Holland and levelled a residential neighbourhood. Everyone clamoured for casualty-numbers. Yet it took the thoroughly organised and fully intact Dutch state three weeks to sift through the debris of this small scale disaster before it could come up with firm casualty numbers. Imagine then the difficulties of collecting numbers of casualties in a messy civil war, yet an emergency without numbers simply refuses to exist. Large-scale suffering cannot be comprehended without numbers; any response to an emergency needs numbers. But numbers are highly problematic for at least three reasons, first of all because it is extremely difficult or plain impossible to come up with reliable data on emergencies; secondly there is a crushing bias for big numbers; and thirdly numbers reduces individual pain and disorder to clean, manageable units processed into largely meaningless national averages. Nobody knows the true number of Afghanis or Somalis killed; there are no comprehensive up-to-date registration. Even in Kosova casualty-figures are distrusted. Everyone involved with emergencies drifts towards big numbers, big numbers to draw attention, to generate funds, and big numbers to lay claims. The big-number bias inflates all categories: the number of people at risk grows and gravitate towards more severe conditions, e.g. from 'at risk from starvation' to 'immediate risk from starvation'. Granted, it is unavoidable and necessary to quantify human suffering in order to conceive, plan and execute any public health measure seeking to reduce human suffering. But quantification of human suffering shifts the focus from personal and embodied suffering to dehumanised, collective, and institutional averages, in the end turning suffering into a commodity in a growth business.

This produces a highly particular way of comprehending the event of an emergency. There is a quest for the most authentic, basic indicator of the human being in danger. Survival is naturally taken as the most urgent interest of the sufferer, and the threats to survival assumed to be violent death, epidemics, hunger, and displacement; all threats to the body. Medical science provides a compelling explanation of life and death as survival or succumbing to physical threats such as disease, malnutrition, and violence. Moreover, the medical causality can be rigorously multiplied to whole populations; in theory there is no explanatory gap between the individual case and the multiple cases of a national population. Finally the medical understanding of the body is developed through clinical experimentation, and thus eminently operational and suitable for active intervention. Unfortunately, however, medical indicators of bodily health have serious shortcomings in capturing the dynamics of a socio-political event like an emergency because causal relations between medical and social factors cannot be established within the horizons of medicine. Of course, the chronic lack of reliable data does not make the job any easier, but that is not the root of the problem. Unfortunately, turning to the social sciences including economics, they in no way matches the medical

operational understanding of life and death. In the social sciences there is almost no body of basic knowledge but waves of models, it has a large gap between micro and macro-level explanations, there is only hypothetical causal testing, and it is highly flawed as a guide for operational, pro-active interventions. I would argue that the operational prowess of medical, natural science, tend to induce an anti-holistic bias in the understanding of emergencies, getting more pronounced the closer one gets to the action in the field.

2. Diseases

Raimo Väyrynen has presented an interesting attempt to use war casualties, diseases, hunger, and displacement as quantitative indicators of complex humanitarian emergencies (Väyrynen 1996). Yet he fails to show how national indicators of health can document specific emergencies. Let us take diseases first. Standard indicators of health include infant mortality and life expectancy. No reliable health data exists for Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova, but UNICEF estimated in 1996 the under five mortality rate to be 211 per 1,000 in Somalia and 257 per 1000 in Afghanistan; life expectancy was estimated to be only 43 years in both countries. (Girardet 1998:103). In an effort to turn these figures into indicators of emergencies Väyrynen focus on the twenty countries most severely affected by poor child health and groups them according to favourable-unfavourable change of under five child mortality 1992-95 (Väyrynen 1996:23). This puts Afghanistan in the group with both 'extreme' levels of child mortality (174-251 per 1000) and unfavourable change together with Sierra Leone, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, and Mali. But Afghanistan was the only country otherwise considered an emergency in this group, and not included in the group was a country like Angola experiencing a *drop* in under five child mortality from 292 to 184 per 1000 during three years of bloody war 1992-95. The correlation seems to be either weak or non-significant.

Life expectancy figures clearly cannot capture the dynamic changes of emergencies. Health figures are important measures of general levels of poverty but they appear to have a problem in picking up the dynamic of the changes in health during an emergency. For instance, health figures would be hard pressed to capture the Kosova crisis, which was brief and affected people generally in good health, causing no epidemics or other sudden changes in health. Health figures for specific groups may be more indicative but give highly incomplete and possibly distorted pictures of the total emergency. For example figures from camps are generally reliable (cf. Joint Evaluation 1996) but ignores groups not in camps. UNHCR defines emergency levels of mortality in camps as $>1/10,000/\text{day}$; (The standard indicator is the Crude Mortality Rate, CMR). The aim in an emergency is to keep it under

one in 10.000 for the population as a whole, and to under two in 10.000 for children under five years old. (Surkhe 2000) in the Kosova crisis this level was reached only once, in mid April in camps in Kukes in northern Albania, while there were no figures for the larger number of refugees staying with host families. A sudden drop in the health conditions of a large group of people is in any case a disaster; but this is not a necessary condition in defining an emergency event.

3. Hunger

Deaths due to starvation is the next widely used medical-type indicator of an emergency. One person's business, employment, and income may all be suspended without creating a situation threatening human survival as long as food is supplied by other sources. But when the food dries up, hunger comes and hunger may become an emergency. The bodily and mentally debilitating process of hunger was described in painful detail by Jose de Castro in his books on rural poverty in Brazilian Nordeste (Castro 1970). However, as research over the last fifteen years has redefined the link between famine and mortality, emphasising the politics of access to food more than the ultimate death by starvation, Väyrynen suggests a better indicator of hunger would be "the percentage of children under five suffering from underweight." (Väyrynen 1996:27) The shift of focus from disaster peaks of starvation to the broader social processes of famine has been important for understanding the phenomenon of hunger, but Väyrynen's indicator seems to be unsuitable for indicating the event of an emergency. In Afghanistan underweight children under the age of five was 19% in 1975 and 40% in 1990, consistent with the war, but the usefulness of the indicator is questioned somewhat by the fifteen year time-span, but also by counter-indicative entries, for instance India, Bangladesh, and Nepal all showing much higher levels of 63%, 66%, and 51% respectively, albeit this was a drop from even higher levels fifteen years earlier. Somalia reported an improvement for what it is worth from 47% in 1975 to 39% in 1990; two years later the UN reported one million children were at immediate risk of starvation in Somalia.

Another indicator of hunger is proposed by UNICEF, defining *global malnutrition* as the percentage of children from 6 to 59 months of age below 80% of the normal weight-for-height ratio. The worst hit areas of Somalia at the peak of the famine had up to 70% malnutrition but spectacular hunger as in Baidoa in 1992 was by no means typical. From early 1993 starvation was brought under control and by 1994 most areas had returned to pre-war levels of below 10% malnutrition with only certain smaller groups. e.g. IDPs in Mogadishu having more than 25% malnutrition. (UNDP 1998a:45) What emerges is a wide regional and social variation with emergency conditions persisting in pockets, but big areas

not an emergency; and even in the worst areas people with money could always buy food. UNDP did not define a level for what constitutes an emergency, but remarked “In almost any other country these indicators would be considered a national emergency. Yet Somalia’s prolonged humanitarian crisis has redefined what is considered an emergency there - only outright famine conditions and deadly epidemics generate an humanitarian response. Nonetheless, the chronically low levels of human development in Somalia constitute a long-term emergency.” (ibid, p. 22)

In Afghanistan the emergency unfolded on top of permanent poor health and malnutrition producing a signal ‘overload’ the medical indicators were unable to capture; the social dynamics of the crisis remained in the dark. The opposite problem was experienced in Kosova where epidemics and starvation were avoided by aid, and the emergency therefore produced a health signal too weak to be audible by medical indicators. Adding up the medical conditions of sick and hungry individuals will not necessarily correlate with the social dynamics of an emergency event. Poor health and starvation are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of an emergency.

4. Violence

I would propose that violence is a necessary yet still not sufficient condition for constituting an emergency event. Violence may be defined without any normative or discursive references as the “unwanted physical interference by groups and/or individuals with the bodies of others...death is the potential ultimate consequence of violence.” (Keane, 1996:67) For our present purposes two additions should be made. First: nature cannot be violent in the precise meaning of John Keane’s definition, but from the point of view of the victims of an emergency the *forces of nature* can very well act violently and cause ‘unwanted physical interference’ and may be added to ‘groups and/or individuals’ in the definition of violence. Second: this definition should include *threats of violence* to make people move, and/or destruction of their assets. Serbs perpetrating ethnic cleansing in Kosova did not touch the bodies of all expelled Albanians, but enough were killed to force the rest to leave. The misfortune of victims of violence is often worsened by famine and epidemics, but not necessarily. For instance in Kosova this did not happen, whereas in southern Somalia 1991-92 occupation and looting by militias precipitated the hunger crisis, and in the Great Lakes 1994, where violent ethnic cleansing crammed people into camps and subsequently 50,000 died of infectious diseases. (Joint Evaluation 1996)

Obviously not all violence constitute an emergency. All compilations of war statistics struggle to distinguish crime from 'political' violence and civilian deaths from 'battle-deaths'. In South Africa, for instance, more than 250.000 people were killed in twenty years from 1976 to 1996, (Tin 1998:359) nevertheless this terrifying number was considered, and still is, as 'crime', not war. Many cities in the world, including Cape Town and Durban suffer more than 2,000 murders a year, yet South Africa is not included by SIPRI in their list of countries at war. How to draw a line between civilian killed because of war and 'direct' battle-deaths is an even more contentious. SIPRI, the world's leading authority on counting wars quoted in their 1993 entry for Afghanistan the number of total deaths as "1.000.000 (estimated direct and indirect deaths 1978-1990)." (SIPRI 1993:123) Their 1995 entry just two years later quoted the total deaths for 1978 - 1994 as ">14.000." (SIPRI, 1995:31) Looking just a little closer at some of the available figures of violent death and displacement in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova during the 1990s may hint at the tremendous problems in defining an emergency quantitatively terms of violence.

The number of people estimated to have been killed in Somalia vary widely. The UN estimated that 300.000 people died of hunger and more than 250.000 lives were saved in the Somalia hunger crisis. (Boutros 1996:5) These figures are criticised by independent researchers. The purely humanitarian assistance up to December 1992 is estimated to have saved 90.000 lives while 230.000 died. The American military Operation Restore Hope from December 1992 is estimated to have saved 'only' 10.000 lives. (Maren 1997:214) Some seem to forget the bloody civil war in the north 1988-91 in which Hargeisa was destroyed by Siad Barre's airpower, and "tens of thousands were killed" (Samatar 2000:57) and hundreds of thousands fled to Ethiopia, and it certainly did not provoke an international humanitarian response. The destruction of Mogadishu between the Abgal forces of Ali Mahdi and the Hawiye forces of Farah Aided in 1992 claimed 3-4,000 fatalities (SIPRI) while Africa Watch puts the number at 14,000 (quoted by Patman 1995:97). In 1994 PIOOM, the peace research institute of Leiden University, estimated the number of war deaths in 1993 at more than 6.000 and the cumulative number of war deaths in Somalia to be 350.000. (Newsletter, Summer 1994, vol. 6, no 1:21) Casualties the next years 1993-99 could have been more than 1000 per year; American forces trying to capture warlord Farah Aided on October 3, 1993 killed "perhaps 700 Somalis" in one day (Maren 1997:217). By 1992 around 1 million Somalis had fled the country, mainly to Kenya (400.000) and Ethiopia (600.000); by 1997 155,000 had repatriated from Kenya and 400.000 from Ethiopia. In 1997 torrential rains in Ethiopia and southern Somalia created disastrous floods claiming 2.200 lives and displacing 250.000 people.

UN presented very big and non-specific numbers for suffering in Afghanistan (as they did in the case of Somalia one year previously). In his foreword to the 1992 UN Consolidated Appeal for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance for Afghanistan (June-December 1992) Boutros Ghali stated that during the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s “well over a million people [were] killed, over two million disabled, nearly six million refugees in neighbouring countries, and two million internally displaced persons.” In 1998 UNHCR put the number of ‘perished’ Afghans during the 1980s at 1,2 million (Regional consultations in population displacements in Central Asia, Ashgabat, 3-4- March 1998). PIOOM puts the number of killed in the Afghan war between one and two millions (Newsletter, Summer 1994, vol. 6, no 1:21). These unspecified figures collected under extremely difficult circumstances with a tremendous political big-number bias became almost axiomatic; they should be treated with some suspicion.

Figures quoted for war-casualties during the 1990s are substantially lower. PIOOM estimated the number of war deaths in 1993 to be more than 5.000. The well-informed Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid (Rashid 2000) estimated 25.000 people were killed in Kabul by indiscriminate rocket bombardment by Hekmatyar’s forces in 1994; in March 1995 3.000 Taliban forces were killed during attacks on Shindand airbase defended by Ismail Khan’s forces; in May-July 1997 more than 3.000 Taliban force were killed in Mazar-i-Sharif; next year 1998 on retaking Mazar the Taliban killed 6-8.000 civilians in revenge; in October-November 1998 around 2.000 Taliban forces were killed in attacks on Rabbani’s forces in the North East. This adds up to around 45.000 war deaths and do not include civilian casualties. In February-March 1998 a powerful earth-quake hit north east Afghanistan around Rostaq claiming 6.000 lives.

Figures for internally displaced persons were mainly collected by aid agencies and should be more comprehensive than casualty figures. Fighting in Kabul 1994 made 300.000 flee to camps in Jalalabad; in 1996 50.000 people fled fighting on the Shomali plain, one of Afghanistan’s most fertile areas; by mid 1997 UNHCR estimated the number of IDPs in Afghanistan to be 1,2 million (UNHCR 1997: 107). In September 1997, 180.000 civilians fled from the Shomali when Masood pressed southwards towards Kabul; when the Taliban pressed Masood back two years later in 1999, devastating once again irrigation, orchards, houses and infrastructure, another 100.000 people were displaced. By 1999 more than 750.000 people were displaced by recent fighting and 1 million people suffering from shortages in central Afghanistan. (Rashid 2000:64,67)

The numbers of refugees is fairly reliable as it was based on registration by the UNHCR of the number of people they assisted. During the 1980s a staggering 6,2 million Afghans (out of a population of 16-20 million) became refugees, mainly fleeing to Pakistan and Iran. This constituted the biggest case-load of refugees in the world, outnumbering the combined number of all refugees in Africa and more than one-third of all refugees in the world. While 2,7 mill repatriated 1992-97 (ibid, 145), in particular right after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, new groups fled to Pakistan. In 1997 2 million Afghans still lived in Iran (also hosting half a million Iraqis) and 1,2 million in Pakistan (697,000 females and 503.000 males (UNHCR 1997:57,63).

Figures of people killed in the Kosova war had one year after the war ended been substantially reduced to less than 10.000 killed by the Serbian forces and below 1.000 killed by the NATO bombings. Displacement in Kosova came in three waves, In 1998, 300.000 people out of 2 million inhabitants were displaced fleeing attacks by Serb forces, about half of them seeking refuge outside Kosova, and the rest displaced in the mountains and forests inside Kosova (Troebst 1999). The second wave of expulsion began immediately after the NATO bombing campaign began on 24 March 1999; within nine weeks 850.000 had been forced to leave Kosova. When KFOR moved into Kosova June 1999 followed by almost all the Albanian refugees, a third wave of refugees fled Kosova into Serbia. It had reached 100.000 Serbs by May 2000 leaving less than half of the pre-war Serb population in Kosova. Figures are from the UNHCR and generally considered reliable.

Comparable flows have occurred only twice during 1990s. In April 1991 some 1.4 million Kurds fled from northern Iraq into Iran, while half a million headed for the Turkish border. Between 14-18 July 1994 about 850.000 persons walked across the border from Rwanda to Goma in Congo. (Surkhe 2000,note5,p.14) Discussing these massive emergencies Astri Surkhe notes that they “are historically rare - while three have occurred in the last decade, in a slightly longer historical perspective they are infrequent and it is unclear if recent occurrences constitute a trend.” (Surkhe 2000:xii).

However, even the most perfectly well-documented figures for violent death and displacement are not sufficient indicators of an emergency event. The notion of some kind of objective correlation of deaths and emergencies is misleading. Even high levels of violence may not constitute an emergency event, for instance in Sri Lanka, Algeria and Ethiopia/Eritrea conflicts claimed very high casualties, reportedly more than 100.000 in each case, yet they do not figure as emergencies together with Somalia or Kosova. Why? The most persuasive answer, in my opinion, is they did not provoke and/or permit a response from the other

actors in an emergency event: donor governments, and humanitarian agencies. Without very large flows of refugees and displaced persons threatening the stability in neighbouring countries and other national security concerns, without media pictures creating a cause in the public, and without access for humanitarian agencies there is no emergency event. It is beside the point to search for a quantitative threshold of violence constituting an emergency event. There is no direct connection, I would argue, between levels of violence and emergency events.

A far more compelling quantitative correlation, I suspect, could be demonstrated between the number of international NGOs initiating projects in a disaster zone and that disaster becoming an emergency event. In Afghanistan the number of INGOs in 1998 were more than 150, in the Great Lakes 1994 it reached 250, and in Kosova/Albania 1999 the number of international NGOs exceeded 350. These might be extreme cases, so the threshold should probably be a bit lower; I would suggest that *a disaster attracting a certain number of INGOs, for instance one hundred, counts as an emergency event*, irrespectively of casualty figures and numbers of starving, sick, and displaced people. This is not because some lives should count for less than others, but simply because the true scope of the social event of violent death and displacement we call an ‘emergency’ involves much more than a disaster hitting a group of people somewhere. Included in an ‘emergency’ are also the state in which the disaster struck, the donor states and public, and a multitude of agencies. It is the synergy of all these actors that produce the *emergency event*.

5. Life-impact

Four conclusions emerge from the above discussion: (i) national sums and averages of health cannot identify a disaster let alone an emergency event; (ii) neither epidemics nor starvation are necessary conditions of an emergency event; (iii) violence is a necessary but not sufficient condition of an emergency event; and (iv) violence causing death and/or displacement, and more than one hundred international NGOs active in the disaster zone are the necessary and sufficient conditions for constituting an emergency event. Humanitarian aid projects should be viewed as integral to the emergency event, and not as external activities arriving at the scene after the disaster. Input from donors, implemented by various agencies is part of the emergency. This activity has a ‘life-impact’ by which I understand the direct impact on the lives of individual beneficiaries, i.e. the outcome of actions trying to avert or ameliorate the effect of a disaster, assessed with reference to a specific disaster-population. To assess the impact on national or state level we will have to use completely different indicators, considered in the following chapter.

What is the impact of one particular aid project on the people living in the area of intervention? That is the simple, yet difficult question of crucial importance to any discussion of specific projects. The general impact of aid ought, of course, also be impossible to discuss without reference to individual projects and their interaction with specific local circumstances. Parameters of impact follows from the characteristic of the emergency: diseases must be countered by securing *health*, hunger must be countered by improving *livelihood*, and violence must be countered by *protection*. In other words, to assess life-impact of a specific humanitarian assistance one should assess the impact on health, livelihood, and protection of individuals caught by a disaster.

The three parameters of life-impact and the three indicators of disasters discussed above relate directly to each other at the level of individuals: health to health, livelihood to hunger, and protection to violence. Violence is the main cause of an emergency; protection is necessary for humanitarian assistance to have a positive impact. Finally, the engagement of a certain number of international NGOs in the disaster is a necessary condition for turning the disaster into an emergency event and for implementing humanitarian assistance. Chapter Five below attempts to assess the impact of thirty-five aid projects in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova. The project sample runs from ‘pure’ humanitarian aid over long-term development aid to risk aid integrating a humanitarian mandate with national security concerns, implemented by a range of local, international and Danish agencies. The methodology used to assess the impact of these projects will be discussed further in Chapter Two and Five. Below I shall very briefly consider a few examples of literature relevant to the study of local impact on health, livelihood, and protection.

Health

The public health methodology of impact assessments is highly developed; see, *inter alia* the research results from the Bandim Health Project in Guinea-Bissau. (Aaby 1999) Numerous evaluations of humanitarian assistance has included public health issues with the focus on effectiveness, i.e. how well (timely, sufficient, equitable etc.) did the response live up to the mandate and goals of the implementing agencies. Only the largest and most ambitious evaluations include assessments of the “post-distribution-impact” because data-collection and time-frames are normally restricted for practical reasons; see, for instance “Evaluation of the Inter-Agency Flood-Response Operation in Somalia 1997”, (Bradbury 1998); “The Kosova Refugee Crisis. An independent evaluation of UNHCR’s preparedness and response”, by Astri Surkhe et. al, UNHCR 2000; and the Joint Rwanda Evaluation, Danida

1996. Public health has not been the focus of the present investigation, and only very simple criteria of effectiveness of health inputs such as distribution of medicines, provision of treatment, therapeutic and supplementary feeding, and improvement of sanitation has been used. Measurements of post-distribution health impact falls outside the scope of this work.

Livelihood

Assessments of the impact of development aid on livelihood has attracted a wide and sophisticated attention. Economic studies has developed methodologies for both micro-economic analysis trying to link aid-inputs of individual projects with changes in livelihood at household and village level, as well as for macro-economic analysis of the contribution of aid to national development. Research carried out by the World Bank has been trend-setting in this field. Studies of the impact of humanitarian aid is a smaller and younger academic field; for a good introduction consult the collection of papers edited by Joanna Macrea (co-editor of *Disasters*, one of the leading journals in the field) and Anthony Zwi: *War and Hunger, Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, Zed 1994. The main achievement of this group of scholars undoubtedly was to drive home the complex, political, and conflictual dimensions of emergencies. Chapter Two will peruse that argument. The notion of livelihood itself has also been developed in the direction of conflict, instability, and de-traditionalising; see, for instance, publications from the Livelihood Project, Copenhagen (Fredriksen 1997, Sørensen 1999). The assessment of life-impact is not ment to measure living standards understood in any economic sense; the indicators are not as broad as, for instance, the UNDP Human Development Index. It is focused entirely on the vulnerability and security of individual persons and hence no economic calculations of impact have been attempted. Assessments remain based on simple registrations within the disaster-zone(s) of food-supply, supplies of means to produce food such as seeds, hand-tools, fertiliser, improvement of employment, income-generation, and provision of education. No economic indicators are included in the assessments and all questions of funding are bypassed.

Protection

The Red Cross movement and many other agencies are grappling with the question of protection as a key objective of humanitarian assistance (cf. Dan Church Aid 1997, Danish Red Cross 1995, ICRC 1997). As long as it was an enemy state, party to the Geneva Convention and obliged to observe the protection of prisoners-of-war etc., things were clearly stated. Today however, more often the threat is one's "own" state, and then the Geneva Convention has a problem: which rules should apply to rebels treated as criminals

by a state at war with its own citizens? What should be the reference, or bench-mark, for assessing protection? Assessments of the impact of humanitarian assistance on the protection of individuals has generally attracted least attention in the literature on humanitarian aid. Research on complex emergencies almost by definition address the problem of protection as a *general* problem. To my knowledge, no methodologies comparable to public health analysis or economic analysis exists on how to assess impact on protection by *specific* projects. Protection has high stakes for agencies, donor-governments, host-governments, and last but not least the victims of an emergency event. Yet, few humanitarian aid projects directly target protection or plan how they will deal with violence, they simply consider themselves to be non-violent and do not square up to the violence endemic to the disaster-zone they work in. The three evaluations mentioned above all address the question of protection and their findings are quite critical of the performance of the aid agencies. In most projects the issue of protection unfortunately only figure as protection of the *expatriate* aid-workers themselves, to put it mildly, a rather limited understanding of the problem of protection.

Protection against violence, expulsion, intimidation, looting of assets, and denial of access are all topical in complex emergencies, and impinge directly on livelihood and health. Protection is a difficult challenge for aid agencies because the local state (fragments) may put beneficiaries at risk; how can an aid agency provide protection outside or even against a local state? Central for the assessment of protection is to clarify the relations of the state with the intended beneficiaries and the aid agencies. Attempts by humanitarian agencies at protection include reconciliation, establishing practical co-operation, dividing hostile groups, arrangements with local militias, negotiations with states, and forms of co-operation with ‘own’ military forces. The impact on protection may be positive or negative.

Let me sum up: the over-all impact on individuals of a particular humanitarian aid project is called “life-impact”. The three parameters of health, livelihood, and protection contribute to the life-impact. The assessment of thirty-five projects presented below in Chapter Five is an attempt to operationalize this model. To do so each project has been assessed for positive, negative or nil impact on health, livelihood, and protection according to the following criteria:

Health: Impact by supply of medicines, medical
and psychological treatment,
therapeutic feeding, sanitation

Livelihood: Impact by supply of food, supplies of means to produce
food (seeds, tools, etc.),
employment, income, education

Protection: Impact by protection against violence,
intimidation, and exclusion;
protection of assets and access

2. COMPLEX EMERGENCIES, STATE-IMPACT

1. Identifying complex emergencies

In Chapter One I suggested that an *emergency event* should be defined as a disaster causing violent death and displacement, *including* the response by international humanitarian agencies. I discussed how well certain public health indicators could identify emergencies, and finally proposed three parameters, health, livelihood, and protection, to assess the ‘life-impact’ of humanitarian aid on individuals. In this chapter the focus will shift to the state affected by an emergency event. Violence and civil war will be central, both to identify emergencies and to assess the possible peace-inducing impact of humanitarian aid.

In the 1980s emergencies were still mainly understood in natural terms, for instance as “desertification” in the Sahel or “draught” in Ethiopia. However, with the concurrence of natural disasters and civil wars the emphasis of institutional assistance and academic explanation gradually shifted from nature to conflict. Sudan and Somalia became a defining events for the notion of ‘complex emergencies’ because messy civil wars so blatantly fuelled devastating hunger crises. ‘Complex emergencies’ became established as a convenient catch-all name for emergencies that was neither caused by nature, nor had a short duration, and the term thus articulated two characteristics that seemed to define most emergencies in the 1990s: an emergency event which had winners and was ongoing.

(i) A complex emergency is propelled by civil war, a deep social conflict, which produces *winners*, groups benefiting from the emergency, and not only the losers associated with the somewhat simplistic view of the “pure” natural disaster emergency.

(ii) A complex emergency has *no clear end*. A complex emergency is not a short blip on the curve of national development, but an ongoing social predicament; it does not in any way conform to the ‘accident’ understanding of a natural disaster.

The versatile concept of complex emergencies quickly began filtering from academia into institutional usage; it was used for instance by UNHCR already in 1993. (An Executive Committee statement, 4 June 1993) The notions of emergency events and complex

emergencies differ in two respects. 'Emergency event' highlights the synergy of disaster and response, while 'complex emergency' stresses the political and economic factors creating and maintaining disasters and their long duration. A complex emergency attracting no international response would not be an emergency event; the disaster 'input' of an emergency event do not necessarily have to be a complex emergency, it can also be a natural disaster.

All three countries in our sample fit the criteria for complex emergencies in both cut-off years; Kosova in 1992 however, as part of fragmenting Yugoslavia. In 1992 and 1999 individuals in all three countries experienced civil wars with violent death and displacement caused by groups planning and executing the violence and benefiting unashamedly from the suffering of others. The emergencies were ongoing and the prospect of peace and stability seemed to be as elusive and remote in 1992 as in 1999; they were complex emergencies.

Civil war cycles in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova

Five cycles of violence can be distinguished in Somalia. First a period 1977-91 of international war between Somalia and Ethiopia linking Cold War rivalry with local irredentist and separatist guerrilla-wars.¹ Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977, using the Western Somali Liberation Front in their attempt to annex Ethiopian Ogaden; Ethiopia supported the Somalia National Movement trying to secede north-west Somalia from the rest of Somalia. Second, a phase 1988-91 of frontal civil war in north-west Somalia, initiated by the rapprochement between Addis Abeba and Mogadishu, directly intensifying the war in the north and ending with the declaration of independence of Somaliland May 18 1991. Third, a phase 1991-92 of frontal civil war in the south leading to the overthrow of Somali dictator since 1969 Siad Barre, widespread destruction of agricultural areas in the south causing famine and finally the destruction of Mogadishu in heavy fighting November 1991 to February 1992. Fourth, a phase of intervention civil war 1992-95 with the UN military intervention UNOSOM 1, August-December 1992, the US intervention UNITAF, December 1992 - May 1993 (some troops under direct US command remained in Somalia until March 1994), and UNOSOM 2, May 1993 - March 1995. Finally a fifth

¹ This rough classification of civil wars follows the typology developed in Tin 1998 and summarized in Tin 1998b; four types of civil wars are proposed according to the type of weapons used by the groups attacking the state: 'house-hold weapons' = intifada; light weapons = guerrilla war; heavy weapons = frontal civil war; sea- and airborne weapons = intervention civil war

phase from 1995 to the present with relative calm in the north and frontal civil war in the south between several clan-aligned forces, to some extent proxies of regional security interests of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, and Libya. The first four phases produced large refugee flows. Somalia became a complex emergency at least from 1988 with the war in the North; it continues to be a complex emergency. When NGOs began arriving in Mogadishu and the south in 1992 Somalia became an emergency event, with the continued deep international aid involvement it continues to be an emergency event.

In Afghanistan four cycles of violence may be distinguished since the fall of the kingdom in 1973. First a cycle of coups in 1973, 1978, and 1979 with escalating violence; then a terrible cycle of guerrilla civil war 1980 - 1992 with the mujahidin guerrillas attacking the Soviet invasion forces and the state forces of the Afghan Communists with sophisticated light weapons; thirdly the inconclusive cycles of frontal civil war 1992-1996 between mujahidin armies using heavy weapons and an insignificant number of old Soviet aircraft; and finally from 1996 to the present a more concentrated if inconclusive phase of frontal civil war with the emergence of the Taliban in 1994 and since 1996 firmly settled in Kabul controlling some three-quarters of Afghanistan, pitted against the Northern Alliance led by Rabbani and Masood lodged in the Pansjir Valley, Badakshan, and Takhar. All phases but the first have produced extremely large flows of refugees and internally displaced persons. Afghanistan became a complex emergency before the Soviet invasion with the escalating civil war in 1978-79 (and before the concept was coined); it continues to be a complex emergency. Afghanistan became an emergency event in the mid 1980s during the Cold War; it continues to attract international aid on a large scale and constitute an emergency event.

In Kosova four phases of violence may be distinguished. First a cycle of repression from 1991 to 1997 with the Serbian imposed apartheid-like marginalization of the Albanian majority in the shadow of the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. The Kosova-Albanians responded non-violently with the development of parallel Albanian state institutions including a referendum for the independence of Kosova. Second, a phase 1997-99 of UCK terrorism provoking major violent reactions from the Serbian forces leading up to the NATO ultimatum of Rambouillet in February 1999. The third phase March-June 1999 was the highly asymmetrical intervention civil war of NATO bombardments of Serbia including Kosova, and Serbian expulsion and displacement of most Albanians from Kosova. Finally a fourth phase of cease-fire 1999 to the present enforced by the KFOR/UNMIK protectorate witnessing ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Albanians against Serbs, Romas and others. All phases have produced large flows of displaced persons but

in particular the third phase. The area of Kosova became a complex emergency and an emergency event only when violence escalated during 1998 and increasing numbers of NGOs began projects there. By mid 2000 the situation remained essentially a complex emergency, and although many NGOs moved out Kosova it also remained an emergency event.

| | 1992 | | 1999 | |
|-------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| | Emerg. event | Complex Em. | Emerg. event | Complex Em. |
| Somalia | X | X | X | X |
| Afghanistan | X | X | X | X |
| Kosova | (X)* | (X)* | X | X |

* As part of Yugoslavia

From humanitarian aid to risk aid

When hunger, disease, and displacement deliberately are used as weapons by a state against groups of its own population, then food aid, medical relief, and protection by default becomes weapons as well regardless of donor intentions. The discovery of winners of emergencies put a bomb under the notion of impartiality as a ground rule for humanitarian aid and the extended time-frame of emergencies shot down notions of linear development. In their important book on hunger and war Macrae and Zwi criticises,

“the fundamental misconception within the international community of the nature of complex emergencies, which systematically ignores the inherently political dimensions of these disasters...Humanitarian crisis are intentionally created, and powerful political and economic pressures strive to ensure that they are sustained in order to achieve their objectives of cultural genocide and political and economic power. It is this potent combination of political and economic factors driving and maintaining disaster-producing conflicts which creates what are increasingly referred to as ‘complex emergencies’”.²

In this situation *any* help will have a bearing on the outcome of the conflict. When, say, planes land in northern Afghanistan with food and medicine for civilians in the Northern Alliance (NA)-controlled areas it is tilting the total balance of power by giving the NA access to complex social resources. Humanitarian aid, or what Mark Duffield calls “the

² Macrea and Zwi, 1994:25,21. In Somalia, for example, it was clear that the crisis killing perhaps 400.000 people in 1992 also produced winners: "Faction leaders, freelance gunmen, and merchants had grown rich as a result of famine and did not want to see and end to the chaos and anarchy that had characterized Somalia for the previous two years." (Makinda, 1993:74)

internationalisation of public welfare”,³ imposed on a state by circumventing official channels and distributing aid behind the lines to insurgent groups, in itself does not constitute a complex emergency. What distinguishes this kind of humanitarian aid from traditional relief aid is the element of coercion that may be used to enforce a policy of universal human rights, including the right to food attached to national interests. It is humanitarian but also intervention potentially transgressing other’s national sovereignty while defending *own* national security interests; it pressurises the relation between foreign states and their citizens, ultimately building up “a new international framework for military involvement, albeit justified under a new humanitarian rubric.” (Macrae, 1994:9). This is what I propose to call *risk aid*, discussed in Chapter Three.

Neither aid nor weapons arrive unaccompanied: from NGO-personnel in white four-wheel drive cars to NATO-troops their presence embody the concerns and legitimacy bestowed by the international community upon their own intervention. What the humanitarian ‘weapons’ of aid have in common with real military weapons is a strategic reach going beyond land based weapons; they can traverse the fronts of a war fought with heavy weapons. This reach is not only technological, but essentially political: deployed in a civil war they will in most cases establish a profound asymmetry between the defending state and the attacking party having access to superior weapons. But crucially the attackers in the civil war will get access to the humanitarian support and violent capacity of a consortium of friendly states and gain implicit or explicit recognition of the international community.

Complex emergencies such as Somalia challenged social science and the humanities to understand violence and conflict as not just neatly either state-to-state or person-to-person issues but constitutive of all social relations, and secondly to understand and acknowledge the message of contingency and non-linear causality. This amounted to a fundamental critique of development thinking as the very embodiment of linear-causal, conflict-ignoring, state-centred, and progress-celebrating theory and practice. The wide-ranging search for explanations and cures discredited ‘prime-mover’ type theories whether economic, political, or cultural, and led on to analysis that was eclectic, and blended different conceptual elements of complexity and contingency together. (Goodhand 1999:14).

³ Duffield, 1994:64; see also his sharp statement "The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid" in *Disasters*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1996).

2. Evaluating the impact of aid in conflicts

Translating these new insights into a rethinking of how to evaluate the impact of aid projects did not prove to be easy. Solutions to three concentric problems had to be found: (i) how to reflect contingency; (ii) how to trace the impact of projects on conflicts; and (iii) how to assess the impact of individual projects on large-scale development.

Evaluations and contingency

Taking non-linear thinking to the brink, as French philosophers Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari do in their 'nomadology' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) the quest for causality, for 'root and stem' explanations, becomes a fundamentally illusory pursuit. Instead they argue for a 'rhizomatic' understanding where all social actions are perceived to be interconnected in a flat, chaotic web of rhizomes. They argue that causal analysis following formal logic will produce little insight into the contingency of social processes, but rather be part of a practice of appropriation of certain domains of social life. Their nomadology have, in my opinion, an encyclopaedic range of inspiring suggestions, all explicitly dis-operational or anti-state. This, I believe, is the conundrum of out-and-out contingent and non-linear explanations: in the end they must bomb the headquarters and destroy any firm reference to discrete historical phenomena; their nomadology is 'useless'.

How far notions of non-linear causality can be incorporated into evaluations is unclear, but not very far, I suspect. Evaluations have an ultra-explicit reference to narrow slices of social practice. It is an academic genre by definition part of a practice of appropriation of certain domains of social life. Evaluations have an institutional addressee demanding findings that are operational. For instance, the landmark 'Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda', stated in the terms of reference, "The main objective of the evaluation is to draw lessons from the experience in Rwanda that will be relevant for future complex emergencies as well as for the operation in Rwanda and the region, including their prevention, the preparations of and provision of emergency assistance, and the transition from relief to development." (Joint Evaluation, Vol.5:70) Any kind of evaluation of assistance, whether academic, operational, or political is confronted with the problem of causality; indeed the very concept of 'impact' implies causality between a certain input and a certain output. It is assumed that inputs and outputs can be isolated in a natural

science-like all-things-equal manner from a complex social situation. Complexity is disaggregated into a set of variables that can be tested producing coarse-grained approximations of the rhizomatic network of social relations. Consultants may slice up complexity and ask, for instance, what was the impact of delivering thousand tonnes of food to a certain group of people? The problem is whether the knowledge produced in fact will be operational, or too little of the unintended impact has been captured to make a quick and simple assessment useful. The historical reality of contingency precluding firm input-output knowledge and the institutional demand paying for operational knowledge pull in opposite directions; usually the institutional side pulls stronger.

Evaluation of (economic) development

Danida has produced a booklet with evaluation guidelines, and when they reach the question of impact they hesitate for a moment. “The combined impact [intended and unintended, positive and negative effects] is the result of complex causal conditions that are difficult to analyse. It may be especially problematic to prove that observable changes can be ascribed to a given aid intervention.” (Danida, Feb. 1999:56) In fact evaluations seldom reach the point of assessing ‘post-distribution’ impact, but deal narrowly with cost-efficiency, effectiveness of implementation, relevance of targets, and the perennial question of institutional co-ordination. Such analysis of individual projects and agencies have almost exclusively been carried out as evaluations by consultants and others working for institutions and paid to assess impact within certain (narrow) terms of reference under severe time-pressure, by necessity reducing wider questions of causality to practical questions of poor data, lack of control-groups, unclear base-lines and soft success-criteria.

However, two analyses of the impact of (Danish) development projects attempts a broader interpretation. In his wide-ranging critique of Danish development aid the Danish development-economist Martin Paldam (Paldam 1997) employs cost-benefit analysis and macro-economic calculations. He arrives, like the World Bank, at the conclusion that while it was possible to show whether individual aid projects were beneficial at micro-level, it was not possible to find any evidence in the economic data of a corresponding impact at the macro-level of national economies; the so-called micro-macro problem. In Paldam’s interpretation this was not due to indeterminate causality, but to poor governance and other dynamic relations explainable in theory, but not (yet) measurable by quantitative economic models.

In the “Danish NGO Impact Study,” undertaken by Steen Folke, Peter Oakley and a team from the Centre for Development Research in Copenhagen (Folke 1999; Oakley 1999), critical of the cost-benefit analysis and employing participant-observation methods, they arrive at a similar, slightly disappointing conclusion. “Impact proved as *elusive* a concept in these other studies [of project-impact] as it has been in the Danish NGO Impact Study. Even the two in-depth studies in Bangladesh and Tanzania, which concentrated on one long-term project, found little conclusive evidence of long-term impact. This was despite using different approaches to their inquiries, and our methodological distinction between immediate and long-term impact.”(Oakley 1999:24) Both Paldam and Folke analysed the impact of development projects in countries of relative political calm with clear, well-tested models according to success-criteria broadly definable in economic terms, but they could not trace any conclusive impact of aid projects. Beyond the immediate beneficiaries and the short term impact became invisible. It will come as no big surprise that tracing the impact of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies confronts the researcher with a challenge. It is difficult to determine base-line and time frame, it is impossible to tell what the outcome had been with different interventions, and the criteria of success are “soft” such as reconciliation, empowerment, and sustainability. There are few hard data comparable to economic series, and no really well-tested models for interpreting data.

Evaluation of humanitarian assistance

A recent volume of the journal *Den Nye Verden*, published by Danida’s research institute, was devoted fully to evaluations, yet only a single article on evaluation of human rights projects touched upon problems relevant to evaluation of humanitarian assistance. It concluded, “The perspectives of conflict and power are seriously flawed in both dynamic and conventional practices of evaluation.” (Madsen 1998:151) despite their centrality to assistance in conflicts. The only assessment of the impact of Danish humanitarian assistance, as far as I am aware, is a eight volume evaluation of Danish humanitarian assistance, commissioned by Danida, written by eight international teams, and published in 1999. Despite its size and the expertise of the authors it is very thin when it comes to assessments of impact. The synthesis report noted that quantitative data by which to measure impact were difficult to obtain and arrived at the vague and generalised conclusion that, “Impact has generally been positive, so far as it has been possible to assess.”(Danida 1999d:35) The major problem remained how to link the impact of each individual project by a chain of causal relations to the general context of conflict. The evaluations reduced the problem by making the chain very short and only look at the

impact on the immediate beneficiaries in very narrow time-frame. It is found in all cases that war and general insecurity lessens the impact of humanitarian assistance, which as general observation hardly comes as a big surprise. The impact of the assessed projects upon the conflict is not considered. Yet, this is exactly the crucial point if we want to know whether any given project has a positive peace-inducing impact.

3. Conflicts, actors, spaces

Violent conflicts killing and displacing *people* is the central aspect of emergencies; violent conflict breaking up *states*, civil war, is the central aspect of *complex* emergencies. Civil war compels social scientists to ask new questions about the state, which are pertinent also to states without civil war: What is the ‘glue’ that make citizens stick together even in deeply divided societies? Which historical forces can dissolve this glue? Where are states likely to fragment? Existing literature on civil war (cf. Tin 1998) often has a rather limited vision, focusing on the parts and the splitting but almost completely ignoring the whole. Although the state was seen by most observers as a defining element of civil war the understanding of *the state itself* was often narrow and descriptive.

Rephrased in a more general way, a theory of civil war able to capture the dynamic of complex emergencies must confront the basic questions of the *subjectivity* of the actors (‘the glue’), the *violence* of the conflict (‘the solvent’), and the *spaces* (‘the lines of fracture’). *Actors* span from the human individual to the state. How to conceptualise the subjectivity of the state was a major problem, suggestions ranged from of a neo-Hegelian historical subjectivity to the de-centred a-historical subjectivity proposed by Foucault and many others. Obviously there are many intermediate actors between the individual human being and the state, different groups of people and institutions, for example the army. *Violence* is defined by space and subjectivity: between two states it is war, between state and citizen is a relation of rule and resistance. The *spaces* of the state-citizen opposition is clearly polarised in the human body and the state territory; there is no violence not touching the body, and no state without a territory.

| | | |
|------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| Register | <u>Man</u> | <u>State</u> |
| <u>Actors</u> | CITIZEN ----- | GOVERNMENT |
| <u>Conflicts</u> | RULE/RESISTANCE----- | WAR |
| <u>Spaces</u> | BODY----- | TERRITORY |

Between the state and the citizen or any group of citizens, a condition of potential or explosive violence reigns. This is a common condition to all states. When it comes to survival the state will use violence against its citizens. Of course, “the question, how much difference a political system can tolerate and still survive,” (du Toit, 1996:6) is answered differently by each historical state. We like to think a democratic state is strong because it can accommodate opposition, while a totalitarian state cracks like glass, or that even state-rule can be abolished altogether by a proper dose of civil society communitarianism. Yet, no state is likely to survive *without* violence as self-defence in the most extreme situations. Civil war can be thus defined in the most general terms by the relations of attack and defence between state and subject. When subjects violently contest rule the situation moves towards civil war. Armed resistance to rule establishes fronts between the state and sub-state groups, the state fragments.

Civil war blurs the polarity of person-state in the three registers of actors, conflicts, and spaces. In order to interpret civil war beyond the simple dichotomy of attack and defence of state rule, I suggest the vast 'strategic terrain' between human body and state territory should be searched for 'bundles' of actors, conflicts and spaces: the social fronts of attack and defence in civil war.

The 'bundles' of state, ethnicity, town, and house

“A whole history remains to be written of *spaces* - which would at the same time be the history of *powers* (both of these terms in the plural) - from the great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of the habitat.” (Michel Foucault)⁴

The nation-state does not rule free-floating individuals, but individuals structured also by forces *other* than the state. Quite distinct historical processes are active simultaneously, all with diverse departures, trajectories, forms of identity-formation, and very different promises for the future; they cannot in any meaningful way be reduced to one dominant logic like for instance “nationalism”, “ethnic-strife”, “class-struggle” or “patriarchy”. Some of these forces have historical roots much older than the nation-state and they may all threaten to fragment the state. The challenge when trying to gauge the

⁴ 1977, in a preface to a French edition of Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon*; Foucault, 1980:149; italics in original.

impact of aid projects is to account for the multi-dimensional context, complex individual identities that touch upon all these factors and are shaped by them.

The engine of a complex emergency is civil war, the state is under attack. This violent reversal of rule between state and citizen cannot be conceived in any monolithic manner but rather as fluid alliances of institutions and individuals fighting on several battle-grounds each in different ways giving the opponents advantages and handicaps. I suggest that four ‘bundles’ or sets of discrete spaces, actors and conflicts can be identified:

(i) The “*house-bundle*” includes the space of house, home, family, privacy; the actors of men, women, generations; and the conflict of patriarchy, the struggle against male dominance.

The relation between person and house-space is *organic*. Belonging to the house are the persons ordered as patriarch, wife, and children. The categories of the house refer to biological differences revealed at birth and marriage, and defined by society as gender and generation. Outside the house is the wilderness or public space. The organic relation is in-active: we *are* the family.

(ii) The “*town-bundle*” includes the space of town, market, commercial networks; the actors of rich, poor, professions, classes; and the conflict of accumulation of wealth, the struggle of classes, against marginalisation.

The relation between person and town-space is *functional*: Individuals are related to town or non-town by their functions. The functional relation is not pro-active nor retro-active, but active: we are what we *do*.

(iii) The “*ethnic-bundle*” includes the space of homeland, holy land, root, grave; the actors of we, they, insiders, outsiders, believers, infidels; and the conflict of inclusion and exclusion, the struggle for bonding and purity, and true belonging.

The relation between ethnic space and person is *essentialistic*, forged by the belief in a determinant essence of the body: ethnicity, faith, decent, language, or historic mission, constituting the chosen community; only the pure bodies belong on ‘our’ soil. Outside the ethnic space are the aliens, the enemies; ultimately a global structure of we and all the others. The essential relation is not pro-active, but retro-active: we are what we *believe* we were.

(iv) The “*state-bundle*” includes the space of sovereign territory, public space; the actors of national government, state institutions, citizens; and the conflict of rule, the struggle against internal rebels and external enemies.

The relation between state and person is *pragmatic*: practically everybody living on the state territory are citizens, members of the state-nation. It is an inclusive relation: nation follows state. Outside the state are the other states, the global system of states. At the end of the day, the pragmatic relation is pro-active: we are what we *can* to let our state win.

The bundles overlap and every individual person simultaneously engage in all four conflicts, as, say, a woman, a milk-trader, an Issaq, and a Somali citizen. Ultimately, all four topographies are global: any particular state is only one element in a planetary system of states; any ethnic space is surrounded by the world of others; the towns of the world are differentiated from the countryside of the earth; any individual house is alone in the wilderness stretching from one end of the horizon to the other.

Sovereign territory, national government, state institutions

The “state” is not a monolith. For the purposes of the present investigation it has three aspects: (i) the state confronts individuals as a sovereign territory, (ii) as a national government, and (iii) as state institutions. This multiple engagement is also the context for an activity like an aid project.

Only as a territorially defined unit, bordering other states does the state become a member of the international community of states. The sovereign territory will normally have a historical continuity going far beyond the government or regime of the day. That is the second aspect of the state: the group of persons at any given time actually wielding the levers of power, which they may do in a manner consolidating or putting at risk the historical continuity of the state. This group of persons may be anything from a democratically elected government to a dictator and his clique. What they share are spatial limits to their rule, a territory, and on the other hand institutional limits, the machinery of rule at their disposal. That is the third aspect of the state, the multitude of state institutions reaching out to the individual citizens.

Fragmentation of the state can happen to all three aspects of the state. The historical, sovereign territory can fragment, for example, by invasion or secession, and even disappear altogether for a long period of time only to reappear, as it happened with Poland; yet territories cannot fragment into new sovereign states without international

recognition. More common is fragmentation of the state government, the supreme leadership of the day, by struggles within the governing elite(s). State institutions, the nuts and bolts of rule are continuously modified, re-arranged, and regulating the links between citizens and government.

Relations between sub-state actors and the state (as territory, government, and institutions) are ambiguous because each actor may develop their own structures of violence or seek protection from the state. Patriarchs can rule women and children in the house keeping them out of reach from the state; but women can struggle for empowerment by breaking out of the house and join state institutions such as law and the vote. Urban-commercial groups can rule within their own space by militias and mafias or seek support from state institutions protecting private property, currency etc. Ethnic groups can rule within their own space or seek protection from the state for instance through minority rights. Relations between the state and sub-state actors are highly relational, shifting, and contingent, and project-impact will have to be analysed specifically for each situation. In the present analysis the point of departure is the currently existing state and the focusing or fragmenting of that state, however politically unattractive it may be.

4. Peace-inducing impact

Life-impact assessed, as we saw in Chapter One, impact from the point of view of the individual person, that is the over-all impact of each project on individual vulnerability in terms of health, livelihood and protection. Now we turn around and take the point of view of the state (or state-fragments) hosting the projects: how much does each project contribute to a fragmentation or focusing of its state-power? The challenge is to devise a model that can assess the peace-inducing impact of humanitarian aid projects in ongoing complex emergencies. “Peace-inducing impact”: each word points to a central assumption for addressing the bottom-line question: humanitarian aid, a help that helps?

Peace

Peace inside a country means a state upholding a constitutional monopoly of violence and enforcing law and order. Peace is not the same as democracy, although a functioning, vibrant democracy presumably is the best way to safeguard peace. Peace inside a country does not, of course, rule out that the state may wage war outside the country. A complex emergency, moved forward by civil war may be conceived as a process of state fragmentation. Fragmentation occurs when power and authority are parcelled out, away

from the national government and state institutions, to all kinds of sub-state actors. As power and authority are slipping away from the national government and national state institutions cease to function the conflict is intensifying. Focusing state power entails a reverse move towards reconciliation and peace, in particular the recapture of control with the use of violence by a national leadership. In Chapter Five I attempt to assess the impact of thirty-five projects on this process. Or rephrased slightly, it is by exploring how projects register with the process of fragmentation-focusing that we may assess their peace-inducing impact.

Inducing

Undeniable, *peace-inducing* implies a causal relation between input and change. Above, we left the question of causality unanswered. It was noted how several researchers see complex emergencies challenge linear notions of causality. The fuzziness of complex emergencies pose serious problems for input-output analysis. What should be the baseline, time-frame, and success-criteria for assessing a positive, negative or zero impact? What should be our point of reference when we do not know what would have happened if inputs had been omitted, increased, or changed? The problems only get more intractable when interpretation of impact is extended from physical dimensions (hunger, disease, death, displacement) to socio-political relations (state fragmenting or focusing).

Impact

To assess the impact of humanitarian aid, then, instead of *measuring* a problematic causal relation it may be possible to *map* structural relations and compare them. The result will highlight difference, not development, and localised, regional or patchy causality. This is not a very radical position, halfway between Deleuze's call for nomadology and the demand for institutional usefulness, but a pragmatic strategy hopefully producing some results relevant to the discussion of humanitarian aid.

5. Zero sum

The impact of projects on sub-state groups is assessed according to their contribution, positive or negative, to the fragmentation of national government and state institutions. Fragmentation is the displacement of power from the national state to sub-state actors. It is assumed that the conflicts between state and sub-state actors are a zero-sum game with the state confronting the three sub-state actors. Gain in one end will be a loss in the other end.

The reduction of patriarchal power in the house is a move towards focusing a national government, because it will be able to get support from women, by supporting them (if opportunistically) in their struggle against patriarchy. The prime example is the right to vote. A Somali example is the inheritance-rights for women granted by the Siad Barre regime in 1974 bitterly contested by patriarchs and religious leaders. Introducing a volume on complex emergencies, the editor notes, "The recognition that gender relations contribute an essential element of analysis has come late to the study of conflict." (Cliffe 1999b:20) It is important not to see gender perspectives as a simple add-on to the 'main' analysis, but to work out the gendered embeddedness of other aspects of complex emergencies. Using material from Mozambique, a researcher shows how gendered inequalities run through all facets of the complex emergency from the pre-war situation, over the burdens and losses of war, to the humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. In each circumstance were women at the short end of the stick. The case of Afghanistan demonstrates this, indeed the Taliban policy on women has forced the gender issue into most other issues as practical political problems, exactly as they are for every women living in Afghanistan. The Taliban government is unusual for a twentieth century state in supporting, and being supported by, patriarchs confining women to the house.

In town space the growth of shadow and informal business not paying tax, customs etc. contribute to a fragmentation of the state. A smuggling racket is an example of a commercial structure fragmenting state institutions in the "town" bundle. The modalities of fragmentation range from evasion of control and corruption of officials to armed resistance and finally full penetration of government institutions by internal and external criminal networks. The state may fragment into narrow, privatised, predatory, networks of kin and clients.

In ethnic space likewise the growth of groups, movements, parties and militias fragment the state, while minorities and individuals seeking support in the national state would help focusing the state. In all three countries the impact of projects on ethnic groups is extremely sensitive and in many cases contributing to state fragmentation.

The sovereign territory of Somalia has not fragmented. International recognition of secession or invasion has not happened. Somaliland has been de facto independent from the rest of Somalia for nine years but has not gained recognition. Somalia is severely fragmented at the level of national government and state institutions; in the north into the

de facto governments of Somaliland and Puntland, and in the south the state exists only as fragments such as self-styled governors, faction-leaders, and war-lords.

Neither has the sovereign territory of Afghanistan fragmented, but the international position of the national government is ambiguous because the UN and most countries in the world recognise the Northern Alliance under Prof. Rabbani that controls very little territory, while three governments, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, recognise the Taliban government controlling about 80 per cent of Afghanistan. The state is deeply fragmented in terms of national government and state institutions. In this situation the impact of projects on state fragmentation is assessed according to the Taliban state in the south and the Rabbani 'state' in the north. When aid projects in Afghanistan accepted village organisations without a single woman, they probably had a positive impact on the Taliban state. In the mujahedin area the regime for opportunistic reasons allowed women a few openings.

Kosova is a state fragment prized loose from the historical, sovereign territory of Yugoslavia by international military action, later sanctioned by the UN. The area has no international recognition of sovereignty. Kosova is a UN protectorate, and UNMIK is the national government and state institutions striving to create a multi-ethnic society against all odds. The analysis assess the fragmentation of this state structure, not that of Yugoslavia.

6. Conclusion

Let me sum up the criteria that will be used for assessing the state-impact of the thirty-five projects. In Somalia, both Somaliland and the South, power-relations between the state and sub-state structures are considered to be of the zero-sum type. In Afghanistan the zero-sum argument has one important modification: in the Taliban area reduction of patriarchal power in the house is considered negative for the state; in the non-Taliban areas the zero-sum applies. In Kosova autonomous power of sub-state structures reduces the power of the UNMIK state according to the zero-sum argument. We may then question each project from the point of view of the state on the following counts:

- House impact:
- ± empowering women?
 - ± project with a female bias?
 - ± spreading ideas of equality and rights for women?
 - ± project input controlled by men only?

- ± women excluded from village councils and other bodies controlling project input?
 - ± securing female employment?
 - ± giving women access to public space?
 - ± providing education for girls?
- Town impact:
- + input into local trade networks?
 - + providing employment?
 - + increasing flows on the local market?
 - + increasing productivity of local production?
 - ± support of inventive income-generation?
 - input into non-regulated, cross-border trade?
 - input into non-regulated, non-taxed market?
 - facilitating non-controlled urbanisation?
 - support of business-groups-cum-militias?
- Ethnic impact:
- + favouring individuals over (ethnic) groups?
 - + promote co-operation between ethnic groups and clans?
 - + support of ethnic groups dominant in the state?
 - ± support of ethnic minorities?
 - ± enhancing ethnic polarisation?
 - ± entrench mono-ethnic communities?
 - ± put a premium on stability at the price of ethnic separation?
 - support of ethnic groups oppositional to the state?
- State impact:
- + recognise and support state authority?
 - + economic support for state institutions?
 - + accept full state control of project?
 - + generate local support for the state?
 - + facilitate implementation of state policies among beneficiaries?
 - + facilitate state control of beneficiary group?
 - ± help integrate violent groups into the state?
 - open clash with state policies?
 - support state fragmentation?

- foster fragmentation and privatisation of state provisions?
- support oppositional groups?

A 'yes' to the above questions will give an estimated positive viz. negative impact as indicated. A number of entries are marked \pm indicating that the impact depends on the local state policy. When, for instance, the Taliban prohibits education for girls (which they not always do) the impact of opening a school for girls in their area will contribute to state fragmentation, while schools for girls in the non-Taliban area will contribute to state focusing.

The important next step is to link the impact estimated for each of the four "bundles". No figures referring to measurable social indicators are involved, only estimates of positive, negative, or nil impact. However, in order to link the estimates they are set to +1, -1, or 0, and then an aggregate state impact is calculated by simply adding the plusses and subtracting the minuses. This is, of course, very risky, and only intended to illustrate the structural zero-sum argument of how states fragment. It should be emphasised that the resulting aggregate state impact assessment claims no objective, quantitative validity. Underlying this aggregation is more than an formal levelling however, namely the sameness of each "bundle": space-person-conflict, with each person simultaneously present in all four spaces and engaged in all four conflicts. Employing the proposed methodology qualitative tendencies of such multiple impact are traced in Chapter Five.

3. ● SUPPLY-DRIVEN AID: THE DONORS

Now we change the perspective to the parties in the emergency event/complex emergency that are *not* suffering. The public supporting humanitarian aid is not suffering, no-one is dying in epidemics, starving to death in a hunger crisis or getting violently displaced and the donor state is not ravaged by conflict, yet they all become parts of an emergency event when they engage with a disaster somewhere else. What is more, they have their own interests in responding to a disaster. In this chapter we will look at how differently the Danish state has responded to people suffering in emergencies during the 1990s. Three types of humanitarian response stand out: (i) the classical ‘Red Cross-type’ response I will call emergency aid; (ii) the ‘developmental’ rehabilitation response I will call development aid; and (iii) the emerging military-humanitarian ‘security’ response, I will call *risk aid*, alluding to Ulrich Beck's notion of *Risikogesellschaft* (Beck 1986). This triad of humanitarian aid does not suggest a linear sequence; to the contrary it implies a critique of the simplified and misleading notion of a linear continuum from conflict-relief to post-conflict rehabilitation and development. Danish assistance to Somalia, Afghanistan and Kosova during the 1990s can provide us with examples of all three types.

1. Three types of needs

Three very different notions of needs correlate with the three types of state responses to emergencies. First the absolute needs of someone else in distress: to be wounded in war, to be taken prisoner by the enemy, to suffer from epidemics, to be made homeless by storms, earth-quakes, and draughts, alleviated by emergency aid. Secondly the relative needs of other people caused by historical late coming: to be one in the mass of ‘under-developed’ people suffering from poverty, poor health, lack of education, and denial of rights, alleviated by development aid. Thirdly the needs caused by our own fears, by imagined risks. potential threats of de-stabilising, the closing-in of suffering, alleviated by risk aid. Needs caused by risks moving in space, a bleak, chaotic mirror-image of the orderly time-table of historical displacement, central to the notion of ‘under-development’. As citizens in the donor-states we know we could all become victims of personal misfortune, but we believe history has sheltered us from the utterly relative kind of risk called ‘under-development’. This new threat of suffering from risks in space or displaced disasters seems to be disjointed from unfathomable historical ‘ethnic’ depths. Suffering has been cut loose from history, and

invested instead with an extreme geo-political salience. When the refugees come here and our humanitarian soldiers go there, when our security depends on containing *their* conflicts, then the linkage of sufferer and donor in the emergency event has reached a completely new level, no longer possible to counter with emergency aid or development aid, but calling for risk aid.

— 1.300 million people were estimated by the World Bank to be living in absolute poverty in 1999, up almost two times from the 1975 figure of 770 million. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Hague 1993:60)

— 800 million or more were living “in a condition of extreme poverty and highly vulnerable to early death” in 1999 (Danida 1999k:128). But their suffering is slow, permanent and unyielding ‘under-development’; assisting them will not constitute an emergency event.

— 40-50 million refugees, internally displaced persons, recent returnees, and stateless persons in total were assisted by humanitarian agencies in 1999. (Danida 1999k:128)

— 13 million deaths world-wide were caused by contagious diseases in 1999 including malaria, diarrhoea and aids, according to ICRC estimates

— 80.000 people were killed world-wide by disasters and war in 1999, according to ICRC estimates.

Of all these suffering people, it was the smallest group, the 80.000 killed in natural and political emergencies that attracted all the political attention because one billion people in Europe, America, Japan, Australia, Arabia and a few more places feared the consequences for their own security of ignoring these emergencies. For instance, Denmark donated 454 million ddk in risk aid to Kosova in 1999 and became part of a high-profile emergency event, yet Denmark donated more to alleviate Tanzanian ‘under-development’ (497 million ddk) in 1999 than to Kosova without generating a single headline. The 11 billion ddk donated in development aid the same year were completely drown out by Kosova; this is clearly not politically sustainable. Very soon, I believe, appropriations will follow political topicality. Already in the late 1990s all OECD countries combined donated approximately twice as much per person in humanitarian assistance than in development aid (Danida 1999k128). As we shall see below, the amounts donated per inhabitant in Kosova were conspicuously exceeding all other appropriations. The point of this is the simple fact that criteria, priorities and interests other than the bodily needs of the suffering individuals caught by a disaster guide the states when they decide who and how to give aid. Suffering individuals in need of aid ideally should be the first and primary stakeholder in humanitarian aid. But they are not.

2. Three types of aid

Charity, the root of humanitarian assistance, is much older than development aid. Most religions praise charitable action, and much missionary work included some element of charity. The first modern, humanistic charity was arguably the Red Cross launched in Switzerland 1863 to serve the needs of wounded in war irrespectively of nationality. It was followed by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1864 and later national societies in most countries of the world (1876 in Denmark). In Denmark the Lutheran state-church in 1922 created an international charity organisation under the name 'Nødhjælpen til Europas Evangeliske Kirker', assisting refugees and homeless after the First World War. The Biafra war gave the organisation, since 1953 renamed 'Folkekirkens Nødhjælp', a high visibility and made the annual collection-days "Bread to the World" a major source of income. When the UN was founded in 1945, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was set up with a mandate to provide international humanitarian aid. Two years later however, the UNRRA was replaced with the UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and FAO, each of which was given a mandate for a particular area of humanitarian aid. Each agency interpreted its own mandate in the broadest possible way, partly to increase its share of the budget, followed by petty feuding and never-ending pleas for reforms and better 'co-ordination'. In 1948 UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine was founded; it is currently caring for more than three million people, and probably the extreme example of how the international community have parked an essentially political problem on a never-ending, costly, humanitarian side-track. In April 1992 the EU integrated all its components of humanitarian aid into one organisation called ECHO, quickly becoming the target of much criticism for being too slow, non-transparent, unpredictable and bureaucratic.

Development aid is a recent phenomenon compared with charity and stemming from a completely different background. The ideal of welfare based on economic growth and shared through international solidarity originated not in religious-humanistic movements like the Red Cross, but in the international labour-movement. It was however, the opportune post-war international alliance of Soviet communism, Western Keynesian welfare and the global geopolitics of de-colonisation that enabled the UN to powerfully espouse the new idea of 'development assistance'. Denmark donated for the first time money to UN "Technical Assistance" in 1950. Reflecting the UN decision to declare the 1960s the decade of 'development,' Denmark in 1960 voted in parliament to donate 1 per cent of GNP to development assistance at an unspecified date. Two years later, March 1962, the first law establishing a permanent body for Danish "Technical Assistance" was passed. In 1971 it was named Danida, an acronym importantly containing 'development' the big new plus-

word. This law is the direct ancestor of the current one regulating Danish development aid. The 1 per cent goal has been reached and even surpassed. Humanitarian aid is included in the 1 per cent target, although it is not governed by the law of development aid. This separation reflecting diverse origins was found in the institutional divisions of most donor country Foreign Ministries between a development desk and a relief desk.

Risk aid is a very recent and rapidly evolving line of state practice. After the Rio environmental summit 1992 Denmark established an economic facility called MiKa [acronym for Environment and Catastrophe] to prevent and alleviate environmental disasters. This also reflected turf-battles in the Danish government with a strong Minister of Environment getting his own small Foreign Department producing a lot of predictable problems of co-ordination with Danida. Renamed Mifresta [acronym for Environment, Peace, Stability] in 1999, to include aid targeting peace and stability, it shall by 2005 amount to 0,5% of GNP, bringing the total Danish aid commitment up to 1,5% of GNP. This is a strong signal of the growing importance of risk aid. Eastern Europe has been the target for this kind of assistance, justified by clearly spelled-out security concerns. This merged environmental concerns with traditional national security, reflecting the mushrooming debate on peace-keeping, peace-enforcing and 'humanitarian intervention', a term significantly acquiring a clear military meaning. The Former Yugoslavia was the dominant empirical lesson and political challenge. Finally responses to local 'out-of-area' threats to national security became increasingly important in the post-Cold-War politics of the NATO. EU members and the US, Denmark included, capped the decade by launching a massive risk aid mission while fighting a 'humanitarian war' without an (expressed) UN mandate.

Box 1. Danish humanitarian assistance, annual three largest donations 1987-99

| Year | Special programmes | Total | | Total hum. assistance |
|---------|--------------------|---------|------------------|-----------------------|
| | | # 1,2,3 | (core + special) | |
| 1987 | | | 192,0 | 419,0 |
| | Ethiopia | 49,0 | | |
| | Afghanistan | 24,0 | | |
| | Mozambique | 4,0 | | |
| 1988 | | | 304,4 | 521,0 |
| | Afghanistan | 50,4 | | |
| | Bangladesh | 48,5 | | |
| | Mozambique | 31,1 | | |
| 1989 | | | 329,1 | 513,6 |
| | Afghanistan | 58,6 | | |
| | Namibia | 42,9 | | |
| | Ethiopia | 36,0 | | |
| 1990 | | | 290,6 | 476,7 |
| | Afghanistan | 37,1 | | |
| | Mozambique | 27,2 | | |
| | Kampuchea | 26,8 | | |
| 1991 | | | 497,0 | 715,0 |
| | Iraq | 126,0 | | |
| | Ethiopia | 46,8 | | |
| | Mozambique | 43,8 | | |
| 1992 | | | 588,6 | 985,1 |
| | F. Yugoslavia | 170,7 | | |
| | Somalia | 104,9 | | |
| | Kampuchea | 77,8 | | |
| 1993 | | | 578,1 | 835,0 |
| | F. Yugoslavia | 198,2 | | |
| | Somalia | 48,0 | | |
| | Mozambique | 41,6 | | |
| 1994 | | | 539,2 | 732,4 |
| | F. Yugoslavia | 153,7 | | |
| | Gaza | 48,6 | | |
| | Sudan | 43,0 | | |
| 1995 | | | 564,9 | 719,1 |
| | F. Yugoslavia | 163,7 | | |
| | Rwanda | 93,7 | | |
| | Angola | 38,4 | | |
| 1996 | | | 719,8 | |
| 1.030,6 | | | | |
| | Rwanda | 137,7 | | |
| | F. Yugoslavia | 132,8 | | |
| | Angola | 38,4 | | |
| 1997 | | | 356,9 | 843,5 |
| | F. Yugoslavia | 69,9 | | |
| | Sudan | 48,0 | | |
| | Somalia | 38,4 | | |
| 1998 | | | 482,0 | 797,8 |
| | Great Lakes | 63,4 | | |
| | F. Yugoslavia | 55,3 | | |
| | Sudan | 54,4 | | |
| 1999 | | | 828,6 | |
| 1.115,1 | | | | |
| | Kosova | 454,1 | | |
| | Ethiopia | 46,5 | | |
| | Great Lakes | 42,3- | | |

Source: Danida annual reports; gross appropriations excluding annual reimbursements

3. The donor: Danida's humanitarian assistance in the 1990s

The budget for humanitarian assistance contains two budget-lines, core and special appropriations, the former for permanent programmes and institutions, e.g. UNRWA or ICRC, while only the latter specifies assistance to individual countries.

Looking through the files on Danish aid to Somalia in the archives of the Foreign Ministry I found no documentation of the criteria for decisions to fund individual projects. There were no memos, no discussion papers, no minutes of discussions of why some appeals were approved while others were refused. This lack of an explicit policy is also noted several times by the evaluations of Danish humanitarian assistance to other countries. Two obvious explanations may be suggested: too much money for a minuscule staff, and too little money for endless needs. A stressed staff had to react to horrifying human suffering often under severe time pressure. In 1992 only three full-time staff were employed in the desk of Humanitarian Assistance, by 1997 the number had grown to six and by 1999 to nine (out of around 300 employed in Danida). These few people had to distribute an annual allocation of close to one billion dkk. As a comparison it can be noted that 120 ECHO full-time staff in 1997 distributed Ecu 442 mill (3.094 mill. dkk), or 25,8 mill. dkk each (Rienstra 1999:26), that is ten times less than their colleagues in Copenhagen. For the small staff in Copenhagen it was simply a lot of money to keep tabs on and there was perhaps little immediate need to prepare written reflections or guidelines on the fast changing and expanding practice of how to provide humanitarian aid. And no time was left to do it once the money had been spent and a new emergency demanded full attention.

Danida had to rely almost totally on appeals coming to them; they could only in a very limited way initiate relief, mostly done through Danish embassies. Ideally it was up to the aid agencies to monitor the world's disasters and secure that their appeals addressed the most urgent needs in a proper way. This was a flexible and swift responding system by default, as Danida had no way to do in-house assessments of appeals. But it was also vulnerable. It was only possible, as one senior officer pointed out to me, on the basis of trust between the ministry and the humanitarian agencies. The staff, rotating from post to post, seldom had time to acquire any specialist knowledge of the countries of the various emergencies they have to select or reject for donations. There was simply no time or staff at hand for a critical evaluation of requests for emergency aid or to exercise the control necessary to avoid (rare) incidents like agencies distributing dental floss and contact-lens solution as emergency relief, both of which inadvertently were funded by Danida (DR-news 2-2-99). The archives did not

contain, as far as I could see, any rejected appeals. There is reason to assume that if any 'weeding' was done, it was through informal contacts leaving no written traces.

It is noteworthy to what extent appeals were tailored to the budgetary routine of the Ministry that stipulated that donations up to 2 mill. dkk (later 3 mill. dkk) could be granted administratively, those up to 8 mill. by the minister, while only those above 8 mill. needed parliamentary approval. Most appeals just touched the 2 mill. dkk limit. Another indication of the staff constraint was the difficulty for Danida to revise the proposed budgets in any substantial manner. Budgets received from the agencies in the field were normally granted fully or, more often in 1999 than in 1992, cut with what seemed an arbitrary amount, i.e. from 3 mill. to 2 mill. without reference to details in the budgets. The reality of staff constraints favoured fewer and larger donations, and in particular on-going programmes in predictable emergencies such as Afghanistan, leading to multi-year appropriations to the largest NGOs, thus potentially further weakening Danida's control.

Also noteworthy was the regularity of donations; for example Danish Red Cross appealed on behalf of ICRC each year 1992-98 for a sum of around 5 mill DKK, which was duly appropriated by Danida; in the same way UNHCR got around 10 mill DKK each year for Afghanistan. This clearly showed that it was not needs of suffering people that added up to appeals of specific sums of money, but the ready supply of politically available funds. When appealing for funds to ongoing complex emergencies no-one was arguing for needs or amounts generated by the specific, current situation, but to last years deals, that had distributed the political and financial available funds amongst the agencies permanent on the pay-roll of the national donor. Each agency presented their porte folio of complex emergencies, some dragging on for many years, doing little more than changing the year on the headlines of the appeals before submitting them.

When the funds had been used it was the duty of the agencies to report on the impact of their projects so they and the Ministry could improve the humanitarian assistance next time. However, the reality as it could be ascertained from the files was far from this ideal. Except for occasional commissioned evaluations, all reporting was done by the implementing agencies, their reporting generally slow if forthcoming at all and of extremely low quality, in most cases limited to a simple financial account. This improved somewhat from 1992 to 1999 through better routines and increased external evaluation. Danida's own annual reports have also improved in lay-out and detailed content.

4. Danida assisting Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova 1992-1999

There is a depressing overlap from 1992 to 1999; emergencies have not ended, and the provision of humanitarian aid had dragged on from 1992 to 1999 in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Afghanistan. If we look further down the list the picture gets even worse. Of the top-ten countries in 1992 only Malawi and Kampuchea did not receive Danish humanitarian assistance seven years later. Of the top-ten countries in 1999 only Timor and the Great Lakes had not received Danish humanitarian assistance seven years earlier; Chechnia was not on the list in 1992 but Russia was.

Box 2. Danish humanitarian aid in 1992 and 1999; ten largest donations

| 1992 | | | 1999 | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1) | Former Yugoslavia¹ | 170.720 | 1) | Former Yugoslavia² | 454.141 |
| 2) | Somalia | 104.915 | 2) | Great Lakes | 46.500 |
| 3) | Kampuchea/Thailand | 77.822 | 3) | Sudan | 42.383 |
| 4) | Sudan | 45.427 | 4) | Somalia³ | 41.499 |
| 5) | Ethiopia | 44.115 | 5) | Angola | 30.606 |
| 6) | Iraq | 33.191 | 6) | Liberia | 29.000 |
| 7) | Mozambique | 32.010 | 7) | Timor | 25.582 |
| 8) | Afghanistan | 30.377 | 8) | Ethiopia | 25.412 |
| 9) | Malawi | 25.589 | 9) | Chechnia | 19.000 |
| 10) | Gaza/West Bank | 24.435 | 10) | Afghanistan | 17.075 |
| Sub total | | 588.601 | Sub total | | 731.198 |
| Total Danish hum. aid | | 804.325 | Total Danish hum. aid | | 1.164.134 |
| Total Danish aid | | 8.236.000 | Total Danish aid | | 11.400.000 |
| Per cent hum aid/total aid | | 9,8% | Per cent hum aid/total aid | | 10,2% |

Million DKK

1-Budget lines Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslavia

2-Budget line Kosova-conflict incl. Macedonia

3-Budget lines Somalia, Horn of Africa

Source: Danida annual reports 1992 and 1999

5. Danida assistance to Somalia 1992 and 1999

Danish humanitarian aid to Somalia was given for the first time in 1991 (1,5 mill. dkk to Dan Church Aid). The 1988-91 civil war in the north of Somalia with massive destruction, atrocities and displacement passed without any Danish humanitarian assistance (but with continued Danish development aid, see Tin 1999). Danish humanitarian assistance to Somalia amounted to 104,9 mill. dkk in 1992. The donations were received/implemented by nine agencies: UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, UN Somalia Trust Fund, ICRC, IFRC, Danish Red Cross, Dan Church Aid, and Save the Children Denmark. By 1999 Danish humanitarian assistance to Somalia and the 'Horn of Africa' had fallen to 41 mill. dkk. The donations were received/-implemented by eight organisations, five active since 1992:

UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, ICRC, Dan Church Aid, and three newcomers: ADRA Denmark, Danish Refugee Council and MSF Denmark.

In an interview in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 25 February 1999, Johs. Dahl-Hansen, head of the office of humanitarian aid in 1992, provided some insight in the criteria used by the Ministry for granting humanitarian aid. He had responded in a creative way to the rapidly unfolding emergency in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa in 1992. Already in September 1991 the UN Consolidated Appeal from the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa estimated “4,5 million to be at serious risk after three years of conflict in Somalia”. Information from FAO, WHO and DHA indicated that a major emergency was building up. A few small donations would not do the job, but on the other hand administratively appropriating a string of donations could cause problems later on in the parliamentary committee for finance. In March 1992 Johs. Dahl-Hansen took the unusual initiative in dealing with the escalating crisis in Eastern and Southern Africa to suggest Denmark should contribute with a sum of 100 mill. dkk.

“The 100 millions were a guess, a nice round sum. [De 100 milliner var et skud, et pænt rundt beløb.]” he said with a smile in 1999. A key justification for the unprecedented appropriation of 100 mill. dkk (October 1992 expanded to 120 mill. dkk) to African emergencies was the linking of civil wars in East Africa with drought in Southern Africa. Dahl-Hansen explained that this link warranted an extraordinary commitment with food aid. Essential in getting political support to the proposal was the argument that most of the money anyway would go to Danish farmers selling their surplus produce to WFP. Before voting on the act Johs. Dahl-Hansen sent his deputy Kristian Højersholt to the WFP HQ in Rome in order to ascertain that Danish agricultural produce would be part of the food-aid to Africa and that a satisfactory amount of money would go to Danish farmers.

Danida argued that the cause of the emergency was a pan African drought; in a press statement released on 26 March they claimed “[A drought] estimated to be the worst in fifty years to hit Eastern and Southern Africa... now threatens more than 20 million people with a catastrophic famine.” Danida not only accepted all claims in the DCA appeal of 18 March, discussed in the next chapter, but on their own account raised the figure of people in need from 18 to more than 20 millions and announced a pledge of 8 mill. dkk to help the “the drought victims of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Somalia” by chartering a ship to bring food from Scandinavia to Africa.

But perhaps even 20 million starving people were not enough. Two weeks later, in the official appeal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Parliamentary Committee on Finance the dimensions of the emergency suddenly was enlarged dramatically 300%, “Approximately 60 million Africans are estimated to be in immediate danger of starvation in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.” This series of escalating and linked claims of drought made it possible to vote in the Danish Parliament an unprecedented 100 mill. dkk blanket emergency aid donation to drought victims in Africa on 21 April, 1992.

It was supported by all parties, even the right-wing parties habitually against all Danish development aid. In a related debate in the parliament a liberal politician Ms. Mimmi Jacobsen swung the house in favour of supporting suffering Africans by relating how on a holiday in Zimbabwe she herself had seen animals dying of thirst in a national park.

On 12 May 1992 Denmark contributed to WFP a special emergency allocation of \$13,516,478 \$. In confirmation with normal practice produce was bought through the Danish Ministry of Agriculture from Danish farmers eager to sell off their surplus production. 10.000 tons of wheat was sent to Somalia at a price of 1,400,000 \$ plus 1,500,000 \$ in transport costs and 116,000\$ administration charge to WFP for just this one consignment. Everywhere in the system big numbers were better than small numbers, even if they had precious little bearing on the realities of suffering. Steven Green, current head of the WFP evaluation department and personally responsible in 1992 for the WFP estimates of the food-deficit in Eastern and Southern Africa considered Danida’s 60 million figure “wild; absolutely wrong” (personal communication, Copenhagen 25 March 1999).

The rest of the year Dahl-Hansen could administratively grant money to individual projects within the 100 mill. dkk frame - also to Somalia donations not justified by drought. For example when the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 4 June granted funds to Danish Red Cross operations in Somalia there was not a single word on drought but on “victims of conflict” in his comments to Parliament. Drought or no drought, needs soon outstripped all allocations and on 30 October the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appealed to Parliament to enlarge the fund for drought-victims in Africa from 100 to 120 mill. dkk. Not only was the drought once again claimed to threatened 60 million people, but it was now no longer the worst drought this century but “the worst drought in the last 100 years.” The money was appropriated. Johs. Dahl-Hansen conceded that many appeals were built on very flimsy arguments; they were not necessarily wrong but he knew that his office did not have the

capacity to evaluate the assessments of need nor what impact the donations had. Indeed, he pointed out, this was not a particular Danish problem; on annual Nordic meetings of heads of humanitarian sections it was a general matter of concern how little knowledge they had of the countries they supported and the impact of their help. In a wish to improve the performance of humanitarian aid Dahl-Hansen as one of his last initiatives before becoming Danish ambassador to Brazil initiated the famous Rwanda-evaluation process.

Over the next seven years the US, the UN and most NGOs left the chaos of Somalia and it quietly became another complex emergency with continuing violent conflict and no end in sight. From the point of view of the Danish government however, Somali refugees arriving in large numbers in Denmark made Somalia at times a ridiculously high priority in *domestic* politics, as we saw in the introduction. Official pledges of development aid was linked to Somali acceptance of repatriation; soon the Home Ministry and the police became involved in politically volatile efforts at repatriation of rejected asylum-seekers.

As a direct consequence of the domestic squabbles Danida dispatched a permanent aid-officer Mr. Henrik Jespersen to the embassy in Nairobi (in charge also of Somalia). Out of 12.000 Somali refugees living in Denmark only 7 were brought back non-voluntarily, but a number of aid projects were initiated in Somaliland supplementing a range of (partly) Danish funded ongoing humanitarian projects. The new projects had a development edge but Danida would not classify Somalia as real development only as post-conflict rehabilitation. This had little to do with actual project-design, but a lot to do with funding. Using first the environmental-disaster programme [MiKa] and from 1999 the ‘Environment-Peace-Stability’ [Mifresta]-programme a number of rehabilitation and reconciliation projects could be defended politically as reducing the pressure of Somali refugees on Denmark. This is in line with the new emphasis on containing risks, and an early example of risk aid.

Interview with Henrik Jespersen, First Secretary (Development), Nairobi 8 Jan 1999 [translated from Danish by HT]

“My job-description would include control with the multilateral organisations implementing programmes for a total of more than 60 million ddk. I deal with repatriation and regional settlements; unofficially I am here because of the political debate in Denmark on Somalis in Denmark. The Danish interest in Somalia is humanitarian, we have a humanitarian mandate here, but not only working with the ‘short’ money. As I see it, MiKa [environmental-disaster-programme] might build a bridge between emergency and development aid, connect the short money with a longer perspective.

6. Danish assistance to Afghanistan 1992-1999

Assistance to Afghanistan began in the context of the Cold War. Anti-Soviet solidarity groups, such as DAC in Denmark, and more ‘un-political’ relief groups, such as Dacaar, worked from Peshawar with Afghan refugees (numbering more than five million in Pakistan and Iran) and mujahidin groups inside Afghanistan. ICRC was the only agency assisting also the communist side of the conflict; they moved their headquarters of Afghanistan operations to Kabul in 1987, and they remain, much to the dis-credit of other agencies, thirteen years later the only aid agency with headquarters inside the country. 1989 became the peak year for Danish humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. Following the optimism generated by Michael Gorbachev’s declaration of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 58,6 mill. ddk was donated in humanitarian aid mostly for repatriation of refugees. The year even saw the initiation of development aid with 18,5 mill. donated to Dacaar for a two-year period. The actual projects implemented by Dacaar were not very different from projects classified as humanitarian aid in other complex emergencies. The ‘development’ label was in many ways an anomaly, the result of a small group of enthusiastic anthropologists wishing to see maximum assistance inside Afghanistan, not only to refugees in Pakistan and Iran. The development label was essential for that purpose.

In 1992 Denmark donated 30,4 million ddk to six agencies (ICRC, IFRC, Dacaar, DAC, UNHCR, and UNOCA) implementing humanitarian aid projects in Afghanistan; in addition Dacaar was funded with 19,6 million ddk from the development aid budget. Seven years later the total donation had fallen, and with more emphasis on development projects: in 1999 17,4 million ddk was called humanitarian aid and 19 million termed development aid, but distributed to the same agencies plus UNICEF.

The Danish humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan 1992-1999 amounted to 222 million ddk. 134 million ddk was channelled through the UN system (UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA, WFP, and WHO) with half of the total going to UNHCR alone. 88 million ddk was donated to Danish NGOs, with 71 million ddk to Danish Red Cross/ICRC/IFRC and the rest divided among DAC, DACAAR, Danish Demining Group and some small groups. Danish Red Cross was not implementing in Afghanistan, but contributed to the major ICRC operation in the country.

By 1999 Afghanistan had sunk to a very low priority in Danida. When we spoke with the charge d'affaires Sven Bjerregaard in the Danish embassy in Islamabad, the closest Danida was to a field presence, he deeply regretted that he had no time whatsoever to deal with Afghanistan; all his time was consumed by controlling the often fraudulent applications for visas to Denmark. Danida were unofficially 'represented' by the well-connected Dacaar (headquarters in Peshawar, not in Afghanistan). In Copenhagen, Afghanistan competed for the attention of a three person Danida staff also in charge of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, the latter two the largest recipients of Danish development aid in Asia. In marked contrast to both Somalia and Kosova there was no element of security in the assistance to Afghanistan, although increasing numbers of illegal Afghani refugees was a matter of concern for the Danish police. As long as the country continued to be ravaged by civil war humanitarian aid could go on for ever and development aid would be built on sand.⁵ The population suffered deeply, but without a vision for the assistance it was kept on a slow burner; on average each Afghani received six times less Danish aid than each Somali.

In the period 1992-99 the average proportion of humanitarian aid to development aid was 57/43. Many 'relief' and 'development' projects did not differ very much. There appeared to be no Danida strategy behind this classification but a matter of circumstance with ICRC and the UN defining most of their activities as humanitarian assistance while Dacaar and DAC defined what they were doing as development. There was practically no connection between Danish domestic concerns and Danida's and the agencies' vision for Danish assistance to Afghanistan. Only the question of Taliban and women's rights could provoke some interest, but the agencies did not try to communicate their response to this problem to the Danish public. The ODI evaluation of the Danish humanitarian aid to Afghanistan concluded that "Danida does not have a strategic approach to its humanitarian programme in Afghanistan; it lacks the tools to guarantee a quality programme because of the absence of clearly stated politics and standards and an acceptance of poor reporting from major, long-term implementing partners [not Dacaar]" (Danida 1999e:xvi)

⁵ Yet only 10 per cent of all the massive assistance provided by SCA all over Afghanistan during more than ten years was damaged by war, according to director Anders Fänge (personal communication Peshawar 31 Aug. 1999).

Box 3. Danish humanitarian and development aid to Afghanistan 1987-99

| Year | HUMANITARIAN AID | | | | | Tot.hum | DEV. AID | | TOTAL | count. |
|-------------|------------------|-------------------|------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------|------------|
| | Dacaar | ICRC | IFRC | DAC * | UN | | Dacaar | Tot.dev | | |
| 1987 | 2,0 | 4,0 | - | - | 20,0 | 24,0 | - | - | 24,0 | A/P |
| 1988 | -10,0 | 2,0 | 2,9 | 36,0 | 50,4 | - | 9,3 | 60,1 | A/P | |
| 1989 | 5,0 | 13,0 | - | 3,1 ^a | 36,5 | 58,6 | 18,5 ^b | 12,5 | 71,1 | A/P/I |
| 1990 | -- | - | - | - | 37,1 | - | 10,9 | 48,0 | A/P/I | |
| 1991 | -- | - | - | - | 20,5 | 13,5 | 18,4 ^c | 38,9 | A/P | |
| 1992 | 0,2 | 5,0 | 1,0 | 3,9 | 20,9 | 30,4 | 19,6 | 19,6 | 50,0 | A/P |
| 1993 | 0,2 | 5,0 | 2,0 | - | 19,7 | 31,1 | 28,0 | 28,0 | 59,0 | A/P |
| 1994 | 0,2 | 5,0 | 1,0 | 3,7 ^d | 20,0 | 29,7 | 19,6 ^e | 12,7 | 42,4 | A/P |
| 1995 | 0,2 | 9,0 | 2,0 | - | 20,0 | 30,7 | 26,5 ^f | 31,5 | 62,2 | A |
| 1996 | 0,3 | 13,0 | 4,0 | - | 17,9 | 32,9 | 22,2 | - | 55,1 | A |
| 1997 | 0,3 | 6,0 | 3,0 | - | 11,5 | 20,4 | 18,7 | 34,8 ^g | 39,1 | A |
| 1998 | 0,3 | 10,0 ^h | 2,0 | 7,0 | 10,0 | 29,3 | 13,1 ⁱ | - | 42,4 | A |
| 1999 | 0,3 | 3,0 | - | - | 14,1 | 17,4 | 18,7 | 19,0^k | 36,4 | A |
| Total§ | 9,0 | 83,0 | 17,0 | 17,7 | 190,8 | 412,5 | 198,3 | 196,7 | 628,7 | |

Millions of DKK

A = Afghanistan; P = Afghan refugees in Pakistan; I = Afghan refugees in Iran

* Including other agencies

§ Totals are minimums, as information is lacking

a) DCA 2; LISA 0,75; DF 0,3; Danske Arkitekters Landsforbund 0,03

b) Appropriation for 1989-90

c) Including appropriation to DCA of 5,0 for 91-92

d) Other agencies than DAC

e) Appropriation, not fully used

f) Part of appropriation 52,0 for 95-98, not fully used

g) Including DAC appropriation of 16,1 for 1997-2000 to primary health in Gozarah

h) 2 mill appropriated to earthquake-victims were not used and returned

i) Danish De-mining Group

j) Figure from Dacaar annual report; this represented 30 % of Dacaar's funding for 1998

k) Part of appropriation of 72,0 million dkk for 2000-2003

Source: Danida annual reports, Dacaar annual reports

For thirty years Denmark had retained a proud normative purpose for giving development aid, as expressed here in the preamble to the law of development aid,

“Målet for Danmarks statslige bistand til udviklingslandene skal være gennem et samarbejde med disse landes regeringer og myndigheder at støtte deres bestræbelser på at

opnå økonomisk vækst for derigennem at medvirke til sikring af deres sociale fremgang og politiske uafhængighed i overensstemmelse med De Forende Nationer pagt, formål og bærende principper og tillige gennem et kulturelt samarbejde at fremme den gensidige forståelse og solidaritet.” (Danida, Annual Report 1999,138)

Afghanistan exemplified the potential dead end of ‘programming relief for development’ to make real an aid ‘continuum’ from relief to development. The classical notion of development was swiftly becoming outdated in regions torn by continuous and contagious internal conflicts creating new trans-national ‘emergency complexes’ (Duffield 1999). The development end of the ‘continuum’ was breaking down. Kosova would show what the future of aid looked like.

7. Danida assistance to Kosova 1992-1999

1998 became the first year Denmark donated humanitarian aid, or more precisely risk aid, to Kosova as such as none of the big sums donated to the former Yugoslavia went to Kosova. A total of 35,8 million ddk was distributed to 13 agencies (DF, DRK, ICRC, IFRC, FKN, MSF, RB, OCHA, UNHCR UNICEF, WFP, IHB). In 1999 Denmark for the first time since 1868 went to war. The level of risk aid in a few days surpassed anything seen in humanitarian aid. 454.1 million ddk was distributed to 31 agencies. On the list of agencies we find the same 13 agencies from 1998 except IFRC and MSF; new on the list are a number of small Danish NGOs, three big Danish private companies, the Danish Civil Defence, UNMIK, and one Kosovar beneficiary, the newspaper Zeri. This made Denmark’s contribution the largest national allocations for the Kosova emergency in the period 24 March-30 June. Comparable figures were Denmark \$71 million, Germany \$58 million, and Italy \$69 million, excluding military expenditure. (Surkhe 2000:xvii).

Yet military expenses of 617,17 million ddk should be added to the risk aid since the military contributed heavily to the creation of the Kosova emergency event, in contrast to Somalia and Afghanistan where there were no Danish military presence. By December 1999 the Danish Defence had deployed 830 persons to KFOR in Kosova and 50 airforce personnel in Italy for Balkan air operations (additional 502 persons were deployed in Bosnia and 58 elsewhere). Officially the total military cost of NATO’s activities in Kosova was covered by the ordinary budget and did not entail an increase in Denmark’s contribution to NATO in 1999. Following the Blace crisis where refugees were denied access to Macedonia the US exerted heavy pressure on the UNHCR and allied states to accept transferral of refugees. In the case of Denmark the costs of admission of some 1.300 Kosovar refugees was 305,7

mill. ddk spent by Danida outside the humanitarian assistance-budget. Thus the total Danish state contribution to the complex emergency in Kosova in 1999 alone was at least 1.368 mill. dkk.

Box 4. Ministry of Defence expenses related to Kosova 1999.

| | |
|--|---------------|
| Kosova Verification Mission | 4,75 |
| Allied Force (air campaign against FRY) | 39,84 |
| AFOR (mil. hum. ass. in Albania) | 32,04 |
| Allied Harvest (Adriatic Sea operations) | 4,60 |
| KFOR (Danbat) | 298,70 |
| EU, UN, OSCE observers in Kosova | 12,10 |
| Subtotal | <u>392,03</u> |
| Salaries, deployed contract personnel | 73,04 |
| Flying hours, F 16, Allied Force | 64,90 |
| Flying hours, transport, Allied Force | 4,2 |
| Wear of materiel, KFOR | 80,0 * |
| Total | 614,17 |

* Estimated according to UN peace-keeping accounting practice

Source: Danish Ministry of Defence; it should be noted that my sources in Forsvars-komandoen and Forsvarsakademiet stressed that the figures were under political censorship and may not fully reflect the expenses; it is safe to assume they were not smaller.

Approximately one week after the NATO bombing began 100.000 people had been expelled from Kosova. There is little doubt that the rapidity and volume of the unfolding humanitarian disaster took both the Ministry and the agencies by surprise. Astri Surkhe (Surkhe 2000) has a very well-informed and judicious discussion of the delicate dilemma facing UNHCR on the eve of the bombings: they were prevented, in part by incomplete military information, to prepare a politically 'in-correct' worst scenario for the Belgrade reactions to the NATO bombing, resulting in desperate unpreparedness when it did happen. This is a topical example of the real political limits to 'early warning', and may temper the optimism of advocates of early warning (cf. Rupesinghe 1998).

Considering this surprise the institutional reaction was swift and comprehensive in Copenhagen. Two weeks after the beginning of the bombings and a one week after the first 100.000 refugees had fled Kosova, 180 million ddk. were appropriated. When the war ended in June the refugees went home just as quickly as they came, but just two weeks after the war ended 300 million ddk were appropriated. In the interdepartmental 'Humanitære Kontaktgruppe' Danida became 'lead-agency' chairing the (at least) twice weekly meetings during the whole crisis. Afterwards Geert Aagaard, head of Danida humanitarian assistance,

said “We were so tired in the end, no-one had had any time off, every other activity was on a slow burner, I don’t know what we should have done if it had continued...”

Box 5. Calendar of Danida funded assistance to Kosova per week

during the first two months after NATO bombing commences 23/3

| 23/3 | 30/3 | 6/4 | 13/4* | 20/4 | 27/4 | 4/5 | 11/5 | 18/5 | 25/5 | Total |
|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-----|------|------|------|-------|
| 0 | 12,0 | 11,3 | 0 | 65,6 | 11,0 | 3,0 | 21,0 | 0 | 0 | 123,9 |

*donation of 180 mill. appropriated 7/4 (Aktstykke 159)

during the first two months after passing of UN Sec.Council Res. #1244 10/6

| 10/6 | 17/6 | 24/6**1/7 | 8/7 | 15/7 | 22/7 | 29/7 | 4/8 | 11/ | Total | |
|------|------|-----------|-----|------|------|------|------|-----|-------|-------|
| 0 | 0,1 | 43,8 | 1,0 | 22,0 | 33,0 | 14,0 | 13,0 | 0 | 20,0 | 149,9 |

** donation of 300 mill. appropriated 24/6 (Aktstykke 252)

Source: Danida

Torben Brylle, deputy director of Ministry’s South Group chaired the group which included officials from the Premier Minister’s office, the Ministries of Defence, Home, and Environment, the police, the Civil Defence, and all the large NGOs, in short almost all players in humanitarian aid in Denmark. It was on a scale beyond anything experienced in humanitarian aid before in Denmark and proved to be very useful for rapid dissemination of information, co-operation, for instance between the Defence, Civil Defence and NGOs, with little previous experience of co-operation. But above all it was a break-through for military involvement in humanitarian assistance from the central planning stage down to the field level (where there were some previous experiences from Bosnia). One observation repeated by many of the people I spoke with was how many ‘firsts’ were invented during the Kosova operation. After the crisis the contact group was put on hold, but not disbanded.

The criteria for success for the risk aid donated to Kosova was quite simple: maximum national visibility, do at least as well as our friends, lift our share of the burden, and avoid scandals. The whole operation was extremely intensively covered by the media. In May DRC was to open a refugee camp in Albania, timed to be visited by the Danish minister of development Poul Nielson. Unfortunately the camp was not quite ready and the refugees refused to use the tents because they were too small; the press had a field day. This was the nightmare of any NGO or Minister, and it led to the beefing up the field presence of the Minister through a special representative. After the war a Danish Steering Unit was set up in Prishtine directly linked with the MFA in Copenhagen and with authority over all Danish aid in Kosova. Danida very rapidly published a plan of action for Danish assistance to the Western Balkans. Both were ‘firsts’ and underlined the heavy bilateral aspect of aid in

Kosova. Assisting suffering people was important in its own right, but incidental, in my opinion, to the primary objectives of Danish foreign policy on NATO, EU, and UN in that order. Not only did Denmark spend more money on Kosova than any other emergency in a single year, it escalated seven years of heavy spending on the Yugoslav complex emergency.

Interview with Torben Brylle, Deputy Head of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-South-section, Copenhagen 2 March 2000 [translated from Danish by HT]

“Several ministries took part in the twice weekly co-ordination meetings. We came each with our own interests. You know, very rapidly an environment crystallised between all the involved partners, and we were asked by agencies if we would pledge funds for a certain project. As a rule of thumb we said 8-9 per cent of total aid should be humanitarian. There were no fixed limits to humanitarian assistance. We did not count backwards from a total amount and then turned down the last appeals. But there is a point where it starts hurting. We diverted funds from our activities in Africa in a considerate manner. We re-allocated funds from the multilateral budget and only minimally from other country-programmes. UNDP-funding was cut back significantly, but we still have the world’s highest aid level. It is important for us to maintain our commitment to donate 1 per cent of GNP.”

“We have a very rapid and flexible funding procedure and very good implementing partners, able to deal with large resources. It is a vulnerable system, though, and we have concluded in the Ministry that we need a more hands-on approach to deal with the increasingly competitive situation our partners are confronted with. We are also as a government, as a state, involved in a competition.”

“Concerning NATO, the co-ordination worked much better than it was feared. We undertook joint operations, they provided logistic support, but great care was taken to respect different mandates, especially with the ICRC. In our policy-paper on assistance to the Western Balkans we prioritise a highly visible Danish assistance. But we are not in a hurry to present a general strategy for our global assistance, as it was recommended by the big evaluation of Danish humanitarian assistance [Danida 1999d], because we would not like to expose ourselves to politicians wanting to cut back aid. We take on-board practice-oriented suggestions.”

“Exit strategies? The beneficiaries have a life after the disaster. In Kosova the international community demands reconciliation with fire and brimstone. I am afraid we just paste on a nice-looking cover.”

8. 1992 to 1999

From 1992 to 1999 the political salience of humanitarian aid grew dramatically. Humanitarian assistance had catapulted from a relatively obscure position within a three-man office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, making deals with parochial interests of agrobusiness and charity-grassroots, to the absolute top of the politics, to high-politics, with everyone trying to get a piece of the action. Nothing could even begin to compare with visibility of the military and civilian humanitarian intervention in the Balkans during the three spring months of 1999. Perhaps the most significant long-term effect was the full blossoming of direct national securitisation of humanitarian assistance, creating something completely different from the vague do-good, military non-committed, remote Somalia episode. There was a national need at the level of high-politics to turn the disaster in Kosova into an emergency event substantiating NATO's claim to wage a humanitarian war. Humanitarian aid was no longer the same.

Box 6. Unequal distribution of Danish humanitarian aid 1992-1999

| Somalia ¹ | Afghanistan | Kosova ² | Kos. total. ³ | |
|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------|
| 1992-99 ⁴ | 357,7 | 221,9 | 489,9 | 1368,0 |
| Per cent ⁵ | 5,1 | 3,1 | 6,9 | - |
| Per inhab. ⁶ | 60 | 11 | 245 | 684 |

1) Including budget-line 'Horn of Africa'

2) Only 1998-99

3) Figure includes 1999 expenses for military in Kosova and Kosova refugees in Denmark

4) Million dkk

5) Per cent of total Danish humanitarian aid 1992-1999

6) Dkk pr inhab. estimated populations in millions: Somalia 6; Afghanistan 20; Kosova 2

Source: Danida annual reports; Ministry of Defence annual reports

Total Danish humanitarian aid 1992-1999 (both years included) amounted to 7.058,6 million ddk or 882,325 million per year, distributed extremely unequally, as the box above documents. It was not the needs of the individual person in Kosova that were sixty-two times higher than the needs of the individual person suffering in Afghanistan. Indeed, the irony is that if there was any difference in human needs, it was rather the opposite with people in Somalia or Afghanistan having less personal recourses to cope with emergencies. In Kosova it was *the refugees themselves* that averted a humanitarian disaster. Poul Nielson's man in Albania said afterwards, "The refugees had resources, cars, money, they were mobile, they rented hoses in Albania. That is why we had no humanitarian disaster." (interview with Niels Severin Munk, MFA, 17 February 2000)

It is not possible to argue for the massive risk aid to Kosova in terms of need. If one does the message would be one of unacceptable double standards with an European emergency deserving a level of assistance incomparable higher per person than in Afghanistan or Somalia. In every respect the assistance to Kosova was out of sync with the humanitarian standards established in Africa and Asia. Why?

Let us for a moment return to the Danish national interest in assisting poor countries beyond the European 'near-abroad'. In a level-headed discussion of Danish aid, the development economist Martin Paldam (Paldam 1997) claimed that Denmark (and other small countries) unlike big powers has no national security interests in the developing countries receiving Danish aid. Thus Denmark's interests must be either altruistic or domestic. (Paldam 1997:172) Yet this is not altogether convincing; another explanation could be that Denmark, as a small country can chose to be a large donor in order to win an international platform for perusing its interest in international peace and co-operation. "Solidaritet med FN-organisationerne forstået som kernen i et spinkelt internationalt samfund har derfor gennem årtier stået som en bærende del af dansk udenrigspolitik... Danmark har efterhånden skabt sig en international position som et specifikt "FN-land"" (DUPI 1999b:80) The authors cite examples from the UN, the World Bank and EU where Denmark through large donations and a consistent policy had secured influence (DUPI 1999b:72). Paldam is perfectly right in stressing that the receiving countries only were incidental to Denmark's national interest, what he ignored was how they are necessary props for Denmark's struggle to improve its standing amongst *other donor countries*. Of course, this argument also applies to other small countries with big aid programmes in particular the other Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands.

Unfortunately, aid can only function as a vehicle for the national interest in this manner as long as dominant international norms continue to credit big aid spenders. Discussing aid conditionality at the Social Summit in Copenhagen 1995 Poul Nielson argued that the biggest threat to continued Danish public acceptance of very high development assistance "come from... the lack of willingness in other OECD countries to contribute." (Nielson 1997:149) It is no fun being the world champion in a game everybody else has abandoned. The 1990s saw a profound change away from altruism towards securitisation of aid: aid, in particular humanitarian aid, increasingly became a vehicle for national security interests also in small countries like Denmark. Fundamentally, I think, because the promise of development to foster a more peaceful world was put to shame during the decade of complex emergencies. Yugoslavia, of course, was the prime example: a developed country sliding

backwards into terrifying civil war undoing development, and ultimately threatening our own security.

Humanitarian aid had travelled a very long distance from 1992 to 1999. From a position of charity aroused by the Somalia hunger crisis, humanitarian aid moved past development aid and ended in a position directly opposite that of charity, namely defending *our own* safety against risks closing in from a fragmenting and threatening world. It had become risk aid, expressed clearly in a publication by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (significantly not the Minister for Development) explaining Denmark's policy in Kosova and the western Balkan. "Fra denne region [Det Vestlige Balkan] udgår en af de mest kontante trusler mod stabilitet i Europa. Gang på gang kræver udviklingen det internationale samfunds engagement. Det har ført til international såvel som national dansk erkendelse af, at en indsats i f.eks. Bosnien-Herzegovina, Albanien og Kosova har en bredere sikkerhedsmæssig betydning, der berører lande også udenfor det geografiske nærområde." (UM temaserie 17, Udenrigsministeriet 1999:45) The Minister then joined together military and civilian intervention, "Bistanden [dansk bistand til Det Vestlige Balkan] - der ligger i naturlig forlængelse af den store danske nødhjælpsindsats og forsvarrets betydelige bidrag til NATO's operationer og Kosova-styrken (KFOR) - omfatter nødhjælp, genopbygning- og overgangsbistand med hovedvægten på Kosova, samt en mere langsigtet støtte til etablering af en demokratisk infrastruktur i regionen." (ibid. p. 36) This was the new context confronting aid agencies; it was to give them almost unlimited growth possibilities.

4 ● THE GOOD INDUSTRY: THE AGENCIES

In this chapter the perspective shifts from the donor state to the implementing agencies. I argued that violent death and displacement were the most salient features of an emergency for the individual victim (Chapter One); for a state caught by a complex emergency civil war was the most virulent component (Chapter Two). By responding to emergencies donor states became parties to them; the unity of disaster and response I called an ‘emergency event’. In Chapter Three I argued that the practice of humanitarian aid moved in three directions during the 1990s: (i) a professional world-wide ‘pure’ short-term emergency aid, (ii) a long-term, local, low-profile ‘humanitarian aid programmed for development’, here called development aid; and (iii) a high-profile, highly selective risk aid integrating national security concerns and humanitarian mandates.

With the explosive expansion of humanitarian aid during the 1990s and the growing economic clout and political salience of humanitarian agencies, in particular NGOs, the responsibility for their ‘beneficiaries’ became a sore point. It dawned on the aid industry that aid could do harm, that aid might put beneficiaries at risk. If violence is the central feature of complex emergencies, protection against violence must be the primary challenge for humanitarian agencies. Yet, humanitarian agencies are per definition non-violent, thus the response to violence became an existential challenge for humanitarian agencies.

How was the challenge of protecting the beneficiaries against violence met by the three types of humanitarian aid? I discuss the ‘pure’ humanitarian aid approach of Dan Church Aid, ICRC and UNHCR in Somalia, the development aid approach of Dacaar in Afghanistan, and finally the risk aid approach of Danish Refugee Council in Kosova. The question of the impact of individual projects will be addressed in Chapter Five.

Box. 7 All agencies funded by Danida in Somalia, Afghanistan, Kosova, selected years; overview of agencies discussed in Chapter Four

| Aid type | Somalia 1992 | Somalia 1998 | |
|-----------------|--|--|--|
| Emerg. aid | <i>DCA</i> <i>UNICEF</i> <i>UNHCR</i> <i>ICRC</i> <i>IFRC</i> <i>DRK</i> <i>WFP</i> <i>SCF-DK</i> <i>UN Som.T. F.</i> | <i>DCA/ACT</i> <i>DCA/DBG</i> <i>UNHCR</i> <i>ICRC</i> <i>IFRC</i> <i>DRK</i> <i>WFP</i> | |
| Dev. aid | | <i>DCA/DBG</i> | |
| Risk aid | | DRC | |
| | | | |
| | Afghanistan 1992 | Afghanistan 1999 | |
| Emerg. aid | <i>ICRC</i> <i>IFRC</i> <i>UNHCR</i> <i>UNOCA</i> | <i>ICRC</i> <i>IFRC</i> <i>UNHCR</i> <i>UNOCHA</i> <i>UNICEF</i> | |
| Dev. aid | <i>DACAAR</i> <i>DAC</i> | <i>DACAAR</i> <i>DAC</i> | |
| | | | |
| | Kosova 1998 | Kosova 1999 | |
| Risk aid | <i>DRC</i> <i>DRK</i> <i>ICRC</i> <i>DCA</i> <i>SCF-DK</i> <i>OCHA</i> <i>UNHCR</i> <i>UNICEF</i> <i>IHB</i> <i>WFP</i> | <i>DRC</i> <i>DRK</i> <i>ICRC</i> <i>DCA</i> <i>SCF-DK</i> <i>OCHA</i> <i>UNHCR</i> <i>UNICEF</i> <i>IHB, verifik.</i> <i>WFP</i> <i>IFRC</i> <i>WHO</i> <i>UNFPA</i> <i>UNMAS</i> <i>UNMIK</i> <i>Open Society</i> | <i>IPPF</i> <i>ASF</i> <i>MSF-DK</i> <i>ADRA-DK</i> <i>MS</i> <i>DSI</i> <i>Mission Øst</i> <i>Beredskabsstyrelsen</i> <i>Brødremenigheden</i> <i>Caritas Danmark</i> <i>Støt Tuzlas Skoler</i> <i>Dialogue Development</i> <i>Danmarks Journalist Højskole</i> <i>Bønnelycke A/S</i> <i>Danish Powerlines A/S</i> <i>Rambøll A/S</i> |

Italics: agencies discussed in Chapter Four

1. Emergency aid: Dan Church Aid, Somalia 1992

Dan Church Aid (Folkekirkens Nødhjælp) did not implement any projects in Somalia in 1992 (nor in 1997), but contributed money to the Lutheran World Federation and their operations. LWF was not implementing any projects in Somalia either, but had a co-ordinating role, collecting money from donors, procuring relief items and shipping them to Somalia, where a number of NGOs were responsible for the final distribution to the Somalis. This long chain left DCA with no control of input and no control of distribution, let alone with means of protection of their beneficiaries. What is worse, it is most likely that this mode of implementing emergency aid exposed the beneficiaries to more risk than had been the case with no aid.

A key person in the LWF operations, both into Sudan and Somalia was Bob Koepp, an American pilot and a committed, hard working, hard smoking, enthusiastic facilitator. While nobody has questioned Bob Koepp's commitment to people in need in Somalia (and many other places) and his stamina in bringing help, his "go in and do something" methods has been criticised seriously (Duffield et. al.1995). Bob Koepp described himself in long talk January 1999 in Nairobi as a cowboy and a dinosaur, and after much controversy he has since left Nairobi and the emergency work. Indeed the DCA/LWF/SEOC set-up was an example of an departmentalised agency approach presumably causing harm. It is described in some detail below because the practices of 1992 only partially has been rectified. What is more, the disregard for control at the distribution end of the aid chain mirrored disregard for facts about the Somalia crisis in the donor end of the chain, in sum raising questions about the integrity of the whole operation.

On the 29 February 1992 a fax headlined "Emergency Assistance Appeal for Somalia," arrived at the office of Dan Church Aid in Copenhagen. It began "SOMALIA AND HER PEOPLE ARE DYING IN A SEA OF MISERY AND SUFFERING!" Sender was Bob Koepp in Nairobi, and he attached two press reports from Mogadishu to his appeal published the same day by AFP describing the ongoing civil war and clan conflicts in the capital; he continued, "As a result of this lack of stability the Somali people at all levels are suffering a human tragedy." There was no mentioning of a drought neither in the press reports, the report filed by Adrian Ratcliffe (Ratcliffe 1992) on behalf of the Lutheran World Federation on 10 March, nor in a report filed by Koepp's special reporter John Parker on 2 April after a visit to Somalia 28-31 March (Parker 1992); a point we will return to. Bob Koepp faxed his appeal to 200 church charities under the LWF umbrella, including Dan

Church Aid on the same day Adrian Ratcliffe left for Mogadishu on a fact-finding mission, i.e. not waiting for him to return five days later with an assessment. Always moving fast, Chr. Balslev Olesen head of Dan Church Aid, in a press-stunt gearing up for the annual Dan Church Aid collection-day in Denmark had visited the Liboi refugee camp at the Kenya-Somali border: Four days after receiving Bob Koepp's fax he could issue a press release on Somalia calling for a six-week emergency assistance to Somalia, and arguing that airlifts were needed as a matter of urgency, "to save the needy and innocent people of Somalia, thousand of lives are at stake." (Press-release, 3 March 1992).

Eleven days later, on the eve of the national collection-day Dan Church Aid no longer referred to thousands of lives at stake but millions, and they now claimed a drought caused an immediate food-deficit affecting 17-20 million people including 4,5 million in Somalia: "Drought hits Africa hard. Dan Church Aid calls on the Danish people to support the annual collection "Bread to the World". The effects of a persistent drought in these months hits large parts of East and Southeast Africa... Some countries are not only hit by drought but also disturbances and civil war, such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Mozambique." (Press-release, 14 March) The collection went well and four days later an appeal, now backed up by the solidarity shown by generous Danes, was sent to Danida asking for 8 mill. dkk. to charter a ship, load it with wheat in Scandinavia and sail it to East Africa and distribute along the coast. No documentation was included, but the money was appropriated; however the idea was defective and on July 10 DCA had to tell Danida that the plan was scrapped. Six days after the appeal with the ship-idea, Dan Church Aid sent a new appeal for 2 mill. dkk on March 24, with a copy of Bob Koepp's fax of 29 Feb. attached and no attempt made to specify needs. The fax, of course, still did not mention drought but civil war as the cause of the emergency, jarring with the collection-campaign and Danida's press releases claiming Somalia to be part of an all-African drought. The money was quickly appropriated (April 6) and on May 10 finally the first 16 tons of food arrived by air to Mogadishu; four months after ICRC had unloaded food in Mogadishu harbour.

During the next couple of months Somalia became an established emergency event. In an appeal July 10 for another 5 mill. dkk to the draught-stricken people of Ethiopia and Somalia. Dan Church Aid repeated the figure of 4,5 million people facing famine because of drought and now talked of "the worst African drought this century...20 million people endangered... Somalia is one of the countries [of East and Southern Africa] hit most severely by drought.... The tragic conditions in Somalia will be all too familiar to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Appeals for 2 mill. were made again on 25 August, 18 September, and 10 November with arguments reduced to simple repetitions of previous appeals,

“Unfortunately, the catastrophic situation in Somalia appears not to be improving... for further information please see our previous appeals.” They were all granted; DCA received 20 million dkk for Somalia in 1992.

Bob Koepp in his first appeal had suggested shipping standard relief items such as foodstuffs, medicines, tents, plastic sheets, kitchen utensils, water-containers, water purification tablets, and soap. However, the audited report from Danida clearly shows that the operation was a pure fly-service. The money went to ‘Southern Air Transport’ flight operators in Nairobi for chartering their Hercules planes. From May 1992 to the end of 1995 Dan Church Aid/LWF airlifted 25.000 tonnes of food and non-food items into Somalia, supported by Danida throughout, and in periods also by ECHO.

Neither Dan Church Aid, LWF nor Bob Koepp’s agency SEOC had any control on the ground with the relief sent to Somalia. Dan Church Aid stated clearly (appeal March 24) that the aim was solely to transport food into Somalia, not to distribute it to the suffering Somalis. “[The aim is to provide] support in form of relief transport to existing agencies working on the ground in Somalia...To generally act as a logistical co-ordinating body.” The complete disregard for the problems of distribution and control worried the Ministry and after an exchange of letters with Dan Church Aid and Bob Koepp, Danida was sufficiently calmed by a promise of SEOC to work close on the ground with SCF-UK. It was also promised that LWF would make frequent monitoring visits to the points of distribution; however, this was never carried out.

In 1997, five years after the big Somalia operation in 1992 Dan Church Aid still had not completed the mandatory reporting and accounting on how they had used the Danish taxpayer money in Somalia. After assisting in “the worst drought in hundred years” internal audit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also in 1997 revealed that of the 20 mill. dkk Dan Church Aid received in 1992 for Somalia, 4.9 mill. dkk were never used. The money was later returned in small instalments with a accumulated interest of 0,8 mill. dkk. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal document, April, 1997) On a DCA letter apologising to the Ministry one of the Humanitarian Aid department staff had scribbled angrily “Will that do?” [Er det så godt nok?] (15 July, 1997 Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal document). But both the Ministry and DCA were busy with new huge projects and no-one had any interest in making a row or displaying the Ministry’s minimal capacity of control.

Interview with Bob Koepp, emergency relief co-ordinator, Nairobi, 8 January 1999

- *On how the LWF Somalia operation began:*

“Our emergency operations [in Sudan] started off for two months but lasted for eight years. It developed into this massive multi-million dollar thing run by me and a couple of other people. In 1991 when Somalia came up there was a big problem, most Christian organisations did not know anything about Somalia because it is not a Christian country. It was the old story, who have we got out there? Hey Bob Koepp! He likes Somalia. We were the first to fly into Mogadishu just after Siad Barre had fled. We were the first people in this very unstable situation. They started shooting and we had to come back to Nairobi still with the cargo in the plane. It was January 1991; we said let’s leave it for a while. We came back in March 1992. We sent our appeals using pictures of starving children. You can call it moral blackmail; it’s not to me. I faxed appeals out to 200 organisations all over the world and the money were rolling in. It became a fly-fly thing. We did not need people on the ground, they were already there. The way we operate, it was like a business-deal. They would come to us and say can you give us a flight to x, y, z? We flew to 25 location, we did everybody! It was a monster that got out of hand.”

- *On dimensions of the emergency:*

“OK, we did not go in and do in-depth surveys and all that. These hungry kids they were survey enough to me! A lot of people used to criticise my reporting, saying it only showed tonnages. True I was not in the business of giving a philosophical discussion of why it is all happening. I mean we were told: get it there! Hell with that, it happened and it worked like the invasion of Normandy.”

- *On causes of the emergency:*

“Yes, in the triangle of death [Mogadishu-Baidoa-Kismayo], they had a famine, they lost a harvest, they got caught between the forces, the starvation was political.”

[But the official cause of an emergency can be changed to suit the situation. Bob Koepp gave an example from Sudan back in the 1980s]

“You know the Sudanese, there is no civil war officially, but there are flood-victims, right, so we were helping flood-victims for eight years.”

- *On control of input:*

“We were just doing simple logistics. I was not the person responsible once the things arrived. With Catholic Relief Service I think 80-90% got through, later it became worse. It was organised on the ground by these organisations. We wouldn’t be doing it if we realised that what we were taking was looted, we would have stopped. 1992 was pretty good to start with. We had no problems - sure we paid off the warlords, for each plane they got 300\$,

their boys off-loaded everything, it was fine. Red Cross did the same thing. We didn't need those guys [UNOSOM]. 300\$ pr plane is cheap compared to 6 billion \$ spent [on UNOSOM]. OK, when the whole place fell apart with this group against that group: how can you work in a situation like that? Beginning of 1993 it started getting really bad, very dangerous; kids would shoot just for fun.”

“In Juba [in South Sudan] we were the power. You became like a warlord yourself. You are as much a warlord as anybody else, a big man... Go ask the little guys. They still call planes ‘Bob’. They think I fly all the planes.”

2. Emergency aid: ICRC, Somalia 1992

ICRC had an institutional weight permitting meaningful negotiations with local Somali power-holders. Yet even for ICRC the problem of protection proved to be unsolvable within the framework and mandate of the Red Cross Movement. ICRC first tried to protect their input by negotiating and co-operating with local structures of power and violence (local elders and militias); by decreasing the vulnerability of the input (wet-feeding), and finally by (grudgingly?) accepting military intervention. In February local committees composed of clan elders was organised to ensure “an equitable distribution of the supplies” (ICRC press release). Problems and inputs increased and in May they set up 120 cooking places for wet feeding in an attempt to prevent looting of dry rations. However, powerful groups then instead of stealing sacks pressurised ICRC to grant them the wet-feeding business and it became a highly profitable business for a small groups of Somalis.

ICRC for the first time openly admitted to the use of armed escort, something directly against Red Cross practice, in a press release from Nairobi explaining the security set-up for food aid in Mogadishu on May 8. “Through the local relief committees 2000 men for the north of the city and 1000 for the south have been called in by the clans or sub-clans there to act as a kind of ‘police force’. These guards protect the beaches where the off-loading is taking place, the main roads to the capital, the relief convoys and distribution points... It has, however, been agreed with the Somali Relief Committees that a small amount of the food brought in would be given to its members as “food for work”. The ICRC stresses that this is by no means a general rule, but is a result of the extremely chaotic situation in Somalia. After examining all possibilities the ICRC came to the conclusion that this was the only way to get food aid through to the victims.”

However, with more than hundred NGOs and other agencies competing to distribute food, strong Somali groups could manipulate the situation. In August the US began a huge airlift of food into Somalia, the unilateral operation 'Provide Relief'. On 21 August the ICRC came with a desperate critique of other agencies for dumping food in a destructive fashion, "The ICRC must now call on aid organisations moving in to Somalia to co-ordinate their assistance and avoid mass air-dropping or dumping food. Otherwise the intricate system instigated by the ICRC after long and careful negotiations to distribute relief effectively within the country could be thrown into jeopardy. Somalia remains an extremely dangerous and volatile place and large quantities of food swamping the country in an uncontrolled fashion could quite easily spark off new security problems." (21 August, ICRC press release).

In October 1992 Philip Johnston of CARE-US became head of the UN '100-days emergency programme for Somalia'; by November he and others from the aid industry had persuaded President Bush to declare that the US Army would go in and protect agencies bringing food to the starving Somalis. When this became an imminent reality ICRC washed their hands and issued a statement on, 'The policy line adopted by the ICRC regarding the possible arrival of foreign troops in Somalia.' It read in parts, "The ICRC notes that to help the victims of the tragedy in Somalia, humanitarian aid is no longer enough. The ICRC believes that a comprehensive political solution is indispensable, and that implementation of such a policy rests with the community of States.... The ICRC concerns itself exclusively with its humanitarian mission. Security conditions must, however, be improved to enable it to carry out this mission satisfactorily." (ICRC press-release, 26 November). This can only be read as a admission of loss of control, and a forced acceptance of US/UN operation. Humanitarian aid had reached its limit when the protection of starving people by food-aid seemed to put the same people at more risk by feeding violent, predatory structures. Twelve days later Operation Restore Hope landed on the beaches of Mogadishu. Humanitarian aid to Somalia had begun its transformation into risk aid. Humanitarian mandates were attached to half-baked national and UN concerns for securing 'a new world order' with disastrous consequences.

The question is however, to what extent the ICRC itself had moved the situation toward the break-down of protection in November 1992 by their own enormous food aid. By November 1992, ICRC and WFP together claimed they provided food for 3 million people, that is the majority of the total population of Somalia. The claim is not true in the sense that ICRC & WFP end-distributed food to 3 million people. In 1992 an executive top-level report in WFP-Rome estimated that only 15 (fifteen) per cent of the delivered food reached

the beneficiaries (personal communication from Steven Green, head of WFP evaluation department; Copenhagen 25 March 1999). This figure was kept secret and never made public. Steven Green gave one example of what happened to the rest. At one point the WFP-stores in Mogadishu was looted and 7000 tonnes of food disappeared in 24 hours; crowds of people carried away sacks and even the militias could not loot it all themselves. “But it was probably the best distribution we ever had,” Steven Green said. Most of the 85 percent looted food would enter the market and fund faction leaders, their militias and followers, and build up the fortunes of certain rich merchants. The words “donor” and “NGO” had entered the vocabulary of everyday Somali language. On the other hand perhaps 100.000 lives were saved; the dilemma was to reduce, alter, or terminate aid when it began creating more problems than it solved. And even if it had been possible at the time to recognise such a breaking-point, it is difficult to believe it would have been possible to act accordingly, against industrial pressures to keep up the massive operation adding to the total turn-over and importance of ICRC and WFP.

Ola Skuterud, head of the IFRC Somalia delegation (1998) personally experienced this dilemma in 1993 in Somalia. “If we have had the ideas of sustainability we have now back in 1992 the ICRC would have gone in less massively, not to create passivity. In Erigavo, Somaliland in 1993 I was responsible for distributing food despite I knew it was not needed and had detrimental consequences. It was political: when we helped in the South we were obliged also to help in the North.” (Interview with Ola Skuterud, Nairobi 7 January 1999).

Incorrect claims of dimensions of the Somalia 1992 emergency

The wildly differing estimates of the number of people in danger of starvation in Somalia (and Eastern & Southern Africa) indicates three key problems with needs assessments:

- (i) An emergency event necessitates a figure of people in need; the press, agencies, ministries, all demand figures no matter how inaccurate.
- (ii) The margin of uncertainty both conceptually and numerically may be so wide as to render estimates almost meaningless.
- (iii) Estimates tend to be inflated over time reflecting that big numbers are better than small numbers for most parties to an emergency, except, of course, the actually suffering people.

Box 8. Various claims of the number of people starving[§] in Somalia and Eastern & Southern Africa 1992 (in millions)

| | | |
|--|---------|--------------------|
| | Somalia | East&South. Africa |
|--|---------|--------------------|

| Date of claim | ICRC | DCA | Danida | UN | DCA | Danida |
|----------------|----------|-----|---------|-----|-------|--------|
| September 1991 | | 4,5 | | | | |
| February 1992 | 4,5 | | | 4,5 | | |
| March 1992 | | 4,5 | 4,5 | 4,5 | 17-20 | 20 |
| April 1992 | 1,5+3,5* | 4,5 | 4,5 4,5 | 20 | 60 | |
| July 1992 | > 1.0 | | | | | |
| October 1992 | | | | | | 60 |

§ 'Starving' covers 'in need of food assistance', 'in dire need of immediate assistance' (ICRC); 'immediate food-deficit', 'in danger of famine' (DCA); 'threatened with a catastrophic famine' (Danida); 'face starvation', 'in imminent danger of starving to death', 'nearing a food crisis' (AP dispatches).

* 1,5 million 'seriously threatened by lack of access to food' plus 3,5 million 'in urgent need of humanitarian assistance'.

UN Under-Secretary James Jonah was apparently the first to suggest the figure of 4,5 million starving Somalis in his September 1991 report to the UN Secretary General on the Somalia emergency. The claim of 4,5 million starving Somalis including 1,5 million in immediate danger of dying began to circulate in the international press, in NGO appeals and government donations at the beginning of 1992. With the unfolding tragedy it quickly became the standard figure, "blasphemous to question". (Maren 1997) It was almost certainly a gross exaggeration.

Three arguments may be advanced against the figure of 4,5 million starving Somalis. First, the uncertainty regarding the size of the total Somali population. In 1992 the World Bank published an estimate of 8,2 mill. and UNDP an estimate of 8,9 mill. while FAO estimated the total population to be 3-4 million. Perhaps the most thorough discussion of all available evidence is found in the Human Development Report for Somalia, published by UNDOS in 1998. Their conclusion is that the total Somali population was below 5 million in 1992 and had reached 5,52 million by 1995. (UNDP 1998a:41)

Second, while it is not theoretically impossible that close to 100% of the Somali population could have faced starvation it is probably not true because the famine was mainly concentrated in the southern inter-riverine area, and not even here were everybody starving. Michael Maren points to the fact that "It would have been clear to anyone travelling beyond the immediate famine zone that the vast majority was [...] not in any danger at all. The entire population of the famine-affected areas of the country was actually only 2,5 to 3 million." (Maren 1998:210)

Finally, the limited precision of the term 'starvation'. Different definitions of 'starving' glossed over the striking difference between the estimates, but how did the actual bodily

condition of a person 'starving' differ from one 'in immediate danger of dying', or 'in need of food assistance', or 'facing starvation' or from being 'in danger of famine' etc. etc.? And how did these conditions differ from the general living conditions of most Somalis struggling for survival in 'normal' years? The unqualified notions of "starvation" lead to full tilt warnings like "Dying in a sea of misery" and grossly inflated figures like the exaggerated Danida figure of 60 million starving people in Eastern and Southern Africa in "the worst drought in hundred years".

Obviously such inaccurate estimates hampered timely relief and the agencies may have influenced protection negatively and put beneficiaries at risk. One example quoted above was the 29 February 1992 appeal from Bob Koepp forwarded by DCA. In the proposal it was just stated vaguely that "thousands of lives in Somalia are at stake" without any kind of evidence. There were no arguments of specific needs necessitating the proposed scope, duration and input of 35 flights to Mogadishu with 1 mill. inhabitants and serving a population of perhaps 3 mill, and the surprising 20 flights to Berbera with a population of 25.000 and serving a population of maximum 1 mill. No reasons were given for any of the amounts of aid proposed: why precisely 1000 metric tons, if not because it is such a nice round number? It moved on the unstated understanding that needs anyway were much larger than the possible emergency assistance. The evaluation of the SEOC severely criticises the focus on inputs as a sufficient measure of success. "Measuring success by input marginalises questions of relevance and effect. The result is to treat the requirement of food as either self-evident or a generalised requirement." (Duffield 1995:3)

I will argue that the over-generous adding of extra millions of starving to an emergency in an arrogant way nullifies the respect for individual suffering. It may well be done in an earnest wish to attract funds to needy people, but quite apart from generating handsome overheads, real needs of real people become endless, abstract and de-personalised. To add another million starving people just to present a really juicy fund-generating emergency is not an act of mercy but an act of de-humanising. To do so has disturbing implications for the human rights of the beneficiaries confronted with the aid industry.

The low ICRC estimates from July of "more than 1 million" starving Somalis seems to be the most plausible. It is testimony of the high degree of professionalism and integrity of the ICRC that they *reduced* their estimate of need from February to July 1992 during the same period where the emergency of Somalia exploded in the global media.

Improper claims on the causes of the 1992 Somalia emergency

We saw that DCA and Danida attributed the famine in Somalia in 1992 to drought. But this contradicts claims made by experts since 1992. I called Bernhard Helander, one of the world's top Somalia experts at the University of Uppsala, and asked him directly if the drought was the cause of the 1992 famine. He answered "Absolutely not!" (personal communication, 4 March 1999). Indeed, the political causes of the famine in 1992 were well-known already in 1992 and stated in several reports coming out of Somalia during 1992, including those from LWF, *inter alia* Bob Koepp on 29 Feb, Adrian Ratcliffe on 10 March, and John Parker on 2 April. The ICRC never talked about a drought-induced famine in Somalia that year (Danish Red Cross only did it once, in a joint appeal with DCA and SCF-DK). Michael Maren quotes a range of US and international press reports on the famine in Somalia from 1991-1992 (Maren 1997:206-215); in none of these are there any mentioning of drought. Alex de Waal and Raakiya Omar wrote in 1993, "The [1992] famine in southern Somalia was due to raids and counter-raids by the armed factions, while north of Belet Ouen, in the north-east (Mijurtania) and Somaliland, there was no famine in any case," (cit. in Compagnon 1998:87). The contemporary conclusions were supported by later researchers. "The main causes of malnutrition are disease and loss of assets... It is not a problem of food availability but accessibility; not deficit but access." (Lagard 1998). "High malnutrition in Bay region in 1992/3 [the worst-hit famine area] did not reflect a lack of food, but the fact that *people had been harvested*." (McAskill, 1998; italics in original; both cit. in Bradbury 1998:112). "The floods [in 1997] were fundamentally different from the politically and militarily induced famine of 1991-93, when food insecurity was not the result of the vagaries of weather conditions but the "harvesting" of people." (ibid. p 112).

Why then talk about a drought in Somalia in 1992? I can see two reasons, both questioning the policy of DCA and by implication Danida. The first possible reason was the lumping together for the purposes of the national campaign "Bread to the World" in March 1992 problems in 16 African countries as one massive drought disaster. This is not the place to discuss whether or not there were droughts in the other countries. The problem is to appeal for and donate money to victims of a drought in a country where there was no drought but people starving for other reasons. That it was done in the service of a noble goal need not be doubted. However, by down-playing the conflict causing the emergency DCA bears their little part of the responsibility for misguided attempts to assist the Somalis.

The second reason for the less-than-true claim of drought instead of civil war as the cause for the famine could be the different rates of compassion elicited by a drought victim and a

civil war victim. DCA and Danida stressed drought and down-played civil war in all their appeals and public communications on Somalia because the Somalis had to be “innocent”, a term used again and again in the appeals, in order to attract maximum donations from the public. People destroying their own country provoke too many difficult questions, also about the protection of beneficiaries and the role of aid in feeding the conflict.

Yet, it can be argued: If people starved and moneys collected saved them why the fuss? First of all in the self-interest of the aid agencies: it is imperative for them to safe-guard the trust of the public, tax-payers, private donors, and governments. Trust is the most crucial asset of any agency doing humanitarian aid. Inaccurate reporting of the dimensions of emergencies and improper identification of the causes of famine in the case of Somalia 1992 could backfire terribly if the claims were proven to be half-truths and exaggerations. Because which claims made by the agencies in the future could the public then trust?

But also because casting the beneficiaries as innocent victims deprived them of agency and responsibility for their own country. The “victimisation” extends and deepens the (unintended) de-humanisation of the beneficiaries by inflated estimates of the number of people at risk. The target population was purified of what could have made it less than a perfect beneficiary. Facts were pushed out of focus that make complex emergencies complex such as local groups benefiting from an emergency and other groups in desperate need of protection. When someone actually contributes to the destruction of their own society, how do you assist the ‘right’ people and how do you make the help sustainable? Such awkward questions were avoided by focusing on the “innocent victims” of simplified emergencies.

3. Emergency aid: DCA/ACT, Somalia 1997

As in 1992 Dan Church Aid did not implement any projects of their own in Somalia in 1997. The level of professionalism and responsibility had risen since 1992 partly through intense discussions of how to learn from Somalia and Rwanda. One practical outcome was the creation of Action of Churches Together, ACT, a co-ordinating body for Protestant church charity, put to the test when big parts of southern Somalia were flooded in 1997. 1 million people were estimated to have been affected by the floods, 250.000 people to have been displaced and around 2,200 people to have died. In 1997-98 DCA contributed both to the ACT-umbrella providing emergency aid during the floods, and to a number of church charities doing various rehabilitation projects. One of these charities was DBG (Diakonia-Bread for the World-Germany); we will briefly discuss their interesting response to the problem of protection, below and in Chapter Five. In an interview the Dan Church Aid

regional representative did not mention these specific initiatives, however, but articulated concerns of poor and inadequate protection of beneficiaries, concerns shared by field staffs in most of the agencies I visited.

Interview with Bodil Holmsgård, East Africa Regional Representative for Dan Church Aid in Nairobi, Nairobi 5 January 1999 [translated from Danish by HT]

“The floods of south Somalia started around 15 Oct 1997. I began to receive reports and called a joint meeting at the beginning of November 1997 [14 Nov.] in ACT and World Concern. We agreed to send an assessment mission to Juba and Shebelle. Then we sent a submission to ACT in Geneva, which then went out to all the national ACT organisations. 17 November 1997 a formal appeal from DCA reached the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the beginning of December planes arrived in Somalia with pumps, agricultural tools, foodstuffs (rice, sugar, tea and cooking oil). It was distributed by LWF, Norwegian and Swedish Church Aid by truck, boat or on foot. This relief operation went on until April 1998.”

I asked her how DCA/ACT terminates relief operations when the emergency is over. Significantly she misunderstood the question to mean how relief could *continue* after the emergency had ended using the concept of rehabilitation popular at the time.

“Rehabilitation is a grey zone between emergency and development. Norwegian and Swedish Church Aid both run permanent programmes. We try to create continuity. Not so many donors want to fund rehabilitation. It is a catastrophe, for example now in Kigali. The Sudan Emergency Assistance Consortium is a good example of capacity building, of continuity. The emergency assistance in the future will have to ask the local communities what they want from emergency aid. We have to develop the local capacities, they have to feel they own the projects. Education is the way ahead. We should co-operate with local NGOs like local churches.”

“We have to learn if our relief operations shall become better. Yet, you soon come to the fundamental question: shall we help? Of course, I think you shall. How could you let the civilian population down because they are ruled by a power hungry dictator? The main problem is corrupt regimes. We should put pressure on Danida to speak out against regimes like in Sudan, we should do lobbyism. DCA ought to be daring, politically. I say this as my personal opinion; to get the political view of DCA you must ask [general director] Balslev Olesen. DCA assists regardless of politics or religion. We support the IGAD negotiations, but they seems to be deadlocked. We need to go new ways. The local women know what it is all about. Woman across clans can sit together, and an understanding will germinate.”

“When it all becomes too much, and I begin doubting if the help helps at all I think of the Christian teaching to help thy neighbour, the man in the ditch; it is love the world needs.”

4. Emergency aid: UNHCR, Somalia 1997, Somaliland 1998

The UNHCR effort in Somalia was for political-institutional reasons to do with the status of Somaliland, divided between an office in Hargeisa, referring directly to Geneva and dealing with the Northwest, i.e. Somaliland, and a regional office in Nairobi, dealing with Northeast, Central and South Somalia. Also for political reasons linked to the non-recognition of Somaliland's independence, UNHCR only began a repatriation programme to Somaliland in February 1997; before that UNHCR repatriation had only taken place from Kenya to south Somalia and not from Ethiopia into Somaliland. This alone points to some of the constraints UNHCR faced in fulfilling its mandate of protection.

The actual performance of UNHCR in 1997 did not remotely live up to the stated ambitions in their 1997 Somali Repatriation Programme. Only 277 persons (all ethnic Bajunis) were repatriated in 1997 by the Nairobi office (Bajuni repatriation was attempted again in 1998 in a farcical and incompetent operation); only 0,79% of the target of 35.000 was achieved. 5,430 persons were repatriated by the Hargeisa office or 5,43% of the stated goal of 100.000 repatriated Somalis.

The minimal achievements of UNHCR raises the question of why UNHCR published so wildly over-optimistic targets: poor judgement of outer constraints and inner strength? On 10 June, 1997 UNHCR had only received one small contribution for the 1997 Somalia repatriation programme. Were targets cynically inflated in order to get what was needed for a much more limited job? Whatever the internal reasons for the disappointingly few people repatriated in 1997, the fact points to constraints over which UNHCR exercised no direct control: i) funding, ii) protection in the host states, and iii) protection in Somalia.

Interview with Kalunga S. Lutato, head of Somali operations at UNHCR regional office in Nairobi, Nairobi 6 January 1999.

- On dimensions of the emergency,

In 1997 the 130.000 Somali refugees in Kenya were located in two camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, both close to the Somali border and far from populated areas; this was a drop from the peak of 400.000 Somali refugees in 1992. 270.000 refugees had returned 1992-1997

from Kenya, of these around 85.000 had returned spontaneously, i.e. not assisted by UNHCR.

- On the causes of the emergency,

In Kenya refugees were generally considered to be a source of crime and this had been an important factor in the recent decree by Pres. Moi to close all camps in the vicinity of Mombassa. Kalunga Lutato also pointed to the historical circumstance that Somali refugees in Kenya were seen as a potential threat to the integrity of Kenya by coalescing with the Somali population in Kenya and fuelling secessionist demands. To prevent a replay of the “shifita-wars” from the early sixties the refugees were kept strictly inside the camps. In general UNHCR puts growing emphasis on repatriation, but before UNHCR could close down the last camps in Kenya Somalia must be made peaceful.

“We cannot do it now, perhaps the camps have to be sustained 10 years or more waiting for peace to come everywhere in Somalia.”

- On types of input

UNHCR tried to prepare for the returnees by QIPs (Quick Impact Projects).

“For the Bajunis [a small minority living on islands off the Kismayo coast, and the only people among the Somalis to repatriate in 1997 and 1998 from Kenya] we try to install civil order by assisting the police with a new head quarter and a new prison. The Bajunis had repeatedly been looted by the militias from the larger groups; they were always the losers in the civil war. We provide water, we plant to stop the desert, we distribute seeds. We tried to create a livelihood for them by drilling a water-well and donating a few small boats. We try to start some income-generating and set up a local administration.”

Whether peace could be sustained in the areas of reintegration inside Somalia after the QIPs expired, Lutato said someone with a much longer perspective must take over. He could not answer that question.

- On control of input

Mr. Lutato could not pinpoint what the Danish donations to UNHCR had been used for in Somalia. Only if donations were given to specific projects was this possible, or if the donor requested flags etc. on the sites of end use. For example the Japanese often requested this, but not the Danish government. He took up his present post in 1997 and had no first-hand information on earlier operations; all files concerning matters up to 1996 had been cleared from the Nairobi office [!]. He did not know which old files were kept in Geneva.

The Somalia programme implemented from Nairobi appeared to be near collapse, only reacting slowly to the local Kenyan political agenda. Obviously those remaining in the camps were those with the least incentive to return for security, economic, or ethnic-political reasons. It afforded only the bleak protection to the Somalia refugees of the camps in the desert of North Kenya. The Somalia programme implemented from Hargeisa seemed to work much better and pro-actively engage the Somaliland authorities. Here UNHCR worked hard and imaginatively to protect the refugees. In the relatively peaceful context of Somaliland dialogue with the state authorities (much more accessible, of course, than their counterparts in Kenya) did make a positive difference for the refugees.

Interview with Guido Ambroso, field/repatriation officer UNHCR Hargeisa, Hargeisa, 25 November 1998.

In a tense atmosphere two days after the Somaliland government had suspended all UNHCR repatriation Guido Ambroso was interviewed in his office.

- On the dimensions of the emergency,

In 1991, 630.000 Somali refugees lived in eastern Ethiopia, by the end of 1997 the number was reduced to 242.000. Close to 400.000 refugees had moved spontaneously back to Somaliland during the period 1992-1997. UNHCR assisted the repatriation of 23.564 persons in the period 1996-1998. Guido Ambroso estimated that half of the remaining refugees constituted a residual group that would not voluntarily repatriate. Low caste people, groups like leather-workers, metal-workers, and barbers considered low by the general society, many of whom Siad Barré had empowered.

“But there is a subtle line between discrimination and persecution and some of these people that fled in 1991 have now returned. That is an encouraging sign.”

- On causes for the emergency,

In 1988 Hargeisa and other Somaliland towns were destroyed by Siad Barre’s troops and almost all the inhabitants fled to Ethiopia. Town-people from Hargeisa owning property were among the first to repatriate and reclaim their property, while people from still unsafe and ruined Borama remained in the camps. Many nomadic families had split, with the men leaving the refugee camps to look after their herds, while women and children remained and received the camp-provisions.

“When Somaliland got secure people came back, but if a new problem comes up people will flee again and we are back to square one.”

- On types of input,

“The camps were a massive input in the local areas. Do too much, and people come flooding. Do too little and people suffer.”

Refugees were counted as cardholders; many so-called “card-lords”, locals holding several cards, had infiltrated the camps. Under the UNHCR repatriation programme a refugee first had to surrender his or her ration-card, second they would receive food for nine months, 30 \$ pr. person, plastic sheets, jerry cans and blankets, a total expense of 140\$ pr. person, and thirdly transport was arranged by hiring private trucks and minibuses.

“Repatriation is a good song to the international community because the long term costs gets down.”

- *On control of input,*

The input of UNHCR in terms of repatriation was influenced by factors over which UNHCR had little direct control. UNHCR had to co-operate with the local authorities, in this case the Hargeisa government. On 23 November after weeks of discussions it decreed a stop to the UNHCR repatriation programme of Somali refugees from Ethiopia. They gave two official explanations: economic problems due to a Saudi ban on import of livestock from Somaliland and the so-called Hargeisa-problem. The reintegration of refugees obviously was affected negatively by the livestock ban causing a general economic depression, but was it plausible to be felt suddenly in November some ten months after the imposition of the ban in February 1998?

“Repatriation is a strategic objective for UNHCR. The problem awaiting us is when there are no more voluntary repatriates. That is when the problem starts. This could happen in the second half of 1999. We can say to the refugees staying in the camps: “OK, you can stay if the Ethiopians want you - but don’t count anymore on goods from the international community.” My personal feeling is we should tell people, “You have one month to take the package - assistance is suspended!”

“The Somaliland government must understand that one day the international community will close off the tap to the camps in Ethiopia, and then the Somalis will come back anyway. Food is the crux of the matter. Temporary assistance should be applied in Somaliland.”

“Refugees act in a perfectly rational manner. If the provisions handed out in the camps are better than what one is likely to get upon returning you stay; if, on the other hand, your prospects are better on returning, you go back.”

Guido Ambroso added that almost no-one repatriated voluntarily from Europe even though returnees from Europe got 10 to 15 times more assistance than the returnees from Ethiopia; in 1997 UNHCR had less than 100 voluntary returnees from Europe. He emphasised that rejectees were not the business of UNHCR.

“Only IOM deals with that. Touching that would ruin our co-operation with Somaliland completely.”

The “Hargeisa-problem” was a name put on this rapid demographic changes caused by large-scale squatting in and around Hargeisa. The returnees drifted towards Hargeisa and Gabiley and did not return to the small towns and rural areas where they had fled from.

Guido Ambroso argued that the civil war had only delayed a world-wide process of urbanisation and the move of UNHCR returnees towards Hargeisa was part of a general tendency of urbanisation. He maintained that the returnees had the freedom of movement. Yet, the Somaliland government strongly disputed this and insisted that the UNHCR had to co-operate with the government in curbing the growth of Hargeisa.

5. Emergency aid: DCA/DBG, Somalia 1998

The German church agency Diakonia-Bread for the World-Germany (DBG), implemented some of the Danida funded emergency aid to Somalia. A number of their projects, including some development-type projects, had devised an interesting modus of protection in the chaotic and unsafe situation of Mogadishu and southern Somalia. Abukar Ali Sheikh, a leading business man from the Abgal clan, was effectively field manager in the semi-permanent absence of Jürgen Prieske from the Mogadishu office due to security and his double responsibility for the DBG Somalia and Sudan programmes. Protection of beneficiaries was entrusted to local structures of violence. DCA/DBG used local militias, some owned by business-men employed by DBG, to protect their emergency assistance. Their simple solution was to keep aid projects small and attach them to local initiatives that had protection. It appeared possible by judicious selection to support private business in a way that did not compromise the humanitarian mandate of the aid. I give some more details in the Appendix of DBG's arrangements of protection in south Somalia with rehabilitation, education, and development projects; see cases 17,19 and 20.

Abukar Ali Sheikh wrote in his final report on the food security project, "Business people from Jowhar and Qoryoley were responsible for the transportation and security of the items... They were encouraged to keep up their business practices and they were the indirect beneficiaries of the project [by selling the relief items and services to DBG]. Through this strategy the risk of long distance transport and the looting of the items was avoided." (30 November, 1998, internal DBG-report) It clearly had controversial aspects, challenging some of Danida's idealistic notions of assisting vulnerable groups, that tend to ignore the problem of violence. I have found no discussion of this solution neither in DBG or DCA publications nor in independent studies of how far Somali business and private militias are able to protect beneficiaries of aid. Abukar Sheikh appeared to be running the programmes in a competent and efficient manner, and my personal impression was it did work well and actually prevented looting. In my opinion, it was one of the few constructive engagements with the challenge of violence and protection I saw in Somalia.

Interview with Abukar Ali Sheikh, programme manager of DBG in Mogadishu, Mogadishu 18 December 1998.

“We cannot deal with the whole need for help; we have selected the six districts in Lower and Middle Shabelle near rivers with irrigation where we support the poorest 3000 families with food, tools and seeds. Before the programme started we spent two years assessing the needs. To know who is poor we take the advice of the elders and local authorities. Our executive teams from Mogadishu had consultations in every village in Qorioley and Jowhar districts and the teams choose the advice if the elders were not corrupt.”

“We are not asking the people themselves if they are poor or not. We are looking ourselves and by the advice of the elders, but not from the poor themselves. Of course there are many people who seems not to be the poorest who always strive to be [counted as] the poorest, but we did not accept their sayings. We implement anything in a diplomatic way, we also have our security [force] that can protect the food we give to the poor people.”

[In one of the visited villages I was told how the villagers had been very scared when the DBG teams first arrived in their big cars with their armed guards and for a long time they hid in their huts; how did Abuker make people calm?]

“The last eight years Somalia experienced something which is very terrible to be expressed in words. You see, the people living by the river are marginalised Bantu. They are afraid for us thinking we are the looters. But after a time, when we had visited them many times they found out that we will give them something and not steal from them, they trusted us. They are happy and they welcome us. To raise their standard of living they need development aid. Six or seven years supply and I believe a good number will raise their standard of living.”

6. Development aid: DACAAR, Afghanistan 1992-99

Of particular interest here, is how Dacaar’s strategic move from emergency or rehabilitation aid to development aid and their tactical engagement with the Taliban regime influenced the protection of beneficiaries from violent death and displacement. Dacaar differs from DCA, DRC, DRK and other large agencies in being a one-shot agency only working in Afghanistan. If it closes down in Afghanistan it cannot move somewhere else. This may give strategic decisions a certain bias. Secondly it has provided a whole string of anthropologists, many of them students of the grand old man in Danish Afghanistan studies Klaus Ferdinand

(including even one of the key external Danida evaluators of Dacaar) with a platform for translating enthusiasm and solidarity with Afghans into practice. Again this may give strategic decisions a certain bias towards dialogue, pragmatism, and long-term commitment differing from the engagements of some global agencies more concerned with their profile in donor countries. There is no doubt that this has earned Dacaar a very high reputation among Afghans and most agencies and donors. When we ask how far Dacaar has been able to secure protection of their beneficiaries, we do it on the background of an agency with an excellent track record.(cf. Pedersen 1997 and 1999)

Dacaar was founded in 1984 as a consortium of four Danish NGOs in order to assist Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Since 1987, when they took over UNICEF's water-programme in the Afghan refugee camps, water-engineering has been a core activity. 1989 they began working inside Afghanistan and by 1999 almost all activities were in Afghanistan, yet they still retained their headquarters in Peshawar. Dacaar characterised itself as "a big civil engineering firm" (Annual Report 1993:6), and indeed their main achievement so far is the construction of 13,365 shallow wells with hand pumps having a claimed 2.161.700 beneficiaries (Dacaar Programme Document 1999-2003, Annex 21). During the 1990s Dacaar gradually moved their focus from rehabilitation to development; to date (1989 - 1999) they have received 198,35 million dkk from Danida's development funds and 9 million dkk from the humanitarian fund. What they were doing on the ground, however, in many ways was similar to what partners in the consortium were doing elsewhere under the humanitarian and risk brackets, for example DRC in Somaliland.

Dacaar made their first proposal for a rehabilitation programme inside Afghanistan in the wake of the signing of the Geneva accord April 1988, "when a political settlement in Afghanistan and a large scale repatriation of refugees were widely expected to follow the scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989." (1989 Annual Report:35) Unfortunately, next year the optimism was put to shame, but Dacaar came with the counter-argument informing all their subsequent activities in Afghanistan. "The sad fact that the overwhelming majority of refugees have not yet found it possible to return to their homeland does not diminish the urgent need for measures to rehabilitate the rural infrastructure and economy... [improving] the prospects of their successful resettlement when large scale repatriation finally takes place." (Annual Report 1990:19).

The move from relief in the refugee camps to rehabilitation inside Afghanistan, facilitating repatriation and subsequently development seemed quite logical. However, in terms of protection it was purely re-active, a point made quite clear in the same report by Bernt

Glatzer. Summarising attitudes among Afghani refugees from the Kunar province living in Pakistan he concluded, “the interviews in total revealed that the respondents are mostly concerned about their personal security...from mines, fighting and gangsters, and economic security.” and he added, “even if we turn the home areas of the refugees into Gardens of Eden, [by rehabilitation] the security problem will remain and many refugees will prefer their present situation [i.e. the camps in Pakistan].” (ibid, p. 47)

Early 1992 the Dacaar steering Committee commissioned an external review of the Rehabilitation Programme (LO Jonsson, EK Langer & G. Pedersen: "Back to Afghanistan: Report on a review of the rehabilitation programme of Dacaar" July 1992) which concluded that the general objective of the programme should be reformulated to include rural development. This was highly important for the future direction of development of Dacaar. As in 1989 the imminent return of the Afghan refugees was envisioned, and it was optimistically argued that Dacaar should prepare for “a situation of accomplished re-integration...by the end of 1995” by changing the mandate of Dacaar into a development NGO. (Annual Report 1992:6) But after the fall of Najibullah a flurry of optimism of peace in Afghanistan was once again brutally extinguished by power-hungry elites both in Afghanistan and other states. Afghanistan’s complex emergency worsened, and in 1995 Dacaar wrote, “The intensified war around Kabul in 1994 and the resulting internal displacement of more than half a million people demonstrated that the progression from relief to development cannot be taken for granted.” (Annual Report 1994:5) and in May 1995 the Dacaar Steering Committee asked ‘Relief, rehabilitation or development?’ They concluded that “Dacaar’s staff and methodologies represent such a resource for Afghanistan’s development that it cannot be allowed to disintegrate when Dacaar’s current rehabilitation mandate is accomplished.” (ibid. p. 5)

In fact, rehabilitation was not in any way about to be accomplished and Dacaar could not wait for national rehabilitation to be completed before commencing development projects. To be realistic they had to change their perspective from development *after* the war, to development of pockets of peace *inside* the war. To localise assistance to areas of relative calm appeared the only way to reconcile development with war. This had a number of consequences detrimental to the humanitarian mandate of assisting those most in need, which the advent of the Taliban only exacerbated. Dacaar needed peace to accomplish long-term development projects, and under the circumstances that was Taliban peace.

Dacaar’s annual report for 1997 is a glossy publication obviously intended to inform as much as to sell Dacaar to prospective donors in competition with many other NGOs. They

noted as their basic principles a reliance “on community participation in project identification, planning, operational implementation, maintenance and evaluation,” and they placed “great emphasis on political neutrality and [that] programme interventions work on the basis of a respect for Afghan culture and universally accepted human rights.” (Dacaar, Annual Report 1997) This was, of course something of a contradiction in so far as Afghan culture, in particular as represented by the Taliban, in several respects precisely did not accept ‘universally accepted human rights’. Dacaar stressed the basic right to personal security and freedom of harassment for all people, something denied by the present political power-holders in Afghanistan; Dacaar further stressed equal rights to employment and training outside the home for men and women, children’s equal rights to education, and equal right to assistance regardless of ethnic, political or religious affiliation. (ibid, p. 9) Insisting on these rights flied in the face of Taliban practice, and sat a high standard by which Dacaar wanted to measure their own achievements. Two years later Dacaar summed up their experience with the Taliban in a carefully worded paper.

“In spite of the Taliban forces controlling the major part of Afghanistan, this is still an anarchic, stateless society rather than a totalitarian state.... This poses a question to the aid agencies operating in Afghanistan whether to relate to the power-that-be as if it is a proper government - or to take the consequence of Afghanistan being a fragmented state and develop strategies according to the varying conditions at local level, be it districts or provinces. With its engagement in Afghanistan since 1989, Dacaar has by and large followed the latter course, working in areas where security and political conditions enabled us to reach the target groups of various programmes.” and they concluded “It is worthwhile to undertake aid programmes under conflict conditions... organisations like Dacaar have managed to implement sustainable developmental projects at grassroots level over the past 7 years without compromising own or donor’s principles.” (Dacaar Programme document 1999-2003, Annex 20 p. 12)

In fact Dacaar was giving no assistance to non-Taliban areas and most of its assistance to Pashtun areas. Dacaar did not assist vulnerable urban populations (numerous in particular in Kabul) nor in conflict areas. They had huge problems assisting women. Of course, Dacaar never had the resources to help every Afghani and they observed a degree of division of labour among agencies. The point is that the shift from rehabilitation to development programmes enhanced a bias towards ‘secure’ areas. The result was starker differences between people lucky to live in relative peace with the Taliban (southerners, Pashtuns, rural populations, and men), and those bearing the brunt of Taliban violence (the Northern Alliance, non-Pashtuns, urban populations, women).

Interview with Thomas Thomsen, senior programme manager, Dacaar, 22 April, 1999, Copenhagen [translated from Danish by HT]

“In Afghanistan it is pointless to choose between either humanitarian aid or development aid. The most important is to provide relevant assistance. In Kabul and the north humanitarian assistance is needed, in the south and the east it is rehabilitation and development aid people need.”

“Our approach is dialogue with local communities, and to tailor our programmes to local needs and to work pragmatically with local Taliban leaders. Our counterpart is the whole of the local community; they don’t have to think the way we do.”

“Our bottom line is when there is a conflict of interests between the Taliban and local communities, and the Taliban denies the population or parts of the population access to our projects. In the western Afghanistan we decided to close our school programme because the Taliban denied girls access to them. In that area the Taliban is regarded as an occupation force. In the eastern Afghanistan the Taliban is on home turf in the very traditional Pashtun society and this makes the situation a little more flexible. We received a provincial requests for a girls’ school in 1996 and choose an pro-active strategy. We forwarded the request to the Taliban, and said our condition for constructing schools would be that the girls’ school was operating before we would build any boys’ schools. We have not received an answer yet.”

“We don’t believe in boycotts. In 1999 we declined funding from Britain because that would tie us to their anti-Taliban line. We believe a pragmatic line enable us to serve the people of Afghanistan much better than black-mailing the Taliban.”

“Security is the all-important parameter, and it became much better from 1994 to 1997. We are very careful with our staff, we employ more than a thousand people and no-one has been killed by violence since we began working in Afghanistan in 1989.”

Late 1999 Dacaar reached the bottom line and pulled-out of south-western Afghanistan. Three main reasons were given by field manager Hugh Fenton: poppy growing, social conflicts over land ownership, and intractable local Taliban leaders. When poppy growing became an issue it was not to protect the poor farmers cultivating a profitable crop, but to protect the agency from sanctions. Dacaar would have had a problem if the Minister for Development saw headlines like “Danish taxpayer-money used for heroin-production in

Afghanistan!” Social conflicts over landowner-ship in the villages are acute in Afghanistan, partly due to increasing population (cf. Marsden 1997). Danida stipulates that aid shall benefit the poorest, but how should Dacaa protect the poor in a village against the unrelenting petty schemes of the powerful families? This goal was only becoming more elusive with the ‘community-empowerment-approach’ subscribed to by most agencies, because an Afghan village in no way was an egalitarian or even sharing community. Intractable Taliban leaders was an ever-present danger that might descend upon any project under the circumstances. Dacaa shared this problem with the Afghan population, of course, but Dacaa could do little to protect Afghans against the Taliban. Where-ever Dacaa operated they had to comply with the local powers; they moved in a pragmatic way and exploited windows of opportunity, they bargained with the aid they supplied, but in the final analysis they could not protect Afghans against their own state (fragments) because they commanded no means of violence. This was to be totally different with risk aid: here donors promised to wage war to protect the beneficiaries.

7. Risk aid: DRC, Kosova 1999

Donors, including Danida, responded to the Kosova crisis with risk aid, integrating humanitarian mandates and national security concerns. At the same time a full scale war was launched by the major donors ostensibly in pursuit of a humanitarian goal. NATO projected overwhelming airforce over Serbia including Kosova. Aid was militarised, and war was ‘humanitarianised’. Aid had three phases: a rehabilitation phase before, a relief phase during, and a second rehabilitation phase after the NATO bombings. Danish Refugee Council (DRC) was active in all three phases, indeed they were busy reconstructing gutted houses in Kosova already in 1998 after the first wave of Serbian atrocities. Our main concern is how did the risk aid integration of DRC’s humanitarian mandate with the security concerns of donor states influence the protection of beneficiaries from violent death and displacement. Part of answer will be sketched at the end of the present chapter and discussed more in Chapter Six; see also cases 9,10,18,27 in the Appendix.

Danish Refugee Council was created in 1956 to assist Hungarian refugees in Denmark and grew later to become one of the major Danish NGOs. Taking part in the unfolding emergency event in Yugoslavia made DRC grow from 30 to 169 mill. dkk. in total funding in just four years (1991-95; of the 1995 figure only 2,5 mill. dkk came from private fund-raising, the rest came from Danida, ECHO and UNHCR; Cowi 1996c:3) Up to 1997 DRC was unique in having both relief projects in the countries where the refugees came from like Bosnia and running a large semi-official integration service for refugees in Denmark. Since

1997 however, integration of refugees in Denmark has been transferred to the municipalities. In 1999 DRC had a turn-over of 500 mill. dkk, a staff of 40 in Copenhagen, and 200 expatriates seconded to operations in 15 countries around the world.

Box 9. Danish Refugee Council, appropriations for the Kosova crisis 1998-1999 from Danida, mill. dkk

| | | |
|-------------------|-------|--|
| 1998 | 8,0 | relief in Kosova |
| 1999 before 10/6* | 22,0 | camp construction (shared with DCA and SFC-DK) |
| | 12,0 | transport capacity (shared with Beredskabsstyrelsen) |
| | 11,5 | relief for refugees and private host families |
| | 2,0 | street-sport, social project |
| | 2,0 | staff expenses |
| 1999 after 10/6 | 6,0 | social and community projects in Kosova |
| | 13,0 | shelters in 950 houses in Kosova |
| | 3,5 | relief for IDPs in Serbia |
| 2000 (DRC appeal) | 39,5 | rehabilitation of 950 houses in Kosova |
| Total | 119,5 | |

* Date of Security Council Resolution # 1244 on Kosova ending the war; all projects in this window were located outside Kosova; source: Danida, DRC

In the period before the NATO bombings, from September 1998 up to March 1999, DRC did rehabilitation of burnt-down houses, mostly around Peja. Their experience from this phase was a crucial asset in the competition for funding in the post-bombing phase. It also underscores the limitations of what protection aid agencies can provide: the protection they can provide is practically limited to zero.

In the second phase DRC worked in Macedonia and Albania; operations in Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosova came to a halt. Danish agencies had little previous experience with building and running camps, but camp construction was a high-priority (and telegenic) activity in the international race for visible aid, and large funds were allocated to this activity. DRC together with DCA and SCF-DK were entrusted funds for several camps but their performance was mixed. This was partly due to the closure of the Montenegrin border from where refugees had been expected to arrive, partly due to the refugees' unexpected high degree of recourses which made them demanding customers: the majority did not move to the camps but stayed with private families (see case 2 in the Appendix). DRC did a positive work with refugees staying with host families, also for the host families, which is important. DRC was asked by UNHCR to co-ordinate and undertake logistics and transport of relief and refugees in Macedonia and Albania. DRC performed excellently together with a team

from the Danish Civil Defence. (cf. UNHCR evaluation) DRC has a long experience with this kind of job and has gained a very high international reputation.

In the third phase it was imperative for DRC to move fast to assist with the repatriation of the refugees, but also to win turf in the competition with other NGOs as soon as the Serbian troops withdrew from Kosova on June 10th. DRC headed the very first relief convoy entering Kosova as implementing partner of UNHCR. On day two of KFOR's presence, 14 June, DRC opened a make-shift office in the UNHCR compound in Fushekosove. DRC had done their job well and ECHO choose them to be lead agency for their rehabilitation assistance to Kosova. Once the refugees had returned to Kosova, which they did faster than any other refuge-population, and mostly spontaneous, the immediate challenge was to secure shelter before the winter. 85.000 houses were severely or completely destroyed, in large parts of western and central Kosova more than 75 per cent of the villages were damaged.

Every person I have spoken with from the aid industry working in Kosova late 1999 expressed mixed feeling by the overwhelming presence of the international community, yet no-one suggested that *they* should been the one to go home. In the DRC field reports two worries are repeated several times. The first is the ubiquitous frustration of poor co-ordination, lack of agreed standards for shelter construction and little respect for UNHCR amongst the more than 300 NGOs flooding Kosova. "Some NGOs do not follow the co-ordination set up by the UNHCR. Some NGOs (MSF, Bergamo etc.) have moved into the DRC villages with bi-lateral programmes....All NGOs apparently follow their own standards and cause great confusion in the villages." (DRC-Report to the Danish Steering Unit, Nov. 1999) It not only caused confusion, but the virtual flooding of certain parts of Kosova with assistance created a quite logical shift in attitude amongst the Kosovars, "It must be noted that the pioneering spirit we experienced among the local population at the beginning of the shelter-programme has evaporated following the very comprehensive offers made by the NGOs. It is becoming increasingly difficult to activate the local population to participate in self-help projects." (Report from DRC to the Danish Steering Unit in Prishtine, December 1999) Aid was supply-driven and the more resourceful Kosovars would shop around for the best offers.

**Interview with Michael Christensen, field co-ordinator DRC, Skenderaj, Kosova,
12 April 2000 [translated from Danish by HT]**

"UNMIK has produced a set of basic standards every agency has to comply with. That's the Bible. It sets out criteria for selection of beneficiaries and standards of construction. Last fall there was just huge differences in standards. Reconstruction is a new phase after the

shelters. Not everyone will be entitled to reconstruction. The international community does not have the resources to reconstruct all houses in Kosova. For the time being we are the only agency doing reconstruction in the whole municipality of Skenderaj. It is estimated that one third of the severely damaged houses [20.000] will be covered this year [2000].”

“The village and the prefecture in Skenderaj town together drew up a list of families in need of assistance. Our team will construct five to ten houses from the bottom-up as models. People come and watch, get their materials and then go home and reconstruct their own houses. Our part of the reconstruction in this village should be finished in three weeks time. The most important is to get the people in the villages activated and motivated so we avoid this ‘balkanism’ with people just waiting for others to come and help them.”

“They could just stop building all those damn petrol-stations and buy all those Mercedes Benzes and build their own houses. There is a lot money around. No-one in the international community are prepared to go in and rebuild all of Kosova. So many palaces are being built, you wouldn’t believe it, houses of 400 m2. Some families quite frankly have loads of money and the social differences are enormous. That’s why it’s so important that we go in and select the beneficiaries. Like our own social-security system back home.”

“You have to be very nuanced. If you want to do good you really have to put some effort into it. If you just want to be good superficially you just go out like a charitable old lady and throw your money around. Reconstruction has been delayed because the donors would like to see how much local people were prepared to do themselves. If we don’t target the right people in Kosova the donors will pull out. There are conflicts enough in the world.”

International agencies faced the problem to rehabilitate property built to European standards in an environment of relatively substantial local resources. In Afghanistan DRC dug wells for more than two million beneficiaries, also to rehabilitate villages and secure the repatriation of displaced villagers. The price for one well including hand pump serving an average of 170 people was 650 US\$ (Dacaar figures); the average donation pr. person was around 4 US\$. The rehabilitation kits DRC distributed in Kosova included hard roofs, windows, doors, and additional ‘kits’ and aid packages for 7-10.000 people costing around 750 US\$ per person (DRC figures). Aid pr. person to the relatively rich country was two-hundred times higher than to the poor country in these examples of village rehabilitation. Never before had so many that had so much already got so much. This reflected not just European-level demands but supply-driven risk aid.

However, even these generous provisions could only protect against winter and bad weather, but not against violent death and displacement. This became increasingly clear in the more

and more worried DRC field reports to the Danida man in Prishtine. This worry went to the heart of the humanitarian objective for the whole Kosova risk aid mission, namely to protect minorities in a multi-ethnic society, promote reconciliation and build a democratic community. At first the bad signs were ignored as a left-over from the war. In the monthly report for July and August field manager Klaus Purup noted, “The security in Kosova has been stable since the arrival of KFOR. Many incidents have happened but only between the Serb and Albanian communities, as tensions remain high.” But two months later Klaus Purup noted with concern, “Kosova is currently not a multi-ethnic society.” (Monthly report for October 1999 p1.) It was obvious that ‘peace’ was not the same as reconciliation. A month later his concern had become alarm, “It is becoming more and more evident that something must be done to avoid ending up in the opposite ditch, as the ethnic minorities are harassed and forced to leave Kosova.” (Monthly report for November, p1.) Kosova might be sliding towards a new conflict. KFOR, UNMIK, and the agencies were unable or unwilling to protect the new minority against violent death and displacement.

Protection had gone full circle and returned to high politics: what was in the end the national security objectives of the NATO countries in Kosova? How could risk aid accommodate the humanitarian mandate to aid everyone, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, race, sex? Protecting individual persons proved to be practically impossible, even by unsustainable cordoning-off Serbian enclaves. High-politics could divide Kosova; in the end that would probably be the outcome, but how long it would take to get there and what shape a compromise would take was unclear.

Box 10. Anders Ladekarl DF, remarks made on a seminar on civil-military relations, DUPI, Copenhagen [translated from Danish by HT]

“Kosova inaugurated a new paradigm for military engagement in humanitarian emergencies. Three observations from the Kosova crisis can be made in that regard: (i) the military intervention was a precondition for humanitarian assistance, (ii) the military provision of humanitarian assistance was highly problematic, (iii) the military had a non-humanitarian motive for its engagement.”

“DRC have decided to accept military protection of our activities, even at the price of neutrality, if in a given situation it is necessary in order to get assistance through. The protection of the individual beneficiary is a central concern for DRC, and should be given a higher priority in the military forces.”

“It worries me when the military begins to do humanitarian assistance. In the spring of 1999 NATO became a key player in the provision of relief, and in Albania NATO/AFOR and

national troops even got a direct humanitarian mandate to end-distribute relief, run camps, and move refugees. It is significant that it was NATO itself that wished to take on this task. The political leadership of NATO realised that a humanitarian input had to pave the way for a political acceptance of a military input. NATO exerted a very strong pressure on UNHCR to make it accept a humanitarian mandate for the military. When UNHCR said yes on April 3 it only took two days for NATO to begin a massive humanitarian activity. Quickly NATO took over the lead of the whole operation from UNHCR in Albania and Macedonia. It was obvious that NATO had made plans long time in advance and never intended to let UNHCR lead. The 8.000 troops in Albania was really a preparation for an invasion of Kosova, but kept under a humanitarian mandate.

“In the NGOs we try to provide humanitarian assistance professionally, and we have a code of conduct. NATO violated these ground-rules repeatedly. They did not give aid to all victims of conflict; they assisted in Albania but not in Serbia. They violated the human rights of refugees by non-voluntary transfers from Macedonia. They made massive use of imported materials and personnel, standards of camps were in places much, much higher than humanitarian standards creating many problems, for instance when the camps after a short period were handed over to humanitarian agencies. They used the humanitarian assistance to further political goals.

“We need the military for protection, not to give humanitarian assistance.”

Box 11. Summary of agency-responses to protection of input and beneficiaries

| | |
|--|---|
| <p><u>1992 South Somalia</u> DCA/LWF/SEOC</p> <p>improper indication of causes</p> | <p><u>No attempt at protection</u> logistics-only approach likely to put beneficiaries at risk, no attempt to protect input and beneficiaries on the ground; input looted, unintended feeding of violent structures; beneficiaries put at risk possible by inaccurate indication of needs and causes of emergency hampering relevant assistance</p> |
| <p><u>1992 South Somalia</u> ICRC</p> <p>elders and militia, ultimately</p> | <p><u>Protection attempted</u> by wet-feeding instead of dry-feeding, negotiation and co-operation with elderly subscribing to US/UN armed intervention; beneficiaries put at risk possible by flooding Somalia with food-stuffs feeding violent structures</p> |
| <p><u>1997 South Somalia</u> DCA/ACT</p> <p>was limited, short-term, and</p> | <p><u>No attempt at protection</u> logistics-only, but harm relatively unlikely because flood-assistance input and under some local control</p> |
| <p><u>1998 South Somalia</u> DCA/DBG</p> <p>DBG armed security; local,</p> | <p><u>Protection attempted</u> by constructive and realistic engagement with local structures of violence; armed business-men protected input, but only marginally beneficiaries</p> |
| <p><u>1998 South Somalia</u> UNHCR/Nairobi</p> <p>camps in Kenya controlled</p> | <p><u>No protection attempted</u> Quick Impact Projects without protection against violence in Somalia, refugee-camps in Kenya controlled by local police</p> |
| <p><u>1998, Somaliland</u> UNHCR/Hargeisa</p> | <p><u>Protection attempted</u> by pro-active negotiations with local government; control and protection by the local government</p> |
| <p><u>1999, Afghanistan</u> DACAAR</p> | <p><u>Protection attempted</u> by pragmatic and realistic selection of approach (“principle-centred, tip-toe, and community empowering”); control and (negative) protection by the Taliban regime</p> |
| <p><u>1999, Alb./Mac.</u> DRC</p> <p>NATO and local Albanian</p> | <p><u>Protection attempted</u> by working together with military forces; control and protection by NATO and Macedonian governments</p> |
| <p><u>1999, Kosova</u> DRC</p> <p>UNMIK protectorate; no</p> | <p><u>Protection attempted</u> by working together with military forces; control and protection by local police-level protection of individuals</p> |

8. Conclusion: agencies and protection

The box above sums up the responses to protection of input and beneficiaries by the agency discussed in this chapter. On the list we can detect two extremes in the responses to protection. One extreme was to do nothing and hope that somebody else would take care of the problem; this was the approach of DCA in two of the three programmes they have on the list. In one programme - the flood emergency response in Somalia 1997/98 - this did not seem to have put the beneficiaries at risk because the total input was relatively limited and of short duration. The evaluation also notes that since much relief was transported to marooned people by helicopters and boats it generally made it difficult for looters to operate.

The other non-protected programme - the SEOC airlift of relief to Somalia in 1992/95 - is very likely to have put beneficiaries at risk because food-relief became a vital, un-controlled resource for militias, small armies, and criminals. Neither DCA getting money from Danida, LWF co-ordinating donations from church charities, nor SEOC organising the airlift of relief to Somalia from Kenya did anything to protect the beneficiaries on the ground in Somalia. The issue was raised half-heartedly by Danida, yet they were quickly calmed by never-fulfilled promises of on-the-ground control from DCA and their partners. The acute danger of aid directly fuelling the conflict by violent groups looting aid-supplies was not reflected by the design of aid. It was irresponsibly regarded as somebody else's problem. DCA was not even able to document that food-aid reached the intended beneficiaries, only that specific tonnages of food had been delivered at certain air-fields. What happened next was a well documented feeding of violent, predatory, and fragmenting structures. (cf. Compagnon 1998, Maren 1997, Natsios 1997, Samatar 2000) Furthermore they presented the dimensions and causes of the emergency event in an inaccurate and improper way that might have hampered relevant relief precisely because root-problems of violence/protection was ignored and obscured.

Feeding violent structures was a general problem, also encountered by ICRC in Somalia 1992, but they tried consistently to deal with the problem, only to be overwhelmed at the end of the year by the US/UN shift to risk aid. Food aid was given indiscriminately also by ICRC, based on exaggerated assessments of needs and without possibility for securing sustainability. None of the agencies discussed here seem to have considered the possibility that their activities may put the beneficiaries at risk in any serious way at the time.

After the unresolved problems of protection of a massive humanitarian intervention in 1992 (getting even more acute in 1993) the tendency towards the end of the decade seemed to be not to deliver more inputs than local power-holders could protect. This was perhaps more a matter of reduced availability than by virtue of new insights. The DCA-supported DBG-

programme in Somalia 1998 tried to set up protection in a constructive way in the context of severely fragmented state power. Only inputs with local protection, like Mogadishu's water-supply, that already *before the input of aid* was protected by an armed business-group, had any hope of sustainability (see case 20 in the Appendix). Even this was on the balance, and the immediate beneficiaries would be the business-people, not any vulnerable refugee, woman or child unable to pay for water.

All programmes on the list depended on protection by local powers (or an intervention force) and agencies would go a long way to establish a working relationship with them. If they disliked local powers, the alternative at the end of the day would be to pack the bags and go home. Most likely that would spell the end of the programme and thus be a rather unattractive option for any agency. So they had to find a local partner. But as it was noted in the case of Somalia, "the principle of working with local structures and supporting local capacity, leaves unanswered how external agencies judge *which* Somalis, *whose* problems and *whose* solutions are legitimate to support." (Bradbury 1998:xvii; italics in original). There was a very strong bias to focus on the nice sides of your partner; for instance stating boldly about the Taliban that "Their message is peace,"(Pedersen 1997:4).

At the other extreme on the list - in Kosova - we find risk aid providing protection by waging war against local structures of violence. This may be the ultimate commitment to protection, indeed most of the Albanians we spoke with in Kosova welcomed the NATO war as the only realistic way to end Serb violence. But at the same time it puts a bomb under any humanitarian mandate. Risk aid poses new dilemmas for humanitarian agencies. Let me end this chapter by mention, as examples of these new dilemmas, six external factors found to constrain UNHCR performance in the Kosova crisis. I quote from Astri Surkhe's evaluation of UNHCR. (Surkhe 2000:viii)

- 1/ High visibility and saliency of the emergency.
- 2/ Extensive bilateralism,
- 3/ Significant blurring of humanitarian and military-political missions;
- 4/ Powerful role and independent agenda of NATO in the humanitarian sector;
- 5 /Complex institutional rivalries among major actors;
- 6/ Reluctant governmental hosts or partners in the frontline states;

1/ High visibility and salience will probably be the case with all emergency events perceived to pose a national risk and responded to with risk aid. This opens up the humanitarian dilemmas of risk aid.

2/ Extensive bilateralism will probably follow directly from trying to contain a threat to national security. The top six EU contributors to the Kosova emergency allocated \$279 million in public humanitarian assistance (excluding military expenditure) but only \$9,8 million directly, or 3,5%, to UNHCR. The evaluation noted wide variations in standards (particularly in shelter), incomplete coverage (particularly regarding host family refugees), and “a tendency for the relief process to be supply-driven and dominated by a competitive concern for visibility.” (ibid, p. vii)

3/ Significant blurring of humanitarian and military-political missions also follows from the risk perspective. The response to the Kosova crisis demonstrated that ‘national security’ and ‘humanitarian’ are fluid and negotiable political notions; humanitarian agencies face the dilemma that it is a two-way street: military agendas may change the understanding of what is humanitarian. Surkhe wryly noted that the Albanian refugees became too important to be left to the UNHCR.

4/ The powerful and independent agenda of NATO in the humanitarian sector is a challenge for humanitarian agencies. They have to engage in high-profile risk aid to retain their political clout, but without forgetting low-profile emergencies calling ‘only’ for humanitarian aid. Surkhe concluded “*In order to protect its universal mission, UNHCR must be heavily engaged in high-visibility crisis.* If not, it will pay a political price that may jeopardize its future capacity to respond.” (ibid, p. xiv, italics in original)

5/ Several institution in the UN, US, EU and regional bodies including NATO and OSCE compete with each other, NGOs and other aid agencies for turf, visibility and leadership in future risk aid. “The Kosova emergency became a defining event in terms of who was there (particularly at the early stage) and how they had performed.” (ibid, p. xi)

6/ Finally, national security interests of one country may, of course, be more or less incompatible with those of other countries engaged in a risk aid operation. In particular regional powers may have their own agendas. One example of this in the Kosova crisis important for UNHCR was Macedonia’s closure of its border at Blace, because UNHCR’s protection of rights to asylum conflicted with Macedonian ethnic politics. NATO did not want a clash with Macedonia and forced UNHCR to back down.

5. ● FIELD IMPACT OF THIRTY-FIVE PROJECTS:

PROTECTING PEOPLE?

In this chapter the perspective moves on from the individual person caught by a disaster (Chapter I), the state fragmenting in a complex emergency (Chapter II), the donor state (Chapter III) and the humanitarian agencies (Chapter IV) to the individual aid project. First-hand, on-the-spot impressions of thirty-five humanitarian projects visited from December 1998 to April 2000 in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova provide core evidence. The evidence is presented in the Appendix as short descriptions and discussions of each project.

It should be emphasised that the assessments presented below are not evaluations of thirty-five different projects, but a comparative discussion of how a certain sample of projects have impacted on the lives of the beneficiaries and the states they live in. As stated in the introduction, the reader will find no cost-benefit assessments of efficiency, no discussions of effectiveness, nor of problems of co-ordination and institutional structure. Chapter V will lead on to the discussion in Chapter VI of attempts to protect the state in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova.

In their evaluation of the Somalia flood-response in 1997 Mark Bradbury and Vincent Coultan mentioned five limitations for their work⁶ all of which I also encountered during my own work: people involved in the projects have since left; quantifying impact proved very difficult; assessing the legitimacy of local authorities was not feasible; time and opportunity to visit beneficiaries in rural areas was limited; and finally problems of access due to lack of security. It has been possible to get interviews with a number of persons involved with humanitarian aid in 1992 and to retrieve some documents, but information is rapidly disappearing. I have not attempted to quantify impact; quantitative information was incomplete, impossible to verify, just anecdotal or simply non-existent. Basis for comparison of the projects is the methodology of qualitative assessment explained in Chapters I and II, and summarised below. The important question of legitimacy is considered in Chapter VI, practicalities including lack of time significantly reduced contact the beneficiaries.

⁶ Mark Bradbury and Vincent Coultan: Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation, Phase I, November-December 1997. Nairobi: UNICEF (1998)

Box 12. Overview of project-sample

| Country | Agency | no. Project | Donor | Beneficiaries | Year |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------|---------------|------|
| Somalia | DCA(DBG) | 7/ Handicapped, Mogadishu; | mix | 120 | 1996 |
| | | 17/ Village rehab. Shebelle; Danida | 18.000 | | 1998 |
| | | 19/ Street lights, Mogadishu; | mix | >10.000 * | 1998 |
| | | 20/ Water supply, Mogadishu; | mix | >10.000 * | 1998 |
| | | 21/ School, Mogadishu | mix | 3.000 | 1997 |
| | UNHCR | 5/ Sheikh Nur Camp, Hargeisa | mix | 175.000 | 1997 |
| | DRC | 28/ Milk project, Hargeisa Danida | 3.700 | | 1998 |
| Afghan. | ICRC/IFRC/ ARCS | 1/ Emergency logistics, Faizabad | mix | 100.000 | 1999 |
| | | 3/ Refugee feeding, Kabul mix | 72.000 | | 1999 |
| | | 4/ Widow programme, Kabul | mix | 175.000 | 1995 |
| | | 8/ Marastoon home, Jalalabad | mix | 100 | 1997 |
| | | 13/ Wazir Hospital, Kabul mix | 50.000 § | | 1992 |
| | | 14/ Ortho clinic, Herat | mix | 4.000 § | 1992 |
| | | 15/ ARCS clinic, Faizabad mix | 30.000 § | | 1996 |
| | | 35/ Sanitation, Kabul | mix | 300.000 § | 1996 |
| | DACAAR | 16/ Health education, Salab mix | | - a | - |
| | | 22/ School, Farah | mix | 500 | 1995 |
| | | 29/ Village infrastructure, Farah | mix | 4.000 | 1997 |
| | | 30/ Water divider, Farah mix | 3.000 | | 1999 |
| | | 32/ Integr. Agri. Dev. P. Zorghun | mix | 175.000 | 1999 |
| | | 33/ Village organisation P. Zorghun | mix | 175.000 | 1999 |
| | | 34/ Integrated Agri. Dev. Salab | mix | 3.800 | 1997 |
| | UNOPS | 23/ School, Faizabad | no Dani. | 165 | 1999 |
| | | 31/ Irrigation, Faizabad | no Dani. | 5.000 | 1999 |
| NAC | 24/ School, Chatta | no Dani. | 1.300 | 1995 | |
| SCA | 26/ Girls' home school, Jalalabad | no Dani. | .150 | 1998 | |
| Taliban | 25/ Girls' and boys' school, Kabul | no Dani. | 2.500 | 1999 | |
| Kosova | DRC | 9/ Shelters, Peja | Danida | 7.500 | 1999 |
| | | 10/ Bussing, Gjilan | mix | 3.700 | 1999 |
| | | 18/ Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet | Danida | 2.500 | 2000 |
| | | 27/ Social centre, Peja | Danida | 2.000 | 1999 |
| | WFP | 2/ Food Aid | mix | 600.000 b | 1999 |
| | OSCE | 12/ Police school, Vushtrri mix | 1.000 | | 1999 |
| | DANBAT | 11/ Cimic activities, Zobin Potok | no Dani. | <10.000 * | 1999 |
| Mr. Mehmeti | 6/ Family hosting refugees, Kukes | no Dani. | 22 c | 1999 | |

Source: agencies.

Year = year project became operational

Figures of beneficiaries during latest one year period/time of author's visit, except

§ - Total number of beneficiaries since start of project

* Author's estimates

a) - Status unclear

b)- Total number of WFP food-aid beneficiaries in Kosova late April 2000; the distribution author saw and discuss reached 5.000 people

c) - The number of refugees staying in Mr. Mehmeti's house; the total number of Kosova refugees staying with host families in Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro in May 1999 was 400.000

1. Selection of projects

Selection of years

Risk aid is a phenomenon originating in the 1990s. Somalia experienced arguably the first risk aid operation with the US/UN operation Restore Hope in 1992. At the time of writing Kosova 1999 is the most recent risk aid operation. 1992 and 1999 was thus selected as cut-off dates for the general discussion of risk aid. My intention was to compare a selection of ongoing 1999-projects visited in the field with relevant experience accumulated from a sample of 1992-projects. Seven years, however, is a very long time in the aid-business. Nothing much is left to see when the food has been eaten, the camps pulled down, and the aid-workers have moved on to new disasters and new assignments. Not even the people, the 'beneficiaries', may still be around, but forced on by new fighting, relocated by governments, or luckily moved back home. In the NGOs, state institutions and UN-agencies I encountered no-one, not even in the countries that had received aid throughout the period, that had remained on duty since 1992. Some had moved to related posts, but personal recollections of aid in 1992 was no longer present with people dealing with aid in 1999; in some agencies not even institutional memory spanned that long. This resulted in the decision only to include projects in the sample that I have visited myself 1998-2000 (Somalia/Kenya in December 1998/January 1999, Afghanistan/Pakistan in August-September-October 1999, and Kosova/Albania in April 2000).

Selection of countries

Somalia and Kosova were obvious countries to include in a discussion of humanitarian and risk aid in the 1990s. A third candidate, keeping the total number of countries at three for practical reasons, should preferably be Asian to ensure maximum geographical spread. Afghanistan was the only Asian country receiving major Danish humanitarian aid both in 1992 and 1999. Besides, it presented an interesting contrast to Somalia and Kosova. In Afghanistan the civil war had a Cold War origin, a very long duration, different types of external involvement, and a low political salience in the 1990s. In Afghanistan humanitarian aid had never been protected by military UN/NATO-operations. In Somalia protection of humanitarian aid had been the direct justification for the first peace-building Chapter VII operation in the world; Denmark had not participated with troops, while in Kosova, Denmark participated in the NATO military operation. The three countries encompass some of Denmark's key beneficiaries of humanitarian aid and provide a comparison of different combinations of military and civilian humanitarian interventions. Finally, humanitarian aid to Afghanistan had evolved far in the direction of development aid offering an input to the discussion on the 'continuum' from relief to development.

Selection of donor

The original terms of reference for the present investigation was humanitarian aid donated by Denmark. The focus on Danish humanitarian aid in a general discussion of humanitarian may be questioned on two opposite counts: the evidence will be too specific Danish to reveal general problems, and in the field Danish aid anyway cannot be singled out in multilateral operations. My impressions however, from experiencing many non-Danish aid projects, have convinced me that most of the problems found in Danish aid are common problems found also in projects flying different flags; secondly, the possible in-visibility in the field of national donations is in itself an important problem discussed by donors eager for maximum national visibility. Thus a discussion of Danish aid may well be of general relevance.

Selection of agencies

Criteria for the selection of agencies were simple: The Red Cross Movement had to be included as one of the largest agencies in humanitarian aid both internationally and in a Denmark; it is represented in the sample with eight projects in Afghanistan. UN agencies had to be included for the same reasons; UNHCR, WFP, and UNOPS are represented with four projects in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova. Danish humanitarian NGOs should be included; two of the largest and most active agencies in the three countries were Dan Church Aid (DCA) represented with five projects (implemented in Somalia by Diakonia-Bread for the World-Germany), and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) represented with five very different projects in Somalia and Kosova. DACAAR is included as an example of a single-country-agency working in the 'grey zone' between humanitarian and development aid; they are represented with seven projects in Afghanistan, all located in the Taliban areas of Afghanistan. For comparison three more Afghan projects were included, two schools run by the Swedish and Norwegian Committees in non-Taliban Afghanistan, and one school run by the Taliban in Kabul. Finally testing the limits of risk aid are three non-typical 'aid agencies': the OSCE and the Danish Army in Kosova, and a private family in Albania, represented in the sample with one 'project' each.

Selection of projects

The final selection of projects from each agency was guided by my priority of first-hand experience of ongoing projects, suggestions from the agencies, and travel conditions. I believe the sample of the thirty-five projects ended up reflecting some of enormous variation

found in ‘humanitarian’ projects in terms of country, function, type, urban-rural location, duration, size, multi- or bilateral implementing, and agency: all aspects entering the comparative discussion below. Half the projects were urban, half rural; half had a duration of more than a year, half less; half the projects were large with more than 10.000 beneficiaries, half were small; half were implemented by agencies on a bilateral basis, half on a multilateral basis.

2. Questions

Two basic assumptions guides the present attempt to map the impact of humanitarian aid. (i) We are talking about complex emergencies as a process of state fragmentation causing violent death and displacement of individuals. (ii) It is necessary and possible to distinguish between impact on human beings, called ‘life-impact,’ and on states, called ‘state-impact’. The idea of life-impact is presented in Chapter I, and the idea of state-impact is presented in Chapter II; they may be recounted in the following terms.

Life-impact

Ultimately positive life-impact is the degree to which any particular humanitarian project (intervention) reduces violent death, displacement, and exposure of human beings. This impact may be assessed along the three parameters of health, livelihood, and protection as positive (+), negative (-) or nil (0) impact according to the following criteria.

Box 13. Criteria for the assessment of positive, negative, or nil life-impact

| Parameter | Criteria |
|--------------------|---|
| Health: | Impact - by supply of medicines by medical and psychological treatment by therapeutic feeding by sanitation |
| Livelihood: | Impact - by supply of food by supplies of means to produce food (seeds, tools, etc.) by employment by income generation by education |
| Protection: | Impact - by protection against violent death by protection against intimidation and displacement, by protection of assets and access |

State-impact

Ultimately positive state-impact is the degree to which any particular humanitarian project (intervention) reduces fragmentation of the targeted state; negative impact will increase fragmentation. A complex emergency is a process of state fragmentation. As power and authority slip away from the national government and national state institutions cease to function, the conflict is intensifying. When the control of violence is (re)captured by a legitimate national leadership, state power is becoming focused. What we want to know is how individual projects register with this process.

For donors and agencies moving into complex emergencies a key problem is the transmission or transformation of intended impact into unintended, unwanted, or simply unknown impact. Agencies may design projects that seek to empower women, to alleviate poverty, to inspire reconciliation between ethnic groups, or to promote good governance. But impact can spread, reverse, change, disrupt or benefit groups far from the planned beneficiaries. A project may target women but what is the impact on exploitation, ethnic conflict and corruption? Another project targets, for instance, good governance, but what is impact on women, poverty, and ethnic groups? ‘Empower women’, ‘alleviate poverty’, ‘regulate exploitation’, ‘reconcile ethnic groups’, ‘promote good governance’, ‘reduce corruption’: how do they relate? To analyse the full range of impacts of such interventions, the impact of individual projects may analytically be disaggregated according to the four ‘bundles’ or sets of discrete spaces, actors and conflicts, presented in Chapter II above.

Box 14. The ‘bundle-model’ of spaces, actors, and conflicts in a nation-state

| Bundle | Space | Actors | Conflicts |
|-----------------|---|--|--|
| “House-bundle” | house, home, family, private space | women, men, generations | patriarchy, struggle against male dominance |
| “Town-bundle” | market, town, commercial network | producers and consumers of food, classes, rich and poor, professionals | accumulation of wealth, struggle of classes, marginalisation |
| “Ethnic-bundle” | homeland, holy land, root, grave | aliens-compatriots, believers-infidels, insiders-outsiders, we-they | inclusion- exclusion, struggle for true belonging |
| “State-bundle” | national territory, | national government, | sovereignty, |

| | | | |
|--|--------------|---------------------------------|--|
| | public space | state institutions, citizens | struggle against internal rebels and external enemies |
|--|--------------|---------------------------------|--|

The bundles overlap and every individual person simultaneously engage in all four conflicts, as, say, a woman, a milk-trader, an Issaq, and a Somali citizen. This multiple engagement would also be the context for an activity like an aid project.

The engine of complex emergencies is civil war, the state is under attack from its own citizens. The model presented in Chapter Two suggested that this attack, this violent reversal of rule between state and citizen, cannot be conceived as a mono-causal process, but rather as fluid alliances of multiple institutions and individuals fighting on several battle-grounds, each in different ways giving the opponents advantages and handicaps. Growth of violent ethnic groups, movements, parties or militias fragment the state, while ethnic minority-groups and individuals seeking protection from the national state, could focus the power of that state. Expanding business-networks outside state control fragments the state while trade and business groups enjoying protection of law and order from the national state could focus the power of that state. Historically the reduction of patriarchal power in the house has included a shift of power towards a national government; a prime example was the struggle for women’s right to vote. The state supported women in their struggle against patriarchy and in turn the state and parliamentarism got support from women, and parties could be vote into power by this new block of voters. A Somali example is the struggle for the right for women to inherit, granted by the Siad Barre regime in 1974 and contested by male religious leaders, ten of whom were executed in Mogadishu. The Taliban government is unusual among twentieth century states in granting patriarchs total power over women, and not even opportunistically - as Rabbani - chip away small bits of patriarchal power to let the state get a foot inside the house. It is assumed that the conflicts between state and sub-state actors is a zero-sum game. The impact of projects on sub-state groups is assessed according to their contribution, positive or negative, to this zero-sum game.

One final complicating aspect for the understanding of state fragmentation is the difference between the state as a sovereign *territory*, a national *government* and a set of state *institutions*. Observing this triad, our point of departure for assessing state-impact may be summarised as follows:

Somalia and Somaliland.

At international, territorial level the state has not fragmented as the international community up to the present has insisted on a unified Somalia. At the level of national government the state of Somalia is severely fragmented between relatively stable governments in Somaliland and Puntland and the warring state-fragments of the South including the capital area of Benadir/ Mogadishu. At the level of state institutions the state of Somalia is currently not existing, but substituted by far-reaching privatisation and external (aid) involvement in state provision and other activities. The zero-sum argument applies for Somalia in the south as for Somaliland in the north.

Afghanistan

At international, territorial level the state of Afghanistan has not fragmented as the international community up to the present has insisted on a unified territory. At the level of national government the state of Afghanistan is fully fragmented between the Taliban government in Kabul, only recognised by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and the administration of Rabbani in the north recognised by the international community including the UN as the legal government of Afghanistan. At the level of state institutions the state of Afghanistan is worn down and deeply fragmented but existing as skeleton line-ministries and other fragments in the Taliban administration. The zero-sum argument applies for the Northern Alliance, but in the Taliban area the extreme policy against women's rights *reverses* the house-state relation: increased patriarchal power is estimated to increase and not reduce, the power of the state.

Kosova

At international, territorial level Kosova is an anomalous state as a disputed territorial fragment of the state of Yugoslavia under protection by the international community. At the level of national government the UNMIK protectorate is the relatively focused state of Kosova. At the level of state institutions the state of Kosova is deeply fragmented between a vast number of different internal and external institutions. The zero-sum argument applies for Kosova.

State-impact of each project is assessed for the *house* -, *town* -, and *ethnic* bundles at the level of institutions, and for the *state* bundle at the level of government. The specific criteria used for assessing the state-impact of the thirty-five projects are summarised below. A 'yes' to the questions below will give an estimated positive viz. negative impact as indicated under 'bias'. A number of entries are marked \pm indicating that the impact depends on the local state policy. When, for instance, the Taliban prohibits education for girls (which they not always do) the impact of opening a school for girls in their area will contribute to state

fragmentation. ‘Positive’ and ‘negative’ impact has *no normative bearing*, it is only assessed from the point of view of the state: focusing or fragmenting the state? The normative, political question whether the focusing, strengthening, of a state, for instance the Taliban state, is beneficial to the *population* will be discussed in Chapter VI, below.

The important next step is to link the impact estimated for each of the four “bundles”. No figures referring to measurable social indicators are involved in the assessments, only estimates of positive, negative, or nil impact. However, in order to link the estimates they are set to +1, -1, or 0, and then an aggregate state impact is calculated by simply adding the plusses and subtracting the minuses; mirroring exactly the procedure of calculating aggregate life-impact.

Of course, this is very risky business, and only intended to throw a some analytical light on the question, whether the impact of each project was to fragment or focus the host state. It should be emphasised that the resulting assessments of aggregate state-impact claims no objective, quantitative validity beyond a systematisation of the qualitative field-estimates I have collected. Underlying this arithmetic aggregation is more than an formal levelling however, namely the return to the real-world complexity, which the four “bundles” of discrete spaces, persons, and conflicts only analytically had disaggregated. Needless to say, this is a standard process of inquiry, and utilised in this case with the hope to produce new insights into the impact of aid upon the conflicts of Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova.

Box 15. Criteria for the assessment of positive, negative, or nil state-impact

| Parameter | Bias | +/- | Criteria |
|---------------|----------|---|--|
| House impact | Mixed | ± | Empowering women? |
| | ± | | Project with a female bias? |
| | ± | | Spreading ideas of equality and rights for women? |
| | ± | | Project input controlled by men only? |
| | ± | | Women excluded from village councils and other bodies controlling project input? |
| | ± | | Securing female employment? |
| | ± | | Giving women access to public space? |
| | ± | | Providing education for girls? |
| Town impact | Positive | + | Input into local trade networks? |
| | + | | Providing employment? |
| | + | | Increasing flows on the local market? |
| | + | | Increasing productivity of local production? |
| | Mixed | ± | Support of inventive income-generation? |
| | Negative | - | Input into non-regulated cross-border trade? |
| Ethnic impact | - | | Input into non-regulated, non-taxed market? |
| | - | | Facilitating non-controlled urbanisation? |
| | - | | Support of business-cum-militia-groups? |
| | Positive | + | Favouring individuals over (ethnic) groups? |
| | + | | Promoting co-operation between ethnic groups and clans? |
| | + | | Support of ethnic groups dominant in the state? |
| | Mixed | ± | Support of ethnic minorities? |
| | ± | | Enhancing ethnic polarisation? |
| ± | | Entrench mono-ethnic communities? | |
| ± | | Put a premium on stability at the price of ethnic separation? | |
| State impact: | Negative | - | Support of ethnic groups oppositional to the state? |
| | Positive | + | Recognise and support state authority? |
| | + | | Economic support for state institutions? |
| | + | | Accept state control of project? |
| | + | | Generate local support for the state? |
| | + | | Facilitate implementation of state policies among beneficiaries? |
| | + | | Facilitate state control of beneficiary group? |
| | Mixed | ± | Help integrate violent groups into the state? |
| Negative | - | | Open clash with state policies? |
| | - | | Foster fragmentation and privatisation of state provisions? |
| | - | | Support state fragmentation? |
| | - | | Support oppositional groups? |

Box 16. Summary of life-impact and state-impact of thirty-five projects

| # | Description | LIFE-IMPACT | | | | STATE-IMPACT | | | | IM- PACT |
|----|------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|---|---|-------------|
| | | HEA- LTHLI | LIVE- TEC- HOOD | PRO- LIFE TION | TOTALHOU- SE IM- PACT | TO-ETH-STA- WNNIC TE | TOTAL STATE | | | |
| | Relief | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Emergency logistics, Faizabad, Af. | + | + | 0 | ++ | 0 | + | + | + | +++ |
| 2 | Food aid, Kosova | 0 | + | + | ++ | 0 | + | - | + | + |
| 3 | Refugee feeding, Kabul, Afg. | 0 | + | - | 0 | - | + | - | + | 0 |
| 4 | Widow programme, Kabul, Afg. | 0 | + | + | ++ | - | + | 0 | + | + |
| 5 | Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, Som. | + | 0 | 0 | + | " | - | - | - | --- |
| 6 | Family hosting refugees, Albania | 0 | 0 | + | + | 0 | + | - | + | + |
| 7 | Handicapped, Mogadishu, Som. | 0 | + | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | Marastoon home, Jalalabad, Afg. | 0 | + | 0 | + | - | 0 | 0 | + | 0 |
| 9 | Shelters, Peja, Kosova | + | 0 | + | ++ | - | - | - | + | - |
| | Protection | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova | 0 | + | + | ++ | " | 0 | - | + | 0 |
| 11 | Cimic activities, Zobin Potok, Kos | 0 | 0 | + | + | 0 | 0 | - | + | 0 |
| 12 | Police school, Vushtrri, Kosova | 0 | + | + | ++ | + | 0 | + | + | +++ |
| | Health | | | | | | | | | |
| 13 | Wazir Hospital, Kabul, Afg. | + | + | 0 | ++ | - | + | 0 | + | + |
| 14 | Ortho clinic, Herat, Afg. | + | + | + | +++ | - | + | 0 | + | + |
| 15 | ARCS clinic, Faizabad, Afg. | + | + | 0 | ++ | + | + | 0 | + | +++ |
| 16 | Health education, Salab, Afg. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | + | ++ |
| | Rehabilitation | | | | | | | | | |
| 17 | Village rehab, Shebelle, Somalia | 0 | + | 0 | + | - | - | - | - | --- |
| 18 | Rehab. of houses, Obrij, Kosova | 0 | + | 0 | + | - | - | - | + | - |
| 19 | Street lights, Mogadishu, Somalia | 0 | + | + | ++ | + | - | + | - | 0 |
| 20 | Water supply, Mogadishu, Somalia | + | + | + | +++ | " | - | + | - | - |
| | Education | | | | | | | | | |
| 21 | School, Mogadishu, Somalia | + | + | + | +++ | + | 0 | " | - | 0 |
| 22 | School, Farah, Afg. | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | 0 | + | + | +++ |
| 23 | School, Faizabad, Afg. | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | ++ |
| 24 | School, Chatta, Faizabad, Afg. | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | ++ |
| 25 | Girls' and boys' school, Kabul, A. | 0 | + | + | ++ | - | 0 | " | + | 0 |
| 26 | Girls home school, Jalalabad, Afg. | 0 | + | - | 0 | - | 0 | " | - | - |
| 27 | Social centre, Peja, Kosova | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | 0 | - | + | + |
| | Development | | | | | | | | | |
| 28 | Milk project, Hargeisa, Somalia | 0 | + | + | ++ | + | + | + | 0 | +++ |
| 29 | Village infrastructure, Farah, Afg | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | + | +++ |
| 30 | Water divider, Farah, Afg. | 0 | + | + | ++ | + | 0 | " | + | ++ |
| 31 | Irrigation, Faizabad, Afg. | 0 | + | 0 | + | - | 0 | 0 | + | 0 |
| 32 | Irrigation, P. Z., Herat, Afg. | 0 | + | - | 0 | + | + | " | + | +++ |
| 33 | Village organisation, Herat, Afg. | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | 0 | " | + | ++ |
| 34 | IAD, Salab, Nangarhar, Afg. | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | 0 | + | + | +++ |
| 35 | Sanitation, Kabul, Afghanistan | + | + | 0 | ++ | + | + | - | + | ++ |

Impact: (+) = positive; (-) = negative; (0) = nil impact; (") = no data

Aggregate life-impact: (0) = nil; (+) = narrow; (++) = middle; (+++) = wide impact

Aggregate state-impact: (0) = nil; (-/+) = weak; (-/++) = middle;

(---/+++)= strong; (----/++++)= very strong fragmenting/focusing impact

3. Answers: Life-impact

Setting the methodology in motion some answers may now be possible to outline. In the section below reference will be made to tables, readers can identify projects by their numbers and read more about them in the Appendix.

Life-impact, health

(Table 1) Life-impact, health

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Positive impact | 1 Emergency logistics, Faizabad 5 Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, S. 9 Shelters, Peja, Kosova 13 Wazir Hospital, Kabul 14 Ortho clinic, Herat 15 ARCS clinic, Faizabad 20 Water supply, Mogadishu 21 School, Mogadishu 27 Social centre, Peja, Kos 35 Sanitation, Kabul |
| Nil impact | 2 Food aid, Kosova 3 Refugee feeding, Kabul 4 Widow programme, Kabul 6 Family hosting refugees, Kukes 7 Handicapped, Mogadishu 8 Marastoon home, Jalalabad 10 Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova 11 Cimic activities, Zobin Potok 12 Police School, Vushtrri, Kos. 16 Health education, Salab, A. 17 Village rehab. Shebelle, Som. 18 Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet, Kos. 19 Street lights, Mogadishu 22 School, Farah, A. 23 School, Faizabad, A. 24 School, Chatta, A. 25 Girl's school, Kabul 26 Girl's home school, Jalalabad, 28 Milk project, Hargeisa 29 Village infra. Farah, A. 30 Water divider, Farah, A. 31 Irrigation, Faizabad 32 IAD. Herat 33 Village organisation, Herat, 34 IAD, Salab, A. |

All projects in the sample presumably in some way influenced the health of the beneficiaries; however, only the ten projects with a public health-component are relevant under the health rubric. They all except one had either an estimated positive impact on health. The Pansjir valley relief (1) included distribution of medicines to displaced persons, the Wazir main hospital in Kabul (13) provided general treatment, the clinic in Herat (14) offered orthopaedic treatment, the social centre in Peja (27) organised therapy, the little ARCS clinic

in Faizabad (15) gave access to basic health-care, and the school in Mogadishu with an attached community clinic (21) served pupils and neighbourhood.

Three projects achieved a positive health impact through sanitation, in Kosova achieved by inclusion of sanitation in a shelter programme (9), in Hargeisa as part of camp lay-out (5), and in Kabul as a large, specialised project (35). Health improvement was also assumed to follow directly from the Mogadishu water-supply project (20). Only one project with a direct health focus, the health-education component of the Dacaar-implemented integrated village development project in Salab, Afghanistan (16), had no health impact as far as we could see. The remaining twenty-six projects had no health component, and although some could influence health indirectly through securing livelihood or protection, they do not score on the health parameter.

Life-impact, livelihood**(Table 2) Life-impact, livelihood**

| | | | | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------|----|------------------------------------|----|--------------------------------|
| Positive impact | | 1 | Emergency logistics, Faizabad | | |
| | | 2 | Food aid, Kosova | | |
| | | 3 | Refugee feeding, Kabul | | |
| | | 4 | Widow programme, Kabul | | |
| | | 7 | Handicapped, Mogadishu | | |
| | | 8 | Marastoon home, Jalalabad | | |
| | | 10 | Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova | | |
| | | 12 | Police School, Vushtrri, Kos. | | |
| | | 13 | Wazir Hospital, Kabul | | |
| | | 14 | Ortho clinic, Herat | | |
| | | 15 | ARCS clinic, Faizabad | | |
| | | 17 | Village rehab. Shebelle, Som. | | |
| | | 18 | Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet, Ko. | | |
| | | 19 | Street lights, Mogadishu | | |
| | | 20 | Water supply, Mogadishu | | |
| | | 21 | School, Mogadishu | | |
| | | 22 | School, Farah, A. | | |
| | | 23 | School, Faizabad, A. | | |
| | | 24 | School, Chatta, A. | | |
| | | 25 | Girl's school, Kabul | | |
| | | 29 | Village infra. Farah, A. | 26 | Girl's home school, Jalalabad, |
| | | | | 28 | Milk project, Hargeisa |
| | | | | 30 | Water divider, Farah, A. |
| | | | | 31 | Irrigation, Faizabad |
| 32 | IAD. Herat | | | | |
| 33 | Village organisation, Herat, | | | | |
| 34 | IAD, Salab, A. | | | | |
| 35 | Sanitation, Kabul | | | | |
| Nil impact | | | | 5 | Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, S |
| | | | | 6 | Family hosting refugees, Kukes |
| | | | | 9 | Shelters, Peja, Kosova |
| | | 11 | Cimic activities, Zobin Potok, | | |
| | | 16 | Health education, Salab, A. | | |
| | | 27 | Social centre, Peja, Kos. | | |

Comparing the three parameters of life-impact we see that twice as many projects had a positive impact on livelihood than either on health or protection. Of the twenty-nine projects, three were short-term food distribution, reaching large numbers of people in Kosova (2), Pansjir (1), and Kabul (3); the long-term Widow project in Kabul (4) secured the livelihood for a large group of vulnerable people, while two other long-term projects secured the livelihood for small vulnerable groups, handicapped in Mogadishu (7) and single-mothers in Jalalabad (8). Sixteen projects had a positive impact on livelihood by providing (some) employment and/or income including the three small development-type projects in Farah and Faizabad (29,30,31). The six school projects provided livelihood to a few teachers, but were implemented to improve the prospects for future livelihood of the pupils. Finally the Kosova bus project (10) improved the livelihood of trapped Serbs by giving them intermittent access to markets.

The twenty-nine projects cover all types of intervention from relief to development, or put differently, livelihood impact seems to be obtainable by almost any type of project, if only resources are made available for beneficiaries. This says, however, nothing about the sustainability of individual projects. Only six projects had no impact on livelihood. The returnee-camp in Somaliland (5), the shelters in Kosova (9), and the host-family in Kukes (6) were all focusing on shelter while livelihood was provided by other agencies. The army Cimic-project (11) focused on protection and only very sporadically assisted with distribution of food-aid, while another Kosova-project, the social centre in Peja (27), focused on psycho-social therapy based on volunteer-work. The special circumstances of the Salab health-project (16) are mentioned below.

Life-impact, protection (Table 3) Life-impact, protection

| | |
|--|---|
| Positive impact | 2 Food aid, Kosova 4 Widow programme, Kabul 6 Family hosting refugees, Kukes 9 Shelters, Peja, Kosova |
| 10 Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova | 11 Cimic activities, Zobin Potok, 12 Police School, Vushtrri, Kos. 14 Ortho clinic, Herat 19 Street lights, Mogadishu 20 Water supply, Mogadishu 21 School, Mogadishu 25 Girl's school, Kabul 28 Milk project, Hargeisa 30 Water divider, Farah, A. |
| Nil impact | 1 Emergency logistics. Faizabad 5 Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, S. 7 Handicapped, Mogadishu 8 Marastoon home, Jalalabad 13 Wazir Hospital, Kabul |
| 15 ARCS clinic, Faizabad | 16 Health education, Salab, A. 17 Village rehab. Shebelle, Som. 18 Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet, Kos. |
| 22 School, Farah, A. School, Faizabad, A. | 23 24 School, Chatta, A. 27 Social centre, Peja, Kos. 29 Village infra. Farah, A. 31 Irrigation, Faizabad 33 Village organisation, Herat, 34 IAD, Salab, A. 35 Sanitation, Kabul |
| Negative impact | 3 Refugee feeding, Kabul |
| 26 Girl's home school, Jalalabad, | 32 IAD. Herat |

A positive impact on protection implies reducing the risk of violent death, displacement and exposure, and protection of assets and access. Burning down of houses may not directly hurt people, but both the violence involved in expelling people and the subsequent exposure makes it justified, in my view, to include protection against displacement by destruction of shelter, by looting of assets, or by denial of access to the means of subsistence under the rubric of protection. A positive impact on health and livelihood could be reduced to nothing if people were killed; only when protected could people benefit from projects that provided health and livelihood. Most humanitarian agencies axiomatically refuse to incorporate violent protection of the beneficiaries into their programmes. It is assumed that protection of project-input and beneficiaries can be obtained by some power legally dispensing violence. But this refusal creates a major problem if the host-state cannot provide protection or directly puts both input and beneficiaries at risk.

From our sample fourteen projects are estimated to have improved the protection of the beneficiaries. They did so in very different ways reflecting the position of the host-state in the local conflict and the type of aid, i.e. whether intervening states used force to protect their projection of risk aid. While it probably always would be preferable to protect people by reconciliation, this was only attempted in two cases. The water-divider in Farah (30) built on a collective agreement in the village shura to protect poor farmers against rich farmers sometimes using more water for irrigation than agreed to, by a little practical installation permanently dividing water for irrigation. In Kosova the Police Training School (12) protected minority (Serb and Roma) students, not by protecting their group 'rights' but their human rights as individuals trying to cut through the spiral of revenge. In both cases protection was achieved by establishing a frame-work for functional co-operation, not by violence. In Hargeisa the women's co-operative (28) protected their assets by a clever reduction of their vulnerability against crime, without use of armed force. Threats were minor in all three cases (better-off villagers, majority-group students without teacher backing, and simple criminals). In the majority of cases this would not have been sufficient, and protection took all kinds of arrangements with those in command of violence.

In south Somalia securing protection of project-beneficiaries by negotiations were a never-ending challenge for the agencies. Protection could only be achieved by highly unstable arrangements with state-fragments such as militias and private armed groups. The DBG street-light project (19) ingeniously harnessed the private interests of six business men-and-militia owners to secure protection of a cheap project that had a positive impact on improving the security of a large number of ordinary citizens of Mogadishu. The persons running the two other Mogadishu-projects, the Imam Malik School (21) and the water-supply project (20), both had their own armed groups to protect the direct beneficiaries and assets. In volatile situations like Mogadishu it appeared to be possible to provide protection only by grafting projects unto existing local initiatives already enjoying protection; ideally by armed groups not compromising the humanitarian integrity of the project.

In Afghanistan protection could be negotiated with local powers that were a little more predictable. The large ICRC widow assistance programme in Kabul (4) made it possible to protect the human rights of widows despite and against obstruction from some parts of the Taliban, because other ICRC activities, such as hospitals, were indispensable for other parts of the Taliban regime. Also in Herat the ICRC could provide protection of Hazara invalids (14) only by co-operation with some Taliban against some other Taliban (persons, ministries, rules, provinces etc.). Protection was achieved by institutional weight and the remarkable diplomatic acumen of the ICRC, not by weapons. Yet, this made only for very

unstable protection, indeed only two of the eight ICRC projects in the sample (4,14) achieved protection. Interestingly, in the same manner, only by Byzantine compromises with other groups, could one wing of the Taliban protect the rights of a few girls to education; a fickle, opportunistic protection, but the best under the circumstances.

Only in Kosova was aid in a position to provide protection by piggybacking on the imposition of state-size military power from the outside. Reconciliation is a hard-to-achieve goal and protection can seldom wait. A second-best course of action is to separate people by military force; this was done by risk aid in four projects in Kosova plus the one in Albania. Food aid to Serb enclaves (2), bussing Serbs out of the enclaves (10), ad hoc protection of movement provided by the Cimic-project (11), and the protected stay in Albania (6) and subsequent return and construction of shelters for the Albanian population of Kosova (9), all five projects achieved protection based on the military presence of NATO/KFOR, not by removing or even reducing the source of risk. For instance, the DRC/UNHCR 'reconciliation bus-shuttle' was able to provide protection only by KFOR escort, not by reconciliation.

Eighteen projects were estimated not to have improved protection, but simply to work under the existing conditions of state authority, however corrupted or fragmented they may be. Significantly, only under the rubric of protection do we encounter a *negative* life-impact, that is projects putting beneficiaries at risk. The three bottom-scoring projects share the unfortunate problem of putting the beneficiaries at risk by assisting them. In a village outside Jalalabad a group of local people was running a non-secret home-school for girls (26); this was against Taliban rules, however, these rules were enforced very capriciously. Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) support was of great benefit to the school, yet, international involvement often made Taliban reactions even more unpredictable. SCA-aid may have exposed the local people to more risk; SCA was aware of this and after discussions with the local people aid was continued. As long as nothing happens risk is difficult to assess. Dacaar's huge development project in Pashtun Zorghun outside Herat (32) was successful in terms of livelihood-impact, but located at the edge of Taliban control it had allegedly been the scene of rebel intrusion. At the time of our visit this was still a minor problem, but for security reasons Taliban denied us access to part of the project area. Location and the high profile of the project obviously made the villagers a possible target for rebels and Taliban counter-actions, and thus put the beneficiaries at risk.

ICRC's refugee-programme (3), feeding and assisting people fleeing the fighting at the Shomali-plain just north of Kabul perhaps most graphically displays the dilemma of

assisting and at the same time putting the beneficiaries at risk. When the people reached Kabul fleeing from enemy areas in the beginning of September 1999, around 1.500 men were arrested by the Taliban. Well aware and afraid of the very efficient Taliban surveillance the refugees with some justification feared that ICRC registration of them had contributed to the arrests. ICRC eventually changed their registration and worked hard and successfully for the release of the prisoners. Food was distributed to 72.000 persons, but the project may have put the beneficiaries at risk. Undoubtedly protection is the most difficult and perhaps least acknowledged challenge for humanitarian aid. The ICRC refugee-feeding programme illustrates this: the only difference between the top-scoring widow-programme and the bottom-scoring refugee-feeding programme, both drawing on the same immense institutional resources and methodology of the ICRC, was the outcome of delicate interaction with the Taliban regime.

Life-impact, aggregate**(Table 4) Life-impact, aggregate**

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|----|------------------------------------|----|
| Wide impact | 14 | Ortho clinic, Herat | |
| | 20 | Water supply, Mogadishu | |
| | 21 | School, Mogadishu | |
| Middle impact | 1 | Emergency logistics, Faizabad | 2 |
| Food aid, Kosova | 4 | Widow | |
| programme, Kabul | 9 | Shelters, Peja, Kosova | 10 |
| Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova | 12 | Police School, Vushtrri, Kos. | 13 |
| Wazir Hospital, Kabul | 15 | ARCS clinic, Faizabad | |
| | 19 | Street lights, Mogadishu | |
| | 25 | Girl's school, Kabul | 28 |
| Milk project, Hargeisa | 30 | Water divider, Farah, A. | |
| | 35 | Sanitation, Kabul | |
| Narrow impact | 5 | Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, S. | 6 |
| Family hosting refugees, Kukes | 7 | Handicapped, Mogadishu | |
| | 8 | Marastoon home, Jalalabad | 11 |
| Cimic activities, Zobin Potok, | 17 | Village rehab. Shebelle, Som. | |
| | 18 | Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet, Ko. | |
| | 22 | School, Farah, A. | |
| | 23 | School, Faizabad, A. | 24 |
| School, Chatta, A. | 27 | Social centre, | |
| Peja, Kos. | 29 | Village infra. Farah, A. | |
| | 31 | Irrigation, Faizabad | 33 |
| Village organisation, Herat, | 34 | IAD, Salab, A. | |
| Nil impact | 3 | Refugee feeding, Kabul | 16 |
| Health education, Salab, A. | 26 | Girl's home school, Jalalabad, | |
| | 32 | IAD. Herat | |

Aggregate life-impact is the simple addition of the estimated impact on health, livelihood, and protection according to a scale of positive (+1), negative (-1), or nil (0). Each project could score +3 (wide impact), +2 (middle impact), +1 (narrow impact), or 0 (nil impact). The figure for aggregate impact does not relate to any quantitative dimensions of impact, but only to the 'multi-dimensionality' of impact. Calculations of aggregate impact expressed in arithmetic quantities are meant to make equal very different types of impact, and is used solely as a heuristical device that may point to tendencies of unintended, unwanted, or unknown effects and side-effects of a given humanitarian project. Neither is scoring 'wide' or 'narrow' meant to imply that some projects were 'successes' or 'failures', but point to real dilemmas confronting aid in conflict situations.

Of the thirty-five projects in the sample four projects had a wide life impact, fourteen a middle impact, thirteen a narrow impact, and four nil impact. The best-scoring projects were the school (21) and the water-supply in Mogadishu (20), both co-funded by Danida through Dan Church Aid and implemented by Diakonia-Bread for the World-Germany (DBG), and

one ICRC-project in Afghanistan, the orthopaedic clinic in Herat (14). What these projects had in common was to have a positive impact on all three parameters of life-impact. The school combined up to tenth grade education for boys and girls with a clinic serving both the pupils, an orphanage attached to the school, and the neighbourhood, finally it had militia-men protecting the school. The water-supply project combined the health-effect of clean water with some employment and protection of the direct beneficiaries and their assets, the well-installations. The ICRC projects combined a positive health-impact by treatment, a positive livelihood-impact by employment, and positive protection by negotiations with the Taliban securing access to assistance for discriminated-against groups including women and Hazaras in Herat.

Bottom-scorers were four Afghanistan projects: the ICRC refugee-feeding programme in Kabul (3), the girl's home-school outside Jalalabad supported by SCA (26), the large integrated agricultural development (IAD) project in Pashtun Zorghun (32), and the health-education component of the IAD project in Salab (16), implemented by DACAAR, all mentioned above. None of the three first projects had a health component and hence no health impact. They all had a positive impact on livelihood, but a negative impact on protection; thus over-all life-impact was estimated to be nil. The latter was a special case. It figured in the project-description responding to a clear donor-priority of development projects having a women-empowering profile. However, in Salab the field-manager could not show us any health education or otherwise convince us of actually undertaking health education, and it therefore scored 0.

4. Answers: State-impact

Now we turn around and take the point of view of the state (or state-fragments) hosting the projects: how much did each project contribute to a fragmentation or focusing of its state-power? Life-impact assessed impact from the point of view of the individual beneficiary, that is the over-all impact of each project on individual vulnerability in terms of health, livelihood and protection. In order to assess impact of each project on the state the perspective have to change radically from the question of the individual human being benefiting or not from humanitarian assistance to the survival of the state under fire in a complex emergency.

It should be emphasised that state fragmentation is assessed from the point of view of the state, not from a normative point of view. In the present analysis the point of departure is the currently existing state and the focusing or fragmenting of that state, however

politically unattractive it may be. A 'positive' or 'negative' impact refers only to the question of fragmentation, not to any moral or political values. Needless to say, this is not a procedure meant to exclude moral and political issues, on the contrary it may hopefully present a basis for informed moral and political judgements.

Note: the values of life-impact and state-impact cannot be compared directly as they are the numerical expressions of quite different social phenomena. I briefly bring together the two series of assessments in the conclusion to the present chapter.

State-impact, “house-bundle” (Table 5) State-impact, house 'bundle'

| | | |
|--------------------------------|----|-------------------------------------|
| Positive impact | 15 | ARCS clinic, Faizabad |
| 16 Health education, Salab, A. | 19 | Street lights, Mogadishu |
| | 21 | School, Mogadishu |
| | 22 | School, Farah, A. |
| | 23 | School, Faizabad, A. |
| | 24 | School, Chatta, A. |
| | 27 | Social centre, Peja, Kos. |
| 28 Milk project, Hargeisa | 29 | Village infra. Farah, A. |
| | 30 | Water divider, Farah, A. |
| | 32 | IAD. Herat |
| | 33 | Village organisation, Herat, |
| | 34 | IAD, Salab, A. |
| | 35 | Sanitation, Kabul |
| Nil impact | 1 | Emergency logistics, Faizabad |
| | 2 | Food aid, Kosova |
| | 6 | Family hosting refugees, Kukes |
| | 7 | Handicapped, Mogadishu |
| | 11 | Civic activities, Zobin Potok, K. |
| Negative impact | 3 | Refugee feeding, Kabul |
| | 4 | Widow programme, Kabul |
| | 8 | Marastoon home, Jalalabad |
| | 9 | Shelters, Peja, Kosova |
| | 13 | Wazir Hospital, Kabul |
| | 14 | Ortho clinic, Herat |
| | 17 | Village rehab. Shebelle, Som. |
| | 18 | Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet, Ko.. |
| | 25 | Girl's school, Kabul |
| | 26 | Girl's home school, Jalalabad, |
| | 31 | Irrigation, Faizabad |
| No data | 5 | Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, S. |
| | 10 | Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova |
| | 20 | Water supply, Mogadishu |

It is important to underline the relational aspect of state-impact: similar projects designed to implement a donor objective of women's empowerment had quite opposite impact on conflicts depending on host state policies. Fifteen projects in the sample were located in Taliban areas, and five in non-Taliban Afghanistan. Seven projects in Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan had a negative impact, from the Taliban's point of view, because they tended to increase access and rights of women and girls, compared with the situation outside the projects. The refugee-feeding project in Kabul (3) made women deal with the ICRC as heads of families because many of their husbands, male refugees belonging to ethnic groups at war with the Taliban, were in hiding or were arrested. The widow-programme in Kabul (4), the marastoon single women's home in Jalalabad (8), the Wazir hospital in Kabul (13), the orthopaedic clinic in Herat (14), the home-school for girls in a village outside Jalalabad (26), even the Taliban school for girls (and boys) in Kabul (25): they are all seven estimated to have reduced patriarchal power to some degree, and thus contributed to the fragmentation of

state institutions because the Taliban in extreme measure had made patriarchy a state (supporting) institution.

The other four projects had a negative impact for the opposite reason. In its conflict with the Taliban government the Rabbani administration opportunistically had granted certain limited rights to women (employment, education, and very limited access to public space) previously denied by the mujahedin commanders of Badakshan. When the Faizabad irrigation project in the Rabbani-area (31) increased male power because an all-male village shura controlled the project-input, it is estimated to have fragmented state power: women were ruled (a little bit more than before) by fathers, husbands, brothers, and not as citizens by ‘national’ state institutions. This seems to be a general problem, also in Europe, with projects supposedly ‘owned’ by families or village organisations that by tradition exclude women from decisions. In the school project in Farah (22), the ICRC sanitation-project in Kabul (35), the two DACAAR ‘integrated agricultural projects’ in Salab and Pashtun Zorghun (34,32), and the two rehabilitation projects in Kosova (9,18), project-inputs were in all cases controlled by men only. The point here is not traditional male dominance as such, but the fact that the projects injected *new* resources into villages and families that were exclusively controlled by men, so that the dominance of men actually *grew* because of the projects, as the men got new resources to control. It seems to be very difficult for agencies to secure women any control over resources donated to families and villages.

Sixteen projects are estimated to have had a positive, focusing impact on state institutions; five projects had negligible impact and in three cases there are no data on this score. Again we see the relational impact of projects; Dacaar’s four village projects (29,30,32,34) and the school in Farah (22) excluding girls are estimated to have had a positive, focusing, impact on the Taliban state precisely because they tended to underpin patriarchy. The three projects in non-Taliban Afghanistan, estimated to focus the state institutions of the Northern Alliance, did so for the opposite reason, because women and girls got access to education and employment in the ARCS-clinic (15) and the schools in Faizabad and Chatta (23,24). This was in sync with most of the world, and because the milk-project in Somaliland (28), the school and the street lights in Mogadishu (21,19), the Police Training School and the social centres in Kosova (12,27), all supported girl’s and women’s access to public goods they are estimated to have had a positive, focusing state-impact.

State-impact, 'town-bundle' (Table 6) **State-impact, town 'bundle'**

| | | | |
|----------------------------|-------|-------------------------------|---|
| Positive impact | 1 | Emergency logistics, Faizabad | 2 |
| Food aid, Kosova | | 3 Refugee feeding, | |
| Kabul | 4 | Widow programme, Kabul | |
| 6 Family hosting refugees, | Kukes | 13 Wazir Hospital, Kabul | |

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|----|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| | 14 | Ortho clinic, Herat | 15 |
| ARCS clinic, Faizabad | 28 | Milk project, Hargeisa | |
| | 29 | Village infra. Farah, A. | 32 |
| IAD. Herat | | | |
| 35 | | Sanitation, Kabul | |
| Nil impact | 7 | Handicapped, Mogadishu | |
| 8 | | Marastoon home, Jalalabad | 10 |
| | | Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova | |
| | 11 | Cimic activities, Zobin Potok, | 12 |
| Police School, Vushtrri, Kos. | 16 | Health education, Salab, A. | |
| 18 | | Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet, Kos. | 21 |
| | | School, Mogadishu | |
| | 22 | School, Farah, A. | |
| | 23 | School, Faizabad, A. | 24 |
| School, Chatta, A. | | 25 | Girl's school, Kabul |
| | 26 | Girl's home school, Jalalabad, | |
| 27 | | Social centre, Peja, Kos. | 30 |
| A. | | Water divider, Farah, | |
| | 31 | Irrigation, Faizabad | |
| | 33 | Village organisation, Herat, | 34 |
| IAD, Salab, A. | | | |
| Negative impact | 5 | Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, S. | |
| 9 | | Shelters, Peja, Kosova | |
| 17 | | Village rehab. Shebelle, Som. | 19 |
| 20 | | Water supply, Mogadishu | |

Imagine a scale spanning from full state control with the market in one end to full market freedom and no state in the other end; Somalia would be at that end with Afghanistan and Kosova not far behind. Urban, commercial networks, syndicates, 'mafias', functioning outside state control will tend to fragment the state. Some groups may corrupt state institutions or in other cases even themselves become state fragments complete with control of violence; I have called them 'autonomous town-structures'. Comparing the projects estimated to have had a positive, focusing impact with those in the opposite end with a negative, fragmenting impact we find no Afghan projects on the negative-list and only one Somali on the positive list; Kosova-projects are represented with two on the positive and one on the negative list.

In the sample, five projects are estimated to have had a fragmenting impact on state institutions, and twelve projects are estimated to have had a focusing impact. A common feature of all seventeen projects with either a positive or negative impact was the channelling of external resources into expanding local commercial networks; they were almost all big projects with many beneficiaries. The eighteen projects estimated to have had no or negligible impact on commercial structures were almost all small projects; at this point where we get close to money a reference to quantities seems to be prudent.

Nine projects are estimated to have had a focusing impact on the state in Afghanistan reflecting that both the Taliban and Rabbani administrations had ways to control the external economic inputs from aid agencies; international agencies were well-known in Afghanistan

to be very law-abiding, for example paying tax in a country where hardly anybody else did. The seven large-scale ICRC projects had a focusing state-impact (widow programme, refugee feeding, Wazir hospital, sanitation project, clinics in Herat and Faizabad, and Pansjir emergency relief). Moreover these projects were only a small part of the total ICRC engagement in Afghanistan, for instance making ICRC in Herat the largest employer in terms of total turn-over in a town of more than 150.000 inhabitants (information from Gilles Sandre, ICRC field manager in Herat). Dacaar's village projects in Farah and Herat (29,32) are also estimated to have had a focusing impact because the Taliban controlled the input. Control of the NGO money was a coveted prize igniting intense internal struggles, for instance in Herat between the Ministry of Health and the Foreign Ministry.

No projects in south Somalia are estimated to have focused the state, for the simple reason there were no economic-commercial state institutions to focus. The Somaliland milk-project (28) is estimated to have contributed to the focusing of the state albeit in the context of very liberal economic regulation. Only the two Kosova projects not operating on the highly opaque market of Kosova are estimated to have focused the state: WFP food-aid (2) was distributed in a way that seemed not to have provoked looting or other direct inputs into criminal structures. Blanket distribution was phased out as the long-term effect would have been problematic. Private inputs by refugees inside Albania (6) for lodging, food, transport etc. are estimated to have been beneficial for the *Albanian* state.

Five projects are estimated to have had a fragmenting impact. In Mogadishu private business groups with in-house militias ran and protected water-supply and street-light projects (29,19). One of these groups was also engaged in the village-rehabilitation project in rural south Somalia (17), supporting certain self-styled local leaders. However, under the circumstances this was a constructive and positive way to reach the beneficiaries. These projects fragmented the state in the sense they entrenched the power of sub-state groups, thus preventing the re-emergence of national state institutions. In Hargeisa with more well-established state institutions the UNHCR repatriation camp (5) had a fragmenting impact because it facilitated a heavy influx of people and trade in Hargeisa, which the government bitterly complained about and had serious problems in controlling.

In Kosova control by the virgin UNMIK customs-service caused serious delays of imports of building-materials October-December 1999, creating big problems for the race-against-winter construction of shelters. Under the circumstances (9) DRC then decided to procure some of their materials on the local market, injecting a substantial economic input into a grey-zone economy out of control of the UNMIK administration. The DRC rehabilitation of

houses in Obri e Ulet (18), on the other hand, is estimated not to have had a fragmenting impact on the UNMIK protectorate because it was undertaken in April-May 2000 with imported materials, and at a time when control with trade was better controlled than six months earlier. Finally the WFP/Children's Aid Direct food distribution to Serb enclaves (2) made possible the anomaly of a total de-linking from commercial networks, enabling the Serbs to survive in the completely surrounded enclaves with no contact to the economy of the Albanian areas. This increased tremendously the power of the UNMIK state vis-à-vis the Serbs in the enclaves, but ironically at the same time perpetuated the problem of ethnic polarisation.

State-impact, ethnic 'bundle' (Table 7) State-impact, ethnic 'bundle'

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Positive impact | 1 Emergency logistics, Faizabad 12 Police School, Vushtrri, Kos. 19 Street lights, Mogadishu |
| Nil impact | 20 Water supply, Mogadishu 22 School, Farah, A. 28 Milk project, Hargeisa 34 IAD, Salab, A. 4 Widow programme, Kabul 7 Handicapped, Mogadishu 8 Marastoon home, Jalalabad 13 Wazir Hospital, Kabul 14 Ortho clinic, Herat 15 ARCS clinic, Faizabad 16 Health education, Salab, A. 23 School, Faizabad, A. 24 School, Chatta, A. 29 Village infra. Farah, A. 31 Irrigation, Faizabad |
| Negative impact | 2 Food aid, Kosova 3 Refugee feeding, Kabul 5 Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, S. 6 Family hosting refugees, Kukes 9 Shelters, Peja, Kosova 10 Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova 11 Cimic activities, Zobin Potok, 17 Village rehab. Shebelle, Som. 18 Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet, Kos. 27 Social centre, Peja, Kos. 35 Sanitation, Kabul |
| No data | 21 School, Mogadishu 25 Girl's school, Kabul 26 Girl's home school, Jalalabad, 30 Water divider, Farah, A. 32 IAD. Herat 33 Village organisation, Herat, |

Projects are estimated to have had a state-fragmenting impact if they contributed to power being accumulated in ethnic structures not controlled by the state. Projects, on the other hand, are estimated to have had a positive, focusing, impact on ethnic conflicts if they diminished the power of ethnic structures not controlled by the state, and/or increased the dominance of the ethnic group controlling state power. In the sample seven projects are estimated to have had a positive impact, while eleven had a negative impact. This is the only aspect of impact found in the sample to have had more negative than positive impact over-all.

Modalities of state focusing were very different. Four projects achieved a positive impact by supporting moves towards reconciliation and co-operation between warring ethnic or clannic groups. The police school in Kosova (12) and the milk co-operative in Somaliland (28) made individuals from different ethnic-clannic groups co-operate, supporting and supported by state institutions bridging several ethnic-clannic groups. In Mogadishu the street light and the water supply projects (19,20) were implemented in different mutually hostile

neighbourhoods, yet all clans supported city-wide functional co-operation in order to get clean water and street light in their own area: both projects had secured backing from all major clannic groups in Mogadishu. In Kosova and Somaliland projects could operate inside a reconciliatory state policy; in Mogadishu the projects had to bridge hostile state-fragments.

The other three projects, estimated to have had a focusing impact, did it the other way around by supporting the ethnic group dominant in the state at the expense of other ethnic groups. Bringing food and medicines to displaced persons in the Pansjir valley (1) supported Tadjiks indispensable for survival of the Northern Alliance and their fledgling state institutions. The school in Farah (22) discriminated against Kuchis in favour of Pashtuns, as the agricultural project in Salab (34) helped implement Taliban/Pashtu state control dominating the local Pashaii. All seven cases are estimated to have had a positive, focusing, state-impact on ethnic conflicts from the point of view of the ruling state.

Eleven projects were estimated to have had no or neutral impact, while six had no data on this score (an ethnic break-down of the Taliban girl's school would have been interesting). Finally, eleven projects are estimated to have had a negative, fragmenting state-impact on ethnic conflicts. Again we see that impact is totally relational: three projects assisted ethnic groups in conflict with a mono-ethnic state, while eight projects contributed to ethnic polarisation in states striving for multi-ethnicity. In south Somalia village rehabilitation (17) assisted Bantu farmers, but appeared to do so by benefiting their traditional adversaries the Abgal clan in charge of the local state-fragments. In Kabul the sanitation programme (35) assisted also non-Pashtun groups at the margins of Taliban control, while the refugee feeding programme (3) helped the presence in Kabul of groups defined by the Taliban as their enemies. The other eight projects with a negative impact were all except two in Kosova. When the UNHCR defended the freedom-of-movement of returnees in Somaliland (5) it had a negative, disrupting impact on the fragile ethnic balances worked out by the local government. In Albania the government welcomed the massive influx of refugees from Kosova (6), but at the same time the presence of armed groups at war with Albania's neighbour mixed with the refugees is estimated to have had a highly fragmenting potential, averted only by massive foreign military presence and the fortunate early return of the refugees. The six Kosova projects, food aid (6), shelters (9), bussing (10), rehabilitation of houses (18), civic activities (11), and social centres (27), all entrenched ethnic divisions inadvertently undermining the UNMIK goal of a multi-ethnic Kosova.

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|
| State-impact, state 'bundle' | (Table 8) | State-impact, state 'bundle' |
| Positive impact | | 1 Emergency logistics, Faizabad |

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 Food aid, Kosova 3 Refugee feeding, Kabul 4 Widow programme, Kabul 6 Family hosting refugees, Kukes 8 Marastoon home, Jalalabad 9 Shelters, Peja, Kosova 10 Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova 11 Cimic activities, Zobin Potok, 12 Police School, Vushtrri, Kos. 13 Wazir Hospital, Kabul 14 Ortho clinic, Herat 15 ARCS clinic, Faizabad 16 Health education, Salab, A. 18 Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet, Kos. 22 School, Farah, A. 23 School, Faizabad, A. 24 School, Chatta, A. 25 Girl's school, Kabul 27 Social centre, Peja, Kos. 29 Village infra. Farah, A. 30 Water divider, Farah, A. 31 Irrigation, Faizabad 32 IAD. Herat 33 Village organisation, Herat, 34 IAD, Salab, A. 35 Sanitation, Kabul |
| Nil impact | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7 Handicapped, Mogadishu 28 Milk project, Hargeisa |
| Negative impact | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5 Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, S. 17 Village rehab. Shebelle, Som. 19 Street lights, Mogadishu 20 Water supply, Mogadishu 21 School, Mogadishu 26 Girl's home school, Jalalabad, |

In the preceding three sections on the “house”, “town”, and “ethnic” bundles of conflicts we considered impact on sub-state actors, and their power-relation with the state, that is the project-impact upon the state was indirect. We now turn to direct impact upon state institutions and state government. There are partisan agencies assisting only one side, often the rebel-side, in a conflict; Afghanistan in the 1980s saw many ‘solidarity’ groups giving aid and advocacy to mujahedin groups and not to the communist side. SCA, NAC, and to some extent Dacaar started out as such solidarity groups, but today in a different context they have become non-partisan humanitarian aid agencies. In our sample there are no partisan groups, only ‘neutral’ agencies working on a standard non-discriminatory humanitarian mandate. They comply with existing local rules and regulations, acknowledge some form of state control with their activities, and do not become ‘political’, that is challenge local state leadership. It is on this background of non-political intentions that their fragmenting or focusing impact on state institutions and government will be assessed. It should be added that this in no way applies to donors. Far from being non-political they peruse national interests to the point of launching risk aid; this confronts humanitarian

agencies with the existential dilemma mentioned above, and discussed further below in Chapter VI.

In our sample, twenty-seven projects are estimated to have had a positive, focusing, impact on state government, while only six had a negative impact; two had a negligible impact. None of the Somalia projects are estimated to have focused the state government for the obvious reason there were no government. On the other hand no Kosova projects and only a single Afghanistan project are estimated to have had a negative state-impact.

All the eight ICRC projects (3,4,8,13,14,15,35), feeding, treating, sheltering and providing for a vast number of beneficiaries, insisted on and promised traditional Red Cross neutrality. The ICRC/IFRC/ARCS engaged the Taliban/Rabbani authorities in negotiations about the welfare of specific groups of concern to the ICRC, not about general questions, for instance on human rights. With endless patience and a substantial economic input this produced concrete results for individuals; the impact on state governments on both sides of the front was focusing, clearly positive from the point of view of either side. The ten projects of Dacaa (16,22,29,30,32,33,34), UNOPS (23,311), and NAC (24) in Afghanistan all had a rather straight developmental and rural profile. Dacaa suggested that village-level inputs avoided saying a principled yes or no to the national policies of Taliban/Rabbani. This 'community-empowering-approach' was attractive because it explored and exploited local windows of opportunity. However, it also produced its own contradictions. How far could you take democracy through so-called village organisations when patriarchs ruled in the house and Taliban in the state? Probably not very far, in fact it is an open question if not the dog was wagging the tail, transmitting rule downwards to village-level, and not the tail wagging the dog, somehow imbibing democracy bottom-up. The impact upon the national Taliban/Rabbani leadership are in all cases, including the Taliban school (25), estimated to have been positive, supportive, focusing.

In Kosova the massive political stakes of risk aid made it extremely difficult to insist on a straight humanitarian mandate, and all seven projects were politically adjusted with donors' national priorities reflected in the policy of the UNMIK protectorate, most obvious perhaps in the case of the Cimic activities; all seven projects (2,9,10,11,12,18,27) are estimated to have had a positive, focusing state-impact. Two projects, the assistance to handicapped in Mogadishu (7) and the milk project in Hargeisa (28), probably had a neutral impact, because there were no state(fragments) claiming authority or responsibility for them.

Only six projects are estimated to have had a negative, fragmenting impact on state government. This is the case of the four projects in south Somalia (17,19,20,221), entrenching state fragments of different kinds. UNHCR's dispute with the Somaliland government concerning the rights of free settlement of returnees (5) had a fragmenting impact, recognised by both parties eager to settle the dispute. Only one project out of the thirty-five supported a local activity openly challenging a state government. This is in itself quite remarkable and contrasts with a lot of principled statements on human rights and other contentious issues, made in donor capitals. On the other hand, SCA supporting the little home-school for girls outside Jalalabad (26) could not in the case of a harsh Taliban reaction possibly have protected the beneficiaries. SCA responded to a local request of school-books and they fully respected the local reading of the political situation, yet it might unfortunately on balance have put the beneficiaries at risk. This points to protection as the fundamental limit of humanitarian aid: in twenty-seven cases out of thirty-five agencies fully complied with local state policies, in seven cases compliance was not applicable, and in the last case, when only just cautiously confronting a state policy, there was no way to follow up with protection of the beneficiaries in the event of a violent reaction by the state. Risk aid, on the other hand, can protect beneficiaries, but at the level of individual projects risk aid-initiated projects do not differ from those initiated as humanitarian or development aid. Protection in Kosova was organised at a level completely different from single projects. They differ from humanitarian and development projects negatively - by the projects *not* implemented, e.g. in Serbia for reasons of national interests.

Aggregate state-impact**(Table 9) State-impact, aggregate**

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| Strong focusing impact | 1 Emergency logistics, Faizabad 12 Police School, Vushtrri, Kos. 15 ARCS clinic, Faizabad 22 School, Farah, A. 28 Milk project, Hargeisa 29 Village infra. Farah, A. 32 IAD. Herat 34 IAD, Salab, A. |
| Middle focusing impact | 16 Health education, Salab, A. 23 School, Faizabad, A. 24 School, Chatta, A. 30 Water divider, Farah, A. 33 Village organisation, Herat, |
| 35 Sanitation, Kabul | |
| Weak focusing impact | 2 Food aid, Kosova 4 Widow programme, Kabul 6 Family hosting refugees, Kukes 13 Wazir Hospital, Kabul 14 Ortho clinic, Herat 27 Social centre, Peja, Kos. |
| Nil impact | 3 Refugee feeding, Kabul 7 Handicapped, Mogadishu 8 Marastoon home, Jalalabad 10 Bussing, Gjilan, Kosova |

| | | |
|---------------------------|----|-------------------------------------|
| | 11 | Cimic activities, Zobin Potok, |
| | 19 | Street lights, Mogadishu |
| | 21 | School, Mogadishu |
| | 25 | Girl's school, Kabul |
| | 31 | Irrigation, Faizabad |
| Weak fragmenting impact | 18 | Rehab. of houses, Obri e Ulet, Kos. |
| | 20 | Water supply, Mogadishu |
| Middle fragmenting impact | 9 | Shelters, Peja, Kosova |
| | 26 | Girl's home school, Jalalabad. |
| Strong fragmenting i. | 5 | Sheikh Nur camp, Hargeisa, S. |
| Very strong frag. im. | 17 | Village rehab. Shebelle, Som. |

Let me repeat, average impacts expressed by figures are ment solely as a heuristical device used in order to facilitate comparisons that may reveal tendencies of unintended, unwanted, or unknown impacts of humanitarian aid. Average state-impact does not relate to any quantitative dimensions of impact, but to the 'multi-dimensionality' of impact. When all points estimated for all 35 projects on the parameters of house, town, ethnic, and state are divided by 35 we get an average score of 0,83. In words this means each project on average had somewhat less than a weak focusing state-impact. (note: the scale goes from nil impact to weak (0 to $\pm 1,0$), middle ($\pm 2,0$), strong ($\pm 3,0$), and very strong ($\pm 4,0$] focusing/fragmenting state-impact) It is important to note that the assessments of state-impact consistently are done from the point of view of the state.

In the sample, eight projects had an estimated strong focusing impact, while six projects had from weak to very strong fragmenting impact. Among the projects with a strong focusing impact is the OSCE police school (12). It is estimated to have reduced male dominance in the school somewhat, to have been neutral in its impact on commercial networks, to have reduced the power of ethnic communities in the police education, and manifestly to strengthen the state institutions of Kosova, that is the UNMIK protectorate. In other words, it was neutral on one score, while the power of two sub-state structures was reduced and the power of state institutions was increased. Following the zero-sum argument the school is estimated to have had a strong focusing state-impact. Among the eight strongly focusing projects are also five Afghani projects, Pansjir relief (1), ARCS clinic (15), village infrastructure in Farah (29), and Dacaar's two integrated agricultural development projects (32,24), all supporting the state government directly, and indirectly by weakening sub-state actors.

At the other end of the scale are six projects estimated to have had from a weak to a very strong fragmenting state-impact. This includes the Kosova shelter and rehabilitation projects (9,18), which both had an estimated positive direct impact on the UNMIK administration, but on balance strengthened sub-state actors more (men ruling over project input, grey-zone

business benefiting from project input and entrenching ethnic groups) thus they are estimated to have had an over-all middle state-fragmenting impact. The UNHCR camp for returnees (5) increased the power of un-controlled urban, commercial networks and entrenched ethnic groups and divisions of the Somaliland capital in addition to openly challenging the refugee-policy of the Somaliland government: on all counts reducing and fragmenting the power of the state; it is estimated to have had a strong fragmenting impact on the Somaliland state.

The over-all bottom-scorer is the village rehabilitation project in south Somalia (17). Input was controlled by the men in the villages, distribution and overheads (high at 15 per cent) was in the hands of local business-people operating without any state control, belonging to a clan that had a problematic relationship with the beneficiaries, and finally supporting local self-styled leaders not improving the prospects of the re-emergence of a national government in Somalia. On all four counts it is estimated to have exacerbated the fragmentation of the Somali state; aggregate state-impact was very strongly fragmenting.

5. Conclusion: correlations of life-impact and state-impact

Above, I stated that two basic assumptions had guided the present attempt to map the impact of humanitarian aid. (i) We are talking about complex emergencies as a process of state fragmentation causing violent death, exposure and displacement of individuals. (ii) It is necessary and possible to distinguish between life-impact and state-impact. Having presented my estimates of life- and state-impact of the thirty-five projects we can now try to bring together the two types of impacts and search for significant correlations.

If the social dynamics of projects mirror the dynamics of complex emergencies it would follow from my assumption above that projects having a state-fragmenting impact would tend to have a narrow life-impact. Furthermore, that the way to achieve a positive life-impact, to reach the goal of humanitarian aid, would be to design projects having a state-focusing impact. But is this simple, positive correlation between projects and complex emergencies borne out by the field impacts in our sample of projects?

Comparing the two sets of impacts, it should be possible to give a very tentative answer to that question. Life-impact and state-impact refer to different social structures and the two figures cannot be compared directly. Instead I have compared the average life-impact and the average state-impact with the averages calculated for thirty-three categories. Repeating the proviso that the figures of impact do not refer to objective quantities but only to qualitative

estimates, we may now search for the faint outlines of cross-cutting correlations. Unexpectedly there seems to be little positive correlation between state-impact and life-impact.

Box 17. Project impact, over/under average impact,* selected categories

| Categories | Life-impact | | State-impact | | n= | Project-nb.s (descriptions, see Box 12.) |
|----------------------|-------------|--------|--------------|--------|------|---|
| State-average | 0 | | 0 | | n=35 | all |
| Life impact | 0 | | 0 | | n=35 | all |
| | > ave. | < ave. | > ave. | < ave. | | |
| Health | | -57 | - | - | n=35 | all |
| Livelihood | +106 | | - | - | n=35 | all |
| Protection | | -47 | - | - | n=35 | all |
| State impact | | | | | | |
| House | - | | | -20 | n=35 | all |
| Town | - | | | -3 | n=35 | all |
| Ethnic | - | | | -138 | n=35 | all |
| State | - | | +157 | | n=35 | all |
| Countries | | | | | | |
| Somalia | +43 | | | -154 | n=7 | 5, 7, 17, 19, 20, 21, 28 |
| Afghanistan | | -18 | +72 | | n=20 | 1,3,4,8,13,14,15,16,22,23,24,25, 26,29,30,31,32,33,34,35 |
| Kosova | | -5 | | -45 | n=8 | 2,6,9,10,11,12,18,27 |
| Aid function | | | | | | |
| Relief | | -21 | | -72 | n=9 | 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 |
| Protection | +24 | | +17 | | n=3 | 10,11,12 |
| Health | +32 | | +92 | | n=4 | 13,14,15,16 |
| Rehabilitation | +32 | | | -233 | n=4 | 17,18,19,20 |
| Education | | -14 | +3 | | n=7 | 21,22,23,24,25,26,27 |
| Development | | -18 | +142 | | n=8 | 28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35 |
| Aid type | | | | | | |
| Emergency | +7 | | | -63 | n=10 | 1,3,4,5,7,8,13,14,15,17 |
| Development | | -7 | +58 | | n=17 | 16,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26, 28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35 |
| Risk | | -5 | | -45 | n=8 | 2,6,9,10,11,12,18,27 |

* Life-impact average = estimates (+1) or (-1) or (0) for health, livelihood, protection for all 35 projects, added and divided by $35 \times 100 = 143$;
state-impact average = estimates (+1) or (-1) or (0) for house, town, ethnic, state bundles for all 35 projects, added and divided by $35 \times 100 = 83$;
averages for all categories of projects are calculated in the same way;
143 has been subtracted from all life-impact-values in order to facilitate comparison;
83 has been subtracted from all state-impact-values in order to facilitate comparison;
all positive values are above-average impact and all negative values are below-average impact.

Box 17 continued. Project impact, over/under average impact*, selected categories

| Categories | Life-impact | | State-impact | | n= | Project-numbers |
|----------------------|-------------|--------|--------------|--------|------|--|
| | > ave. | < ave. | > ave. | < ave. | | |
| Location | | | | | | |
| Urban | +41 | | | -27 | n=16 | 3,4,5,6,7,8,12,13,14,15,19,20, 21,25,27,35, |
| Rural | | -27 | +17 | | n=19 | 1,2,9,10,11,16,17,18,22,23,24, 26,28,29,30,31,32,33,34 |
| Duration | | | | | | |
| > 1 year | +7 | | +11 | | n=16 | 4,5,7,8,13,14,15,16,20,21,22, 24,26,29,34,35, |
| < 1 year | | -6 | | -9 | n=19 | 1,2,3,6,9,10,11,12,17,18,19,23, 25,27,28,30,31,32,33 |
| Beneficiaries | | | | | | |
| > 10.000 | | -6 | +8 | | n=13 | 1,2,3,4,5,13,13,15,17,19,20, |
| < 10.000 | +7 | | +2 | | n=22 | 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,14,16,18,21,22,23 24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,34 32,33,35 |
| Implementing | | | | | | |
| Multinational | +18 | | +10 | | n=13 | 1,2,3,4,5,7,12,13,14,15,23,31,35 |
| National | | -4 | | -11 | n=18 | 6,8,9,10,11,16,17,18,19,20,21,22, 24,25,26,27,28,29,30,32,33,34 |
| Agency | | | | | | |
| Taliban | +57 | | | -83 | n=1 | 25 |
| WFP/CAD | +57 | | +17 | | n=1 | 2 |
| OSCE | +57 | | +217 | | n=1 | 12 |
| DCA/DBG | +57 | | | -183 | n=5 | 7,17,19,20,21 |
| ICRC/IFRC/ARCS | +32 | | +55 | | n=8 | 1,3,4,8,13,14,15,35 |
| DRC | +17 | | | -83 | n=5 | 9,10,18,27,28 |
| DANBAT | | -43 | | -83 | n=1 | 11 |
| UNOPS | | -43 | +17 | | n=2 | 23,31 |
| Mehmeti | | -43 | +17 | | n=1 | 6 |
| NAC | | -43 | +117 | | n=1 | 24 |
| UNHCR | | -43 | | -383 | n=1 | 5 |
| DACAAR | | -57 | +174 | | n=7 | 16,22,29,30,32,33,34 |
| SCA | | -143 | | -283 | n=1 | 26 |

* Life-impact average = estimates (+1) or (-1) or (0) for health, livelihood, protection for all 35 projects, added and divided by 35x100 = 143;
state-impact average = estimates (+1) or (-1) or (0) for house, town, ethnic, state bundles for all 35 projects, added and divided by 35x100 = 83;
averages for all categories of projects are calculated in the same way;
143 has been subtracted from all life-impact-values in order to facilitate comparison;
83 has been subtracted from all state-impact-values in order to facilitate comparison;
all positive values are above-average impact and all negative values are below-average impact.

– Only fourteen out of thirty-three categories had a positive correlation between life-impact and state-impact. Six categories of projects (protection, health, long-term, multinational implementing agencies, WFP, OSCE, and ICRC) combined a wide impact on the lives of the

beneficiaries with a focusing impact on the state in which they lived. Eight categories of projects combined a narrow life-impact with fragmenting state-impact (Kosova, relief, risk aid, short-term, national implementing agencies, DANBAT, UNHCR, and SCA).

– The majority, nineteen categories, had a negative correlation between life-impact and state-impact (Somalia, Afghanistan, rehabilitation, education, development function, emergency type, development type, urban location rural location, large, small, Taliban, DCA, DRC, UNOPS, Mehmeti, NAC, and Dacaar). For instance the shelters in Kosova (9) on average had a positive life-impact but a fragmenting state-impact; while the agricultural project outside Herat (32) on average had a strong focusing impact on the Taliban state, but nil impact on the lives of the beneficiaries.

Three categories stand out with above-average state-focusing impact: (i) Afghanistan, (ii) development function, and (iii) Dacaar; yet they all have significant below-average life-impact. (i) To work in Afghanistan the agencies had to co-operate with the Taliban (when in that part of the country), protection of beneficiaries was difficult and inputs would benefit the regime. (ii) Projects with a development function had to promote stability and predictability, permitting a long perspective, but they would not have an impact on lives much beyond livelihood. (iii) Dacaar favoured a pragmatic approach to the state; on the life-impact side the Dacaar projects with their development profile aimed rather narrowly at improvement of livelihood; except for one project they had no health impact and little impact on protection. All three categories worked together and produced an above-average positive state-impact, but at the same time as these projects contributed to the consolidation of the Taliban state, they had a narrow life-impact compared with the average of our sample.

The exact opposite picture emerges with the categories of (i) Somalia, (ii) rehabilitation, and (iii) DCA/DBG: far below-average state-impact (=fragmenting impact), but above-average life-impact. (i) The agencies had to relate to the small groups controlling state power, and inputs at project-level could not prevent further fragmentation. (ii) Recourses injected into sub-state structures drove fragmentation forward. (iii) DBG as implementing agency had to be both pragmatic and creative to work at all in the chaotic situation in Mogadishu providing protection and health besides livelihood. This multi-dimensionality by necessity gave projects a significantly above-average life-impact.

The category of humanitarian aid also had the negative correlation of below-average state-impact and above-average life-impact. Humanitarian aid is donated to alleviate suffering in a short-term perspective. Even when projects funded with a short-term intention drag on for decades, as in Afghanistan, donor-intentions may remain a series of short-term interventions

with a negative relation to the state (fragments). Development aid projects have a long-term perspective, and on the ground they differ from humanitarian projects at least in one important respect: they have a positive relation with the local state. In Afghanistan and Somalia we see a mix of both types of aid, indicating a donor bewilderment on the position of the local state: can, shall? aid develop the existing state or only do humanitarian gap-filling, waiting for another more acceptable and capable state to arrive at the scene? Unfortunately, both humanitarian and development aid leave the problem of protection unanswered.

Risk aid is different because it tackles the problem of violence, protection, and state power up front. This does not, of course, guarantee success (peace, prosperity, democracy), but from the word go the political intentions of the donor will frame each aid projects in a way humanitarian and development aid never do. The difference is a spelled-out national security agenda. All Kosova projects in the sample were risk aid projects no matter what their aid function were (relief, protection, rehabilitation, and education in our sample). While all projects in Kosova and only in Kosova were risk aid, except for the lone DRC project in Somaliland, the projects in Somalia and Afghanistan were mixed humanitarian and developmental. Average life-impact of projects seem not to differ much across aid types.

There are no consistent, positive correlation between state-impact and life-impact of the thirty-five projects in the sample because a condition for implementing projects at all, in all three countries, was de facto support for the local government. Projects could aim at any kind of assistance, education or health, relief or development, protection or rehabilitation, the relation with the state was mainly supportive. But the relations of the local state with the populations, the beneficiaries, went from relative positive in Kosova to dictatorial in Afghanistan and predatory in Somalia. Thus, the nexus between state-impact and life-impact was variable and gave humanitarian aid a different local bias in each country.

In Afghanistan agencies could build on the relatively stable state of the Taliban, and concentrate on aspects of social existence sheltered somewhat from the burning issue of violence and protection against violence. In Kosova, the mandate of humanitarian agencies to provide protection of human beings had been tied to issues of national security, providing protection of Albanians on a scale humanitarian projects never had been able to do, but at the same time corrupting the neutrality of humanitarian aid. In the chaos of southern Somalia agencies had to become something close to state-fragments themselves in order to do anything at all. They could not just improve livelihood in a 'pure' development project, but

had to engage with every aspect of social existence, and that gave the unique combination of state-fragmenting impact and wide life-impact.

In all three countries recourse was injected, the authority of the state (fragments) was recognised, but projects as such could not be designed to provide protection of the beneficiaries. This would not be a problem in a peaceful condition where a democratic state protected the rights of citizens, but in a complex emergency where precisely the state (fragments) put citizens at risk, protection poses a very difficult problem for the aid agency. How do you operate in a situation where a violent threat to the beneficiaries seems to be preventable only by violence, threatening to foster a spiral of violence ultimately posing a greater risk for the beneficiaries?

Perhaps in the final analysis there is a way to avoid that question, which no single project can answer. To me there seems to be a certain scope on project level for soliciting a little violence to counter small threats of violence in an imaginative way which should be explored. In the sample of projects presented here the controversial DBG projects in Mogadishu could perhaps inspire other agencies to a closer reflection on how to protect their beneficiaries. However, even the most imaginative solutions at project-level are rapidly overwhelmed by violence if the stars are unfavourable. There is little doubt that to face the challenge of protection we have to move to the level of the territorial state within the international community of states where states are protected or ruined. This is the theme for the next and final chapter.

6. ● PROTECTING STATES?

We have moved from emergency events, complex emergencies, donors, and humanitarian agencies to the field impact of aid projects. We will remain in the field in this final chapter, but instead of the close-up perspective of individual humanitarian projects of the preceding chapter we will take a wide-angle perspective to include other interventions trying to protect, create or recreate states in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova. If my initial assumption remain valid, that complex emergencies are a process of state-fragmentation driven by civil war causing violent death and displacement, then any type of foreign policy activity that contributes towards state focusing (reconciliation, peace) could be assumed to protect people.

But this assumption begs the question: focusing which state? It cannot be taken for granted that the answer will be a type of nation state like the ones we have known in the twentieth century. Indeed, current developments in ‘our’ three countries all challenge basic notions of the nation state. For instance, in Somalia no-one rules the national territory, in Afghanistan most state institutions have been discontinued, and in Kosova there is no sovereign government; all creating difficult dilemmas for humanitarian aid. I shall attempt a provisional mapping of four state-focusing interventions: (i) top-down, (ii) protectorate, (iii) bottom-up, and (iv) experimental.

1. Somalia

At the turn of the century four alternative interventions had been attempted from the outside in order to create and recreate a Somali state.

Box 18, Somali state alternatives, c. 1992-99

(i) *Top-down* state building of the 'Siad Barre-model'. The nation state (re)created on the basis of a national army sponsored by outside power(s).

(ii) *Protectorate*; military administration; suspension of national sovereignty.

(iii) *Bottom-up* state building based on implanting and revival of local self-government with outside involvement in infrastructure and services.

(iv) *Experimental* type. A minimal, federal state with radical freedom for local entrepreneurs, internationalised social services and unresolved problems of violence . International containment, restricted refugee reception.

Top-down

Around year 2000 the international community still defined Somalia as that territory at the Horn of Africa which was not Djibouti, nor Ethiopia, nor Kenya. Colonial history, that is the national interests of the Powers, still defined the first and crucial point of reference for all attempts to recreate a sovereign government and viable state institutions in that particular bit of Africa. The Somali nation state had not originated as a state for all Somalis. Independent Somalia came into being in 1960 by the merger of the Protectorate of British Somaliland and the Italian-administered Trusteeship Territory of Somalia, creating a diaspora of more than one million Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Somali politicians hoisted a national flag with a white five-pointed star symbolising 'the five Somalias', and unsuccessfully used arms to extend the international borders in 1960-88, including a major international war against Ethiopia in 1977-78 which it lost disastrously. Neither the UN, the OAU nor any other international organisation have accepted any changes of the Somali national territory at any time during the life-span of independent Somalia. North-west Somalia declared itself independent in 1991 within the borders of British Somaliland, but has never been recognised by any country. National unity remains forty years after independence the point of departure for all international attempts, to seek reconciliation, peace and development in Somalia, for instance the IGAD and the most recent and most promising peace conference hosted by Djibouti May-July 2000.

The first Somali state-structures were alien colonial impositions on the nomadic, republican Somali society. The British colonial and military administration was confined to a handful of officers ruling with askari troops through the top of Somali clannic society. Beyond strategic

concerns in World War Two, British interests were only to keep the area reasonable peaceful. In the south Italy also had settlers, developing irrigated agriculture, including banana-plantations. To man the colonial administration and a future independent state a tiny Somali national elite, including a political party, was fostered in the 1950 by the Italian and British colonial powers. The career of 'warlord' Mohammed Farah Aided is a good example of this. Born in 1934 as fifth out of 13 children to nomadic parents near Belet Weyne in the Italian colony, he was privileged to get an education. He later got a job with the Italian colonial police, moved up through the ranks and was eventually sent to Italy on NATO military education in the late 1950s. He returned at the time of Somalia's independence as a key player in the small circle of men from the police and military establishment ever since competing for the spoils of Somali national power.

Independent Somalia was shaped from the top-down by Cold War support of the national army. In the 1970s mainly by the Soviet Union because Ethiopia under emperor Haile Selasie was aligned with USA. However when Mengisthu took power in Ethiopia the Cold War polarity switched extremely rapidly and USA became Siad Barre's backer during the 1980s. The arms build-up on the Horn of Africa numbered millions of light weapons, thousands of tanks and other heavy weapons and hundreds of sophisticated aircraft (Clapham 1995:77). Only on two occasions did this top-down externally sponsored national government of Somalia arouse any enthusiasm in the population. According to I.M. Lewis the peaks of Somali nationalism were reached at independence in 1960 and with the Ogaden war in 1978 (until Siad Barre lost it). Since then Somalis have cherished the notion of the Somali nation, but lost all faith in the Somali state.

During the 1980s the regime became increasingly corrupt and repressive while a combination of military and civilian aid allowed Siad Barre to make the Somali army one of the largest south of Sahara (Marchal 1996, Maren 1997). Independent Somalia never became a viable state, but was kept floating by opportunistic outside subvention and a staggering cynicism shared by donor and host, well described by Michael Maren. The mis-rule by the tiny elite of independence has continued for forty years through civil war and intervention. "The civil war does not appear as a political revolution: the Siyaad Barre's regime is over but key actors of that period are still present in the inner circle of the factions, all over Somalia... UNOSOM's time was, indeed, a repetition of Siyaad Barre's attitude before the market: overprofits, contracts based on political clientelism, huge corruption and easy money." (Marchal 1996:114-113) Indeed, most of the present faction-leaders were part the previous state elite. While they have fought bitterly amongst themselves they have been extremely successful in monopolising power.

Where Gerald Hanley erred in his entertaining description of Somalia during British Military Administration (Hanley 1993, org. 1971) was that modernity would eradicate tribalism. On the contrary modern, independent Somalia were more violently divided into ‘tribal’ areas than during colonial times. Indeed, most observers of Somalia forty years after independence would mention clans as a crucial aspect of state fragmentation and agree that clan-lineage still form a basic map of loyalties and support but not whether they necessarily will prevail over a civic consciousness generating a new state. For instance in the recent peace conference in Djibouti participants were selected on a clan-basis, with 175 to Darod, 175 to Hawiye, 175 to Digilmirifle, 205 to Dir including 100 to Issaq and 40 to Gadebursi, 30 to Issa, 35 to southern Dir, 90 to an alliance of minority-clans, and 100 to women.

In Somali tradition no focusing of power beyond ethnic space is legitimate. As I.M. Lewis wrote, “Although the Somali people had a strong sense of cultural and linguistic unity, they did not form a single political unit. They were a nation, not a state, although they possessed all the prerequisites for effective statehood...The most stable unit in a flexible and shifting pattern of alignments was the ‘*diya* paying group’. This consisted usually of a few hundred male heads of families who were parties to a joint treaty or contract (*heer*) to pay and receive compensation for injuries and death or, in default, seek revenge.” (Lewis 1993:25) In a nation state, compromises defusing group violence are reached under the state’s monopoly of violence. Somali nomadic society was the opposite: no monopoly of violence and only fluid compromises. Taken as a whole it was a very durable and resilient social structure. Yet compared with a state is was a paradox of stable instability.

A long and heated debate on the function of clans in the fragmentation of contemporary Somalia pits an ethnographic-essentialist position connected with the voluminous and highly influential work of I.M. Lewis against a constructivist and nationalistic position eloquently defended by Ahmed I. Samatar recognising the salience of clans but insisting that Somalis are not doomed by their blood to clannism. We shall briefly return to Samatar below. The three voices below all stress the importance of clans but beyond that the possibility of co-existence. They belong to a young, successful Mogadishu business-man, a political analyst and senior adviser to Mohamed Sahnoun, UNDP and the EU Commision, and thirdly one of the most influential ministers of the Somaliland government.

Interview with Abukar Ali Sheikh, DBG, Mogadishu

“It is true it is a clan war. Before, when there was a government clans fought over water and wells. Siad Barre used the national budget to pay for his clan. The last eight years is has been

political, looking for a president. People are intermingling in Somalia. I do not believe Somali clans hate each other. But politicians used their militias to shoot someone from the clan that are challenging them. Then people had to separate into safe areas.”

Interview with Walid Musa, Senior Adviser, Political Affairs and Governance, European Union, Somalia Unit, Nairobi, 7 January 1999.

“Somalia is essentially a clannic society. In Somalia today there are two ways to go, either a total division of the country into clannic divisions, or some kind of arrangement that will put it together satisfactory to all of them. Mechanisms of co-existence among clans requires a substantial amount of time. During the totality of Siad Barre’s time this process was stopped. It is going to take 10-20 years. Yet, that is nothing in the life of a nation. Somaliland is the model today in dealing with clannic society, but it is still a single clan territory, the Issaq. “

Interview with Mohamed Saeed Mohamed ‘Geez’, minister of planning, the Somaliland Government, Hargeisa, 21 November 1998.

“We Somalis are tribal. We have to live with it without letting it destroy us. The politicians are the problem. Go to the tribal elders. Without the consent of House of Elders we can do nothing. It is the way the British ran the country.”

“In Erigavo I spent four months speaking with all the clan militias in order to set up a local administration. I sat under the trees and discussed with them and their demands to our government. It is a grassroots approach. They must use this in the South. We never took part in the international conferences. Why should we talk with the warlords? They represent no constituencies, only a hundred militias. They must bring their house in order before we can talk with them. We are in no hurry.”

“To secure the peace in Somaliland is our most important objective. We use 65% of our budget on paying salaries to 15.000 militias to keep them under control. We do not need a big army, we do it to protect ourselves against the militias. We would like to form a national army and police and demobilise the militias. We could retrain those with school education as teachers, and rehabilitate schools; 5000 could teach 150.000 pupils!”

“Somaliland is not a tribal entity like Puntland. It has historical colonial borders. We are an experiment for all Somalia. Up to now no system was devised that could deal with the tribes. They can compete economically. But they must share something - a state. If we cannot do it - then God bless Somalia!”

The alternative of a top-down state, based on a national army sponsored from the outside, demands super-power interest, an (unlikely) regional agreement, or war giving one regional state the power to determine the future of Somalia. There is no unity of purpose amongst Somalia's neighbours to recreate a unified state, and no other external pressure (comparable to the cold-war geo-politics) to do so. Ethiopia supports Somaliland and the break-up of Somalia. Egypt and Libya for the same reasons support a unified Somalia; they paid late 1998 for a 3000 strong Benadir police force as a step in that direction.

All the top-down peace-conferences sponsored by the UN and others have been counterproductive for two reasons, partly because they have built upon faction leaders themselves benefiting from conflict and disunity with no genuine wish to build peace, and partly because they have not been all-inclusive, with Ethiopia sponsoring one set of factions and Egypt sponsoring another set of factions. In the foreseeable future it is unlikely that a national leader can focus the power of Somalia. The IGAD peace conference in Djibouti had overcome the first problem by not focusing on faction leaders, but has not solved the other problem with both Somaliland and Puntland boycotting the conference.

Unfortunately, the permanent geo-political conflict of Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile water seems to keep Somalia constantly de-stabilised. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia has increased even more the value for Ethiopia of a separate Somaliland (and Puntland) and access to the harbours of Berbera and Bosaso, thus further dimming the hopes of peace in Somalia.

**Interview with Walid Musa, Senior Adviser, Political Affairs and Governance,
European Union, Somalia Unit, Nairobi, 7 January 1999.**

“I can confirm to you that the political destiny of the South today is not up to the Somalis at all, it is shared by external factors. Today two very strong external players are calling the shots, Egypt and Ethiopia. The political destiny of Somalia is not in the hands of the Somalis at all. Full stop.”

Protectorate

The UNOSOM operation has sparked much controversy and a large literature (cf. Compagnon 1998 for one of the best introductions); I shall only briefly address one aspect

of protection. 1988 onwards ever larger segments of the Somali population were in desperate need of protection against their own leaders stealing their food, ruining their cities, and laying waste their country. In December 1992 when the American troops arrived many Somalis thought and hoped the warlords would be arrested, but instead the warlords were embraced by the US representative and "gained a spurious legitimacy as political leaders," (Patman 1995:104). A key question in the whole operation remained disarmament of the militias. In the official record of the UNOSOM, Boutros Boutros-Ghali writes deeply disappointed about the refusal of the USA to use their available force to do that. "Unless disarmament is fully implemented, it would not be reasonable to expect UNOSOM to fulfil other aspects of its mandate." (Boutros 1996:288.)

Yet, one may speculate that, if the militias had been disarmed in an effectual manner and the warlords arrested would the UN have been able to fill a power vacuum on a long-term basis? They would have had to set up a real protectorate on the lines later developed in the Balkans. However, no such powers were given in Somalia. The Security Council Resolution 814, the most ambitious of the mandates given to the UN operations, talked only of "providing assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions... and promoting national reconciliation." (Boutros 1996:262). The Americans had no interest in committing themselves to such a difficult long-term project. And indeed it is an open question whether that would have been a wise course to take. It is hard to see how UNOSOM could disarm the militias without becoming part of the conflict, and then immediately all Somalis would turn against the UN. "The US/UN deliberately aimed to destroy Somalia as a nation and abrogate their sovereignty" (SNA press release August 3, 1993; cit. in Ruhela 1994:191). A paper written during the same crucial days i.e. after the June 5 killing of 24 Pakistani troops but before the October 3 killing of 18 US soldiers presents a very perspective formulation of the problem.

"For the moment, UNOSOM in Mogadishu has taken on the appearance of an army of occupation under siege... The UN's first offensive resulted in a more aggressive campaign and brutal threats and killings by hostile Somalis, and repeated strikes by the UN-forces, in which many civilian Somalis lost their lives. Somalis of all clans will find it hard to forget that UNOSOM has Somali blood on their hands." and it concluded, "A political settlement cannot be rushed... Reconciliation will only happen when Somalis feel their interest can be protected and represented through the political process, without resort to force. If it takes longer than a couple of years to establish that kind of confidence in a system, so be it; the alternative is more fighting and death later on... The UN can use the lessons learned in Somalia to improve the conduct of similar rescue missions. Unfortunately, Somalia probably

will not get another chance.” (UNOSOM 1993, written for the Second UNOSOM Informal Donor Consultation, Nairobi 27 July 1993)

In the end the question was, how, and with what mandate from the Somali population, the international community, itself divided with many agendas, could have side-tracked the warlords. To move in and save a population from its own despots is a fundamental challenge to the political wisdom and military staying power of the international community having accorded itself the right to use violence by the unique invoking of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Unfortunately the Somali intervention did not produce the blueprint which many had hoped for such ambitious interventionist practice.

Interview with Matt Bryden, War Torn Societies Project UNRISD, Hargeisa, 22 November 1998.

“I saw it. When the force came [December 1992] everyone was euphoric. The first day was spectacular. The helicopters chased the technicals (improvised heavy weapons of the militias). People believed it was raw power. UNOSOM could have arrested the warlords, but the Americans did not want casualties. From the very first day the forces were tested by the militias and made to react in an unpopular war. The militias won. Then it was “bring elders, women, NGOs”, anyone as an alternative to the warlords. It was ridiculous, apart from those that got direct humanitarian aid, UNOSOM only empowered the warlords and rich merchants. It was a wrong attempt. It was totally alien with no reference to Somalia’s history.

Whatever the much discussed details for the failure of UNOSOM, it is safe to say that no-one is going to propose a protectorate in Somalia in the foreseeable future.

Bottom-up

Neither the national borders of Somalia, nor the inner borders have been washed away. Ethnic-clannic violence has not produced sustainable borders of their own, that is producing a territorial reflection of ethnic-clannic purity. The conflicting claims over Sool and Sanac districts by Somaliland and Puntland is an example of this: neither side wants to divide the districts along clan lines; they must go undivided either to the state to the west or to the east.

Walid Musa shrewdly observed in his strategy paper for the EU Commission (EC/Somalia Unit 1998) that practically everyone dealing with the socio-political situation in Somalia

whether from the inside or the outside has accepted the Siad Barre district and regional mapping of 1973 as their main geographical reference. Despite the collapse of all national authority the surviving political formations, largely following pre-colonial tribal congregations and traditional clannic influence, nevertheless use the existing Barre regional map of Somalia. Positions like regional governor, mayor, chief of police have also survived, while efforts to create a new structures of administration and representation, like the UN district councils, have been unsuccessful.

Ever since the departure of Barre, the outside world had tried unsuccessfully to produce new national and local leaders of Somalia from the bottom-up. The Life and Peace Institute of Uppsala and the War Torn Societies project of UNRISD has been at the forefront of the bottom-up approach. Based on extensive local research and consultations they have tried to “promote a better understanding for post-conflict rebuilding issues in a country without a central government by looking more closely into individual, group and community initiatives and coping mechanisms” (WSP-internet presentation). They have been able to improve the understanding of Somalia among NGOs and develop the standards and focus of international and local NGO work. But in terms of state reconstruction, successful bottom-up democracy initiatives at some point will have to challenge powerful people without a democratic mandate (that includes most current Somali leaders) and ultimately protection will become an issue. External NGOs and other agencies have supported civil society persons, women, professionals, business-men, elders, traditional leaders etc. without even remotely challenging the power of the men with guns. Bottom-up patches of democracy may be better than no democracy, but the more successful the sooner it will face the question of violent rule, which needs a national-level answer. And then externally-based initiatives like LPI and WSP have to decide how far and with what mandate they will move as political actors.

Interview with Ali Hussein Alio Ebrou, District Commissioner of Qorioley, Qorioley, Lower Shabelle, 14 December 1998.

I asked if local leaders could contribute to the recreation of government?

“We support our traditional authorities, the judges, the district commissioners, our security forces, and our sultan; we solve local problems ourselves. We are the base, we solve the basic problems of Somalia. Somalia should be one and united. We should not say good-bye to Somaliland. We share the same language, the same culture. What we see from Hargeisa is a bargaining game. Hargeisa want to gain when Somalia is united again. Egal wants to be the president of Somalia.”

Interview with Ali Salad Hassan, senior Programme Officer, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 6 January 1999

“Who are the people that can claim legitimacy? Aid organisations speak of civil society etc. but that is putting the cart before the horse. Civil society gets looted, it has no protection of its own. It is militias creating security that will gain legitimacy. Egal brought all the militias of Somaliland together, paid them and defused conflicts without violence in Hargeisa Airport and Burao. In this way he won legitimacy. The only solution is to work with the people with guns, the warlords and the faction leaders.”

Experimental

Experimental intervention to (re)create a state differs from top-down, protectorate, and bottom-up interventions by making the meaning and function of national boundaries ambiguous, which the three other types of interventions strives to keep intact. Around year 2000 the few state-functions that actually provided anything to people in Somalia were taken care of by international agencies mostly working out of Nairobi. For example UNDOS saw itself as a doing the job of a Somali ministry of planning, (interview with Gian Paolo Aloi, Operations manager UNDOS) the IFRC Somalia delegation performed services eventually to be provided by a Somali ministry of health, (interview with Aisha Omar Maulana, Delegate, Somalia IFRC) and the EC Technical Assistance saw itself as contributing to a practical bottom-up state creation (interview with Vasilis Petridis, EU Somalia Rehabilitation Programme). This list of caretaker functions was very long. To be sure, the agencies always sought to have local counterparts. UN agencies, for example, produced a letter saying local groups supported the project in question (interview with Larry de Boice, UNDP Deputy Director, Emergency Response Division). The Somalia Aid Co-ordinating Body (SACB) tried to co-ordinate all this work and performed co-ordination on a fully voluntary basis of agencies and donors, all with their own agendas, and without at any time claiming or wishing to be a real “caretaker-government”.

People in Somalia naturally wanted to have access to state-provisions like water, health, infrastructure, education etc. But SACB had no democratic mandate from the Somali population. SACB could not guarantee the access of vulnerable groups to the services, they could not secure sustainability, and they could not provide protection of their inputs beyond

agreements with various local state-fragments. This caretaker state was a look-alike state without arms providing tangible services, but having no control of violence.

The Somali state had not disappeared, it had fragmented. Thus the Nairobi caretaker state was an addition to the multiple state-fragments in Somalia. There was a very clear division of labour and co-operation between the two sides. SACB provided state service: health, education, infrastructure etc. while the state-fragments provided protection of aid. Violence was out of the hands of SACB and the factions and business-men with militias were free to rule with violence. The meaning of the Somali national territory had become highly ambiguous with state institutions mainly located outside Somalia and very hard to access for Somalis, erratic provision of public goods, a population divided by a host of sub-national criteria, no monopoly of violence, and no democratic process or mandate.

This ambiguity of the national territory was increased by the development of local business. It was probably the most important example of social interaction transgressing both clan-borders inside Somalia and the national borders outside Somalia by importing and exporting throughout the region without a state to regulate, protect, or legalise business. In a highly interesting analysis the expert on Somali business Roland Marchal noted that the “money market is certainly the most amazing market in the post-civil war Somalia. Without any Central Bank or monetary control, this country has been able for most of the civil war to keep a national exchange rate with the dollar and to develop business activities all around the country.” (Marchal 1996:104) Somali business networks were trans-national and crossed clan-lines, and they could use this as an insurance, for instance when business-men from several clans jointly chartered a dhow to transport their commodities from Dubai to Mogadishu in order to minimise the risk for looting by enemy clans in Mogadishu harbour.

Ahmed I. Samatar noted that “Somalia has no president or cabinet, no national army or police, no national system of justice, no national system of piped water, electricity or telephones. [It has] exhausted any sense of civic community. In my opinion, then, all of these factors add up to the stunning conclusion: the Somalis have been the first to smash the post-colonial state without putting anything in its place.”(Samatar 2000:62) Few would contradict him; the contentious issue is the quality of this ‘post-government state’ (Helander) or ‘radical localism’ (Menkhaus and Prendergast). Samatar is quite clear: “My position is that while few Somalis regret the shattering of the post-colonial state, the vast majority, like other human beings around the world, wish for a national governance that can foster their well-being (providing, for example basic security, human and economic development and competent management of international affairs).” (ibid, p. 63)

But perhaps governance does not have to be *national* to provide basic public goods? Somalia is an experiment with other frameworks. It is important to note that practically all public interactions takes place in Somalia outside the shattered national systems. For example, the telephone system in Hargeisa is incomparable better than the Siad Barre-time public telephone system, and even far better than Kenyan public system. Another example is the provision of basic health. It is better with more clinics functioning now (1998) even in the south, than during Siad Barre. True, the standard used to be abysmal, but the point is that improvements have taken place without a national government, but with international aid.

Somali may provide an example to the emerging discussion of globalisation and war economies, that differ somewhat from the often-cited examples of Sierra Leone and Liberia exporting commodities of extreme high value attracting international private security. Privatisation of international provisions of public goods by the aid industry linking up with ‘illiberal forms of political economy’ in Somalia fits well with Mark Duffield’s discussion of how “globalisation has helped illiberal and quasi-feudal forms of political economy to expand... the violence associated with post-nation state conflict is not harking back to a developmental malaise or the reappearance of ancient tribal hatreds but based on contemporary structures and processes.”(Duffield 1999:14) Read positively we see today in Somalia an experimental intervention that might point towards a second generation post-colonial African state. This would be a state which does not build on nationalism or nation-building in the form we know from the last two hundred years including the first generation of independent African states. Potentially it could develop a formula for radical power-sharing with smaller (clan) entities inside and larger (international) entities outside the national border, which may overcome the perennial nation-state problem of ethnicity not matching national territory. How far the practice of the caretaker administration in Nairobi will take it is impossible to tell. How it will be developed by the Somalis is hard to know. But it is without doubt an initiative suggesting a peaceful way out of the impasse of ethnic space.

**Interview with Walid Musa, Senior Adviser, Political Affairs and Governance,
European Union, Somalia Unit, Nairobi, 7 January 1999.**

“In my personal view, the extent of democratic exercise going on in Somalia is unmatched anywhere in the world. Today in Somalia, as long as you can protect yourself, you can say, do and implement what you want. Absolute democracy, uncontrolled democracy, the advanced stage of freedom! Somalia by the virtual absence of a state for 8-9 years is giving an example to the rest of the world that the [national] borders system established before may be correct in most cases but not in all of them and it needs to be reviewed. Full stop. This is

what Somalia is saying today to the world, the international community. This is what Somalia is contributing to the international world order.”

He paused, and added,

“The problem is to pay for such an demonstration. Everywhere the solution began with the creators of war. The solution must begin from the warlords. Creating a system which they themselves will not survive. When tranquillity returns to Somalia it will be a controlled tranquillity. A system in which in its ways of control will be more or less like Siad Barre.”

2. Afghanistan

At the turn of the century the four ‘Somali’ alternatives had also been perused in different configurations in dealing with the Afghan state from the outside, all dictating the contexts for aid.

Box 19, Afghanistan state alternatives, c. 1978-99

- (i) *Top-down* state building of the ‘Siad Barre’ model. The nation state (re)created on the basis of (competing) national armed forces sponsored by outside power(s).
- (ii) *Protectorate*, invasion and puppet government; violation of national sovereignty.
- (iii) *Bottom-up* state building based on implanting and revival of village organisations.
- (iv) *Experimental* type with internationalised state institutions and unresolved relations with non-recognised regime, having near-monopoly of violence.

Top-down

Around year 2000 the national territory of Afghanistan remained determined by the clash of imperial geo-political interests of Britain and Russia with the expanding Kingdom of Afghanistan hundred years earlier. The territory straddled the Hindu Kush with Pashtuns south of the mountains, Uzbeks and Tadjiks north of the mountains and Hazaras living in the wild, central mountains. The river Oxus became a national border separating Uzbeks and Tadjiks from their fellows in the Russian Empire, later Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan in 1887; six years later the famous Durand-line came to define the western-most edge of British India, separating the Pashtuns living in Afghanistan from millions of fellow Pashtuns in British India, later Pakistan. After twice defeating British interventions Afghanistan became recognised as an independent buffer-state in 1919 and a member of the UN in 1946 retaining the late 19th century borders. All international mediations in the Afghan conflict has taken as their point of departure the territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

After World War Two foreign aid began pouring into Afghanistan, one of the few independent 'developing' countries in the 1950s. In the early years of development aid Afghanistan was the world's largest recipient of aid. King Zahir Shah, ruling from 1933 to 1973, and his cousin prime minister Daoud Khan tried to play America out against the Soviet Union, "I'll light my American cigarette with a Russian match" became Daoud's famous joke. USA sponsored big irrigation schemes and roads, the Soviet Union then constructed more roads and mines. They sponsored the Afghan army; between 1956 and 1977 one third of the entire officer corps were trained in the Soviet Union. From 1956 to 1978 the Soviet Union gave a total of US\$ 1.26 billion in economic aid and an equal amount in military aid; USA in the same period gave US\$ 533 million in total aid, most of it in the 1950s. (Rashid 2000:13; the Soviet figures are possibly inflated by unrealistic official exchange-rates)

In 1973 Muhammad Daoud Khan, prime minister of Afghanistan 1953-63, staged a coup d'état against king Zahir Shah and proclaimed Afghanistan a republic and himself president, leading to the communist coup April 27, 1978, the so-called Saur Revolution, staged by army and air force commanders. Harsh and repressive communist policies led to general uprising from 1978 and the Soviet invasion December 27, 1979. Michael Gorbachev pulled out last Soviet troops in 1989, and the communist regime of Najibullah collapsed in 1992 followed by mujahedin governments of shifting composition under Burhanuddin Rabbani amid growing chaos and violence. The Taliban took Kabul in 1996 and around year 2000 controlled four fifths of Afghanistan with Rabbani controlling the rest. The war continued with different countries sponsoring the two sides; Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates recognised the Taliban; Pakistan in particular supported the Taliban regime materially. Opposing the Taliban were Iran, Russia, and India, providing military and other aid to the Northern Alliance under Rabbani and Masood.

Interview with Sidney Peterson, SCA field manager Taloquan, conducted in Peshawar, 29 Sep 1999 [translated from Swedish by HT]

"I saw Pakistani F 16 jet-fighters December 1998 shoot Masood's helicopter on the airport in Takhar. In September 1999 the Taliban bombed daily the town of Takhar where I lived, the market and other non-military goals. Most planes came from Mazar-i-Sharif. Pilots may be Pakistani; we discuss that a lot. Each morning we drove through the town and collect the dead. People in Takhar are desperately scared of the Taliban; to the Taliban they are infidels, everyone here is considered an enemy and they fear a massacre like in Mazar. Both sides put out land-mines more than ever before, and much more than are de-mined."

“They are so far from each other, they can never negotiate. The Talibs have a plan for Afghanistan to turn it into this super Islamic state. But Masood, he doesn't have a plan really, what would he do if he took Kabul? He can never do any thing. It will always be a divided country, there is no solution, I cannot see one anyway.”

The outside world insisted on the preservation of a national entity called Afghanistan for their own strategic reasons. Only one example: Abdul Rashid Dostum had declared a new capital in Mazar-i-Sharif for a possible separate state of the north. After 1992 he claimed to have more diplomatic representations in Mazar than Kabul had, among them the major UN-office for Afghanistan. But all the neighbouring regional states put pressure on him to retreat from his separatist talk and to recognise 'the unity' of Afghanistan.

Interview with Hermione Youngs, field manager NAC, Faizabad 25 Sep. 1999

“Afghanistan has the bad luck of being where it is. Pakistan has 2.000 soldiers in Herat and 2.000 soldiers in Jalalabad. I have personally visited captured Taliban soldiers and seen among them mercenaries from China, Japan, and even a Brit from Yorkshire. Why do France go on funding Masood? All the French NGOs are busy in the Pansjir. Two years ago I hoped the Taliban would take over Badakshan and do away with the commander mentality. Now I would not. I have spent eight years in Afghanistan. Peace will not come in my life-time.”

On a personal level there has been a remarkable continuity throughout the war. Burhanuddin Rabbani, then a junior professor of the Sharia Faculty of Kabul University started around 1972 the first of the Islamic movements Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Society). (Described in detail by Olivier Roy 1991:76-91) Gulbuddin Hikmatyar was put in charge of political activities and Ahmad Shah Massoud became a member of the Muslim Youth. He was later related with Rabbani through marriage. Rabbani was President of Afghanistan in various mujahedin governments in Kabul 1992-96. For the non-Pashtun population in the northern half of Afghanistan this was the first time in almost two hundred years without Pashtun rulers.

**Interview with President Burhanuddin Rabbani, State House, Faizabad,
Badakshan 27 Sep. 1999**

- What was the beginning of your Islamic Movement?

“We wanted to change the politics in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was in a very bad situation. No political parties just the king. We wanted to change the mind of people. We wanted to use the very good programme in the Islamic ideas. We sent a messages to Daud after his coup [17 July 1973]: Mister Daud, we are ready to support you, but on the condition of democracy and the release of political prisoners. We in the Islamic parties wanted democracy. The Marxists killed many people - when we came into power we let them stay, we did not kill them, and we released all prisoners.”

- You bear a heavy responsibility for the destruction of Kabul 1992-94 when you were president of Afghanistan?

“No, it was not Afghans against Afghans, but outside forces. They had made friends with Hekmatiar. Then [1994] some group came from Kandahar by the name Taliban. They sent me a letter saying they were a group from religious schools. In Kandahar there were very bad commanders, and they asked if we could help them change the situation. We said we are ready to help you. At that time we did not know they were a group from the outside. When they attacked Kabul [1996] we had less ammunition and the Taliban had millions of dollars to give to commanders to bribe them. Pakistan, United States, Saudi Arabia and the UK are behind the Taliban.”

“We are the recognised government, we have friends. The Taliban is an opposition group, it is our right to defend ourselves. If the Taliban wins all Afghanistan the Pakistanis will not let them alone. They do not want a united, strong Afghanistan. From our side we want to solve the problem without war. We want to talk with the Taliban. The war is fuelled from abroad. They want war in Afghanistan. The major problem is from the outside. The Taliban is not free, they have to do what the centre who helps them says. If they stop to help them they will stop. The Taliban have not even a factory to produce a needle. They use weapons not allowed by international law. The planes come from Pakistan. Brahimi [UN negotiator] said [1998] there are Pakistani troops in Afghanistan. The Pakistani foreign minister said: We need this area if there was war between India and Pakistan. We have said to Pakistan: pull out your troops and establish good relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I tell you, the Taliban are mercenaries. Three years ago [1996] we talked with a US delegation and said the Taliban are very dangerous for the world; if there is no support there is no Taliban. Now all the Afghan people say we are ready to attack the Taliban even with stones and our hands; to live under Taliban is like peace in the grave.”

“Heavy fighting is not the way to solve the problems of Afghanistan, this fighting will continue to kill and disable people,. We are trying honestly to do something for the sake of peace in Afghanistan but the foreign enemies of Afghanistan will not let us do this. [UN] just coming and discussing is not the way to solve the problem, unless the Europeans and the

United States takes a special interest in solving the Afghanistan issue it is not possible to solve it. In East Timor immediately the problem was solved.”

- Elections in East Timor was important for UN involvement; do you have any plans in the North for elections to give you a mandate from the population?

“This is not just a case of elections in the North because from the beginning up to now we want to have elections in Afghanistan, but the only group against elections are the Taliban.”

- What is your policy on women’s rights?

“The policy of my previous government in Kabul was clear; also here there are no restrictions for women. They can have education and the medical faculty here in Faizabad, even in the hospital, there are more female doctors [than male]. There are no restrictions, they have the same rights.”

The Taliban was a new generation of leaders challenging the Rabbani generation of commanders. They transcended the chaotic infighting of commanders and warlords under the mujahedin rulers 1992-96 and developed a power-structure totally centralised under one man, Mullah Omar. Yet, at the same time, they institutionalised their power in a fashion probably more eccentric than any other nation state.

The Taliban’s apex decision-making body (The following description of the Taliban state is based on Rashid 2000:98-104.) was the Supreme Shura based in Kandahar, a city which Mullah Omar has left only once (to visit Kabul in 1996). The Shura was dominated by Omar’s original friends and colleagues, mainly Durrani Pashtuns, who came to be called the “Kandaharis”. Two other Shuras reported to the Kandahar Shura, the cabinet of acting ministers in Kabul or the Kabul Shura, and the military Shura. The head of the armed forces was Mullah Omar although there was no actual definition of his position or his role, as there was no clear military structure with a hierarchy of officers and commanders. Several of the members of the military Shura were also acting ministers, creating even greater chaos in the Kabul administration. While a minister was away at the front no decisions could be taken in the ministry. The system ensured that no Taliban minister became proficient in his job or created a local powerbase through patronage. To implement his decisions Mullah Omar relied less on the Kabul government and increasingly on the Kandahari religious scholars and the efficient religious police in Kabul.

“Within the ministries the Taliban’s work ethic defied description. No matter how serious the military or political crisis, government offices in Kabul and Kandahar are open for only four hours a day, from 8.00 a.m. to noon. The Taliban then break for prayers and long

afternoon siesta. Later they have long social gatherings or meeting at night. Ministers' desks are empty of files and government offices are empty of the public. Thus while hundreds of Taliban cadres or bureaucrats were involved in a drive to force the male population to grow long beards, nobody was able to answer queries in the ministries... What the Taliban ultimately created was a secret society run mainly by Kandaharis and as mysterious, secretive and dictatorial in its ways as the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia or Saddam Hussein's Iraq" (Rashid 2000:101, 98)

Smuggling and drug-production are mainstays of the Taliban economy, both transgressing national boundaries and norms, seriously de-stabilising neighbouring countries. Ahmed Rashid estimates the Afghan Transit Trade, an agreement from 1950 whereby Afghanistan could import customs-free through Karachi, has grown into "the main source of official income for the Taliban [and] the biggest smuggling racket in the world and has enmeshed the Taliban with Pakistani smugglers, transporters, drug barons, bureaucrats, politicians and police and army officers." (ibid, p.189). Most of the goods imported to Afghanistan are then illegally sold in Pakistan. In Hayatabad outside Peshawar, the largest smugglers market in Pakistan, I saw shop after shop selling Sony TVs all in boxes printed 'Transit to Kabul'. Afghanistan imported, for example, twenty million TV-sets in 1998, although TV is forbidden in Afghanistan. The value of the transit-trade was estimated by the World Bank in 1997 at US\$ 2,5 billion, or half of Afghanistan's GNP.

Afghanistan had by 1999 become the world's largest opium producing country. The UNDCP (Discussion Paper for ASG meeting Stockholm 21, June 1999) estimated "that 63.000 hectares of opium poppy were under cultivation that gives the potential to produce 3.200 metric tones of raw opium". Rashid estimated the actual 1999 production of opium to be 4.500 tons (Newspaper *Information* 1.8.00) Trafficking-routes go through all neighbouring countries, in particular Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan, everywhere distorting local economies and social structures through corruption and addiction. Pakistan, for instance, had no heroin addicts in 1979, 650.000 addicts in 1986, three million by 1992 and an estimated five million by 1999 (Rashid 2000:122). Inside Afghanistan poppy-growing is expanding rapidly and both farmers and the Taliban need the income; more than 90% of the opium originates in Taliban areas. (UNDCP 1998.) The Taliban are collecting the *zakat* tax on all dealers moving opium at a rate of 20 % of the local price. (Rashid 2000:118) 30-40 per cent of the 1999 Taliban war-budget, estimated to total US\$ 100 million, was covered by drug-dealing, 60-70 per cent from smuggling and 5-10 per cent from direct economic assistance. (Rashid, *Information* 1.8.00)

Interview with Mohamad Jawaz Waziri, Head of Department for the UN and NGOs, Taliban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kabul, 16 Sep. 1999.

“The first priority of the people of Afghanistan was to live in peace. Taliban brought unity to the country, peace and stability. You see, there was a lot of factions. Taliban has implemented this Sharia law in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan because it was the desire of the people. People enjoy this, they can travel everywhere day and night. This was done by the blood of Taliban, because if there is no peace nobody can do their work. So actually the Taliban is sincere with the people of Afghanistan and they are honest in their promises. You see, it was also by the blood of the Afghan people that the Soviet Union was divided and no longer rules over Asia. So this Cold War was finished by the blood of Afghanistan.”

“We had this discussions with him [Masood] but actually he don’t like peace, they have started this fighting [on the Shomali-plain] and Taliban have pushed them back to their area. Actually, you see, they are murder people and thieves and looters. They don’t like this peace and security, they are involved in different kinds of crimes; they have killed many people and also they have looted many people and now they are in the mountains. ”

“Taliban wants to reconstruct this country and to call for the refugees to come back. But the economy is very difficult and without the support of the international community, your government, it is very difficult. We are very happy with Dacaa and know about their work in Khost with more than 400 wells, culverts and primary schools; they are very honest. Now there is peace and security and you can do your work in a good atmosphere. We invite other agencies to come and help us with reconstruction.”

“Also about these drugs. We have started to fight that and destroyed 32 factories and also 400 hectares of land in Kandahar; we have fired more than 2.000 kg in Jalalabad. We have asked the international community to give the farmers alternatives. I tell you there are no-one in Afghanistan to smoke this heroin. It is also the responsibility of the world to stop their smugglers and traffickers. We have also prohibited the smoking of cigarettes for Taliban. The officials of Taliban, they don’t smoke cigarettes.”

“Also about this women employment. They are in the hospitals and the clinics. We have female staff in hospitals and the interior ministry. Those women are now in their homes and the Taliban pay their salary at home. We are going to do something for their future, we want to make for them separate institutions, so we are not against our mothers or sisters or brothers. This is in our law, in our Sharia.”

Protectorate

The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the ten year long war that followed shall not be described here. (Rubin 1995 is a good introduction) However, it may briefly be considered as a parallel to the armed interventions in Somalia and Kosova. Strictly speaking only UNMIK was a protectorate, UNOSOM less, and the Soviet invasion more but ultimately a terrible failure. Compared with the uses of violence in Somalia by UNOSOM and in Kosova by KFOR the Soviet protectorate was in a completely different league of violence with casualties of more than a million killed; but interestingly not with numbers of troops deployed relative to the populations.

Box 20. Use of violence in three interventions

| | Troops deployed | Population | Number killed |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Somalia (1993-94) | 28.000 US/UN | 4-6 million | > 1.000 |
| Afghanistan (1980-89) | > 100.000 Red Army | 15-20 million | >1.000.000 |
| Kosova (1999-2000) | 35.000 KFOR | 2.3 million | < 1.000 |

The intervention did cost the Soviet Union about US\$ 5 billion per year (Rubin, 1995:179). The combined US-Saudi Arabian assistance to the mujahidin reached about US\$ 1 billion per year in the late 1980s and peaked with US\$ 1,3 billion in 1989. The Pakistani secret service was able to offer a reward of two new Stinger missiles to any mujahidin commander shooting down a Soviet aircraft. The weapons included besides Stingers, heavy artillery “and other arms considered appropriate for a shift from guerrilla to conventional warfare.” (ibid., p. 182) correctly expected to break out once the Russians had left. Import of weapons on this scale made Afghanistan the world’s third-largest importer of weapons equalling Japan and Saudi Arabia. (ibid., p. 109). In 1992 Afghanistan had accumulated more light weapons than the combined stockpiles of Pakistan and India. (ibid., p. 196) Today this proliferation of light weapons is upsetting the security of the whole South Asian region (Smith, 1995).

Rubin describes in well documented detail how the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia controlled the mujahidin and corrupted all local power structures in a aggressive involvement mirroring the devastating Soviet invasion. In particular the Pakistani secret service ISI manipulated the mixture of colossal military aid and intense internal ethnic rivalries in order to prevent a united exile Afghan government to develop in the refugee communities, which they perhaps would not have been able to control; with the obvious result that after the Soviet exit no strong Afghan government could be installed in Kabul. The guerrilla war against the Soviet protectorate ended as guerrilla wars have to do, without taking the capital in an outright military victory, but with a politically produced break down in the will to fight, an evacuation.

(cf. Tin 1998:56-69 for a discussion of the military limits of guerrilla war) The victory - the Soviet pull-out - was as much an outcome of the internal resistance as the shifting, post-Berlin Wall global geopolitics. No Afghan structures were unmarked by the scramble for external recourses of violence and the effects of their use. The enormous inflow of recourses washed away traditional social relations. The war made the Afghan state 'overdeveloped' only in terms of destructive capacity. Perhaps the most striking example was the use by the mujahidin of sophisticated aircraft left behind by the Soviet forces, a technology totally beyond the general level of productive forces in Afghanistan (and soon most aircraft were grounded due to the lack of technological and social support systems).⁷

Bottom-up

Foreign states' support of local structures were facilitated by aid projects promoting, for instance village organisations. However, they were exclusively focused on local issues. The perspective could not be development of a democratic Afghan state from the bottom-up as long as the Taliban were in power. Any support of democracy or human rights would put the beneficiaries at risk, as we saw in the example of SCA support to girls' home schools. This gave bottom-up sponsoring of democracy a limited vision compared with Somalia where local initiatives could take part in renovation of fragmented national structures. With a centralised repressive capacity and providing state institutions more or less in ruins, the international aid community had to adopt a policy of stay-at-the-bottom co-operation with local counterparts. Most agencies saw this as a condition beyond their control, and had no illusions that a focusing of state power could grow out of village organisation. It could not produce a permanent solution, but temporary improvements, for example rehabilitation in areas of relative peace without waiting for a comprehensive peace settlement.

The real problem, however, was not that bottom-up initiatives were unlikely to reach to the top, but the opposite problem that the Taliban's proudly dictatorial regime was facilitated down-to-the-bottom by aid. Aid became a source of fragmentation, not of reconciliation.

Experimental

⁷ Left behind was at least 130 jet fighters including advanced MiG-27 and Su-25, 800 helicopter gunships including Mi-24 with rapid-fire machine-guns and multiple fragmentation rockets, and seven airbases in Bagram, Kabul, Shindand, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Faizabad and Kunduz. (Amnesty, 1995:22, 27)

Support for an experimental state in Afghanistan, along the lines of caretaker-state in Somalia, was limited by the existence of the Taliban exercising a near-national monopoly of violence. At the same time, the brutal denial by the Taliban of any social responsibilities left it to the aid agencies to provide basic relief, rehabilitation, and development aid to the people of Afghanistan. Rashid poses the tough question, “whether humanitarian aid is only sustaining the war, because it gives the warlords the excuse to absolve themselves of taking responsibility for the civilian population. The Taliban continuously insisted that they were not responsible for the population and that Allah would provide.” (Rashid 2000:127)

In my opinion, and indicated by the assessments of aid projects in Afghanistan presented above, there is no doubt aid contributed to sustaining the war because it was a net support of the regime. However, aid was only a minor factor in the total support received by the Taliban regime from other countries, and a suspension of aid could not alone have made the Taliban end the war.

UN and NGO programmes, however limited, constituted by default Afghan state institutions. Health, education, infrastructure, rudiments of social service, were run from Peshawar and Islamabad. SCA, for example, ran 203 clinics all over Afghanistan treating 1 million patients, covering a population of 8 million and 560 schools with 120.000 pupils from their office in Peshawar. Anders Fänge, SCA country director, suggested in an interview with the author that more than half of all Afghan villages could have been touched or site of emergency or development aid during the last twenty years.

After extended discussions the aid community set up in 1997 a unique co-ordination mechanisms for Afghanistan with ‘Principled Common Programming’ co-ordinating the appeals of all aid agencies including NGOs, and ‘Strategic Programming’ trying to give the UN’s political and humanitarian initiatives a common purpose. In totality the ambitious experiment could well be seen as a focusing of some state-like functions, for example in areas of water supply, health and education. The perspective of this build-up of human and material resources was that it some day could become building-blocks of an Afghan state. One crucial area was not agreed upon however, the capacity-building of the Taliban state-institutions. Most agencies argued that it was morally and politically indefensible to support in such a direct manner Taliban rule, while a minority held the view that you should engage the Taliban, and try to develop their state institutions to get a possibility to exert a positive influence. This minority included Erick de Mul head of UN humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

Interview with Erick de Mul, Humanitarian Co-ordinator, UN Resident Representative, Afghanistan, Islamabad 30 Sep. 1999

Support for the Taliban state institutions?

“Since the Taliban is not a recognised government we remain in this halfway situation where we cannot officially do much. We cannot do capacity building, we cannot get too close to the institutions. Which I think could be a mistake. In the sense if we could have the possibilities first of all to promote exposure, have more contacts it would be positive. It would help if we had the possibility to assign advisers to the technical institutions. It would certainly help.”

“I strongly feel - this is a very personal opinion which is not official - whether we like it or not or whether it is in the north or in the south, as long as there are some kind of leadership that is awkward, has no tools, you’ll have to come to terms with the fact that it is there and maybe by helping them with some reasonable tools you could get somewhere, a minimum type of assistance, a minimum management structure. I think that is a way we should try to be useful.”

- Humanitarian aid makes resources available for military purposes?

“Yes - it is the same in Pakistan. Leave the schools and hospitals to the aid agencies. There are plenty of countries that do that, so what’s different? Then again you are between a rock and a hard place, what can you do? Let the people rot and say, well you have such awkward leaders that they have to come to their senses and spend the money they have on you instead of arms to beat the Northern Alliance or vice versa. That is very difficult. What can you do? My answer would be in spite of everything try to help a little bit. That’s a dilemma that has been there all the time. Even in the poorest country with a reasonable government you could always argue that too much money were spent on security or defence and too little on education etc. I would argue that the situation in Pakistan is not so different from Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is condemned but Pakistan is not. They got credit for having been anti-communist.”

The Taliban differed from governments in many poor countries by being a state able to disarm the population, enforce law and order, impose a strict Sharia law, open roads to traffic and maintain and command a fighting force through more than five years of continuous full scale war. The Afghan state was sponsored top-down by Pakistan but the outcome seems not to be a stable government friendly towards Pakistan, but a frightening de-stabilising of Pakistan becoming Talibanised. It was the combination of efficient, nation-wide rule (less a few provinces) and a governmental ethos so utterly contradicting international norms and a military, economic, political, and religious practice massively de-stabilising the whole region,

that sat Taliban apart. They were truly challenging the most basic assumptions of what a nation state could be.

3. Kosova

Suddenly, at the end of the century the four ‘Somali’ alternatives was perused in different configurations in dealing with the territory of Kosova from the outside, dictating the context for aid.

Box 21, Kosova state alternatives, c. 1992-99

(i) *Top-down* competing state building of the ‘Siad Barre’ model. Yugoslav nation state integrity re-asserted by national armed forces; top-down sponsoring of secessionist nation state army (UCK) by outside power(s).

(ii) *Protectorate*, violation of national sovereignty, followed by a real international protectorate.

(iii) *Bottom-up* state building based on implanting and revival of local, municipal administration and politics

(iv) *Experimental* type with internationalised state institutions and unresolved relations with non-recognised regime having near-monopoly of violence .

Top-down

The Balkan Wars on the eve of the First World War transferred sovereignty of Kosova from the Ottoman Empire to the Serbian Kingdom. December 1913 Albania was recognised by the Powers as an independent country, leaving half of the Albanian population outside, mostly in Kosova under Serbia. With small adjustments the border between Albania and Kosova is in force today. Italian and German occupation forces during the Second World War ended for a while the Serbian rule in Kosova and united Kosova with Albania. The pro-western liberation front in Albania, Balli Kombëtar (BK) wanted to keep Kosova as part of Albania, but secession of Kosova was unacceptable to Yugoslav communist leader Josip Tito, and the Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha supported his position. With a different communist leader (for example Koci Xoxe) Albania might have become part of Yugoslavia or a Balkan federation. No-one at the time envisioned Kosova becoming an independent nation state. As it were, outside pressure from the great Powers once again divided the Albanians. Kosova was recreated in 1945 as a province of Serbia, a republic in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with a provincial border towards Serbia, republican borders towards Montenegro and Macedonia, and an international border towards Albania. The borders of Kosova separated Albanians living inside Kosova from the majority of Albanians living in

Macedonia and Albania, precisely as the Durand line had divided the Pashtuns in Afghanistan from those in Pakistan and the colonial borders of Somalia had divided the Somalis. In all three cases borders determined by the Powers divided nation and state, and governments were sponsored top-down from the outside in all three cases. “Thus at the end of the twentieth century”, wrote Alexandar Pavcovic, ‘the outside powers are still being called upon to draw and maintain international or intra-state borders in the Balkans and help enforce them by their own military force.’ (Pavcovic 1997:192)

A provincial leadership sponsored from the outside (Belgrade) ruled the Kosovar population top-down granting almost republican status in 1974 but after 1991 ruling through a de facto apartheid system. The international community recognised the authority of Slobodan Milosevich in Kosova although a claim by Serbia (including Kosova) and Montenegro in 1992 to continue automatically the membership of the UN of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not accepted by the UN General Assembly. It was decided that Yugoslavia should apply for membership which it had not done by Jan. 1, 1999. The Kosova-Albanians managed to stage a referendum on the independence in 1992; the vote was massively in favour of secession from Serbia and Ibrahim Rugova was elected president. He successfully advocated a policy of non-violence and appeal to the Powers for some years, but the hopes of recognition were dashed with the Dayton agreement in 1995.

In March 1998 Shkëlzen Maliqi, philosopher, publicist, and former leader of the Social Democratic Party of Kosova, in an article warned about the explosive situation in Kosova, “The Dayton agreement was a regional watershed, enshrining the ethnic principle within Bosnian politics and suggesting that violence could succeed in winning international recognition. Albanians have drawn their conclusions... Years of international attention on the Balkans, endless discussions of “preventive diplomacy” and “early warning mechanisms”, may have come to nothing... The specter is of Milosevich provoking a widespread Albanian uprising, and then war, to justify ethnic cleansing... Autonomy would not pacify the Albanians, and a republic would only produce tensions similar to those that led to the break-up of the former Yugoslav federation. The most prudent approach must be to seek compromise solutions without definite outcomes but with foreign guarantors.” (Maliqi 1998:190)

The worst of Maliqi’s predictions unfolded, leaving Kosova at the end of 1998 with up to 2.000 battle-deaths, more than 200.000 internally displaced persons, and 100.000 refugees, in addition to 350.000 Kosovars already seeking asylum outside FRY (SIPRI 1999:28,58,63).

International attempts to contain the 'crisis' led to the Rambouillet negotiations and finally to war against Serbia on March 23, 1999.

Protectorate

How to combine humanitarian intervention with national sovereignty is a major legal problem, which has not found its solution yet. There is a vast literature on the question of humanitarian intervention in general,⁸ and on the issues of peacekeeping/peace-enforcement in particular.⁹ From the point of view of ending civil wars, however, it is probably more crucial to secure *local* legitimacy than obtaining international legitimacy for an intervention. A majority of the population in the attacked state must accept the intervention as legitimate because it supports *their* interests by enforcing peace if need be against the interests of groups maintaining and benefiting from the conflict. How to ascertain a popular, local mandate will be difficult because in situations where humanitarian interventions are relevant, the population will often be terrorised and silenced, with maybe only a few exiled voices audible to the outside world. If a majority of the population is actively against external intervention it will become a hostile invasion regardless of a UN-mandate and the peace enforcement effort will revert to interstate war.¹⁰

The humanitarian intervention in the Kosova crisis has been the subject of much controversy, also among those basically supporting military action against Milosevich. This is not the place to enter this discussion; two comments may suffice. Two points in particular have been criticised: the use of threats from Dayton to Rambouillet, and the air-only-war against Serbia. Of course, if a more coherent and credible policy line against Milosevich' apartheid and violent repression in Kosova could have obtained a solution like the present broadly acceptable to the Albanian majority without a war, that would have been vastly preferable. Or would it? For the Kosovars, for the neighbouring countries, for the cause of civilisation, yes. But I suspect national interests, above all American, calculated that NATO, fighting a short, manageable out-of-area war for avowedly humanitarian principles could be setting a positive precedent for the future of NATO. If that is correct, then the use of threats could have been less of a failure, judged by American national interests, than they appeared to be. It is probably safe to say that NATO gravely mis-calculated the Serbian response to the

⁸ One researcher in the field counted 1800 titles on humanitarian intervention; Weiss, 1997. For introductions cf. Knudsen, 1995; Eknes and McDermott, 1994 .

⁹ Cf. Eide (co-editor of the journal *International Peacekeeping*), 1995; Jakobsen, 1998.

¹⁰ This almost happened for the Ecowas-operation in Liberia. The complexities of peacekeeping in such an environment is described in Adelke, 1995.

bombings. The ensuing asymmetrical war with unopposed bombings in Serbia and unopposed expulsion in Kosova would at some point have forced NATO into a land war (see for instance Judah 2000:265-286); this was avoided by Milosevich' surprise acceptance of Serbian withdrawal from Kosova. What alternative strategies would have accomplished is hard to say; Milosevich and his army escaped almost unhurt from the war, and we may not have seen the last round of the war of Yugoslavia's break-up. Most of the Kosova Albanians I had a chance to speak with in April 2000 were convinced the war had been necessary and justified; whatever ulterior motives USA might have had, in 1999 they coincided with the national aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Kosova Albanians.

Hostilities were ended by a peace-agreement signed by Slobodan Milosevich June 3 and endorsed by Security Council resolution # 1244 June 10. The resolution was a strange compromise whereby Kosova remained part of FR Yugoslavia, while the international community neither recognised Milosevich's authority nor a local authority in Kosova. The power-vacuum was to be filled with a UN protectorate acting under Chapter VII, consisting of a 'security presence' i.e. KFOR, and a 'civilian presence' i.e. UNMIK. KFOR was set up like UNITAF in Somalia by individual states authorised by the UN to deploy an armed force, and not under UN command. NATO more or less controlled KFOR: the Russians did not get their own sector but was spread out under the five NATO-countries in command of the five Areas of Responsibility, Germany, Italy, France, UK and US.

UNMIK was the international civil presence in Kosova, with a mandate to provide interim administration of the area; it had no armed wing but an understaffed police-force. UNMIK reflected the extreme political salience of risk aid accommodating the main actors in the international community: UNHCR responsible for humanitarian affairs, the UN for civil administration, OSCE for institution-building, and finally the EU for reconstruction. There was a lot of overlap between UNHCR and EU, between OSCE and UN, and UN and KFOR producing all the predictable, inward-looking, tiring, and bureaucratic battles producing more heat than light. In Prishtine the army of civilian administrators and NGOs numbering perhaps some 30.000 occupied the best buildings of former Yugoslav banks, ministries and security apparatus and filled the streets with their white cars.

Regulation No. 1999/1 was UNMIK's first law. It was very brief "All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosova, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)." Granting to itself these almost unlimited powers, and backed up by the presence of some 35.000 troops on the tiny territory of Kosova one would imagine that Bernard

Kouchner, the SRS in Kosova, co-founder of MSF and former French minister, could control the area. But this has not been the case. KFOR was deployed to deter Serb forces returning to Kosova, and this has been accomplished; but who will be most patient, ten or twenty years ahead, KFOR or the Yugoslav Army? Kosova was round four in the war of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and there is little reason to believe it will be the last as long as the Milosevich regime is intact. The KFOR attack on the Trepca metallurgical complex in August 2000 with more than 2.000 soldiers including all 750 Danish troops in Kosova, by far the largest military operation in Kosova since the establishment of the protectorate was a significant move to 'occupy' the northern part of Kosova in advance of local elections scheduled to October 2000, and put a brake on Serb moves to divide Kosova and somehow move the Serbian border down to the Ibar river. It could be highly important show of determination if it is followed-up with a credible long-term vision. The official explanation of the operation provided by Kouchner namely to end an environmental hazard seemed extremely far-fetched.

Initially UCK was given almost free reins to intimidate Serbs and establish themselves as the local power, in an unwise replay of the welcome extended to the Somali faction leaders in December 1992 by UNITAF. First of all this made most Serbs flee Kosova; with their departure the reason d'être of UNMIK began to crumble. In the north of Kosova an area became almost hundred per cent Serbian, prefiguring a divide of Kosova. Continued ethnic violence caused serious problems for the establishment of a credible local administration. In a move to co-opt selected local leaders a so-called Joint Interim Administrative Structure was set up December 1999 with Thaci, Rugova, and Qosja, the main leaders from the Albanian side, while the Serbian side boycotted the initiative. The UNMIK-News noted "that the work of UNMIK has been hampered by the activities of parallel structures in Kosova. Dr. Kouchner said the new structure would involve the people of the province directly in their own affairs. Parallel structures would be transformed or integrated into the JIAS," but then the hammer of the protectorate fell down, "Still Kouchner retained executive and legislative authority in Kosova." (UNMIK News No.20, 20 December 1999) David Chandler noted in a critical review of the rise of the Balkan protectorates that, "The international community [have] assumed complete legislative and executive power over the formally independent state [Bosnia]... The High Representative has more autocratic control than even the colonial administrators of the past." Chandler 1999:127)

Interview with Shkëlzen Maliqi, the office of Zeri, Prishtine 14 April 2000

“UNMIK represents a weak organisation, the UN. But UNMIK is run also by NATO-states. Politics is not done only here, but also in the big centres. And there is OSCE which is not a powerful organisation, but have some duties here. The problem of the EU is they still have no common foreign policy. We are victims of the unclear position among the big powers. NATO is important. The US actually has three bases in the region, one in Macedonia, one in Albania and one here. The largest is Bond Steel, the biggest they have constructed outside USA since the Vietnam war. I don't know, maybe they want to be here twenty years or more. It is positive because they are not here as a colonial power, but as kind of... well, there is a big dispute on the American role, but they had a positive role in establishing global security in both World Wars.”

“To start to solve the problem, not only among Serbs and Albanians but in the region there is an urgent need to start democratisation in Serbia. Milosevich' regime is the big upsetting problem. With Milosevich in power there cannot be any kind of reconciliation. And nobody believe in the Serbian opposition. The Kosova issue is linked to a regional solution.”

“The Serb enclaves are in a desperate situation because there is no room in Serbia, no real support. But there is no positive step on their side to accept the new reality. Many of them are still believing that Serb forces will be back.”

“No [Albanian] parties here have full legitimacy. During the war we used to have two governments and the problem of legitimacy and mandate is under dispute. All forces lack legitimacy. But these military guys [UCK] they took power in the municipalities because they were armed, more dynamic and the LDK was confused. They had no strategy, Rugova was as usual very passive, interested only in keeping his position as president.”

“The question of self-determination could be decided in one or two years. America is pushing elections, but the Europeans are afraid if you give Kosova a parliament they will immediately declare independence. But we cannot declare independence if we have no real support from the international community. If nobody recongnizes us, we will enter into some kind of isolation; it would be counter-productive.”

UNMIK's awkward position reflected the contradictory motives of risk aid: blurring of humanitarian and political-security missions, maximum national visibility, and short-sighted, ad hoc dealing with day-to-day problems without a long-term policy. A telling example of this reduction of the mission to an adjunct of narrow national interests came in July 2000 when Denmark and Norway were suggested as joint commanders of KFOR in 2001. In a comment the Danish Chief of Staff said that it would be a valuable experience for the Danish Army, and he looked forward to doing it. There was not even a single word on accomplishing

something in Kosova. At the same time the Danish Foreign Minister said KFOR and UNMIK would go on indefinitely.

Bottom-up

Bottom-up fostering of a democratic state in Kosova faced two contradictions. In the post-protectorate perspective the Yugoslav state was waiting (with new leaders, it was hoped), and in the short-term perspective the protectorate made local democracy ambiguous. “What would happen” asked Tim Judah, “if, after having vigorously promoted democracy, the assembly that the Kosovars elected was told by the international community that it could not do the only thing it wanted to do, which was to declare independence? Would KFOR and the UN become seen as the occupying enemy, rather like the Serbs before them?” (Judah 2000:298)

Risk aid tied all projects to the objectives of the protectorate. Patient, experienced expatriates tried to use the windows of opportunity opened by a benevolent protectorate. The person responsible for the democratisation under the OSCE-pillar in the UNMIK was Arne Piel Christensen, former director of Danish Refugee Council.

Interview with Arne Piel Christensen, Head of OSCE Democratisation section, Prishtine, 13 April 2000 [translated from Danish by HT]

“You know, we go out and tell people what democracy is, that it is the division of the executive from the legislative and the judiciary. And then people ask us: What about UNMIK, with Kouchner being both the executive, the legislator, and the judiciary with the power to hire and fire judges. Well, that is a good question, and we have to say, it is an exception and transitional.”

“The Albanians tell us: before we hear about your programmes we would like to know whether you support our independence. The Serbs want to know if we support Kosova remaining part of Yugoslavia. Everyone we co-operate with are selected by us in order to get some constructive counter-parts to work with, and that cannot be sustained for a very long time. That is why we want an early election.”

“Kosova is so over-traumatised and self-centred. You can understand that, but that is not the same as you have to fulfil all their expectations. Now they sit and wait for assistance. The first six months were crazy, every country was frenetic to demonstrate that the NATO-

bombing had been appropriate and justified and the only way they could demonstrate that was by claiming it had been part of a humanitarian operation. That is why every government showered humanitarian aid on Kosova. Well, this created a strange atmosphere in Kosova where the community spirit somehow has gone away. Earlier you had the parallel structures acting in a manner of solidarity because they had a common enemy. Now that solidarity has evaporated.”

“Most people running shops with no good connections to the UCK have to pay a secret tax. When some of these structures are included in the new administration it colours the image of UNMIK in the population. Thachi’s brother was found with weapons and 500.000 DM, most of them false, in his flat. But when UNMIK tried to investigate the case Thachi said, why do you attack my family? So many people do all kinds of business, but you target me. Then UNMIK simply had to slow down the investigation. We propagate some principles and values. But if those notions are promoted by structures working to closely with the former UCK structures involved with illegal taxation, policing, and intimidation it makes it very troublesome for us to promote democracy.”

“In the end I am patient in relation to social change. I have experience from other conflict-areas telling me you must never loose the long-term perspective in a confusing environment where you each day have to find ad hoc solutions and only can take small steps ahead. But then when you turn around and look back on where you came from two-three-five years ago you see that after all many things succeeded, there is a forward-moving process and the population have jumped on board.”

Experimental

After the bombings and the return of the Albanian refugees the European Union promised an escape from the binarity of Belgrade or freedom. Shkëlzen Maliqi was one of the few Kosova-Albanians arguing for flexibility on the question of independence. Already in February 1998 he had suggested that the EU could act as guarantor for a compromise.

“The status quo in Kosova rests on the fact that the Albanians have managed to organize a substantially independent society, while Serbia has retained the control of the traditional state functions. Society and state are in open conflict. Neither, however, can subdue the other. The problem is that the society and the state are utterly ethnicized and their relationships has been reduced to that of naked force.” and he continued, “The most rational and least painful [solution of the Albanian question] would be the application of a partial, rather than a conclusive, solution. This would be based on the division of power and parallel life, but under

agreed conditions... An agreement could be reached to set up a free region or zone of Kosova, like the former free zone of Trieste... This free zone or region would be under a tripartite supervision, by a joint Serbian-Albanian Commission, and with the European Union as guarantor. Conditions permitting, Kosova might even become a part of the Europe of regions.” (Maliqi 1998:186-7)

‘Europe of the regions’ or any other name put on the modification of the nation state of which the EU was both the outcome and the facilitator captured the experimental perspective of the intervention in Kosova. One of Denmark’s leading experts on the EU enlargement process, Lykke Friis from DUPI, wrote, “The Conflict in Kosova was a watershed for scholars as well as for decision-makers. Whereas the countries in South-eastern Europe could previously only dream of merely being mentioned as possible candidate countries, they were suddenly equipped with nothing less than a membership perspective.” (Friis 1999:211)

With the current speed of EU-enlargement, however, this was a very long-term perspective. An experimental engagement with the local state-fragments was necessary to develop a European integration of Kosova at any level. Unfortunately EU-financed reconstruction appeared to have little connection with this perspective. In Kosova the EU had put up sign-boards detailing which directorate had financed this or that project, but my personal impression was that most beneficiaries, ordinary people, felt very little gratitude towards the EU, but somehow very quickly took aid to be their right. The political dimension was left somewhere in a nebulous future. A group of Danish foreign policy experts wrote,

“Vesteuropæiske lande bør forfine strategier, der gør det stadig mindre vigtigt i Europa, om de enelte folk har formel selvstændighed eller ej...I sidste ende er det selve EU-udvillingen, der rummer det potentiale. Intet andet er vidtgående nok til at overbevise befolkningsgrupper om, at formel suverænitet er ved at blive mindre afgørende og interessant... Nedtoningen af den formelle suverænitet kræver på kort sigt en bedre indsats, når det gælder opbygningen af en demokratisk selvforvaltning, end den vi har set indtil nu i Kosova.” (Wæver et. al. 2000:71).

The experiment with the nation state in Kosova along these lines would take first of all a credible perspective towards integration into EU coupled with a credible development of local democracy in Kosova. At the moment the EU still awaits a major structural reform to make enlargement with the east and central European countries possible. With the war in Kosova rapidly fading in public memory the EU needs leaders able to sustain the vision of Europe

sharing the responsibility for Kosova with the Kosovars for mutual benefit. In Kosova the leaders must produce more than sweet words for their own ethnic constituencies.

4. Conclusion

Aid is only one tool in the tool-box of international relations. To protect, create, or recreate states in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova many tools were used by the donors of humanitarian aid and other states. All three countries were violent places making the populations pay terrifying costs of violent death and displacement. No tools proved capable of full protection of either states or people, but some were better than others.

Box 22. Protecting states from the outside

| | Sovereign territory | National government | State institutions |
|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| SOMALIA | | | |
| Top-down | 1960 - the present | 1960-1991 | 1960-1991 |
| Protectorate | - | - | 1992-1995 |
| Bottom-Up | - | - | 1992-the present 1 |
| Experimental | - | - | 1995-the present 2 |
| AFGHANISTAN | | | |
| Top-down | 1919-the present | 1946-79, '89-pres ³ | '46-79, '89-the pres. - |
| Protectorate | - | 1979-1989 | 1979-1989 |
| Bottom-Up | - | - | 1992-the present |
| Experimental | - | - | 1997-the present 4 |
| KOSOVA | | | |
| Top-down | 1921 ⁵ | 1991- ⁶ | - |
| Protectorate | - | 1999-the present | 1999-the present |
| Bottom-Up | - | - | 1999-the present |
| Experimental | - | - | 1999-the present 7 |

- 1) Including projects by Life and Peace Institute
- 2) Business, Somalia Aid Co-ordinating Body and the EU Commission
- 3) Since 1996 Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates recognised the Taliban; the UN continued to recognise the Northern Alliance under Dr. Rabbani
- 4) The Taliban experiment and the UN experiment
- 5) International and internal borders of Kosova, no sovereignty
- 6) Kosova's declaration of independence in 1991 was only recognised by Albania
- 7) The experiment with the nation state beyond the protectorate perspective

(i)

Top-down dictate of international borders by the Powers created the territories of Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova. The Powers also decided to grant Somalia and Afghanistan sovereignty but not Kosova. Top-down sponsor-ship maintained national or splinter governments, typically by build-up of armies. During the 1990s sponsors of Somalia included the US, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Libya; sponsors of Afghanistan included the US,

Soviet Union, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Independent Kosova was only recognised by Albania; the Albanian parallel state institutions was not sponsored by other states; only UCK. Sponsor-ships reflected strategic donor-interests and the interests of local elites, but only incidentally the over-riding interest of local populations: protection. However, there is no doubt that intact national governments have provided the only stable protection of the three populations. Incidentally the 'golden age' of national rule occurred in all three countries around 1975. In Somalia with the one positive achievement of Siad Barre, invention of written Somali and literacy campaigns before the war against Ethiopia. In Afghanistan with the last relatively prosperous and stable years of King Zahir Shah's rule before communism. In Kosova with the high degree of self-rule granted with Tito's 1974 constitution for Yugoslavia.

(ii)

Protectorates respected the national territories but not national sovereignty. In Somalia sovereignty had fragmented and UNOSOM only partially established a protectorate. In Afghanistan the Soviet invasion created a protectorate behind a puppet Afghan government. In Kosova sovereignty was left suspended while KFOR and UNMIK ruled for an open-ended period. In Afghanistan the invasion targeted people, it did not protect them. It protected a dictatorial state. In Somalia the protectorate initially protected relief-distribution, but soon mostly protected itself killing more than 1.000 Somalis in armed action. In Kosova the war successfully permitted the return of Albanian refugees, but the protectorate was ill-prepared to protect the Serbs in Kosova. Protectorates protect states, not people.

(iii)

Bottom-up democratisation had local impact only, and respected by words national territory and government but not always by intent. Bottom-up democratisation was often formulated as a minimum: do no harm! leaving fragmented national institutions alone and the question how to protect the beneficiaries against violence from a repressive environment unanswered. Protection could be accomplished in small circles by working with local armed groups.

(iv)

Experimental state-support negotiated both national territory and national government. In Somalia 'radical localism' (Prendergast) made rule extremely local and contingent, while other types of social activities such as business expanded across factions and beyond Somalia's borders, and a range of state-services were internationalised and privatised. Fragmentation of state-territory, state-authority and state-functions happened alongside the emergence of trans-national networks. In Afghanistan

national territory remained the basic point of reference in the war. The state fragmented in a peculiar manner as the Taliban jettisoned almost all state functions except those of war, repression, smuggling, and drug production, but all those functions were trans-national. Some state-functions have been salvaged by international agencies, but the extent of the experimental internationalisation of state functions did not match the level of Somalia because state control of violence remained more focused in Afghanistan. In Kosova national territory, government, and institutions were ambiguous, fragmented and internationalised. The perspective for Kosova was no independence, but neither ruled by the titular state; a commitment to democracy, but ruled by a protectorate; and perhaps a future inclusion in a non-nation state, the European Union. In all three cases the territories of violence were different and smaller than territories of 'welfare' and business; the 'operators' of violence were not the same as those providing 'welfare' and doing business. In all three cases the local economies almost totally disregarded national boundaries, and engaged in legal and illegal trans-national networks.

A common pattern can be identified. First very high levels of international aid, (reaching 40 per cent of the state budget in Afghanistan in the 1970s and a similar levels in Somalia in the 1980s, and higher in Kosova with the diaspora-tax in the 1990s). Then bloody civil wars provoking interventions and protectorates (1978-79 in Afghanistan, 1988-92 in Somalia, and 1998-1999 in Kosova). The protectorates met very different responses. In Afghanistan ten years of heavy fighting with terrible human costs in death and the world's largest refugee crisis, in Somalia low level hostility and slow repatriation of refugees, and in Kosova a warm welcome and the speedy return of refugees. All protectorates demanded high profile international involvement and were extremely costly; two were failures and one has no end in sight. The Red Army pulled out from Afghanistan in 1989, US Army withdraw from Somalia in 1994; in Kosova we do not know the end of the story yet, but officially a ten to twenty year frame has been mentioned. Evacuations did not lead to peace but to continued war, regional interference and de-stabilisation

C

ONCLUSION: A HELP THAT HARMS?

Humanitarian aid runs the risk of doing harm. The aid worker is confronted with the dilemma, that saving lives today may put other lives at stake tomorrow. That doing good may end up causing harm. The present book has explored this dilemma, based on the impact of humanitarian aid upon people and conflicts in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova of the 1990s. Experiences from aid agencies, donors, and my own first-hand impressions of thirty-five humanitarian projects, visited from December 1998 to April 2000 in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova, provided the core evidence.

1. Emergency event, life-impact, and state-impact

Complex emergencies are deep, social conflicts, propelled by civil war, which have *winners*, groups benefiting from the emergency, and not only the losers of the “pure” natural disaster emergency. Complex emergencies are not short blips on the curve of national development, but ongoing social predicaments; they have *no clear end*. The notion of complex emergencies, however, does not adequately capture the links between victims, agencies, donors, and states, all partners in humanitarian aid.

Suffering on a grand scale will always be a disaster, but left unnoticed by the world it is not yet an *emergency event*. With no audible voice the sufferers have to be discovered by the world to set the stage for an emergency event, whereupon all the other actors can perform their parts. Without large flows of refugees threatening the stability in neighbouring countries and other national security concerns, without media pictures creating a cause in the donor public, and without access for humanitarian agencies, there is no event. Contributing to the ‘emergency’ are not only the victims, but also the state in which the disaster struck, the donor states and the donor public, and the multitude of humanitarian agencies. It is the synergy of all these actors that produces the *emergency event*.

Humanitarian aid projects should be viewed as integral to the emergency event, and not as external activities arriving at the scene after the disaster. This activity had a ‘life-impact’ by which I understood the direct impact on the lives of individual beneficiaries, i.e. the outcome of actions trying to avert or ameliorate the effect of a disaster, assessed with reference to a

specific disaster-population. Parameters of impact followed from the characteristic of the emergency: diseases must be countered by securing *health*, hunger must be countered by improving *livelihood*, and violence must be countered by *protection*. Of these parameters, protection was paramount; health and livelihood were dependent upon protection.

However, humanitarian aid also had an impact on the context of the emergency event. Life-impact assessed impact from the point of view of the individual person. We had to turn around and take the point of view of the state (or state-fragments) hosting the projects to assess 'state-impact': how much did each project contribute to a fragmentation or focusing of its state-power? A complex emergency, moved forward by civil war may be conceived as a process of state fragmentation. Fragmentation occurred when power and authority were parcelled out, away from the national government and state institutions, to all kinds of sub-state actors. As power and authority were slipping away from the national government and national state institutions ceased to function the conflict was intensifying. Focusing state power entailed a reverse move towards reconciliation and peace. Peace is not the same as democracy, although a functioning, vibrant democracy presumably is the best way to safeguard peace. It was by exploring how projects registered with the process of fragmentation-focusing that we tried to assess their state-impact.

2. From humanitarian aid to risk aid

Humanitarian aid grew dramatically during the 1990s. At the turn of the millennium more than 10.000 international NGOs provided aid with a global turn-over estimated to be more than 15 billion dollars. Large, glittering trade-shows catered for the needs of the aid industry. Emergencies did not end, and the provision of humanitarian aid expanded without any limits in sight in countries like the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan and Ethiopia. Of the top-ten recipients of Danish humanitarian aid in 1999 only Timor and the Great Lakes had not received Danish humanitarian assistance seven years earlier.

This growth changed the face of humanitarian aid. The 1990s saw a profound move away from altruism and developmentalism towards securitisation of aid. Increasingly humanitarian aid became a vehicle for national security interests, even in small countries like Denmark. The political salience of humanitarian aid in international relations grew dramatically and national securitisation of humanitarian aid blossomed, unfolding something completely different from the vague do-good, military non-committed, remote Somalia episode. In Denmark, for instance, humanitarian assistance catapulted from a relatively obscure position within a three-man office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the absolute top of politics. Nothing could

even begin to compare with the visibility of the military and civilian humanitarian intervention in the Balkans during the three spring months of 1999. A national need turned the disaster in Kosova into an emergency event substantiating NATO's claim to wage a humanitarian war. Humanitarian aid was no longer the same.

During the 1990s international donors, including Denmark, had developed three very different responses to emergencies: (i) a highly professional 'Red Cross-type' emergency aid response; (ii) a 'rehabilitation' response more or less blending into 'real' development aid; and (iii) an emerging military-humanitarian 'security' response, I proposed to call *risk aid*. They were not steps on a 'continuum', as their political motivation were mutually exclusive: emergency aid was motivated by the humanitarian imperative; development aid by normative support to a world of nation states; risk aid by the donor's national security.

These three mutations of humanitarian aid correlated to three very different notions of need. First, the absolute needs of someone in distress: to be wounded in war, to be taken prisoner by the enemy, to suffer from epidemics, to be made homeless by storms, earth-quakes, and draughts; alleviated by emergency aid. Secondly, the relative needs of people caused by historical late coming: to be a mass of 'under-developed' people suffering from poverty, poor health, lack of education, and denial of rights; alleviated by development aid. Thirdly, the needs caused by our own fears of potential threats of de-stabilising, of imagined risks, of the closing-in of suffering, needs caused by risks moving in space; alleviated by risk aid. When the refugees came here and our humanitarian soldiers went there, when our security depended on containing *their* conflicts, then the linkage of sufferer and donor in the emergency event had reached a completely new level of political salience. But suffering behind the enemy lines became off-limits for humanitarian aid and the humanitarian mandate was put in jeopardy.

Humanitarian aid had travelled a very long distance from 1992 to 1999. From a position of charity aroused by the Somalia hunger crisis, humanitarian aid ended in a position directly opposite that of charity, namely defending *our own* safety against risks closing in from a fragmenting and threatening world. It had become risk aid. This was the context confronting aid agencies in the new century; it was to give them almost unlimited growth possibilities.

3. Protection

With the explosive expansion of humanitarian aid during the 1990s and the growing economic clout and political salience of humanitarian agencies, in particular NGOs, responsibility for their 'beneficiaries' became a sore point. It dawned on the aid industry that

aid could do harm, that aid might put beneficiaries at risk. As violence is the central feature of complex emergencies, protection against violence became the primary challenge for humanitarian agencies. Yet, humanitarian agencies were per definition non-violent, thus protection against violence became an existential dilemma for them.

Emergency aid

Undoubtedly protection is the most difficult and perhaps least acknowledged challenge for humanitarian aid. The investigation revealed two extremes in the attempts by the agencies to protect their beneficiaries. One extreme was to do nothing and hope that somebody else would take care of the problem, the other extreme was to co-operate with the military in 'humanitarian' war. Dan Church Aid subscribed to the first approach in two of the three programmes we have looked at. The airlift of relief to Somalia in the early nineties is very likely to have put beneficiaries at risk because food-relief became a vital, un-controlled resource for militias, small armies, and criminals.

The reason is simple. In theory food aid was given directly to needy people. But in practice neither the humanitarian agencies nor the beneficiaries could control the food and the enormous resources floated upwards looted by larger violent units, typically the militias. Denial of access to local resources, i.e. looting of stocks, forced labour, depopulation of fertile land etc. compounded the ravaging effects of food aid. The looted food would be eaten eventually, but it represented first of all an enormous source for feeding the local war-economy. "Pouring more food into this unnatural and corrupted economic system would do more harm than good without a dramatic change in the security situation," Andrew Natsios, a top USAID man in Somalia 1992 wrote and he concluded, "Perhaps the two objectives of decreasing violence and increasing nutrition were mutually exclusive in the absence of a disciplined security force." (in Clarke 1997:85, 91) Within weeks powerful local groups had established ways to divert, distort and digest the aid input. Dependency grew and local economies was distorted through inflation, undermining of productive activities, through excessive imports, and by feeding socially destructive structures through over-size, unprotected aid.

Emergency aid operations in the context of complex emergencies seem in general to permit local power structures very quickly to adapt to aid-flows; continued aid will put the beneficiaries at greater risk while perversely withdrawal becomes ever more painful. Problems will become increasingly intractable over time as pre-aid social structures of peace-time are destroyed, and confront the agencies and donors with the conundrum that emergency aid

cannot protect the beneficiaries. Permanent emergency aid tend to end in a situation, where aid is limited to the lowest possible level of subsistence coupled with erratic health efforts. No protection against the predatory structures, created and fed by aid, is possible within the political mandate of emergency aid. More aid will not solve the problem without a political will to tackle protection against violence. Aid without protection should be discontinued. It is imperative that exit-strategies are considered from the very beginning of emergency aid operations, not to create more situations like south Sudan or south Somalia. Food-aid to Somalia in 1992-93 graphically displayed the dilemma of assisting and at the same time putting the beneficiaries at risk.

**Interview with Walid Musa, Senior Adviser, Political Affairs and Governance,
European Union, Somalia Unit, Nairobi, 7 January 1999.**

Walid Musa considered the humanitarian intervention in the South as,
“- successful measured against the prime objective, to save lives. After the military intervention one was able to control the banditry making logistics successful. How much peace it contributed in that era? The answer is zero. The focus was on saving lives - without regard for the damage to peace. The Danish contribution was part and parcel of other contributions, it had no way of being an individual one. It did save lives, but it did not contribute to peace. In Somalia there was a genuine need but no genuine will to peace. People are dying and you cannot say I'll not save the life of this person lest there is peace.”

First Conclusion

Emergency aid should be designed to be professional in execution and co-ordination, specific in targeting beneficiaries, and minimal in duration; like the flood emergency response in south Somalia 1997, or the earth-quake response in north Afghanistan in 1998. Aid ameliorating the effects of ongoing war will unavoidable feed more violence as long as protection of vulnerable groups are not secured; emergency aid can not provide such protection. *Exit strategies* is the most important factor for reducing negative effects of emergency aid.

Development aid

In most complex emergencies, violence is extremely erratic with relative tranquillity for long periods of time in certain areas, next to areas of constant fighting, displacement and suffering. To localise assistance to areas of relative calm, bypassing zones of crisis, appeared to be the

only way to reconcile development with war. Aid agencies increasingly choose not to wait for national peace before commencing development projects under the (ICRC) slogan 'programming relief for development'. They changed their perspective from development *after* the war, to development of pockets of peace *inside* the war. Yet, this had detrimental consequences for the humanitarian mandate of assisting those most in need, as they, of course, were to be found in the most unstable and insecure areas.

To work in Afghanistan all agencies had to co-operate with the Taliban (when in their part of the country) and inputs would benefit the regime, while protection of the beneficiaries was difficult, something my field data repeatedly documented. Projects with a development function had to promote stability and predictability, permitting a long perspective, but they tended not to have an impact on lives much beyond livelihood. Dacaar, for instance, favoured a pragmatic approach to the state; they had little impact on protection, they contributed to the consolidation of the Taliban state, and they had a narrow life-impact, compared with the average of the sample projects.

The exact opposite picture emerged in south Somalia. The agencies had to relate to the small groups controlling fragments of state power, and inputs at project-level aggravated this fragmentation. DBG as implementing agency, for instance, had to be both pragmatic and creative to work at all in the chaotic situation in Mogadishu, providing protection and health besides livelihood. This multi-dimensionality gave projects a wide life-impact. They could not just improve livelihood in a 'pure' development project, but had to engage with protection, and that gave the unique combination of state-fragmenting impact and wide life-impact.

Agencies implementing development aid projects in all the cases investigated in this book, effectively supported the regime or violent group ruling in the project-area and subscribed to whatever protection it could provide. Protection of the beneficiaries was only possible, within the political mandate of development aid, by patient co-operation and negotiations with the regime of the day. However, the fact that regimes ruled without any popular or democratic mandate, that social inequalities benefited the rulers, that gendered, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and urban privileges were upheld by social conflict, produced very narrow limits for such discussions. This fact, and the fact that development projects needed security, created a barrier blocking aid to the most vulnerable. Development aid produced losers.

To be a beneficiary of the services provided by rehabilitation/development projects was fully comparable to winning in a lottery. The winners were happy, but they were few. The local structures of violence giving or denying individual Somalis, Afghanis, or Kosovars access to

the lottery were almost impossible to touch for the donors. Inputs given to vulnerable groups provoked fraud, intimidation, and looting by powerful groups in all three countries; only small-scale inputs given to privileged groups with arms or protected by outside military did not initiate new violence. The result was extremely low sustainability of the services and grossly inequitable access to them.

The most constructive long-term strategy for development aid is probably to develop state institutions by education and training, by ‘capacity-building,’ as institutions historically tend to have a life much longer than regimes. Development aid cannot change governments, but it can build small blocks of state institutions, which a future regime may use to implement a socially responsible national development. I met several well-educated Afghanis from the communist regime-era, now working in aid agencies; they were some of the last remaining scraps of Afghan state-institutions. If Afghanistan within twenty years is to be reconstructed as a nation state, I believe they would be a core element; others could be trained.

Development aid wields no power, except the promise of aid and the threat of pulling out. My impression was that knowledgeable, courageous, and persistent individuals in agencies and local groups had a certain scope on project level for soliciting a little violence to counter small threats of violence. Perhaps the controversial DBG projects in Mogadishu could inspire other agencies to a closer reflection on how to protect their beneficiaries. However, even the most imaginative solutions at project-level were rapidly overwhelmed by big-scale violence if the stars shining on the firmament of the international relations were unfavourable. There was little doubt, that to meet the challenge of protection acts eclipsing aid were decisive. A person with a life-long experience from development work, and in a central position in the international political and humanitarian game influencing Afghanistan’s future, summed up the situation.

Interview with Erick de Mul, Humanitarian Co-ordinator, UN Resident Representative, Afghanistan, Islamabad 30 Sep. 1999

I asked him, - How long will aid continue to Afghanistan?

“I don’t know. I think it will still continue, because the rich countries are becoming increasingly scared about influx of people coming from this part of the world and Africa. I am convinced - but this is my very personal opinion - that the rich countries are scared by the possible influx of people, but with no intention whatsoever to make poor countries become their equal or become their competitors. They want to keep status quo. And that is a very difficult balance to strike. So what you see, there is no balance and it becomes a disaster; that

is OK, then we solve the disaster through humanitarian aid, emergency aid. It is so easy, we have enough food to supply anyway and plastic sheeting is not very expensive, and we recreate a little bit of balance and then we keep them out, but we don't help them forward. I think it is quite clear if you see over the last years, how the shift is from development aid to emergency aid, it is all emergency aid. Also in the World Bank and IMF - in that system you can do two things, you keep them poor - increase their debts and you know they are almost killed, and you apply conditionality so you keep them in check. It is very simple. If you listen to the rhetoric you would expect the western world is really interested in development. That is total rubbish! They are not interested at all.

Second Conclusion

Development aid could not support the most vulnerable in conflict-zones because projects needed security. Development aid in all cases provided a net support for the ruling state (fragment). Aid projects had no means to protect their beneficiaries, but development aid was in all cases involved in the local political process as provider of resources. Agencies could decide to use aid as a leverage for protection by *engaging the state* (fragment) pro-actively. Examples were DBG's co-operation with armed business in Mogadishu and ICRC's non-confrontational negotiations with local powers. However, agencies trying to do political reconciliation on a national scale has failed so far. Agencies should in any case formulate a bottom-line for such involvement, and be prepared to pull out.

Risk aid

At the other extreme in the range of agency responses to the dilemma of protection - in Kosova - we find risk aid providing protection by piggy-backing on a war against local structures of violence. Donors, including Danida, responded to the Kosova crisis with risk aid, integrating humanitarian mandates and national security concerns, while they launched war ostensibly in pursuit of a humanitarian goal. Aid was militarised, and war was 'humanitarianised'. This may be the ultimate commitment to protection, indeed most of the Albanians we spoke with in Kosova welcomed the NATO war, as the only realistic way to end Serb violence. But at the same time it put a bomb under humanitarian impartiality. In Kosova, the mandate of humanitarian agencies to provide protection of human beings had been tied to issues of national security, providing protection of Albanians on a scale humanitarian projects never had been able to do, but at the same time corrupting the neutrality of humanitarian aid. Risk aid could not live up to the humanitarian mandate to assist

everyone, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, race, sex. Protecting individual persons proved to be practically impossible, even by cordoning-off Serbian enclaves.

At the end of the day, what was the donor vision of an accomplished risk aid mission in Kosova? Continuation of the UNMIK protectorate until some sunny day, when Milosevich and all Serbian nationalists have been thrown out of office by a democratic Serbian opposition and Kosova happily rejoined Yugoslavia? Beefed-up, comprehensive law and order, trying to protect minorities for a future independent, multi-ethnic Kosova? Complete population transfer, secession of north Kosova and a deal with Serbia? Or an earnest Stability Pact for Balkan, including Serbia, with a European Union perspective? Everything and more, probably. The vision was extremely blurred because the promise of development, understood as national economic development, to foster a more peaceful world was put to shame during the decade of complex emergencies. Yugoslavia, of course, was the prime example: a developed country sliding backwards into terrifying civil war undoing development, and ultimately threatening European security. If development can not promise peace and stability in a world of conflict and instability, then, I think, the political perspective of a post-national European Union will become central.

Third Conclusion

Protection by risk aid is powerful but limited in two crucial respects. First, only a few of the world's complex emergencies will probably be so important from a national security perspective, that they warrant high-profile, expensive risk aid. Second, when the security perspective takes over humanitarian impartiality becomes impossible: military protection will produce victims, classified as enemies. Only the Red Cross will have humanitarian access to them and no military protection. We are back to square one.

The phenomenal rise of risk aid is likely to continue and increase its dominance of the politics and business of aid. If this proves to be correct, humanitarian agencies must develop ways to *re-assert the humanitarian mandate* in the ever-closer embrace with national security. At both operational and strategic levels the different mandates of military and humanitarian agencies should be expressed and if possible, agreed to before the next Kosova. This should also include military acceptance of humanitarian standards.

4. The experiment

Foreign policies that contribute towards state focusing (reconciliation, peace) was assumed to protect people in a complex emergency. But this assumption begged the question: focusing

which state? Which state would and could protect people? It could not be taken for granted that the answer would be a nation state as we have known it in the twentieth century. Indeed, current developments in Somalia and Afghanistan as well as Kosova all challenged basic notions of the nation state. What I have termed 'experimental' intervention to (re)create a state differed from 'top-down', 'protectorate', and 'bottom-up' interventions, by making the meaning and function of national boundaries ambiguous, which the three other types of interventions tried to keep intact. Experimental intervention could perhaps turn the painful fragmentation of the nation state into a more constructive experiment with forms of post-nation states.

In Somalia, the few 'state-institutions' that provided anything like health, education, and infrastructure to people in the country were international agencies. Somali business networks were transnational and crossed clan-lines, while state fragments, the factions and businessmen with militias, ruled by violence. Geographies of sovereign territory, national government, and state-institutions had no functional overlap. Perhaps governance did not have to be national to provide basic public goods. Somalia was a chaotic, ad hoc experiment with many other frameworks. Read positively we saw in Somalia an experimental intervention that might point towards a second generation post-colonial African state. This would be a state which did not build on nationalism or nation-building in the form we have known it during the last two hundred years, including the first generation of independent African states. Potentially it could develop a formula for radical power-sharing with smaller (clan) entities inside and larger (international) entities outside the national border, which could overcome the perennial nation-state problem of ethnicity not matching national territory. Somalia provides an example to the emerging discussion of globalisation and war economies, that differs from the often-cited examples of Sierra Leone and Liberia. The rest of Africa and the world saw Somalia as a failure and a threat, but it should not be forgotten that it caused much less regional de-stabilisation in the 1990s than it did in the 1970s or 1980s as nation state.

In Afghanistan it was the combination of nation-wide Taliban rule (less a few provinces) and a governmental ethos, so utterly contradicting international norms, and a military, economic, political, and religious practice massively de-stabilising the whole region, that sat the Taliban state apart and challenged basic assumptions of what a nation state could be. Experimental support for the state in Afghanistan, along the lines of caretaker-state in Somalia, was politically and practically limited by the existence of the Taliban, exercising a near-national monopoly of violence and a near-total disregard of national bureaucracy. The real problem, however, was not that bottom-up initiatives were unlikely to reach to the top, but the opposite problem that the Taliban's dictatorial regime was facilitated down-to-the-bottom by aid. Aid

became a vehicle of fragmentation, not of reconciliation. In my opinion, and indicated by the assessments of aid projects in Afghanistan presented above, there is little doubt that aid contributed to sustaining the civil war by functional support of the regime. However, aid was only a minor factor in the total support received by the Taliban regime from other countries, and a suspension of aid could not alone possibly have made the Taliban end the war.

The protectorate in Kosova was a third experiment with a state form contradicting or transcending the nation state. UNMIK was granted dictatorial powers, it was backed up by the presence of some 35.000 troops on the tiny territory of Kosova but it had little success in preserving a multi-ethnic society or fostering democracy in its first year of existence. UNMIK's awkward position reflected the contradictory mandate: experiment with the state-form so-to-say through the back door, while keeping up a facade of Yugoslav sovereignty and ad hoc dealing with day-to-day problems by the autocratic protectorate. Sovereignty, government, and state institutions had exploded over several disjointed territories; for example, the international telephone-prefix of Kosova could not continue to be Yugoslavia as the Albanians objected, it could not be a new Kosova-code as the Serbs objected, so it became 337 for Monaco! Experiments with a democratic state in Kosova faced two contradictions. In the post-protectorate perspective the Yugoslav state was waiting (with new leaders, it was hoped), and in the short-term perspective the protectorate made local democracy ambiguous. Only the European Union promised an escape from the binarity of Belgrade or freedom. 'Europe of the regions' or any other name put on the modification of the nation state, of which the EU was both the outcome and the facilitator, captured the experimental perspective of the intervention in Kosova.

Here, as in Somalia and Afghanistan, the fundamental problem with these experiments were protection of vulnerable groups. Business, legal and illegal, were quick to flow out through the crumbling national walls, but protection historically made possible by overlapping sovereign territory, national government and state institutions was lying in ruins. By the turn of the millennium, Somalis, Afghans, and Kosovars could only dream of enjoying protection by the state like they, or their parents, had experienced a generation ago, around 1975. Let me end with one last voice from the field, belonging to Nora Katanolli, a young woman from Peja in Kosova. She was a courageous person, daring to talk of reconciliation, in spite of threats to herself and her family. Ultimately, after aid and interventions, people must find courage in themselves to live in peace.

Interview with Nora Katanolli, project assistant DRC, Peja, Kosova, April 19, 2000

“As we came here [back to Peja after being refugees] everything was destroyed. When we came there were no smiles, people were just thinking how to survive. We know the suffering had changed now. We know that others are suffering now, other people who are not living here, who are the citizens and who are not with us now. We have to think about that. Maybe it is early, but we have to think about that.”

“I am afraid of elections. People here don’t know how to loose. They will fight. Some of us are willing to change something; some of them are willing to die not to change anything. I think it is early for elections. Everyone that lived here must be back. They will apologise, but they will come back here and they will live here as decent citizens. I don’t have to say hello to them. But they have to live here. Because this is also their place, they are born here. Maybe then, together, we will try to find solutions. How we can live together.”

“Shkëlzen Maliqi, he is very clever, pro-Europe, but they will not win. Because people like these two persons Rugova and this Thaci, they are not good for the country. It is our destiny to be led by stupid people. Me, for example, I will not go to the election. I have no-one to give my vote, no-one has done anything to improve my life. Nobody.”

“I was eyewitness of one man being killed in the local market. Saturday. There was gunfire, yes, and he was dead in front of me... He was Roma; he was selling some furniture and there was a great deal of people. It was the market day and everyone went to buy things. I was with my sister and then... I don’t know from where... I saw this man coming, I thought he wanted to buy something. I did not put my mind to it. But then I heard someone saying: “In the name of the people!” and I heard six times gunfire. Then I saw... Then I lost my consciousness for two or three minutes. I was with my sister, and I saw the dead man and he was my neighbour and he has done nothing wrong to nobody. The man who shot him escaped. He had the gun. And nobody did nothing to stop him. Then I reported to the UNMIK police. Nobody from the locals, they did not want to say nothing because they were afraid.”

“In the name of who is he killing? In the name of the people! That is what the words were in my mind: He is not killing in the name of me or any of my family; he doesn’t have to mention the name of the people. Who’s people?”

Who’s people?

We saw how the Powers divided nations and created states. They insisted on the inviolability of borders dividing Somalis, Pashtuns, and Albanians; at the same time they dictated that Somaliland could not secede, Afghanistan could not split and Serbs and Albanians should live together in Kosova. The perception of a nation state being a homogenous, mono-ethnic

one-nation-per-state entity is wrong. The problem with nation state borders were not their adherence to a principle of homogeneity, but their reflection of the opportunistic, cynical, geo-strategic national interests of the Powers, powerful enough to create borders by force.

Yet, national governments were not doomed to perpetuate conflicts in their own countries. Leaders in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Kosova could, if they had wished to do so, have ended the complex emergencies that were tearing apart their countries. What we saw, was the outcome of their deliberate choice not to do so.

Aid agencies were not forced to do harm. However, when they decided to implement their projects in dictatorial and predatory states they were net supporters of the power-holders. Agencies had no means to protect their beneficiaries; they only had a slender margin to craft imaginative arrangements with the local men wielding guns.

The terrible, final conclusion, is that only the individual person suffering in the emergency has a direct interest in protection and peace; and not even she or he may be prepared to welcome peace.

A

PPENDIX: THIRTY-FIVE CASES

1

Emergency logistics, Faizabad, Talogan, Pansjir, Afghanistan; beneficiaries approx.. 100.000; agency: ICRC; operation begun at the time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Middle life impact**

Health: positive; actual distribution had not begun in the Pansjir at the time of our visit, but we saw trucks leaving Faizabad for the Pansjir valley with relief items including medicine, estimated eventually to have a positive health impact

Livelihood: positive; food relief was on the way from Talogan to Pansjir

Protection: none; no protection included in the ICRC relief

Interpretation of state impact: **Strong focusing state impact**

House: none; small scale assistance to be of short duration estimated to have negligible impact on house structure

Town: positive; ICRC dealing with private truck owners and rice-merchants supported trade networks outside control of the Taliban state

Ethnic: positive; direct support for non-Pashtun ethnic groups influencing the ethnic balance in Afghanistan against the Taliban

State: positive; material and practical recognition of the anti-Taliban forces in the Northern Alliance

In early September 1999 the Taliban would let no-one cross the Shomali front and travel directly from Kabul to the Pansjir. Instead of a hundred kilometre road journey from Kabul directly into the Pansjir valley relief workers had to go by air to Faizabad in the far north of Afghanistan, and then drive two or three days on miserable mountain roads down into the Pansjir. When we arrived in Faizabad a dust-storm was howling through the little town, people said it was a sign of winter and in a month access to the Pansjir would be blocked by snow. Taliban forces was advancing along the northern front as well and had captured the brigades over the Amu Darya river cutting off the Northern Alliance's last road-link with Tadsjikistan and the outside world. Taliban was bombing towns in Takhar closing in on Faizabad using old Soviet jet-fighters and presumably Pakistani pilots.

Figures was circulating of 100.000 IDPs fleeing the war on the Shomali-plain and seeking refuge in the Pansjir valley, while only very few had started fleeing Takhar into Badakshan (By April 2000 UNHCR said 140.000 persons were displaced from the Shomali plains since August 1999). A three-man ICRC emergency team had just arrived from Kabul with the ICRC plane; the day before emergency-teams from UNOCHA and NAC had arrived. Two ICRC relief delegates were going to the Pansjir to survey the displaced persons

while the third member of the team went to Talogan to purchase 150 tons of rice. He returned three days later, just before the town was bombed and evacuated, and explained he had bought rice from local middle-men. Transport was contracted with local truck-owners. There was a food surplus in Takhar, but not in Badakshan, and a deficit in Pansjir.

In the next couple of days we saw trucks being sent from the ICRC compound in Faizabad to Pansjir with medicines, tents and blankets. The whole operation was small, for example compared with the earthquake in Rostaq the year before, and not a difficult job according to the ICRC man. This was the only place in Afghanistan except for Kabul city that ICRC did emergency relief in September 1999.

2

Relief food distribution, Serb villages Skulanevo, Radevo, Lepina in Lipjan area and Babin Most village near Kopiliq, Kosova; appr. 5.000 beneficiaries in the four villages; agency: WFP/Children's Aid Direct; operational since July 1999; ongoing at time of visit in April 2000; at that time WFP distributed food to 600.000 people in Kosova

Impression of life impact: **Middle life impact**

Health: none; no health component in the food aid

Livelihood: positive; food aid provided a temporary livelihood in the relative isolation from employment and markets

Protection: positive; food aid contributed to a short term refuge from harassment

Interpretation of state impact: **Weak focusing state impact**

House: none; food aid had marginal impact on gender structures

Town: positive; food aid tied beneficiaries into state-controlled distribution and facilitated their exclusion from local commercial networks outside state control

Ethnic: negative; food aid facilitated ethnic polarisation in Kosova and presumably helped Belgrade's efforts to secure a Serbian presence in Kosova

State: positive; food aid was an important support to UNMIK's goal of a multi-ethnic Kosova

American wheat was loaded on trucks in the WFP warehouse in Prishtine, one of five large WFP-warehouses in Kosova at the time in each KFOR's zone, and field managers from Children's Aid Direct supervised the rural distribution. Action Against Hunger was responsible for distribution in urban areas; in several zones Mother Tereza was responsible. The aid basket contained 12 kg of wheat flour, 2 kg beans, 1 kg vegetable oil, and 1 kg of sugar pr. person pr. month. WFP had done a blanket distribution from July to September 1999 to 1.4 million people. On top of that other agencies had distributed food to 300.000 persons; practically the total population of Kosova had received free food. Many countries contributed to this; some gave in-kind contributions, for example Denmark in 1999 donated 269 tons of canned meat, 214 tons of biscuits and 109 tons of vegetable oil; value 7 mill dkk. From October 1999 to February 2000 food-distribution was scaled down to 900.000 persons. Considering the very rapid resumption of private trade and well-stocked markets the scale of relief must be questioned.

In each village food we saw the food being loaded from the truck into stores; people would come during the next days to pick up their rations. There was no Ethiopia-like hunger scenes with starving people lining up for food, nor indeed an emergency food situation. The

problem was not poverty but access. In the enclave of Babin Most, for example, the local contact persons explained that land around the village belonged to the Serbs; Albanian fields were on the other side of the hills. In 1999 they planted normally and were able to harvest 80% of a normal harvest. The problem was access to the mill, now located in an Albanian village two kilometres away; nobody dared bring the grain down the road to the mill. Security was the key issue. Last week ten cows and a horse was stolen from Babin Most and a Serb man was shot. It was said that the minimum distance between Serb and Albanian fields was the range of a rifle shot.

WFP had announced it was going to reduce the total number of beneficiaries in Kosova from 600.000 to 300.000 people. The difficult job of actually de-registering individuals was left to the local contact-persons. In Babin Most the village manager of distribution, Bogdan, said people were very angry. They have held a 'focus-group meeting' and everyone protested against being de-registered, arguing that the desperate situation of Serbs in the enclaves made de-registering too painful. 90% of the villagers had no income, they all needed aid. Bogdan had cut down his last tree, even his fruit trees, to get firewood. He estimated that 800 people had remained in Babin Most and 200 had fled to Serbia out of a pre-war population of 2.500. But relatives in Serbia could not remit money as Serbia was poorer than Kosova, and their relatives were IDPs in Serbia subsisting from humanitarian aid. They had no relatives in Western Europe. Only the poorest had stayed, those who could buy something in Serbia had left. Many families had split up, with wife and children in Serbia and the old people waiting in Kosova to see what would happen. But next winter they would not be here, people said. They would go to Serbia.

In Banleve, the next-door Albanian village, families were planting potatoes. A man we spoke with had returned from Germany and with his savings bought a micro-tractor. He was worried Serbs would drive by during night-time and throw hand-grenades or plant land-mines on his field. In the Serb villages there was no destruction, but many houses were locked up and everywhere there was an air of desolation and desperation. The men we visited in Babin Most watched Serbian television and hoped the situation somehow would become "normal like it was before 1998." "We are surrounded by Albanian villages. If we get protection and can move we don't need humanitarian aid, and then our children can go to school." People were glad to receive the food, but the dominant feeling was embarrassment and desperation over their utterly unsustainable situation and dreadful prospects. We detected disturbingly little desire of reconciliation in our talks with them.

3

Refugee feeding-programme, Kabul, Afghanistan; approx.. 72.000 persons; agency: ICRC; operational September 1999, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Life impact nil**

Health: none; no health component in feeding-programme

Livelihood: positive; livelihood secured but no long-term assistance

Protection: negative; ICRC listing of IDP beneficiaries played a disputed role in Taliban arresting more than 1.500 from the target group; on the other hand ICRC helped trace the detainees, work for their protection and negotiated their release with the Taliban.

Interpretation of state impact: **Weak focusing state impact**

House: negative*; with many men in hiding, it was the women who dealt with the ICRC

Town: positive; ICRC procuring relief items abroad supported the cross-border Kabul trade networks

Ethnic: negative; ICRC helped to secure the existence of 'enemy' groups in the capital

State: positive; ICRC at the same time both inadvertently and openly facilitated Taliban control of the IDPs

* Taliban policy against women

Relief distribution to the IDPs took place on a field in the northern part of Kabul between yards selling building materials. Men squatted to one side and women to the other side. Every women was covered by a head-to-foot *burqa* hiding the faces and even the eyes behind a net. Young ragged men wearing big black turbans, the non-uniformed Taliban police, kept the women in order by beating them with sticks. The hot, dusty air was filled with yelling. A man with a megaphone called up individual heads of families. Identity was checked several times before people were allowed to queue up and receive their rations, transported by boys on small wheelbarrows. Each family received rations estimated by ICRC to cover 50 per cent of three months needs: 75 kgs of wheat flour, 30 kgs rice, 20 kgs beans, 4,5 kgs ghee, 6 blankets, a tarpaulin, and candles; worth 1,8 million Afs. ICRC procured foodstuffs at the local market and in Pakistan; ICRC logistics worked well under the difficult conditions.

The relief operation had started eight days ago, when people fleeing from the Taliban offensive on the Shomali-plain just north of Kabul were cut off from escaping into the Pansjir valley and began arriving in the city. The Taliban forces moving against the Northern Alliance allegedly destroyed people's harvest, buildings, fruit-trees, vines, even irrigation structures and all other means of livelihood. Those that had managed to reach Kabul with

their cattle sold it in order to survive, and Pakistani traders had been quick to come to Kabul to take advantage of the situation. A large number of men (allegedly 1.500) had been arrested by the Taliban suspected to be enemy soldiers trying to sneak into Kabul disguised as refugees.

Mr. Shuja from the ICRC told us that they had serious problems in counting the number of IDPs. The ICRC had contact with representatives from Shomali who gave them lists of IDPs coming from specific villages into Kabul and the distribution had been organised according to where people came from on the Shomali, not according to where they had found private shelter in Kabul. Because people feared arrest, the ICRC was unable to cross-check the lists in the tense situation, and many IDPs did not dare to be on the list at all. Furthermore, the ICRC could not be sure when the IDPs actually had arrived, i.e. if they belonged to the new group of IDPs targeted for assistance, or the group of long-time IDPs in Kabul. Even though the ICRC would keep their registration confidential any such activity could put the IDPs at risk of prosecution by the very efficient Taliban secret service. Fears and rumours circulated among the displaced persons that ICRC somehow had made it easier for the Taliban to arrest people. At the same time the ICRC tried to protect people and had after long negotiations with the Taliban authorities secured the release of the arrested IDPs.

Mr. Shuja estimated their lists were 70-80% correct. In total they assisted 9000 families displaced from the Shomali, approximately 72.000 persons. Apart from a small ICRC operation initiated in Pansjir all relief in Afghanistan was distributed in Kabul. The Taliban had told people to go to the former Soviet embassy grounds which had become a crowded, miserable refugee camp. The UN supported this camp, which was the only official camp for displaced persons in Kabul. Roderick Chartres from the ICRC commented, “We are anti-camp. It is easy to start camps, but damn hard to close them”.

4

Assistance programme for families headed by widows and disabled persons, Kabul, Afghanistan; approx.. 175.000 persons; agency: ICRC; operational since 1995, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Middle life impact**

Health: none;no health input, but some of the food input was privately sold for medicines

Livelihood: positive; important contribution to the livelihood of two vulnerable groups fully dependent on external input

Protection; positive; the programme supported the rights of disabled persons and a group discriminated twice as women and as widows by the Taliban government

Interpretation of state impact: **Weak focusing state impact**

House: negative*; female headed households were supported outside patriarchal tradition and Taliban strictures

Town: positive; ICRC input into cross-border Kabul bazaar trading links

Ethnic, none; no clear impact on ethnic polarisation

State: positive; everything ICRC did was sanctioned by the Taliban, the Taliban policed the widows

* Taliban policy against women

On an open area between derelict Soviet-made housing blocks, a neighbourhood called Microrayon (a Russian term) hundreds of widows waited patiently in the heat dressed or hidden in their blue and beige *burqas*. In one day the ICRC staff would distribute food and non-food items to 650 widows, and the distribution would continue for 25 days to a total of 14.000 widows. The widows came from the whole city. All the time we spent at the distribution women in *burqas* would try to get our attention through the veil and beg insistently to be included on the list of beneficiaries. One widow told us she was around 30 years old, she had been a widow for two years; she came from Kabul. She could not marry again. It was against her tradition to re-marry when a woman had children. What about the future? we asked. God decides; but it cannot become worse, she replied. Another widow told us that if the ICRC stopped the distribution of food she would die. She had no relatives and no children. Eligible for assistance were widows below 40 years of age with no sons older than 15 years.

Strict interpretation of the Sharia law by the Taliban regime and enforced harshly and capriciously by the *Amr Bil Maruf wa Nahai Anil Munkar* (Dept. for the Preservation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) made life extremely difficult for widows. They were not

allowed to leave their house without a *mahram*, a close male relative. In principle they had to stay home even if that meant starving. In practice they relied on help from family if they had any, or charities. Every three months the widows would receive ICRC rations that would last for one month. For the rest they depended on families and in particular on every bit of income their children could get. The programme had been running for four years and reached 22.000 families, including 17.000 widows and 5.000 families headed by a disabled person. It was not a programme the Taliban liked. Earlier the ICRC had been allowed to employ female staff, but the Taliban had prohibited this one year ago. This created serious problems, for example with the identification of the widows as no male ICRC staff were allowed to see the faces of the women. They now had to recognise the individual widows by their hands and voices.

There seemed to be some overlapping with WFP, ACF and others providing relief in Kabul. The ACBAR database for 1998 lists 19 NGOs (but not the ICRC widow programme) running different feeding programmes in Kabul including CARE distributing parcels of 12 kg beans and 4,5 kg ghee pr. month to 10.000 widows. The total food-input is not clear, but none of the programmes match the ICRC widow programme in size. Roderick Chartres from the ICRC said he would like to see ICRC move out of this programme because the ICRC tried to shift their emphasis in Afghanistan towards development projects; deputy-head of delegation in Kabul, Christophe Luedi mentioned agro-projects, management of hospitals, water and sanitation projects. If ICRC moved out of the widow programme they would secure continuation. WFP, for example, could move in with their bakery programme and the so-called silo-bread, a nutritious mix of several grains with a taste less attractive than the ubiquitous wheat *nan*, and thus less disruptive of the commercial structures than the free distribution of wheat bread.

5

Sheikh Nur returnee camp, Hargeisa, Somaliland; approx.. 175.000 persons; agency: UNHCR; operational Feb. 1997; ongoing at time of visit in December 1998.

Impression of life impact **Narrow life impact**

Health: positive; some sanitation programmes in the camp

Livelihood: none; no livelihood provided in the camp

Protection: none; no protection secured

Interpretation of state impact **Strong fragmenting state impact**

House: --; no data on impact on house dynamics

Town: negative; facilitating non-controlled urbanisation of returnees

Ethnic: negative; entrenching ethnic zoning of Hargeisa

State: negative; UNHCR clashed with the Somaliland government on location and free movement of repatriatees

The Sheikh Nur squatter/returnee camp was a vast area of round shelters built by sticks and blue UNHCR plastic sheets on a rocky hill outside Hargeisa. The camp was planned for 2500 families returning from camps in Ethiopia assisted by UNHCR and was laid out in sites of 12 times 20 metres. Yet, by December 1998 only 40% were UNHCR-returnees, the rest was spontaneous returnees and rural migrants including a growing number of refugees from the South, i.e. the rest of Somalia. The Somaliland government considered them foreigners not covered by the relief programmes for Somalilanders.

The returnees drifted towards Hargeisa and Gabiley and did not return to the small towns and rural areas where they had fled from. Guido Ambroso from UNHCR argued that the UNHCR assisted returnees from Ethiopia had the freedom of movement and if they settled in Hargeisa it was only part of a general tendency of urbanisation. Yet, the Somaliland government strongly disputed this and demanded that the UNHCR co-operated with the government in curbing the growth of Hargeisa. The influx caused a severe strain on the still ruined municipal services, in particular the water supply, but above all, people said to me, it threatened the extremely sensitive clan geographies of the town, with returnees from different clans clustering in separate parts of the town, such as Sheikh Nur, around the Stadium and up on the Airport hill. The Somaliland Minister of Planning, Mr. M.S. Mohamed, emphasised, in a telephone conversation I had with him from Denmark, that no official distribution of refugees according to clans took place.

6

Family hosting refugees from Kosova; Kukës, Albania; 22 beneficiaries; agency: Rushit Mehmeti; operational April-May 1999; closed at time of visit in April 2000; total numbers of refugees hosted privately: Kukës 90.000, all Albania 285.000, FYR Macedonia 115.000.

Impression of life impact **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; no health input

Livelihood: none; food aid not provided

Protection: positive; private residence protection

Interpretation of (Albanian) state impact **Weak focusing state impact**

House: none; not challenging gender structures of host or beneficiary families

Town: positive; boost of trade in Kukës

Ethnic: negative; cooling the imagined unity of Albanians in Albania and Kosova, while materially supporting

a large Kosova Albanian population inside Albania at war with Serbia

State: positive; de facto support of the government of Albania's strategic policy of open-ended reception of Albanian refugees

Albanian families hosting refugees from Kosova can hardly be considered a Danish humanitarian aid project; however, Denmark contributed to the funding of UNHCR, DRC and other agencies involved in feeding and otherwise assisting - more or less successfully - the refugees staying with host families. The assessment above summarises first the life-impact of the shelter provided by the family of Rushit Mehmeti on the refugees he hosted; second it estimates the aggregate state-impact on the Albanian state of hosting up to 90.000 refugees in Kukës.

In many complex emergencies local coping strategies are a submerged iceberg hidden below the tip of highly visible international aid. While not fully documented the importance of the assistance provided by host families in Albania and FYR Macedonia stands out in contrast to the international assistance provided in (expensive) camps. (note: Several evaluations of the humanitarian response to the Kosova crisis have been published; in this section I draw on the 'Independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response' by Astri Surkhe et. al. UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit; Geneva 2000; prepublication edition)

Kukës is a remote town, even by Albanian standards, with better road connection to Prizren in Kosova than either to Shkodra or Tirana in Albania. Sunday, March 28 the first

28.000 refugees crossed from Kosova to Kukes; by the next day some 64.000 refugees had arrived. When the crisis broke UNHCR had only emergency stocks for 10.000 people in Albania, stored in the south, and only one UNHCR staff in Kukes. Instantly the tiny, desolate mining town became the head-line story the world over, and with Kosova a no-go area for journalists the refugees in Kukes became the main source of first-hand information about the war. In mid-April the pool of 450 international journalists outnumbered UNHCR staff in Kukes five to one. In mid-May nearly 860.000 Kosova Albanians had fled or were expelled to Albania (444.600), Macedonia (344.500) and Montenegro (69.900). (6)

In April 2000 we interviewed the family of Rushit Mehmeti, whom we knew from a visit in 1994, about the refugee crisis. Rushit had died during the refugee crisis, and now his son Leonarde, married with two children, was head of the family. When all the Kosova Albanians started to pour in, “the Kukes families came out and tried to pick up some families for refuge in their private homes.” Rushit’s family of ten had housed 22 refugees in one of their two small houses. Leonarde’s younger brother Nazir got a job with the French NGO Solidarité that had hired a place where they cooked food they brought to the camps. Leonarde explained that the refugees had money and wanted to get their own food, so they did not use to eat together with them. He used to go with them to show them where the shops were and also to make sure they got the right prices.

Leonarde was not impressed by the international aid, only somewhat by the Arab-Islamic assistance. “For almost one month only the Kukes people responded to the crisis. In the end 300.000 people had come to Kukes alone and the town could not manage to get anymore because all that used to be empty spaces, stores, schools etc. were occupied by refugees living there.” In the third week of the crisis the health situation in Kukes was getting close to the complex emergency threshold of 1 death per 10.000 per day. (6) Then the government of Albania mobilised 500 busses and trucks, enabling 300.000 refugees to be transported south from Kukes. Bilaterally arranged national contingents and later, NATO troops under the AFOR umbrella, built camps and provided facilities for just 50.000 refugees. Nato flew in more than 13.000 tons food, tents, medical supplies and water to Kukes and 20-30.000 refugees out of Kukes. (65) However, the evaluation states “By far the most significant providers of assistance were the Albanian population who hosted up to 285.000 refugees, albeit mostly on the basis of payment from the Kosovar refugees, particularly in the towns. In Kukes, a population of only 25.000 hosted up to 90.000 refugees.” (67) At least 100.000 refugees remained in Kukes throughout the emergency despite efforts to make them move. (p. 66, note 9/84) At the end of April some 15.000 people were still sleeping on their tractors in Kukes.

Most of the people of Kukes earned money because of the situation. The UNDP estimated that \$6 million a month was spent in rent alone in Albania (n17,84); on average

\$25 per person per month was spent by the refugees. A lot of trade started to cater for the new demand. Leonarde commented, still with slight disapproval, “They could not eat without a Coca-Cola and salad. Though it was a war situation they always asked, can we have a shower? They were not as poor as we were. But not all of them had money. All the people that came from the urban areas in Kosova they wanted to rent a place and stay, the others were going to the tents.”

CRS and IFRC, via the Albanian Red Cross, undertook the task of distributing food as well as non-food items to refugees in host families. The inherent logistical challenge of distributing to a widely dispersed population, the lack of registration and “policy confusion resulting from the commercial nature of most of the arrangements with the families meant that many host families and refugees received no assistance at all. “ (67) MSF’s survey in late April of 2,379 Kosovars and Albanians showed 20 per cent had received no food at all, and 57 per cent only one distribution. The situation improved by late May, but Refugees International reported in June that families in small towns and villages had still received no assistance. (n.15,84) Despite comprising two-thirds of the refugee population, both in Albania and Macedonia, refugees with host families received disproportionately limited assistance as donors and agencies focused attention on the camps which gave bilateral assistance high visibility. Nobody knew for how long the Albanian families, above all in Kukes, could continue hosting a refugee case-load adding up to more than one-tenth of the total Albanian population. “It was feared by many in UNHCR and the NGO community that the host family network could not be sustained, and its collapse would be catastrophic.” (57)

The exact numbers of refugees in host families is unknown, in part because of problems of registration during the crisis. Yet, some over-all numbers are known. At the end of April, of the 355.000 refugees in Albania only 24 per cent were sheltered in camps and collective centres (171 sites) (The 31 per cent quoted in the evaluation must be erroneous; considering the refugee figures correct (85.000 in camps+270.000 with host families) the ratio of camp/host families was 24/76 not 31/69) of the refugees (85.000). By 8 June out of 446.500 refugees, 179.612 or 40 per cent was sheltered in 351 sites including 56 tented camps (65 note 6,7, 84) The large international effort had only reduced the proportion of refugees with host families from 3/4 to 2/3.

At the same time there was at least from mid-May an over-capacity of places in the camps; moreover many camps, in particular those erected by military forces, far exceeded humanitarian standards. The biggest gap in the international humanitarian assistance both to Albania and Macedonia remained support to the refugees in host families. The evaluation of the UNHCR performance during the Kosova refugee crisis concludes, “The mixture of the economically motivated involvement and the generosity of the Albanian population in their response, combined with the relative wealth of many of the refugees who were able to pay for

accommodation and food, were arguably the most significant factors in avoiding a potential crisis.”(67), adding, “the two main saving graces of the operation - the hosting by families, and the refugees’ ability to pay for food - are unlikely to have been sustainable.” (81) Both were local resources.

The 22 refugees stayed two months in Rushit Mehmeti and his son Leonarde’s house. Leonarde insisted that the family got no money for housing the refugees. He found it OK, this was their tradition of hospitality and Albanian emotionalism, as he said.

7

War invalids in Martini Hospital, Mogadishu, Somalia; approx.. 120 persons; agency: DBG/DCA; operational since 1996; to be closed down at time of visit in December 1998.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health : none; no medical support

Livelihood : positive, the invalids were fed

Protection : none; no protection of the invalids was provided

Interpretation of state impact: **State impact nil**

House: none; the invalids remained head of their families

Town: none; negligible impact on commercial town structures

Ethnic: none; ethnic structures not influenced

State: none; negligible impact on state structures

The Martini Hospital was not functioning anymore in December 1998. It was Somalia's first hospital built by the Italians in the 1920s in old Mogadishu. Since the destruction of Mogadishu in 1991 the buildings were empty shells but I was told some 1500 people lived in the large hospital area including approximately 120 war-invalids from the 1978 Ogaden war, former Siad Barre officers and their families. When I visited it around fifty invalids in wheelchairs were sitting in the shade under trees waiting for their one daily meal. Food was prepared in a monster pot over an open fire in the ruins of the former hospital kitchen. DBG (DCA) had funded the food for three years and the construction of a concrete water cistern; continuation of funding was now questioned by DBG because as a pure relief project it was outside their core business; perhaps WFP would take over. The invalids hoped food somehow would continue, and they asked me to convey their gratitude to the donors overseas. One of the invalids told me they had been in the hospital for twenty years; their suffering during the civil war could not be described, he said.

Many of the men in the wheel-chairs looked better fed than those with legs.

8

‘Marastoon,’ a women’s home, Jalalabad, Afghanistan; approx.. 100 persons; agency: ARCS/ICRC; operational since 1997, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health: none;no health input, the women and children in the marastoon had perhaps slightly above average access to health service

Livelihood: positive; the families in the marastoon had their livelihood secured as long as they were admitted

Protection: none; impact on protection was ambiguous; the women were possibly protected by the armed guards, at the same time they were exposed to all kinds of pressure from the guards.

Interpretation of state impact: **State impact nil**

House: negative*; women’s independence of patriarchal control over their families was supported, but to some extent replaced by institutional control including guards

Town: none; negligible impact on autonomous town structures

Ethnic: none; negligible impact on ethnic structures

State: positive; the municipal Taliban authorities controlled the marastoon

* Taliban policy against women

A ‘marastoon’ is a traditional Afghan community welfare institution, now supported in some areas by the Afghanistan Red Crescent Society (ARCS). In Jalalabad the marastoon housed 15 female-headed families and some older women without children. At the time of our visit 65 children lived in the marastoon. In one room a loom stood with an abandoned carpet, there was a large communal kitchen. Several armed men guarded the place. The women and children looked well, and seemed happy with living in the marastoon. Their alternative would have been difficult arrangements with distant family-members or possibly renting a room privately. Living on the street was impossible for a single women due to Taliban control, and they provided no help whatsoever to women-headed families. The ARCS had run the place for three years and during this time seven families had moved out when the children had grown up and got some employment. One women, for example, had just moved out with her six children because the eldest son had got a job at the customs office. The total number of female headed families in need for support in Jalalabad was not known, but assumed to be much larger than the 15 families admitted; the selection criteria were not entirely clear.

9

Shelters, Kline, Decan, and Peja municipalities, Kosova; beneficiaries 7.429; agency: DRC; operational since Sep 1999; ongoing at time of visit in April 2000.

Impression of life impact **Middle life impact**

Health: positive; some sanitation included in shelter kits

Livelihood: none; no livelihood component in the programme, but the shelter kits probably often made private resources otherwise needed for shelter available for productive inputs

Protection: positive; protection of private houses

Interpretation of state impact **Middle fragmenting state impact**

House: negative; the NGO input was controlled by the men

Town: negative; the sudden influx of resources boosted autonomous structures on the local, uncontrolled market

Ethnic: negative; shelters contributed to the consolidation of Albanian mono-ethnic villages despite UNMIK efforts to secure the return of Serbs

State: positive; shelter construction was a key point of access for UNMIK civilian control of Kosova

When the expelled Albanian population returned back to Kosova in June and July 1999 the provision of shelter was the most complex challenge facing the multifarious relief organisations. The total housing stock in Kosova in September 1999 was estimated to be 330.080 houses. 287.029 houses were surveyed from June to September 1999 by the International Management Group. 128.105 houses were damaged, including 50.090 destroyed (uninhabitable, irreparable and requiring reconstruction), and 53.676 with moderate to severe damage (uninhabitable without repair work). Destruction was extremely uneven with most Albanian houses burnt and hardly any Serb houses destroyed during the war (but perhaps more than thousand houses belonging to Serbs burnt after June, 1999). This is reflected in the regional distribution of destruction with the Albanian north-west most damaged and the Serb north and south-east relatively undamaged, as well in the type of houses damaged. Almost exclusively single-family houses have been damaged, while former state-owned multi-flat blocks predominantly inhabited by Serbs are almost undamaged. In Kosova NATO bombings have caused practically no damage to civilian houses. It should be noted that damage came in two waves in 1998 and 1999. For example in Barane 67% of the houses were destroyed before the NATO bombings, and DRC had rehabilitated 130 houses from September '98 to February '99 in the area.

The DRC shelter package consisted of two rooms each 18 m² with heating, facilities for cooking and sanitation, and a plastic roof-cover to guard against further degradation of the house. The price of one shelter kit was 11.500 ddk, not including the plastic provided by UNHCR. In the first shelter phase July-December 1999 the target was shelter for 10.000 returnees and IDPs at an average price of 1.750 ddk/per person. In the second phase of rehabilitation January - December 2000 the target was hard roofs, windows, and doors for 10.000 people at an average price of 4.000 ddk. (Actually this was the third phase for many of the recipients as they had received assistance from DRC already in 1998 after the first wave of destruction of Albanian houses in the Peja-area.) With additional 'kits' and aid packages the aid pr. person was around 1000 US\$. From the beginning relief was targeted at 'vulnerable groups' ("Preference is given to vulnerable families." ECHO report Sep. 1999 p2) but in practice the lack of solidarity amongst the villagers made the more resourceful get most of the assistance.

With the DRC-staff we visited Barane near Peja, one of the most heavily destroyed areas of Kosova. At the same time the area was classified as the richest food-economy area in Kosova by a needs-assessment carried out for WFP. Satellite dishes and German cars signalled respectable wealth, but above all the high number of new large houses in the villages was notable, constructed during the last ten years in an ongoing process of enlargement as funds were remitted from abroad and accumulated locally. One house of 300m² had received shelter aid. The farmer showed us around before entertaining us in his kitchen equipped with a dish-washing machine. With his brother, on a temporary visit from New York, listening in strange sullen way, the farmer gave evasive answer on questions of income and property.

A DRC community-organiser afterwards said "The poor are too shy and embarrassed over their poverty, they do not ask for anything. ECHO has a questionnaire to select beneficiaries, but it is not easy to get honest answers. The villagers, they don't like us. we are like detectives. Village leaders cheat us. It is very difficult." (cf. the official ECHO questionnaire) A related problem was the declining 'self-help' willingness in the villages. "It is proven that the pioneer-spirit of the local population one experienced at the start-up of the shelter programme is evaporating as the NGOs push ever more offers", it was noted in a monthly report from DRC, "It is getting harder and harder to activate the local population to join the self-help programmes... it is most difficult to mobilise voluntary labour to the self-help programmes."

The overabundance and poorly co-ordinated shelter programmes of countless NGOs finally saturated the demand. "This week we distributed materials in the village of Cupovac", an ECHO report from week 39-1999 complained, "but the day after the material arrived, the people of Cupovac was to unhappy with the quantity of material in the roof kit B, that they

refused to receive it, and told us to take back the materials...It has suddenly become difficult for the NGOs to “sell” more shelter kits in Pec - it has turned into a buyer’s market.” Nov. p4. One could say the ‘villagers joining a NGO self-help programme’ is a total contradiction in terms from the beginning, and the villagers stepping back to let the tireless NGOs do the job is a very practical ‘self-help programme’.

With funds flooding in the most serious practical problem was delays in import of material, especially at the Macedonian border. Only when the local market suddenly could offer construction timber and DRC began buying locally in November did work move forward. The extreme rapidity of the commercial market to readjust to the post-war situation and offer all kinds of commodities testify to a large demand and availability of money in Kosova. In an ECHO report for Sep. 1999 it is noted that, “The availability of building materials in the Kosova region is steadily increasing and a lot of private activities have been observed... It seems like the private initiative has overtaken the NGO emergency programme. It should be noted however, that...in the rural areas where most of the population lives, the situation looks more “normal”, and almost all of the activities here are carried out by NGOs.”

10

“Reconciliation bus shuttle”, Gjilan, Kosova; approx.. 3.770 persons; agency: DRC; operational August 1999; ongoing at time of visit in April 2000.

Impression of life impact **Middle life impact**

Health: none; no health component in the programme

Livelihood: positive; a few jobs and limited access to education, food and non-food items secured by the bus

Protection: positive; some freedom of movement secured for minorities

Interpretation of state impact **State impact nil**

House: --; no data on impact on house dynamics

Town: none; marginal impact on autonomous town structures

Ethnic: negative; the bus preserved the Serb minorities by offering relief from their limbo existence

State: positive; the bus contributed to the short-term retaining and control of Serb minorities, essential to the goal of a multi-ethnic UNMIK state

The bus shuttle in Gjilan was part of a larger project also running busses in Prishtine and Mitrovica on routes that were not commercially viable, all funded by UNHCR and implemented by Danish Refugee Council. The objective was to “increase freedom-of-movement and confidence building” for minorities trapped in ethnic enclaves. We arrived a Sunday morning in April 2000 to the church in Gjilan and in the little street leading up to the church a very small market was going on. A few old men and women sold milk, cheese, and vegetables. Two white busses, painted UNHCR and with acrylic sheets protecting all windows, were parked in the street. The ethnic geography of Gjilan had an enclave of Serbs around the orthodox church in the very centre of the town and a number of isolated villages a few kilometres out of town separated by Albanian areas. One year after the war Serbs could only venture into Albanian areas at the risk of their lives. KFOR protection was mandatory for safe movement. Children, men, old black-dressed women with their baskets and young people filled the busses and we set off with two US army armoured vehicles protecting the passengers. The Serb interpreter was in radio-contact with the UNHCR operations centre. The route took in eleven villages and the church.

The latest available statistics (March 2000) showed 3.943 passengers in Prishtine, 6.824 in Gjilan while the bus was suspended in Mitrovica after armed attack killing one passenger; the Prishtine passengers was 73% Serbs, 19% Albanians and 9% Roma (but never mixing in the same bus) while the Gjilan passengers were 100% Serb. The US soldiers

said there had been no incidents on this route and in the villages children milled around the American Army vehicles getting sweets from the very young US soldiers. In a situation of extreme ethnic separation the bus gave Serbs some freedom of movement, and they appreciated that. They had good land and food, growing vegetables, but no employment and no access to markets. At the same time the bus made an anomalous situation possible. They had been isolated for seven months, that is until the bus started. The day we visited the town a Serb man was lynched at the main bus station. "When the terrorists have gone, all Serbs will come back, many, many!" a Serbian man assured us. A young man in the bus said, "Two years ago people had a nice life without problems. I think all was normal." He said he didn't anymore had a place to go to have some fun. He was bored in his village and had only been able to buy a few clothes. Yet he liked to stay in his village (Silevo), only he wanted that place to be safe. All to be normal again. He had some Albanian friends, he explained. But now they didn't exist for him. He didn't exist for them. He last spoke with them a year ago. We asked if he had tried to contact them. First he said no, but in fact he tried to call them on the phone but they told him something bad, they did not want to talk with him. He could live in Serbia without pressure, without problems, but he could not move there because he was born in Silevo; this was his home, yet "here it is not possible to live normal."

The 'reconciliation' bus shuttle could either be seen as a temporary measure bridging a period when minorities were at risk, after which a normal social life could be established, but not in itself changing the social and political situation. Or the bus could be seen as in itself contributing to reconciliation. My impression was that it did not contribute to reconciliation but rather entrenched ethnic polarisation because it made the situation for the Serbs a little less impossible, but not requesting any move towards reconciliation on the part of individual Serbs. They more or less hoped the bus would keep them floating until the situation *ex ante* could be restored by some magic stroke. The DRC expatriate staff we talked with said they saw no signs of reconciliation, but on the contrary youngsters and even old grandmas making provoking Serb hand signs when the bus crossed Albanian areas. And in the Albanian areas the road signs had all Cyrillic letters erased with Albanian place-names sprayed on.

11

Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC), Zubin Potok and Zvecan municipality, Kosova; beneficiaries 15.000, agency: Danbat Cimic-section; operational July 1999; ongoing at time of visit in April 2000.

Impression of life impact **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; sporadic facilitation of NGO health-programmes on individual basis

Livelihood: none; sporadic assistance with distribution of food aid

Protection: positive; protection provided on ad hoc basis only, based on de facto ethnic separation; but backed up by massive KFOR-force;

Interpretation of state impact **State impact nil**

House: none; Cimic-activities attempted to be gender-neutral

Town: none; Cimic-activities attempted not to duplicate commercial activities

Ethnic: negative; Cimic-activities put a premium on stability entrenching ethnic separation

State: positive; Cimic activities helped generate important local support for the UNMIK protectorate

A small house just outside the gate of the Danish Army Camp Olaf Rye served as Cimic-centre. Here the local population of Zubin Potok, one of the three northern municipalities still with a more than 90% Serb population, could get in contact with the Danish battalion in a relatively informal manner and solicit assistance with a surprising wide range of practical problems. Of the approx. 850 Danish troops deployed ten persons including officers comprised the Cimic staff. Cimic was not something like a NGO in military garb. Their primary task was to contribute to the protection of the force by making the local population react positively to their presence. The Cimic section had mostly co-ordinated logistics and protection such as bringing out medicine and health teams, distributing food during winter to remote villages, and escorting persons through 'enemy' areas. Main Cimic-tasks at battalion-level was general social assistance, drawing up a list of NGO projects in AOR, establish a network of local contacts, gather information on local conflict, defusing criticism of NATO, 'neutralise' possible NGO bias towards the (Serb) population, and co-ordinate projects with the UN and NGO in the area (only around 20 in this not-so-popular Serb area). It had less to do with actually undertaking planned, long-term assistance. They had a very mixed impression of the NGOs, from very positive of the Danish Refugee Council, to a dim view of one Japanese NGO called 'Peace Wind' that distributed very real-looking toy guns to children in a village. "We got so angry, what kind of ugly message was that, and they were dangerous. If we suddenly see a real-looking gun pointing

at us we might shoot. We had to collect them from the children,” one officer said, “People complain, but they are not good at doing something themselves. We came to a village with food aid, and the villagers did not even bother to help off-loading the sacks and boxes. We said: OK then we take it back!” Another Cimic officer spoke of their ‘form-curve’, how positive their daily interaction was with the locals. This had a lot to do with driving around in the area, showing plain politeness in their contact with people and conveying a picture of accessibility and impartiality. Subject to daily security-assessments they had got permission not to wear flak-vests and to do Cimic rounds between the villages on bicycles.

The completely destroyed Albanian village of Qaber (Serbian: Cabra) was the most high-profile spot in their area. The village leader Mr. Osman Rahman, a shrewd LDK politician, more or less prevented individual reconstruction. Japanese prefabs - left-over from the earth-quake in Kobe - now housed the entire village. The ruin had huge political salience and he received a steady stream of foreign visitors, to this “the most destroyed Albanian village in Kosova”. Pictures of himself with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ms. Sadako Ogata, with the Prince of Denmark, etc. etc. adored the wall together with the flags of America, Denmark, NATO and Albania. We accompanied the Cimic officers trying to organise the repair of the electricity-supply to Qaber, by first driving to Mitrovica, locating personnel from the Electricity Board of Mitrovica and persuading them to help, then rattling on the rutted roads back to the private home of the Serb head technician of Zubin Potok municipality and finally escorting him in their car down to the Albanian village leaders of Qaber village, where the practical problem eventually was put in order. This was a fairly typical day, the Cimic officer said.

Reconstruction of the village was highly controversial because it would tip the delicate ethnic balance in the municipality, and commit large resources to a fairly small Albanian group in the middle of a large Serb population. Danida had declined to assist reconstruction, but the Albanians lived there protected by Danish check-points. One week ago a group of Albanians had approached the Cimic centre and told they intended to move back to Kolovrt, an isolated, abandoned village in the mountains some kilometres behind the Serbian villages in the Ibar valley. They requested Danbat to give them security. The Cimic Section resolved to drive up to the village and check the situation and invited us to come along. The twelve houses, magnificently situated high up in the mountains, had been abandoned for more than ten years, yet they had some recent damage from fire. The request posed several problems for Danbat. If Albanians moved in, the extremely delicate ethnic balance along the Ibar river would be influenced. Also the Albanians living in surrounded village of Qaber and staunch supporters of LDK were anxious if it really was the old inhabitants of Kolovrt moving back or UCK people from Skenderaj behind the mountains extending their operations. Even if it

was the true former inhabitants of Kolovrt moving back any risk of creating a new ethnic flash point was unacceptable to Danbat.

The ethnic conflict affecting all levels of social life in the area presented the Cimic-officers with dilemmas they alone could not resolve. At the one hand they saw KFOR as absolutely necessary to prevent new violence, at the other hand they were convinced the Kosovars ultimately had to stop the violence themselves. People requesting assistance for different kinds of engineering works possessed all the facilities and skills to do the job themselves. They only lacked security. It was a hundred per cent political problem. It was telling how in their letters to Danbat the ethnic tensions and the war invariably were alluded to only indirectly as “the well-known incidents” or “the well-known situation”, betraying perhaps a certain embarrassment, and certainly unpreparedness to acknowledge personal responsibility for the conflict. Cimic leader, Major Henrik Juncker had made up his opinion, “Either they move apart or they find a way to co-exist. We can help them by bringing together spokes-persons from both groups. We can set up a framework for reconciliation. But what is needed is a political solution. If we were not here, war would break out the day we left.”

Serbs had requested assistance to build a road that would enable them to travel from Zubin Potok to Zvecan without passing the Albanian dominated part of Mitrovica. Danbat was requested to give this project engineering support and military protection; similar requests have come to build roads from Albanian enclaves to Mitrovica bypassing Serb areas. In a letter to the French commander of Multinational Brigade North the head of the Cimic Section, major Juncker, as strongly as possible questioned the wisdom of the plan. “DANBN estimate, that the construction of these roads will advance freedom of movement but at the same time it will also contribute to a more ethnically divided society.” It is hinted that if the French commander goes ahead with the road the Danish forces will give it a very low priority, “At the moment DANBN has only limited engineering resources available for supporting the mentioned road construction.” It was pointed out that this matter was of central importance to the purpose of Cimic work, that is reconciliation in the end permitting the withdrawal of foreign troops. Major Juncker and Danish commander Egendal pressed the French brigade for a clear answer. “In the light of the above mentioned MNB(N) [the French brigade] is requested to make a principal decision about MNB(N) support to the mentioned road constructions that, at the same time will advance the citizen’s freedom of movement but will also divide Kosova further in two ethnical (sic) parts.” signed Juncker and Egendal March 20, 2000 French support for the road would touch the raw nerve of the undecided future of Kosova. When we spoke with Juncker two weeks later he had received no reply from the French commander.

12

Police Training School, Vushtrri, Kosova; beneficiaries 1.000, agency: OSCE; operational since September 1999; ongoing at time of visit in April 2000.

Impression of life impact **Middle life impact**

Health: none; police training not (yet) including health service

Livelihood: positive; livelihood secured for students, instructors, and deployed officers

Protection: positive; ethnic-minority students protected on campus; protection of the population by the Kosova Police Corps not yet achieved

Interpretation of state impact **Strong focusing state impact**

House: positive; the gender policy of the school empowered women

Town: none; the school had marginal impact on autonomous town-structures

Ethnic: positive; the minority-policy of the school favoured individuals over ethnic groups

State: positive; the school secured vital co-operation between violent groups and the UNMIK protectorate

Part of the OSCE mandate for Kosova was the creation of a Kosova police force. The Police Training School was housed in the former Yugoslav police school in Vushtrri, built in 1969. It was not destroyed during the war, yet it needed a major overhaul. Teaching started at the same time as rebuilding began and the first winter tested everyone's enthusiasm and determination. When we visited the school in April 2000 it was nearing completion and students as well as staff would soon have a vast compound of high-quality class-rooms, offices, gyms, dormitories, kitchens, workshops, etc. Director of Police Education and Development was Steve Bennett, a charismatic retired US Marines Military Police officer. For the first intake they received 40.000 applications for 400 seats reflecting perhaps more than anything the desperate lack of employment in Kosova. One element in the screening of applicants was public lists, so for example the behaviour of former police-officers could be established.

The police course took 28 weeks and consisted of 9 weeks at the school followed by 17 weeks of field training with an UNMIK police officer and an additional 2 weeks of advanced classroom training. The training was conducted in English provided by an international staff seconded from 15 countries and translated into Albanian and Serbian; language was a real problem at the school. The first 176 students had graduated on October 1999. Bennett said police takes maturing, it is a career education, and he was confident they would eventually become competent officers. They enrolled 350 new students every 4 weeks, had accelerated the training and hoped to have 3.000 officers ready by September 2000, and

4.000 by January 2001. Female students has been a very positive and moderating influence on the student body, according to Bennett. They comprised 20% of the students, and they studied harder and performed better than the male students. They also had a lower average age, and thus should stay longer in the force.

Minorities goal was 15%, the actual number was 12% Serbs in the force. However, the multi-ethnicity of the force was fraught with problems, and hard pressed Bennett could come up with only few 'lights in the tunnel'. The various ethnic groups treated each other correctly in the school, there had not been a single incident, but they did not integrate at all. Vushtrri was 100% ethnically cleansed of Serbs, and the families of the Serbs officers had not dared come to the celebration at the end of the course. Steve Bennett went to Gjilan with their certificates and when the Serb officers came they were welcomed by their Albanian colleagues. That was one light in the tunnel.

One difficult problem was the limited capacity to pay officers a sufficient salary to avoid corruption of the force. This was part of a general problem of UNMIK salaries, too low to sustain families. Bennett was deeply committed to the task of creating a modern, community-serving police force in Kosova. He tried to move forward without losing support in the community. One of his initiatives was an 'outreach department' establishing contact with communities and (potential) officers before and after the academy.

Steve Bennett told us that OSCE had an agreement with the UCK that 48% of all students should belong to the UCK. While he emphasised that no-one were admitted that did not pass all tests, he acknowledged that the deal was purely politically motivated to keep the school out of trouble. But it did not compromise the goal of the school. "UCK is committed to multi-ethnicity, I have seen it work on this school," Bennett was not naive, but realistic. Problems were everywhere, there was no established law in Kosova, very few judges, no functioning prisons, and above all, of course, the undecided political future of Kosova.

13

Wazir Akbar Khan Hospital, Kabul, Afghanistan; approx.. 50.000 persons; agency: ICRC; operational since 1992, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Middle life impact**

Health : positive; people got seriously needed treatment

Livelihood : positive; livelihood for health personnel; improved prospects for patients

Protection : none; very limited protection against discrimination of vulnerable groups

Interpretation of state impact: **Weak focusing state impact**

House: negative*; ICRC tried to secure female treatment and employment at the hospital

Town: positive; a big employer and one of the few large functioning enterprises in Kabul

Ethnic: none; marginal impact on relations of ethnic groups; ICRC tried to secure access to the hospital for discriminated ethnic groups

State: positive; a very important input to the Taliban state

The Wazir Akbar Khan Hospital was built in 1948 by Czechoslovakia as a luxury hospital with 100 beds. In 1999 it had 240 beds including 26 medical beds and an orthopaedic ward in buildings that were run down and dirty, but compared with the more or less ruined city of Kabul not at all bad. The hospital had 300 staff including 50 females. The most common problems were car accidents, mine injuries and other accidents; TB was increasing. ICRC took care of the surgical equipment and stocked up the dispensary; it was not clear to what extent the patient had to buy medicines. In Afghanistan the ICRC supported the Wazir Khan hospital and the Karte Sehr hospital for war wounded in Kabul besides hospitals in Ghazni, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. The Taliban themselves ran the best hospital in Afghanistan, the military hospital in Kabul with 300 beds and an extra 100 beds for female relatives.

We spoke with the nurse Christine Hundt, a Swiss Red Cross health delegate, working with the management of the hospital. She claimed all emergency cases were treated; as for other cases, money or connections helped.

“We are here to assure that the assistance reach the patients.” she said. All staff in the hospital was hired by the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) opening up avenues of control and advantage for the Taliban. A nurse got \$ 3 pr. month. Everyone had to have other jobs in the evenings. Without ICRC assistance the hospital would not be functioning, and health care at a hospital would be out of reach for the vast majority of the Kabulis, not to mention people from the rural areas.

We had a talk with Dr. Asraf Majid. Educated in Peshawar he became vice-president of the hospital in March 1999. He appeared to be very dedicated to make the hospital function, even against heavy odds. They had four X-ray machines, only one was working; they had six operating theatres, but only two anaesthetic machines, so they could only operate two patients at a time. He showed us all wards of the hospital, and obviously the patients were the lucky ones that had been admitted to a hospital functioning at all.

14

Orthopaedic workshop and clinic in Herat, Afghanistan; approx.. 4.000 persons; agency: ICRC; operational since 1992, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Wide life impact**

Health: positive; the orthopaedic treatment clearly improved the health of the beneficiaries

Livelihood: positive; some invalids got jobs at the clinic and a number of the patients could after treatment secure their own livelihood

Protection: positive; a few non-Pashtuns in particular Hazaras, were admitted to the clinic despite Taliban obstruction

Interpretation of state impact: **Weak focusing state impact**

House: negative*; together with the dissemination of the idea of equality the clinic perhaps in some cases could reduce some of the inequalities of the house.

Town: positive; The clinic was an valuable input into the regional economy of Herat

Ethnic: none; ICRC was struggling against Pashtun discrimination of access of ethnic minorities, but negligible impact on ethnic structures

State: positive; The presence of ICRC in Herat was a significant boost to the Taliban regime.

* Taliban policy against women

Almost everyone in need of orthopaedic treatment came to the ICRC. Only an unknown percentage of females from the provinces did not come. However, to provide ethnic minorities, in particular the Hazaras, with equal access to the clinic the ICRC had to, and did, struggle against Taliban-Pashtun discrimination. The whole ICRC orthopaedic programme in Afghanistan had treated 40.000 patients and Herat had produced 4000 limbs. The components were made in Kabul, while Herat made the sockets and did the fitting. The clinic staff was all-Afghan except the director, Leslie a delegate sent out by British Red Cross; most of the staff were land mine-victims. He said that Afghanistan still had a lot of mines and people would go on hitting land mines, maybe for fifty years; there were still mines even inside Herat. Indeed mines were still laid out at a rate higher than old ones were recovered with. 75 per cent of the patients were land-mine victims, 25 per cent were traffic-accidents and deformities.

The clinic included a dormitory for patients and relatives and the ICRC paid for the return ticket. Earlier they had paid for tickets both ways but then people would come just to visit relatives. Still a one way ticket was a lot of money to pay, perhaps 600.000 Afs. In the opinion of the director the clinic would not be existing if it was to be funded by Afghan

money. Without help the patients would have had to raise money themselves and go to Pakistan as they did before 1992. The orthopaedic clinic was only one of the projects implemented by the ICRC in Herat; in terms of turn-over the ICRC was the largest business in Herat.

A special group of patients come from the Taliban prisons. The morning I visited the clinic three men had been admitted, all three of them had had a hand and a foot cut off by the municipal Taliban executioner. They had robbed a car on the highway. Some days earlier two men had come, also with a hand and a foot cut off. They had stolen things worth \$ 2. Leslie commented that he ought to tell the executioner to remove the hands a bit further up the arm, so that he could better fit a prosthesis.

A young man with the big turban typical of the Taliban fighters had lost both his legs three years ago by shelling and survived without legs. I saw him try on his new prosthesis for the first time. He took a few steps and told me he felt OK. He would go back to Kunduz to fight. Leslie exclaimed: "Take his legs off!" and everyone in the room started laughing.

Treating war-wounded in a country at war begs the question whether you assist the war effort. ICRC provides humanitarian assistance without answering that question. It is up to the individual and the state. In the case of the young man wanting to go back to the war on his new limbs ICRC could not prevent him, and they would not put conditions on their assistance to him. This sums up the ICRC position. Also with the mutilated prisoners they would treat them and not take a public stand against the Taliban justice, but try to argue for respect of humanitarian norms in direct, non-public discussions with the Taliban authorities.

15

Primary Health Clinic, Faizabad, Badakshan, Afghanistan; approx.. 30.000 persons; agency: IFRC; operational since 1996, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Middle life impact**

Health: positive; people received medical treatment

Livelihood: positive; secured a few vitally important high-skilled jobs also for women

Protection: none; no protection provided by clinic; ICRC tracing and dissemination activities associated with clinic, but they seemed not be much more than posters

Interpretation of state impact: **Strong focusing state impact**

House: positive; in its modest way the clinic was a focus for women struggling against male/state repression

Town: positive; the clinic and ICRC supported a few Faizabad traders and their regional network

Ethnic: none; no impact of ethnic composition, all residents of the town admitted

State: positive; the IFRC/ICRC input was beneficial to the Northern Alliance

The clinic was situated in the ICRC compound on the main street of “new” Faizabad; neighbours were MSF, Afghanaid, Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, Focus, and UNOPS; most had set up shop in connection with the 1998 nearby Rostaq earthquake and had since remained in Badakshan trying to do some development projects. Still Faizabad was a remote place only accessible by the small UN and ICRC planes, and everything concerned with expatriates closed down during the long winter. The Faizabad ARCS clinic was part of a IFRC (Geneva) funded drive to re-vitalise ARCS as a national Red Crescent Society; clinics had been set up in 27 of Afghanistan’s 29 provinces. In Badakshan the ARCS programme was dwarfed somewhat by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan funding three comprehensive clinics with a male and a female doctor each and eight basic clinics. Besides the clinic ARCS had three ‘departments’ for relief, tracing and dissemination, reflecting the standard Red Cross mandate. They had a facilitating function during disasters (as we saw), and they ran a small programme for disabled and poor people providing some food and clothes. The ARCS clinic was staffed with a male and a female doctor, one nurse, one health educator, and one pharmacist. IFRC was paying the ‘incentives’ for the staff.

In one day admission-cards were issued for twenty men and twenty women to be examined by the doctors from 8 to 12 in the morning; perhaps seven cases in one day would be referred to the general hospital in Faizabad. The main health problems were diarrhoea in summer and pneumonia in winter, and TB; patients with TB were referred to the hospital in

Faizabad (funded by ICRC). Some disabled people were sent to the Ortho-centre in Kabul with the ICRC jet every 15 days. After the consultations were finished for the day we talked with Dr. Anis, a highly articulate women from Faizabad. She studied in Kabul to become a surgeon; when the Taliban took Kabul she fled to Faizabad, where she was born, and she helped to start the clinic. She had also helped to start a medical faculty in Faizabad, staffed by herself and other refugees from Kabul, mostly women. She and the female pharmacist were bitter about family-planning. People came and asked for anti-conceptives, but they had no supplies of p-pills or spirals. Condoms could be bought at the market, but people had little money. "We are very bored that the ICRC don't help us with contraceptives. People fight for drugs, and we don't have enough," she said. Dr. Anis even initiated a women's association in Faizabad that worked with uneducated women, they did English courses and had set up a small training centre for jobless women.

She was up against heavy odds; the mujahedin of the Northern Alliance were fundamentalist like the Taliban. When the mujahedin took Faizabad after the communist regime they forbid all women to go on the streets. After two months it had become absolutely unbearable and women started to go out. Only after the Taliban took over Kabul they became a little better, said Dr. Anis, women could work and girls could go to school, but the local mujahedin government still forced them to wear *burqas*. "We don't know why they have this idea." said Dr. Anis, "Faizabad was not like that before. Here a man with a Kalashnikov is president. Killing is the mujahedin habit - they are not good Muslims. When we speak with them, they don't listen, they are uneducated, just mujahedin, they think with the gun - what can I do!" With the war closing in on Faizabad Dr. Anis was afraid the Taliban would come and make life impossible for women, like they did in Kabul; she added bitterly "If the Taliban comes President Rabbani will disappear in a plane."

16

Health education component of integrated agricultural development project, Salab, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan; approx..(?) persons; agency: DACAAR; operational since 1997 (?), ongoing (?) at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Life impact nil**

Health: none; no documented health education

Livelihood: none; no documented health education

Protection: none; no documented health education

Interpretation of state impact: **Middle focusing state impact**

House: positive*; the men had got increased leverage in the house controlling Dacaar's access to the village by means of the all-male village organisation

Town: none; marginal impact on autonomous town structures

Ethnic: none; marginal impact on the ethnic consolidation of the village

State: positive; Dacaar's health education plans by necessity facilitated Taliban control of the villages, for example concerning family planning

* Taliban policy against women

Dacaar's only contact with the local women of Salab villages, the supposed beneficiaries of the health education, was through the husband of the one woman supposedly doing the health education. All Dacaar staff were male, and none of them had ever spoken to any of the local women, although some had been in Salab for two years. No woman was a member of the village organisation which was the key 'partner' institution sanctioning every aspect of Dacaar's work. The Dacaar community organiser had been working in the village for a year, yet he had never been able to talk with Dacaar's female health educator. We knew that local culture constituted a formidable barrier to the ambitious health-education, and were curious to see how it was tackled.

However, when we visited Salab the field-staff was unable to produce any evidence of any health education. Despite our persistent requests to see the health education programme, the local Dacaar staff only provided evasive answers. While we do not question Dacaar's sincere wish to do something for the local women we must at this point question if there was actually a functioning programme. On top of the tradition barring the contact of local women with any man outside her family none of the Dacaar staff spoke the local Pashaii language; while most of the local men spoke the national language (Pashtu), the women supposedly did not, further hampering contact. The internal Dacaar evaluation of the pilot integrated agricultural project in Salab concluded that Dacaar had no meaningful contact with the local

women. When we asked the field manager about family planning we were told that as the Taliban government was against it Daccaar had no family planning programme. The community organiser commented that “women here work so hard they don’t get children.”

We spoke with a village man thirty-six years old, married with seven children. He said he had too little land to support his family, “not even for one month.” His wife did no firewood collection in the mountains (the main source of money income in the villages) because she was too busy looking after the seven children. “It is her obligation,” the man said. She was twenty when they married, now he wanted to buy a second wife. Previously he had twice spent a year in Iran working where he had learned stone masonry. Now he was working for Daccaar; he preferred that to Iran. If there was a job in the village he would like to remain, otherwise he would have to go back to Iran. Now he earned money, and on Fridays he went to the bazaar and bought things for his children. But Daccaar and the other NGO that had built a school some years back were the only employers ever in the village.

17

Food security project, Qorioley district, Lower Shabelle and Jowhar district, Middle Shabelle, Somalia; approx.. 18.000 persons; agency: DBG/DCA; operational October 1998, completed at time of visit in December 1998.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; no health component in the programme.

Livelihood: positive; livelihood of 3.000 families was secured in the short run

Protection: none; no incidents of looting but no protection of inputs and beneficiaries

Interpretation of state impact: **Very strong fragmenting state impact**

House: negative; aid interacted with and gave added importance to male village elders

Town: negative; Mogadishu business people with own militia supported through the programme

Ethnic: negative; the Bantu target group benefited materially from the programme but the Abgal clan at the same time increased their social control at the expense of the Bantu

State: negative; local level state fragments, e.g. governors, was recognised and propped up by the external input

The DBG food security project, funded by Danida, targeted 3024 poor families in Lower and Middle Shebelle, some of whom became victims of the 1997 floods. It consisted of provision of 3024 sets of agricultural hand tools, provision of 604 tonnes of beans and maize distributed as food for work, preparation of 3024 hectares of agricultural land by tractor (1 hectare pr. family), and finally the provision of 45 tonnes of seed consisting of beans, maize and sesame. It was implemented in October-November 1998.

Qorioley, Lower Shebelle

The districts along the Shabelle river south and west of Mogadishu are some of the most fertile areas in Somalia. Fifty kilometres out of Mogadishu paved roads were destroyed and all traffic except animals used improvised dirt tracks impassable during the rainy season. Almost everything built by groups larger than a family, i.e. by the state and companies, was destroyed when I visited the area in December 1998. Ruins of factories, farms, public buildings and large structures of every kind were empty shells. Italian colonialists began early in the century to use the labour power of the Bantu peoples living along the Shebelle river on banana-plantations. The Italians constructed canals drawing water from the Shebelle, later extended by the national development of the Barré dictatorship funded by development aid; canals were always expressions of state power. Far from being wealthy farmers, the Bantu have been at the bottom of the Somali social hierarchy, despised

and subjected to many forms of exploitation and subjugation by the nomadic and dominant Somali clans. This reached terrible depths during the civil war in the 1990s, where the Bantu were the primary victims because invading clans, in particular Farah Aideed's Habar Gidir, looted their stocks and denied them access to food. It was also mostly the riverine Bantu that suffered from the floods in 1997.

In the DBG team there were no Bantus. Indeed there was an element of clan and urban patronising in the whole project implementation. Abukar remarked that hundred years ago the Bantu lived like monkeys. Also today the nomadic clans living in the same areas habitually let their herds graze on the fields of the Bantu, destroying the crops. "We Abgal are the looters of the Bantu," Abukar continued jokingly, as we approached one of the small villages along the river with our two four-wheel drive cars and eight heavily armed guards.

Plants were sprouting on the fields from the donated seeds, but lack of rain worried the villagers. They took us down to the river to see the clogged up irrigation canals. Once they made their own small canals. Now they could not do that. One elder said the young people didn't know how to work hard. The Siad Barre state gave them a job and they all went to the city. But discussing the problem of the canals a bit further it turned out one NGO (they did not remember which one) four years ago rehabilitated their canals; now they were clogged up again. The ruined only stone house in the village had been a "Casa", a state agricultural marketing board storehouse. Everybody I spoke to were happy it was gone because the state did not pay well for their produce, but on the other hand they were unhappy it was looted because now there was no more electricity to the irrigation-pumps.

Ali Husein Alio Ebrou, Qorioley District Commissioner, spoke at a dinner in Qorioley town 14 December 1998. He thanked for the help given by DBG and the Danish People and appealed for more help, first of all with the repair of 1 kilometre road-connection from Shebelle bridge to the highway that was impassable during rains and rehabilitation of 15 kilometre of the Liban irrigation Canal to secure farming during droughts. Second in importance was farm cultivation, soil preparation with tractors in areas with heavy grass; food for work, tools and seeds.

Jowhar, Middle Shebelle

In Jowhar district I visited some villages by the Shebelle river; one called Moyko was still flooded and 1050 families were displaced, most of them to Jowhar town and people were dying from hunger around Jowhar, we were told. The IDP-camps outside Jowhar looked disorganised and desperate. Abukar Sheikh said, "When the floods came we used boats to know the situation. We went to Jowhar and informed UNICEF. The needs was more than we could do. In Jowhar district 4 villages are marooned and the people are displaced to Jowhar town; they lost everything. 5000 families in Jowhar are eating grass, they come from the marooned villages and they need emergency aid. First of all they need food so they don't

die; then shelter and help to re-farm their land. To raise their standard of living they need development aid. Six or seven years supply and I believe a good number will raise their standard of living.”

After touring the area, including the utterly ruined and looted sugar factory built with Cuban help, once Somalia’s largest productive unit, a sumptuous dinner had been arranged by DBG for the local leaders at the InterSOS compound in Jowhar. Twenty men ate rice and meat. Hassan Nur Hassan, acting governor of Middle Shebelle, member of the elders council and chairman of the water supply company in Jowhar rose and specifically requested assistance from Denmark (since I was there) to stop the gaps in the river banks in order to prevent further flooding, and to repair the bridge and the road to Mogadishu. While people drifted out of the steaming hot hall he continued, “Many international organisations have come here. DBG is the best. It was the only organisation that supplied sugar, oil and rice, not only maize and sorghum like the other organisations. We hope DBG and Denmark will continue to help us. We have many marooned villages and displaced people in Jowhar district. 5000 families are eating grass at the moment. We made a collection of one kilo of grains from each family with food. But we cannot continue without international help. What we really would like is DBG to open an office in Jowhar.” Mohamad Osman, police commander in the district of Jowhar spoke next. “As police commander I promise security. But all over the world crime happens. We are not special. We have a fertile land, we don’t always depend on donors. We just want an incentive. The best thing would be a DBG settlement in Jowhar. DBG has a good reputation among the grassroots. Thank you.”

18

Rehabilitation of houses, Obrije Ulet village, Skenderaj municipality, Kosova; beneficiaries 2.500, agency: Danish Refugee Council; pilot project starting up at time of visit in April 2000.

Impression of life impact **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; health not included

Livelihood: positive; the donation of building materials made private resources of unknown quantity available for agricultural production

Protection: none; no project-level mechanism to protect minorities returning to their property

Interpretation of state impact **Middle fragmenting state impact**

House: negative; men largely controlled the input from donors

Town: negative; procurements on the local market nourished autonomous town-structures

Ethnic: negative; de facto acknowledgement of mono-ethnic municipality

State: positive; project actively supported UNMIK authority and guidelines for reconstruction

After the first phase of shelter construction from September 1999 to February 2000, the next phase in assistance was rehabilitation of dwellings. We visited a pilot project begun in Obrije Ulet in the rural Skenderaj municipality with 65.000 inhabitants; of the 9.317 houses in the municipality 3.837 houses were destroyed severely (UNHCR cat. 3-4) and 3.902 completely (UNHCR cat. 5). Obrije was a poor village partly because the Central Hills was the poorest agricultural region of Kosova and they had only had six men working abroad sending back money, and partly because Obrije had been a UCK strong-hold heavily targeted by the Serbian forces. When electricity broke down three years back it had never been repaired, now a German NGO were busy reconstructing transmission lines, transformers and low-voltage grid.

An intense discussion had taken place among NGOs, UNMIK, and the local municipality on the proper and co-ordinated standards for reconstruction of houses. The more-or-less agreed position was that owners of destroyed (cat. 5) houses had to reconstruct walls ready for roofing before they could get international assistance as it would be far to costly to reconstruct totally damaged houses. Danish Refugee Council was fully reconstructing five severely damaged (cat. 4) houses with hard roof, doors, and windows in Obrije. The villagers were then supposed to look at the houses as blueprints for how to reconstruct their own houses. Materials would be distributed by DRC, but DRC would not

provide teams of workers. Danida had donated money for reconstruction of 350 category 4 houses in Skenderaj municipality, and 600 elsewhere.

The selection of beneficiaries was jointly managed by municipality, NGOs, and UNMIK in principle ensuring that the most vulnerable families was assisted first. However, the money-value of each reconstruction kit was very high and all the problems encountered in the shelter programme with actually reaching the most vulnerable and not only the most pushy was expected to bedevil the reconstruction programme as well. No rehabilitation work could be started before ownership of the house was established. Skenderaj's tiny 1,5% non-Albanian pre-war population had disappeared and they would probably not return, but in elsewhere they might and DRC would only rehabilitate houses occupied by the original owners. "It is the cork we have to unscrew," said Michael Christensen, DRC field manager. The Serbian authorities had destroyed proofs of ownership and other registration as much as they could, but re-establishing ownership was nearing completion after difficult work done by Habitat, municipalities, and representatives from UNMIK, using archives, salvaged bills, and witness-statements from neighbours to determine legal claims to property.

19

Street lights, Mogadishu, Somalia; estimated more than 10.000; agency: DBG/DCA; operational 1998, ongoing at time of visit in December 1998.

Impression of life impact: **Middle life impact**

Health: none; no health component

Livelihood: positive; direct support of a few business-men and indirect support of general commercial activity on certain streets and areas of the city

Protection: positive; light improved security on the streets, and the installations were protected by the business-men's private militias

Interpretation of state impact: **Weak fragmenting state impact**

House: positive; gave women safer access to public space both as shoppers and traders

Town: negative; the business-men involved in the project received support for their autonomous commercial structures including militias

Ethnic: none; attempted clan balance in distribution of street-lighting

State: negative; fragmentation and privatisation of light-provision and protection of assets between private business-men and foreign charities

One evening I was taken on a drive with my guards to see the DBG street-light project in Mogadishu. Since the civil war there had been no electricity in the city except for private generators belonging to a few rich people and expatriates. All electric wires had been looted, even underground wires had been dug up and sold as scrap (leaving many roads impassable with criss-crossing trenches). DBG/DCA has donated a small sum (a part of 0.5 mill. dkk budgeted to 'infrastructure' in the 2. Sep. 1997 appeal) to provision of street-light on certain main roads. Wires had been replaced very crudely on street posts (protected against new looting by lots of barbed wire) in six different parts of the city and connected to generators owned by six private business-men commercially selling electric power to a few near-by shops, enterprises and private houses. For example were parts of Balad Road and Armed Forces Road in north Mogadishu now illuminated for a few hours every evening by electricity coming from Abukar Ali Sheikh's generator (himself project co-ordinator for DBG). DBG paid for wires and fuel, and Abukar (and the other business-men) donated power to the street-lamps. People were very happy for this, it improved security and was good for business.

I found this a very innovative rehabilitation project (much better than an expensive street-light rehabilitation-project I saw 1992 in Luanda, Angola funded by SIDA, complete with new lamp-posts and expensive armature) because it was extremely basic, building on

primitive but existing resources *which had protection*. Like the water project (see case 20) most people could benefit from the light, even if business-men were the immediate beneficiaries. It did not provide services which built on expensive installations rewarding looting by local structures of violence. The business-men could protect their installations with their private militias (Abukar also had his own security-force). Expensive installations provided without protection by outside donors would generate new violence as long as no central authority existed.

20

Afgoye Water Wellfield, Mogadishu, Somalia; estimated more than 10.000; agency: DBG/DCA; operational since 1998, ongoing at time of visit in December 1998.

Impression of life impact: **Wide life impact**

Health: positive; access to clean water would improve the health of the unknown number of people in Mogadishu that could afford the water

Livelihood: positive; secured the livelihood of a small number of persons from managers to water-retailers

Protection: positive; armed self-protection of asset and immediate beneficiaries

Interpretation of state impact: **Weak fragmenting state impact**

House: --; no data on house impact

Town: negative; direct support to the self-styled (and armed) water consortium

Ethnic: positive; water-scheme claimed to be sanctioned by all clans in Mogadishu

State: negative; the state function of water supply was parcelled out between a private company and a foreign charity

Afgoye Water Wellfield 25 km outside Mogadishu was a large water supply-scheme for Mogadishu. It was constructed 1979-82, financed by the European Union and the World Bank as a strategic investment in development. It was maintained up to 1991 by a Danish company called Comwell. It consisted of a small oil-fuelled power plant, a high-voltage transmission line to the 30 well-pumps and a water pipe network into Mogadishu (estimated population one million in 1998). A group of businessmen had for several years protected the site with arms and repulsed looters with people killed on both sides. In keeping with normal Mogadishu practice in the caretakers room some ten light and heavy automatic rifles were at hand and the whole area was constantly patrolled by armed guards. The water scheme was run by private businessmen from Mogadishu. In the budget submitted by DBG to Danida 2. September 1997 3.7 mill. dkk was specified for the wellfield rehabilitation (including a high overhead to local administration of 15%). The largest budget item was technical equipment (2.3 mill. dkk).

Mr. Abdullahi Dhegoweyne, Afgoye Water Wellfield Co-ordination Chairman, told me that the power plant was the only public installation that had survived the civil war and the subsequent looting. One of the three big diesel-generators was salvaged when it was left behind by UNOSOM. He asked the international community for an 'incentive' of fuel for the power plant, and said, "We hate politics and warlords, please stop funding them. We lack a government. We don't know when it will come, we are so tired of politics." I said water is

also politics, and everybody laughed in agreement. Indeed, his group had held meetings with all clan leaders and warlords and got separate letters of acceptance from each faction. Now it was of commercial interest for businessmen. December 1998 one bottle of imported water cost 2000 Sh. (0,25\$) and pumped water could be sold for 1000 Sh. pr. litre. distributed from the wellfield by donkey carts. Almost all distribution pipes in Mogadishu had been looted, and tap water was a pipe dream.

The wellfield team had apparently technical expertise to run the wells, and compared with all other service installations I saw in Mogadishu it looked extremely well organised including their spare part-stores. Obviously they were sitting on a potential money-making machine and they were prepared to continue using violence to protect it. Everybody in Mogadishu needed good water, and to the extent people could pay for the water they would benefit. Obviously the business-men running the wells would be the immediate beneficiaries; violence determined that. Sustainability for such a capital-intensive installation, however, was questionable given the volatile situation in Somalia.

21

Imam Malik School, Mogadishu, Somalia; approx.. 3.000 persons; agency: DBG/DCA; operational since 1997, ongoing at time of visit in December 1998.

Impression of life impact: **Wide life impact**

Health: positive; pupils and locals treated at the clinic attached to the school

Livelihood: positive; teachers employed, education would eventually contribute to the livelihood of the pupils

Protection: positive; armed militias protected the school and pupils

Interpretation of state impact: **Weak fragmenting state impact**

House: positive; girls attending school

Town: none; marginal impact on urban-commercial structures

Ethnic: --; no data; the school probably entrenched the predominance of the Abgal clan in the north-central sector of Mogadishu

State: negative; the state function of education was parcelled out between a private group and several foreign charities

Imam Malik School in central Mogadishu had 2000 pupils including 750 girls up to tenth grade in December 1998. They studied in two shifts taught by 35 teachers (average class quotient of 57). In the school compound there was also an orphanage for 200 children, and a health clinic with an Out Patients Department. The buildings were low, simple structures, but well-kept with tables and blackboards. The school looked well organised and clean. A Kuwaiti NGO “The African Muslim Agency”, paid the teachers salaries, their ‘incentives’ as it was called. The principal explained to me, “So the teachers don’t loot the school.” The parents paid for books and school uniforms, black trousers and white shirts for boys and green *chadors* for girls. CARE had rehabilitated the old school, destroyed by fighting and looting, and DBG, partly funded by Dan Church Aid, had build 12 new class rooms, two septic tanks, plus rooms for an orphanage with a Koran-school. The clinic treated children from the school and the orphanage and the neighbourhood; like everywhere in south Somalia the main problems were TB, malaria, and bronchitis. Wealthy Somalis paid for the medicine. ‘Incentives’ for the nurses were paid by the Kuwaitis.

Because of the acute lack of schools in Somalia it was a rare privilege for a child to be admitted to the school. Less than 5% of the children of Mogadishu attended school; far less in the rural areas according to the director of the school, Mr. Abdi Mohamad. After talking with the parents he would decide whom to admit. The man from DBG, visiting the school with me told me he had 8 children, including one daughter and two sons attending the school.

Of course, resumed fighting in Mogadishu could ruin the school again, but with peace it looked well set to be sustainable because it was based on parents with money and good connections to both Muslim and Christian charities. Helping one school was better than helping no-one, and the children milling around in the school-yard decorated with big murals showing Somalia's Muslim faith and bonds with Arabia, were clearly winners in a lottery with very high stakes.

22

School near Adraskan, Herat province, Afghanistan; approx.. 500 (?) beneficiaries; agency: Dacaar; operational since 1995, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; no health education

Livelihood: positive; a few teachers were employed, paid by the Taliban state; up to ten years education of boys

Protection: none; the project did not address protection of input or beneficiaries

Interpretation of state impact: **Strong focusing state impact**

House: positive*; exclusion of girls from the school exacerbated gendered inequalities

Town: none; negligible impact on commercial town structures

Ethnic: positive; consolidating Pashtu dominance by admitting Pashtu children and (continued) exclusion of Kuchi nomads from education

State: positive; school construction in Taliban areas by international NGOs imply recognition of, and supply of resources to, the Taliban state.

* Taliban policy against women

Near Shindand, close to the main highway connecting Herat and Kandahar Dacaar in 1995 built a school with a capacity of 500 pupils. The village community and local administration was to do the maintenance of the well-built stone building; teachers should be paid by the government. When we visited the school in September 1999 the only pupils were eight boys taught by the headmaster. While the boys of different ages patiently crouched on the bare floor the headmaster, an old, withered man, explained the condition of the school. According to Afghan custom there were no chairs or tables; blackboards were black squares painted on the wall. The school served eleven villages with 472 boys in the school-age, but only a few attended the school. Only when the fathers allowed them could they attend school, and few fathers could do without the work of their sons and very few had money to purchase stationary. The government paid a monthly wage of 3 lak Afs (approx.. \$ 8) to teachers of social and science subjects, but 7 lak Afs (approx.. \$ 18) to teachers of religious subjects.

No girls were allowed to attend the school. With the authorities providing education for boys while discriminating against girls gendered inequalities in the house worsened. Also fathers restricting boys access to education upheld generational inequalities in the house. At the same time the Taliban state for practical and ideological reasons welcomed the reaffirmed authority of the patriarchs. The building was in poor repair with broken windows and cracked walls; the headmaster explained as they had no ladder they could not fix the

roof; he asked repeatedly the Dacaaar monitor to supply them with a ladder. The declining maintenance and attendance obviously made the school unsustainable. Another school we visited nearby of more or less the same size and design was a fully local initiative and better maintained and full of boys.

None of the Kuchi nomads living in the vicinity attended the school, only Pashtuns did. The input of a school under such circumstances deepened local ethnic polarisation. To the extent new schools in Pashtun areas was not balanced by new schools in non-Pashtun areas the over-all ethnic imbalance of Afghanistan was aggravated. On the short run this might strengthen Pashtun rule and possibly the Taliban state.

23

School, Faizabad, Badakshan province, Afghanistan; approx.. 165; agency: UNOPS; operational since August 1999, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; no health education

Livelihood: positive; a few teachers got a mediocre salary; the school gave the promise of six years education for the slightly better-off children in the village

Protection. none; no protection of input

Interpretation of state impact: **Middle focusing state impact**

House: positive; girls for the first time ever went to school

Town: none; negligible impact on autonomous commercial structures

Ethnic: none; education of local, Tadjik/non-Pashtu groups, apparently no ethnic groups excluded,

State: positive; direct support to the Northern Alliance

The primary school was built by United Nations Organisation for Project Service (UNOPS) in a village just outside Faizabad on the road leading to the old Soviet military airfield. It was only two months old when we visited it in September 1999, until then all teaching in the village was done in open air on a field. Enrolment was 44 boys in first grade (seven to nine years old), 14 in grade 2, 21 in grade 3, 28 in grade 4, 25 in grade 5, and 14 in grade 6, a total of 156 including the 33 girls in first grade. Girls had never before been to school in this village. The village consisted of 400 families, and according to the headmaster most of the children were not allowed to go to school but had to work for their families. NAC had donated pens and books while the Rabbani government paid the eight teachers a salary of 100.000 afs per month (equal to the price of two cans of Pepsi on the market in Faizabad). The total UNOPS input was \$27.000 for the construction of the building, a sum equal to a teacher's salary for more than 1000 years. The principal explained that all the teachers had to do ordinary farming work besides teaching; his hands documented a life full of hard manual labour.

24

Primary and secondary school, Chatta village, Badakshan province, Afghanistan; approx.. 1.300; agency: NAC; secondary level operational since 1998, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; no health education

Livelihood: positive; employment for (female) teachers; up to twelve years education for boys and girls

Protection: none; no protection of the project

Interpretation of state impact: **Middle focusing state impact**

House: positive; improving both the status of girls and women

Town: none; margin

al impact on autonomous town structures

Ethnic: none; education of Tadjik/non-Pashtu groups, apparently no local ethnic groups excluded

State: positive; support to the Northern Alliance

The whitewashed, tin roofed school in Chatta village was built on the slopes of the narrow valley leading down to Faizabad. Chatta was a village of 500 families and five mosques; three men from each 'mosque-group' made up the village shura. After consultations with the shura Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC) had built the school. It had been expanded over the years, in 1999 providing education for 600 girls attending school in the mornings and 600 boys in the afternoons. The Chatta school was now extended to 11th grade and eleven girls had reached that level. Forty teachers, three male and thirty-seven female including the headmaster (married to the mullah of Chatta's largest mosque, Mr. Ghulam Hussein). The madrassa in Chatta, by comparison had 250 pupils - all boys.

We spoke with some of the teachers in Chatta, all very young women; they had all been trained at the local teacher's college in Faizabad and were now on the payroll of NAC. They thought religious subjects as well as science. Inside the school none of the female teachers wore their *burqas*, and there was much laughing and slightly flirtatious giggling when our photographer portrayed them. In the principal's office wall-maps of the periodic system, the human body and the universe hung side by side with portraits of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the famous mujahedin enemy of the Taliban and Ghulam Hussien's brother, a martyr of the jihad, after whom the school was named. There was a good atmosphere in the school imbued with local commitment to education.

In 1999 NAC was running 97 schools in Badakshan with a total of 17,451 boys and 5,921 girls in classes up to 12th grade. NAC employed 741 male teachers and 744 female teachers. The government of the Northern Alliance did not ban girls' education. Hermione Youngs, the energetic and dedicated field manager of NAC in Badakshan had organised the import of thirty tons of schoolbooks to the schools in Badakshan. The only 'open' route to Badakshan was across the high mountain passes from the far north of Pakistan into western Badakshan. She had to negotiate access with the governor of the Pakistani Northwest Frontier Province and with the self-styled commanders in Badakshan and then to organise a caravan of 300 mules to take the books to the schools.

25

Girls and boys school, run by the Taliban, Kabul, Afghanistan; approx.. 2.500 persons; agency: Taliban Ministry of Education; operational since August 1999, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of impact: **Middle life impact**

Health: none; no health education

Livelihood: positive; livelihood for a few teachers; at the time only a few months education offered, the sincere commitment to girl's education politically unclear

Protection: positive; limited protection of access for girls to education

Interpretation of state impact: **State impact nil**

House: negative*; even limited education of girls will tend to limit patriarchal power

Town: none; negligible impact on autonomous town structures

Ethnic: --; no data on ethnic composition of pupils

State: positive; a clever move by the Taliban to counter external (and internal?) critique of discrimination of girls, but apparently not signalling a general change in Taliban educational policy

* Taliban policy against women

Mohammed Jawaz Waziri from the Taliban Ministry of Foreign Affairs and head of the department of NGOs and the UN, wanted to prove to us that the Taliban did not prohibit education for girls and arranged for us to see a recently opened school in the posh Akbar Khan neighbourhood in Kabul. On the grounds around a mosque a lot of small girls in several groups were being thought in open air. The principal, the imam from the mosque, explained that 2500 boys and girls (we did not get the gender breakdown) attended the school, boys in the morning shift and girls in the afternoon shift. The girls were thought religious subjects, English and Pashtu language, and mathematics; the curriculum was sixty percent secular and forty percent religious subjects. School books were donated by a German NGO, which also donated the teachers salary.

The girls were thrilled by the unique opportunity to go to school and the teachers seemed to be happy to get the rare legal chance to teach girls. However, the principal, and the other officials we spoke to seemed a bit puzzled by the signal sent by this school, and it was difficult not to suspect it to be specifically opened as a showcase for foreigners criticising the Taliban ban on girls' education. Perhaps it was also a move in an internal Taliban struggle between religious hard-liners and pragmatics eager to placate educated Afghan fathers

appalled by the poor educational opportunities for their daughters (and sons) provided by the regime. The Taliban had no other schools for girls.

26

Girls home school, Jalalabad, Afghanistan; approx.. 150; agency: SCA; operational since 1998, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Life impact nil**

Health: none; no health education

Livelihood: positive; teachers were paid a small sum by SCA; five year education of girls

Protection: negative; families feared arbitrary Taliban reaction against the education of their girls

Interpretation of state impact: **Middle fragmenting state impact**

House: negative*; parents decided quietly to improve status for girls against Taliban gender rules

Town: none; no direct impact on autonomous town structures

Ethnic: --; no data on impact on ethnic structure

State: negative; open civil disobedience against Taliban rules

* Taliban policy against women

In a large village just outside Jalalabad local initiative had started up a small home school for girls banned by the Taliban from public education. 300-400 families lived in the village, or some 4.000 persons including around 1.200 boys and 1.200 girls. With education starting up after the war most of the boys from the village were attending school, but the home school could take in only a few of the girls all excluded from education by the Taliban: 60 girls in first grade, 40 in 2nd, 23 in 3rd, 20 in 4th; they had no-one in fifth grade yet. They expected more pupils would come in the future. Last year they only had twenty girls in first grade and the figures showed increasing enrolment. The parents paid school-fees supporting the teachers. The head teacher had been a teacher in Kabul for ten years, she had three children, and the two other teachers were local and had five and six children respectively. The head teacher was using a room in her own house for the school, with classes two-and-a-half hours in the afternoons.

This year the villagers had donated a house to the fifth grade class. They would try only up to fifth grade; they were afraid the Taliban would close the school if they admitted older girls. Everything was new, and Taliban reactions were highly arbitrary. "We hope the Taliban will not come and close our school," the head-teacher said. Home schools were not and could not be clandestine. At one hand this was an open challenge of Taliban rules and authority; on the other hand, it was merely taking advantage of one of the many cracks and inconsistencies and differences in practice within the Taliban state structure. The Swedish

Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) was supporting such local-initiative home-schools for girls with school-books in many areas, but on a low-key basis not to provoke the Taliban more than the parents.

27

Community centres 1&2, Peja, Kosova; beneficiaries 2.000, agency: Danish Refugee Council; operational since September 1999; ongoing at time of visit in April 2000.

Impression of life impact **Narrow life impact**

Health: positive; psychic-social self-'treatment' and encouragement in informal groups

Livelihood: none; volunteer-work

Protection: none; protection not included

Interpretation of state impact **Weak focusing state impact**

House: positive; compared with the surrounding society the centres had a positive female bias

Town: none; the centres had marginal impact on autonomous town-structures

Ethnic: negative; the two community centres reflected the ethnic Albanian predominance in Peja and exclusion of minorities

State: positive; the centres encouraged grassroots self-organisation while being integrated into the NGO/municipal and UNMIK state structure

Centre 1 was located in a large private house, with kindergarten, sewing class for women, rooms for activities for larger children. We asked the women in the sewing class what their husbands thought of them attending the course. They laughed and assured us that their husbands liked very much that they got qualified and hopefully could get a job. But not much activity was visible, and we doubted if they would ever get qualifications leading to jobs; but perhaps the chance to meet other women and talk was more important.

Centre 2 was in the centre of Peja on the second floor of a small office block. It had been started October 1999 to house women's groups. Each day four groups of each 12 women used the centre. Eight women were present when we visited the centre, the rest attended a commemorating of 148 people massacred in Rugova. Three months ago the centre was expanded to accommodate more local groups, including mathematics, folk-dance, modern dance, drama, theatre, mountain-climbers, anglers, and computer introduction; fourteen groups with a total of 875 members, most of them 12-18 years old, and equal numbers of male and female, used the centre in April 2000. Groups that had found a voluntary teacher could ask for admission. DRC rented the premises and no-one got a salary. The manager said they ran the centre very much to take the stress off people for a short while. Dancing and singing was good. A group of 13-14 year old youths with their teacher was rehearsing a dance performance, a blend of American hip-hop and Albanian folklore full of nationalistic pathos. We got a good impression of the centre. Dedicated

leaders and enthusiastic youths, getting a basic training in self-organisation. Nora, the young DRC field manager for the social centres in Peja, which also included three small centres in near-by villages, was full of energy and urgency, fuelled both by terrible war experiences and a well-articulated and courageous desire for reconciliation.

28

Women's co-operative milk project, Hargeisa, Somaliland; approx.. 3.700; agency: DRC; operational since 1998, ongoing at time of visit in December 1998.

Impression of life impact: **Middle life impact**

Health: none; no direct impact on health

Livelihood: positive; help to self-help securing of livelihood

Protection: positive; no direct protection, however the scheme ingeniously worked with little cash money outside the protected Hargeisa market reducing the risk of looting

Interpretation of state impact: **Strong focusing state impact**

House: positive; money-income secured by the project improved the position of women in the house

Town: positive; inventive autonomous commercial town structure

Ethnic: positive; some co-operation across ethnic and clan borders

State: none; little direct impact on the ultra-liberal Somaliland state

One day my Somali friend Rage and I went with Faduma and Halima, two strong, charismatic women, chairman and the vice chairman of Hargeisa Women's Milk Co-operative, down south towards the Ethiopian border to a tiny nomad's camp in order see how the co-operative worked. The milk co-operative had 200 women members and they collected milk from 3500 women in the bush; the co-operative reached beyond tribal and clan boundaries. Faduma explained that the basic idea of the co-operative was to pick up milk in an area of one day's car travel from Hargeisa from nomadic women who could not otherwise market the milk (the majority of Somaliland's population are nomads), sell it in Hargeisa and bring household-items such as sugar, soap, or flour from the market back to the nomads.

Except for Faduma and Halima most of the women were illiterate so they had devised an original way of communication: each nomadic women would tie a little sugar, flour etc. in scraps of cloth to her milk-can, and then the woman selling the milk in Hargeisa would buy what was indicated, tie it to the can and return everything the next day with one of the small pick-up trucks. They had to rent around 35 cars from men owning cars in Hargeisa in order to collect the milk from the nomads and bring it into Hargeisa. This was very expensive, said Halima, and often the battered old cars broke down ruining the milk. It was also dangerous, we saw one of the cars that had just overturned and killed two women.

We arrived after night-fall at a tiny one-family camp consisting of two round huts, one for sleeping and one for cooking. A woman and her husband and two small children were

sitting around a small fire. She roasted a few maize-cobs for us and brewed some tea. Rage had brought some *qat* which the husband happily started to chew. The women in the camp had given birth to eleven children, two had died, four lived in Hargeisa, the two small ones lived with her in the kraal and three of her children lived in Norway, where they had arrived as un-accompanied minors seeking refugee. I asked Faduma what their husbands thought of the co-operative. They found it OK for the women to earn money, she said. Faduma's husband had a second wife, but she did not want to discuss that. Next day we drove across the bush picking up milk and ended at noon at the dusty, bustling Hargeisa market where the milk quickly sold out, all transactions carefully reported in a ledger. The milk co-operative was very well organised. It was a local invention and ran by local initiative. The town-countryside co-operation, bringing milk into town and town-goods back to nomadic women, was a unique feature. The involvement of the Danish Refugee Council was quite modest: after heavy rains, impassable tracks and no income DRC had provided a loan of \$6000 to start business again. The women had punctually paid back the loan with \$150 pr. day.

However, the availability of money in DRC had the perverse effect of focusing the attention of the leading women on how to persuade Helga Griffin, field manager of DRC, to donate more money rather than developing their own strengths. They asked for money to change traditional clay containers with plastic cans, to improve collection points in the bush, for money to get them through periods with no income after rains; their appeals quickly became unrealistic and too demanding, and they came to believe that their own operation depended on this elusive outside input, which the whole set-up of course contradicted.

29

Village road, Tewesk village, Farah province, Afghanistan; approx.. 4.000 persons; agency: Dacaar; operational since 1997, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; no health component in programme, but villagers claimed they would have better access to a clinic in town

Livelihood: positive; access to market would improve livelihood of some farmers, but no maintenance and no over-all co-ordination to ensure a usable road: not a sustainable project

Protection: none; project had no protection;

Interpretation of state impact: **Strong focusing state impact**

House: positive*; the local women

were excluded from shura requesting the road; the husbands might articulate the views of their wives, but even so the net outcome was growing inequality in the house.

Town: positive; the road allowed entrepreneurs owning small trucks to increase their trade on the market in Farah

Ethnic: none; negligible effect on autonomous ethnic structures

State: positive; aid inputs in the Farah area including the Dacaar engineering projects were controlled by the Taliban and boosted the regime

* Taliban policy against women

Dacaar was finishing a number of small infrastructure engineering projects such as access-roads and irrigation in villages around Farah. The landscape was flat, dry, hard and dusty. We visited a village six kilometres outside Farah, cut off from the main road leading to town by a small stream and deep mud after rains. Dacaar had finished a culvert across a tiny stream; a two kilometre road could now connect the village with the main road. The culvert was constructed well and would add to Dacaar's achievements in the annual report. The local labour input was not paid for (neither by food) by Dacaar, it was part of the village contribution towards the project. The men working were selected by the shura leader, and they could not refuse to do it. The Dacaar engineer told the men to do the filling next to the culvert carefully, otherwise trucks would soon damage it when they braked.

But the road was almost useless. Another NGO had previously constructed a number of small pipe-culverts on top of the road; with the filling blowing away the culverts were now turning into concrete barriers. We saw how small trucks and donkey carts only just managed to cross the culverts. If the road was not substantially repaired it would soon be impassable.

In my talks with site engineers and shura leaders and other local people I asked them why their village had become the lucky beneficiary of Dacaar assistance. Site engineer Abdul Rahim explained the community had got a request from Dacaar for project proposals, and according to the wishes of the community construction of culverts bridging the streams was chosen. He stressed that the projects addressed real needs. “Without the culverts it was impossible to drive a truck to the town.” He said the main problem for the village people was they could not sell their agricultural produce on the market in Farah town, and when they had sick people they could not move them to town. 75 per cent of the village participated in the meeting where the agreement with Dacaar was signed. This was exactly the minimum participation demanded by Dacaar; needless to say, after local customs all women from the village were excluded from the meeting.

Another village leader, the school headmaster, explained the village had tried to ask other agencies to fix the road as Dacaar did not want to extend their input to this road. But they could not find any agency to fix the road, and the headmaster said they were sorry because there was no government authority to help them. They still had a hope that Dacaar would help them, but the Dacaar engineer said they had three tractors in the village and could do it themselves. I suggested that the winter mud was not a new problem, and that their fathers and grandfathers had solved it without help from Dacaar. The villagers nodded and said that earlier they had constructed the culverts by wood and used donkey carts. If the road became useless they would go to town in the old way, yes, they might do that if they didn't find anyone to help them.

30

Water-divider, part of agricultural infrastructure project, Farah province, Afghanistan; approx.. 3.000; agency: Dacaar; under construction at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Middle life impact**

Health: none; no health component

Livelihood: positive; better use of water and less social friction would improve the average livelihood of the village

Protection: positive; the water-divider was planned and hoped to protect the water-rights of weak social groups

Interpretation of state impact: **Middle focusing state impact**

House: positive*; women were excluded from village shura deciding the use of external input of resources

Town: none; negligible impact on autonomous commercial structures

Ethnic: --; no data on ethnic impact

State: positive; all NGO activities were permitted and controlled by the Taliban

* Taliban policy against women

The water-divider was a concrete construction basically dividing water from a river into four canals serving two villages outside Farah town. No gates were included, i.e. the ratios between the four canals were constant. The site engineer explained that the project had been selected by the village shura because the people of the village and the big owners of the land along the canals, “always had a conflict and disputes and fights because the water was not enough for the demand, and every owner wanted to water his own land first. Many years ago it had been decided how much water everyone should have. They needed a divider dividing the river water according to their rights,” and he added, “the problem was very serious.”

Yet the leader of the village shura acknowledged that before the Soviet war the village managed this problem of dividing water themselves by a rather simple structure of wood and earth. This was no longer possible he maintained. There could be several explanations for this beyond trying to persuade a donor to continue assistance; in this area where large parts of the population were returnees social structures that earlier had regulated social conflict no longer could do so, also there had been a substantial growth in the population.

31

Irrigation channel, Chatta village, Badakshan province, Afghanistan; approx.. 5.000 persons; agency: UNOPS; under construction at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; no health component, not likely to have any direct impact on health

Livelihood: positive; better irrigation would improve and extend agriculture in Chatta

Protection: none; not likely to have any direct impact on protection

Interpretation of state impact: **State impact nil**

House: negative; inputs from UNOPS controlled by men-only village organisations

Town: none; a negligible impact on autonomous commercial structures

Ethnic: none; marginal impact on ethnic structures

State: positive; input sanctioned and controlled by the Northern Alliance

In a small mountain gorge just behind Chatta village water from a little stream had been diverted into a short canal, carried around the side of a mountain and used for irrigation of fields further down hill. Ghulam Hussein, the imam and chairman of the village shura explained that the canal, partly cut into the mountain side, originally was constructed by the Daud government 25 years ago. Then 15 years ago during the war a flood destroyed it; six years ago after the war Afghan Aid, a British NGO, rebuilt it, but a new flood destroyed it two years ago. Now UNOPS had surveyed a new canal a bit higher up. It was only 830 meters long but the canal had to cross the river on a bridge. Fifty people had been working for 2,5 months; the first difficult 250 metres was a UN construction and the villagers were paid for work, the next 500 metres was the village contribution and the men were not paid.

The UNOPS man explained that the shura or village organisations had identified the problem which the UNOPS responded to; however others in the village disputed this and said the UNOPS had offered the project to the shura. The village had 500 families and around 5.000 inhabitants; the new canal would add 300 jeribs to the 900 jeribs land already irrigated and give each family an average arable land of 5000m². This village was relatively well-off, famous for its apples, walnuts and mulberries. Ghulam Hussein said that the village hoped to find another NGO to help them install a micro hydro-electrical generator taking water from the high canal. In the new big mosque the village was building wiring for electricity was already installed.

32

Integrated agricultural development project, 128 villages around Pashtun Zorghun, Herat province, Afghanistan; approx.. 175.000 persons; agency: Dacaar; operational since August 1999, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **life impact nil**

Health: none; health education included in project. but problems of access to women; no data as yet on health impact

Livelihood: positive; already the pilot project had achieved an increase in productivity

Protection: negative; as high-profile aid to Taliban-held areas villages in the project area could become targets for anti-Taliban attacks; the project was fully dependent on Taliban protection

Interpretation of state impact: **Strong focusing state impact**

House: Positive*; house inequalities increased with external input of resources fully outside control of women

Town: positive; with increased productivity of agriculture including gardening and the proximity of a market in Herat commercial structures were likely to grow

Ethnic: --; no data on ethnic impact

State: positive; both in Herat and at local level every input was controlled by the Taliban, the big project was materially and politically supported the regime

* Taliban policy against women

Taliban captured Herat in 1995 and ruled the local non-Pashtun Dari-speaking population as an occupation force. Each Talib district-commander was changed every two months to prevent, in typical occupation style, the development of any local power-bases. Rumours had it that on the day before our visit to Pashtun Zorghun a few hours drive from Herat town an armed anti-Taliban group had attacked the area, and in any case we did not get permission to see the whole project-area for security reasons.

Dacaar's large integrated agricultural development project was situated in a relatively prosperous area and consisted of various agricultural components such as irrigation, farming techniques, seeds, and some fairly ambitious community components, including village organisations and health education. It was an example of how far in the direction of development the erstwhile relief-agency Dacaar had moved in Afghanistan. The target was a twenty per cent increase in agricultural productivity and a fifteen per cent saving of water. As the project was planned for a five year period and had just started up only tentative estimates of impact was possible at the time of our visit. The project had no ambitions of changing the

very inequitable land ownership; on the flat valley-bottom the farmers were mostly self-owners, while on the hillsides they were tenants. The Dacaa site manager knew the outcome would be differentiated, some would get an increase of perhaps five per cent while others could get a fifty per cent increase in productivity. Many villages lacked manpower because the young men went to Iran in search of employment; there were also many political refugees because of the Taliban. One consequence was loss of water from curries due to the lack of maintenance. Dacaa made it possible for some young men to work for a period in their home villages.

There were more houses in the village now, people said. Peter Marsden's survey in the Farah district of agricultural sustainability stressed the huge detrimental impact of sharply increasing population. (note) I wanted to ask about family -planning, but my interpreter refused to translate the question. It took me four question before the community developer understood I wanted to know about the women's situation. Yes, they were all men in the shura, he admitted, but the members discuss with their wives privately. Literacy was very low and they wanted to have schools for girls, but confronted with the Taliban prohibition they waited. No home schools here, "people are waiting for a change in government policy," said the Dacaa man. The shura-leader we spoke to lowered his voice when he said he had spent some time in the hills as a refugee; 30 percent have still not come back. Life was much better during Daud, he said, only from his own family ten persons were killed during the war.

33

Village organisation-component of integrated agricultural development project, Pashtun Zorghun, Herat province, Afghanistan; approx.. 175.000 beneficiaries; agency: Dacaar; operational since 1999, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; no women in the village organisation; it was difficult for the village organiser to get access to women and tackle health problems

Livelihood: positive; by participating in village organisations 250 villages got access to the NGO recourses including jobs and agricultural improvements

Protection: none; ‘democratisation’ and ‘empowerment’ by setting up village organisations could challenge local Taliban rule provoking reactions, however village organisations co-operated fully with the Taliban

Interpretation of state impact: **Middle focusing state impact**

House: positive*; the all-male village organisations added to the patriarchal power in the house

Town: none; negligible impact on autonomous commercial structures

Ethnic: --; no data on ethnic impact

State: positive; the condition for work in the village organisations was co-operation with the Taliban, as such the village organisations facilitated Taliban rule

* Taliban policy against women

Of particular interest of the Pashtun Zorghun project in terms of state impact was the community work component. Traditionally, i.e. before the war started in 1979, the elders (male, of course) used to decide everything in village community organisations called ‘jirgas’. The war caused profound disruptions of social networks and dislocation of authority and the ‘jirgas’ fell apart. (Saudi) Arabic influence during the war spread the notion of ‘shuras.’ [Ahmed Rashid says shura is Dari word?] Dacaar had ran social development workshops in their headquarters in Peshawar for field officers to introduce the idea that village organisations (VOs) was the way to create partners, demand participation, and utilise resources. Village organisations was set up in each village for every 50-100 households, in total more than 250 village organisations for 25.000 households in 128 villages, composed by spatial proximity or ethnic affinity. Dacaar was demanding participation from at least 75 per cent of the households at the initial community meeting deciding whether or not to co-operate with Dacaar.

In Pashtun Zorghun one village in the area had refused to sign the contract with Dacaar; but they came back after pressure had been put on them from other villages. What exactly had been the discussion we do not know, but in other areas the ban on poppies had been the issue. The village organisation-process was slow, in one village it took six months to decide who should contribute how much work to an irrigation project. The contribution of unpaid work was decided by the shura according to water-rights and landowner-ship and age. The VOs was greeted quite enthusiastically by the Danida evaluation team. (note) In field office #2 Mullah Gulahmed explained they had set up ten village organisations. They kept minute-books of the social activities discussed. He showed me one; for tenth of August 1999 it read,

“Place: majid; Subject: monthly report

1) location of wells; 2) discussion of toilets; 3) factors affecting crop yields.

ad 1) specification of location of three wells in the village;

ad 2) problem of insects, list provided to water-supply team;

ad 3) less water for irrigation; insects; weeds;

43 people present, 34 households represented.”

Dacaar’s site manager was Mr. Rauf. He had studied plan-science at Kabul University from 1984, and later in Pakistan; he impressed me as a very dedicated and competent engineer, really wishing to improve the local people’s lot. “Dacaar has its own strategy,” Mr. Rauf explained enthusiastically, “We work *with* the community, not *for* the community. We secure ownership of the project, so it can be sustainable. Other NGOs work *for* people, and they make people just wait for delivery. We think it will be possible in our project to achieve 70-80 percent of the target, but we even had to learn the villagers to drink well water.” We discussed how much the Dacaar five year plan owed to the five year plans of the Daud government. Mr. Rauf acknowledged that Dacaar used some concepts rather similar to the development notions of the pre-1979 government.

The ethos of development had also striking similarities to the communist ‘plan’ imposed on the peasants by hard-working enthusiastic cadres, sent out by state organisations extending the business of rule. Rauf wished Afghanistan would get a stable government. “They could copy the Dacaar project!” he said. I asked if Dacaar actually does a kind of political education with the propaganda for village organisations. Mr. Rauf answered, “Yes, you awake them. Their mind has been shocked. Local leaders are also local resources. The local supervisors know all the workers. The elders are part of the discussion.” After a pause he said, a bit worried, “Please don’t quote me for ‘shocking the population’.”

On the one hand Dacaar performed openly in a state-like manner, as a little line ministry of planning, agriculture, irrigation, health, but on the other hand was not the subtle talk of ‘partnership’, ‘local ownership’ or ‘democratic village organisations’ inadvertently

an agency of imposition and control? It was fully outside the capacity and mandate of Dacaa to extend any 'democratisation' at village level up to national democratisation, but the Taliban regime could extend their control of the population down and into the structures set up by Dacaa. For a start they only needed an informer in each village organisation.

34

Salab integrated agricultural development pilot project, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan; approx.. 3.800 persons; agency: Dacaar; operational since 1997, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Narrow life impact**

Health: none; no documented health improvement of health component

Livelihood: positive; some employment at the project and an increase in agricultural productivity

Protection: none; presence of aid agencies raised the stakes for Taliban and their opponents; no fighting in the area, but Taliban demanded armed escort of visiting foreigners

Interpretation of state impact: **Strong focusing state impact**

House: positive*; input controlled by men, women totally excluded from all village organisations

Town: none; no direct impact on town structures

Ethnic: positive; some extension of Pashtun-government influences and control over non-Pashtu population

State: positive; aid closely controlled and by default direct support for the Taliban

* Taliban policy against women

Throughout our stay in Salab we were protected/controlled by three armed Taliban guards; this did not happen to us anywhere else in Afghanistan. To reach Salab one had to drive some hours north of Meterlam, turn west up into a narrow, stony valley of once forested steep mountains. Eleven small villages of two-storey stone houses was perched on the hillsides, and every scrap of land that could be irrigated was laid out in tiny terraces. The total population in Lower and Upper Salab was 681 families and 3.830 people (5.6 persons per. family, a low figure for Afghanistan, probably reflecting a very high child mortality) of these were 177 families/987 persons not living in the villages. Total agricultural land available was 578 jeribs or 120 hectares; this was less than 2.000m² of poor, steep, and stony ground per family. Dacaar came to the area 1994-96 to make drinking water-projects, then it was selected as pilot site for an integrated agricultural development project and finally funding was obtained for a large-scale project now in its first year. None of the Dacaar staff, except for casual labourers, came from the area, and no-one spoke the local Pashaii-language, but most villagers spoke Pashtu.

It was a difficult project for three reasons: population pressure making development severely unsustainable; poppy growing closing in on the project villages; and extreme

discrimination and seclusion of women. The engineering aim was to reduce water loss 15 percent and increase productivity 20 percent

One of Dacaar's conditions for aid is a contribution from the village not less than 15 percent of total input. This is normally contributed as unpaid work; however in Salab people were too poor and instead a number of men worked for Dacaar for half the normal wage (30 Pak. Rupiahs/day); besides they did some unpaid work and contributed some materials. In the district there were no other employment. Normally the men went to Iran and Pakistan in search of employment, but now they worked for Dacaar. An internal Dacaar evaluation of the Salab pilot project concluded that value of the increase of production was less than the financial input of Dacaar.

Dacaar told us that they had had certain problems in selecting the project site. In some other sites in the area first selected (with a slightly more promising environment?) villagers had refused to sign the Dacaar contract. Dacaar could not confirm this was due to poppy growing. When Dacaar started in Salab no-one was growing poppy, and a ban against it was not included in the first contract. However, we were told that in Salab a number of families had objected to aid because of the ban on poppies; eventually they had been persuaded by the majority of the villagers to stop poppy-growing, and they had been paid some compensation for doing so.

Next to the Dacaar field office, one of the largest houses in the village, was a dilapidated, but substantial school built by a NGO. We asked many people, including the 18 member Dacaar staff, but no one remembered who built the school; people only remembered that it was five years old. No-one used the school anymore; in this village girls had never attended school. One of the leading site engineers said, "Other valleys are not aware of Dacaar and development. Now Salab people know about meetings and their responsibilities." But the community organiser complained that participation was low. As no women were allowed by village custom to have any contact with men not from her own family, they were excluded from the village organisation set up by Dacaar to 'empower the community'. All staff was male, and we were told that none of them had ever spoken to any of the local women. The Dacaar community organiser has been working in the village for a year, yet he has never been able to talk directly with the female health educator. Dacaar's only contact was through the husband of this one woman supposedly doing health education (see case 16). When we asked about family planning we were told that as the government was against it Dacaar had no family planning programme. In this critically unsustainable environment reduced mortality might well in the middle term lead to more pressure, especially on women and children reducing health.

35

Sanitation, Kabul, Afghanistan; approx.. 300.000 beneficiaries; agency: ICRC; operational since 1996, ongoing at time of visit in September 1999.

Impression of life impact: **Middle life impact**

Health. positive; significant drop in infectious diseases attributed to project

Livelihood: positive; the programme gave employment to a limited number of craftsmen

Protection: none; the programme had no direct protection

Interpretation of state impact: **Middle focusing state impact**

House: positive*; inputs controlled by men

Town: positive; input of resources into the building trade

Ethnic: negative; the project areas included non-Pashtun neighbourhoods

State: positive; all inputs were permitted and controlled by the Taliban and by default made resources available for the Taliban

* Taliban policy against women

Kabul had no sewage for its one and half million inhabitants. Health surveys indicated that better sanitation would have a higher health impact than medical protection; ICRC estimated that the effect of improved latrines in Kabul was a reduction of child diarrhoea of 300%. The old latrine one saw everywhere in Kabul consisted of a small cubicle built into the outer wall surrounding all houses; people would squat on top of a chamber which had an opening unto the street, where the night soil could be removed; often the lid had broken and the result was extremely un-hygienic, especially during rains. The new latrine was basically the same, but with a larger chamber with a better lid onto the street, separation of urine, and a pipe for ventilation. ICRC provided pipe, netting, door, slab, cement, material for the chamber and skilled labour. The owner of the house contributed 30-40 percent of the value of a new latrine. ICRC began building latrines in two pilot areas, a hilly and a flat area.

We walked up the slopes of the Kohi Asamayi mountain, once a green spot now a sprawling squatter town with many refugees from the Pansjir. We saw no *burqas* up there, it was an area where the Taliban was not coming and the men guiding us quietly slipped their skullcaps into their pockets. ICRC calculated this neighbourhood had 2.500 families and they had built 1.900 latrines. The area had water in a few street taps for two hours in the morning and two hours in the evening. Electricity was working.

The other project area was in flat neighbourhood in northern Kabul. We visited a house where they were constructing a new latrine. It was a twenty year old mud brick house in two storeys housing 18 people. The owner was a former police officer, now working as a

casual labourer. His father used to work in the ministry of telecommunications, it no longer worked. They had electricity, and a well in the tiny garden, but the water was very poor, He believed the latrine would be good for the health of his family and the environment of the area.

There were estimated to be some 100.000 latrines of the old type and 100.000 private shallow wells in Kabul. The city had a very shallow ground water-level, and the water was heavily polluted. Target of the ICRC latrine-programme was 80% coverage in north Kabul. It had started in August 1996 and until 1999 more than 30.000 latrines were constructed. The next step was to co-operate with the night soil collectors to make sure every latrine was emptied at regular intervals. It was a fairly new project for the ICRC, and quickly becoming popular. Every district in Kabul now came to the ICRC and asked for latrines.

R

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